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Abstract 
Post-armed conflict statebuilding has come to be considered as a fundamental element 
of building a viable and sustainable peace in the aftermath of armed conflict Though this 
compromise with state was in the first years mainly directed to democracy promotion, its policies 
and premises have evolved towards a more technical project of institutional capacitation, which 
seeks to address states’ fragility and create the condition for a lasting peace. This evolving 
compromise has been subjected to wide reflection, both in the policy circles engaged in 
intervention spaces and in the academia. The critiques and reflections were mainly guided by two 
perspectives: a first one, which questioned whether statebuilding contributed to creating peace; 
and a second one, which mainly questioned the type of peace created. On one hand, the appeals to 
refocus on state-society relations and to promote local ownership emerged as necessary conditions 
to create an effective, sustainable and legitimate state able to contribute for the creation of peace. 
On the other hand, critics progressively exposed how statebuilding represented an external-
oriented exercise of stabilisation which ultimately put in motion a depoliticisation process of the 
post-armed conflict spaces and subjects. However, and when one explores this discussion, one deals 
with an awkward silence towards citizenship, the concept which has traditionally framed the 
political condition of individuals and state-society relations, and has invested states with 
legitimacy. More important, we have identified this silence not only in the normative policy 
documents of major international organisations but also in the debates that have criticised the 
limited achievements of statebuilding or how it has produced a depoliticising narrative of the local 
spaces of intervention through its technical mantra. Accordingly, this work seeks to explore this 
silence and bring citizenship back to this discussion. For that purpose we depart from the concept 
of citizenship and the condition of citizenship that has emerged in Guatemala in formal peace 
times and how the discourses and practices of post-armed conflict statebuilding have contributed 
to the (re)creation of a peaceful sociability in the country. Our purpose is to depart from the 
possibilities opened by an analysis centred on citizenship to re-engage with power and politics on 
spaces of intervention in order to overcome the current narratives and recognise the political 
condition of individuals and groups in these spaces. Such reflection shows us that even though 
international actions and discourses on statebuilding project a depoliticising narrative detached 
from local political dynamics, such actions impact nevertheless the power relations which sustain 
the condition of citizenship. Thus, the international actors’ contribution for the (re)creation of a 
peaceful sociability are essentially dual, stretching from a depoliticising narrative of local spaces of 
intervention to the political spaces and possibilities that emerge as a consequence of these actions. 
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Resumo 
A reconstrução de estados em cenários de pós-conflito armado tem vindo a ser 
progressivamente considerada como um elemento fundamental na construção de uma paz viável e 
duradoura. Ainda que este compromisso com o Estado tenha, numa primeira fase, estado associado 
à promoção da democracia, as premissas e as políticas que lhe estão associadas evoluíram para um 
projeto de capacitação institucional técnico, que procura dar resposta à fragilidade dos estados e 
criar desta forma as condições para a construção desse projeto de paz duradouro. Este 
compromisso tem vindo a ser submetido a um constante escrutínio, quer no círculo político das 
organizações e atores que intervêm nestes espaços, quer na academia, guiado, fundamentalmente, 
por duas perspetivas: uma análise que questiona se a reconstrução de Estados pode contribuir 
para a construção da paz; e uma outra que questiona o tipo de paz que se pretende construir. Por 
um lado, existe um apelo crescente para concentrar a atenção nas relações entre Estado e 
Sociedade e promover um sentido de ownership sobre o processo, concebidos como condições 
necessárias para criar um Estado efetivo, sustentável e legítimo, capaz de contribuir para a 
construção de um projeto de paz. Por outro lado, as perspetivas mais críticas argumentam que a 
reconstrução de Estados representa, essencialmente, um exercício de estabilização, que em última 
análise, expõe um processo de despolitização dos sujeitos e espaços de pós-conflitualidade armada. 
No entanto, e ao explorarmos esta discussão, somos confrontados com um estanho silêncio no que 
diz respeito ao conceito de cidadania, que tem tradicionalmente representado a condição política 
dos indivíduos e a relação entre Estado e Sociedade e tem sido o garante da legitimidade das 
instituições estatais. Mais importante, este silêncio é notório não só em documentos institucionais 
normativos de organizações internacionais mas também nas perspetivas que têm vindo a criticar a 
narrativa de despolitização inscrita na reconstrução de Estados. Neste sentido, este trabalho 
pretende explorar este silêncio e trazer de volta à discussão o conceito de cidadania. Com esse 
propósito, partimos do conceito de cidadania e da sua condição no estudo de caso da Guatemala 
para compreender de que forma os discursos e práticas de reconstrução de estados têm 
contribuído para a construção de uma sociabilidade pacífica. O nosso objetivo é partir das 
possibilidades apresentadas por uma análise centrada no conceito de cidadania para abordarmos 
de forma diferente o poder e a política nos espaços de intervenção, e assim transcender as 
narrativas atuais e reconhecer a condição política dos indivíduos e grupos nestes espaços. Esta 
reflexão mostra-nos que, ainda que as ações e discursos internacionais sobre a construção de 
Estados projetem uma narrativa de despolitização afastada das dinâmicas políticas locais, tais 
ações afetam as relações de poder que sustentam a condição de cidadania. De facto, o contributo 
dos atores internacionais na (re)criação de uma sociabilidade pacífica é essencialmente marcado 
pela dualidade entre a despolitização dos espaços de intervenção e os espaços e possibilidades 
políticas que emergem como consequência dessas ações.  
Palavras-chave: Reconstução de estados, cidadania, paz, Guatemala  
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1. Introduction  
Twenty one years ago, amidst the profound changes and challenges 
affecting the international system, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali produced a document with the purpose of establishing a new role for 
the UN in the promotion of peace worldwide. Peacebuilding was inscribed in the An 
Agenda for Peace (1992) and has been, since then, a central reference in the 
international engagement with post-armed conflict scenarios. Considering the 
changes the world was undergoing, and the traditional and new challenges ahead, the 
Secretary-General sustained that the organisation “[…] emerged as a central 
instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of 
peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 17). Regarding these ambitious goals, Boutros-Ghali 
defined four broad fields of action and intervention that, together, framed a “coherent 
contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter” (Boutros-Ghali, 
1992). In addition to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, the 
report defined a fourth dimension for UN intervention, understood as the “action to 
identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Since the first three 
tasks were already strong elements of UN action regarding conflict, the introduction 
of the term “post-conflict peacebuilding” became one of the most important 
statements of the Agenda. 
The term, as well as the actions it compromised, were inscribed in a liberal 
precept, and entailed a large effort and compromise of international actors with a 
reengineering attempt of post-armed conflict societies. This project was extensive 
and demanding, but most of all, it was confronted with difficult and challenging post-
armed conflict realities which questioned the effectiveness of its project and 
demanded a revision of the existing frames of actions for creating peace. 
International actors did not grasp the extensiveness of the challenges created by the 
conflicts that emerged in the 1990s and, as a consequence, their ability and 
willingness to intervene faded, thus questioning the ambition of international peace 
promotion settled in the Agenda.  
The UN engaged in an internal process of reflection and revision while the 
academia focused its attention on the shortcomings and the missing conditions to 
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attain the promised liberal peace. The conclusion of this reflection has been in some 
degree condensed in Roland Paris tenet of “Institutionalisation before liberalisation” 
(IBL) (Paris, 2004) which meant, in practice, that the problems faced and created by 
the promotion of a liberal peace resulted mainly of the absence of strong institutions 
able to manage the liberalisation processes. Progressively, this view gained pace and 
the argument that the peace missions carried during the 1990s neglected the state was 
diffused. When the UN was called to intervene in Kosovo and in East Timor, 
statebuilding was definitively inscribed as a precondition for peace. However, and as 
we shall see in more detail, this inclusion has not transformed peacebuilding efforts 
into more successful outcomes. The high profile cases, such as East Timor for 
instance, have proven how fragile the categories of success conceived by 
international actors can be.  
The connection established between peacebuilding and states 
(re)construction was then subjected to reflection. The critiques and reflections were 
mainly guided by two perspectives: a first one, which questioned whether 
statebuilding contributed to peace; and a second one, which mainly questioned the 
type of peace being created. On one hand, the appeals to refocus on state-society 
relations and to promote local ownership emerged as necessary conditions to create 
an effective, sustainable and legitimate state able to contribute to the creation of 
peace. On the other hand, critics progressively exposed how statebuilding 
represented an external-oriented exercise of stabilisation which ultimately put in 
motion a depoliticisation process of the post-armed conflict spaces and subjects.  
Our reflection departs from an important silence that crosscuts the 
reflections on statebuilding. Current efforts to create peace depart from an 
international engagement with the creation of viable institutions able to sustain a 
peaceful sociability. However, and even if statebuilding attempts to (re)build a state 
that resembles the modern idea, the issue of citizenship, state-society relations 
modern frame and the source of state’s legitimacy, has not been brought to the 
discussion. More important, we have identified this absence not only in the 
normative policy documents of major international organisations, but also in the 
debates that have criticised the limited achievements of statebuilding or how it has 
produced a depoliticising narrative of the local spaces of intervention through its 
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technical mantra. Reading the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding an 
immediate question crosses our mind: if states are being (re)built isn’t citizenship 
being (re)affected? And shouldn’t the critical accounts of the depoliticisation 
narrative that denies local actors their political agency engage in a discussion of the 
concept which has for long established and recognised individuals’ political agency?  
 
The dissertation research proposal 
The present work departs from this absence to establish the grounds for its 
reflection. As a consequence our research was guided by the following question: 
does the vision of citizenship contained in international post-armed conflict 
statebuilding discourses and practices contribute to create a peaceful sociability, 
i.e. the non-violent articulation of conflict? Our initial assumption is that even 
though statebuilding departs from a diagnosis of fragility based on the modern state 
ideal, it has deployed alternative concepts to affect state-society relations, thus 
establishing an understanding of citizenship detached from the complex 
configurations of politics in spaces of intervention and their centrality in the 
(re)creation of a peaceful sociability.  
The use of citizenship as an analytical device has a two-fold purpose in the 
present research: first, to analyse the narrative established in post-armed conflict 
statebuilding regarding the political condition of individuals and groups; and second 
to transcend this vision and explore, through citizenship, the power relations and the 
political condition in spaces of intervention. We use the term power relations to 
capture the interaction between individuals’ agency and, particularly, how these 
interactions and disputes structure the condition of citizenship. Of course, these 
relations often translate into dominance, the power over the other. However, it is 
important to note that others’ resistance, for instance, must also be considered as the 
affirmation of their own power. Additionally, this term need not to have a negative 
meaning: it is foremost representative of the political condition of disagreement and 
divergent action.  
To accomplish this dual purpose, we depart from citizenship debates to map 
the elements of the concept and create a conceptual reference. Comparing the actions 
of statebuilding with the liberal ideal of citizenship that is its reference is important 
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and we will engage in that discussion. It seemed nevertheless limiting to our purpose 
to establish citizenship as an analytical tool able to transcend the depoliticisation 
narrative. Thus, we depart from the inherent relational nature of the concept of 
citizenship – in the sense that its content, practices and meaning are (re)shaped by 
power relations established on different spaces of governance – to approach the 
condition of the concept in statebuilding spaces.  
As a relational concept and condition, citizenship is built on the dialectic 
inclusion/exclusion, and it is precisely here that the political can be grasped. It must 
be noted that these divides do not refer solely to the state’s bordering process that 
establishes who is included/excluded in the political community. To this geographic 
divide, citizenship debates have identified others, metaphorical in some sense, and 
which convey the idea of the lines of inclusion/exclusion that permeate society based 
on access to citizenship rights or the (non)recognition of their specific social and/or 
cultural condition and needs. Citizenship is built along these inclusion/exclusion 
divides and, by focusing on them, we are able to explore political relations, either as 
the attempt to maintain a certain status or to profoundly reshape citizenship 
condition. This relational understanding entails that citizenship is a located concept 
and it unfolds in specific spaces, according to the existing power relations and the 
governance frames. We do not assume here an essentialist view of space. Rather, as 
citizenship debates demonstrate, the spaces where citizenship is located stretch 
beyond a geographical definition and are not exclusive to state’s territory: they are 
foremost related with the spaces where governance is affected and where power 
relations gain expression.  
An additional clarification is in order. The present work uses the term post-
armed conflict statebuilding to convey the specificity of our context of analysis. In 
these contexts, internationally sponsored statebuilding is established in the large 
project of creating peace and, thus, the evaluation of its actions are always related 
with statebuilding possible contribution to that purpose. Necessarily, we do not use 
here a restrictive conception of statebuilding interventions, limited to transitional 
powers exercised by international actors. On the contrary, we believe that these are 
exceptional conditions and cases that often tend to overshadow other international 
practices that target states even if they are not-so-total exercises of reengineering. 
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Instead, we consider post-armed conflict statebuilding interventions as the actions 
carried or sponsored by international actors which seek to establish the institutional 
foundations to the creation of peace. Interventions in this sense do not imply the use 
of force or a suspension of local authority but the term rather conveys an idea of 
action with purpose, and which often translates in supported projects on the ground 
targeting specific areas of state rehabilitation after an armed conflict. The adoption of 
this comprehensive definition enables an analysis of the evolving compromise of 
international actors with the state for peacebuilding purposes, reflecting on the 
differences and the continuities present. 
 
The case-study approach 
Considering the dissertation research proposal of bringing citizenship to the 
discussion of post-armed conflict statebuilding actions and discourses, and their 
contribution to (re)create a peaceful sociability, and the necessary reflection to 
establish a conceptual reference of citizenship able to map international actors’ 
depoliticising narrative and simultaneously transcend it, we have decided to adopt a 
qualitative approach to develop our research. Such methodological standpoint fits our 
view of citizenship as a condition built on power relations and, consequentially, 
subject to change (Devine, 2002; Rathbun, 2008).  
Specifically, we have opted for a case-study approach in order to carry our 
reflection. This choice is consistent with our general qualitative view and is 
consequent of our understanding of citizenship as a located concept and our goal to 
explore the condition of citizenship in spaces of intervention. George and Bennett 
(2005) have identified some advantages of case-studies not only to test hypothesis 
but foremost for theory development purposes: (1) high levels of conceptual validity; 
(2) the possibilities of fostering new hypotheses; and (3) the possibility to explore  
causal relations and causal complexity. These advantages were particular appealing 
considering our purpose to explore the condition of citizenship in intervention 
spaces. Furthermore, and considering that our reflection is directed towards theory 
development rather than theory testing, we consider that such methodological 
standpoint provides the necessary tools to develop a reflection that truly dialogues 
with the findings and forces us to revisit our theoretical underpinnings (George and 
 6 
 
Bennett, 2005). Furthermore, and considering our research purpose, we have opted to 
focus on a single case-study instead of a controlled comparison across cases, 
adopting a close position to George and Bennett (2005) in what concerns the 
possibility that evidence within a case poses to affect theoretical frames.  
This does not mean that we have overlooked some considerations regarding 
the choice for a case-study approach, particularly a single case-study. George and 
Bennett (2005) have identified some of the constrains that emerge with such choice, 
and two of them are particularly relevant. The first concerns the possible bias of case 
selection, caused either by initial assumptions or expected outcomes which may 
compromise the validity of the choice. The second addresses the limited 
representativeness and, consequentially, the limits of generalisation of the research 
conducted, particularly in single cases. To representativeness and generalisation, the 
authors oppose the possibilities that process-tracing offer in single cases, through the 
multiple observations and the links necessarily established amongst them, to 
establish causal inferences in the absence of a comparison that grasps variance 
(George and Bennett, 2005). In what concerns our research, our purpose is not to 
infer general conclusions but rather to establish, through the case-study, a conceptual 
reference that can be applied to other cases. This means that we focus primarily on 
defining the parameters to guide our process-tracing in what concerns the condition 
of citizenship – namely, by focusing on power relations and answering to Cornwall’s 
(2002) appeals to explore the “histories of governance and experiences of rule”.  
Regarding the danger of a biased choice, the authors stress the need to 
establish clear criteria to ground the case selection, namely the relevance for the 
research objective and the variation and control the case offers to the research 
problem (George and Bennett, 2005). Collier and Mahoney (1996) have even 
explored how the risk of selection bias, and the consequent limitation on the number 
of case-studies, is often related with the researchers’ attempts to capture different 
causal relations. Ultimately, the selection of the cases or case, should be guided by 
the events related with our research purpose are identified (George and Bennett, 
2005) and this selection must be consistent with or be in our research best interest.  
Our research proposal demanded that we choose a case-study departing 
from specific parameters that allowed us to: (1) grasp how current statebuilding 
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practices are inscribed in an evolving international compromise with the state’s role 
in creating peace apart from the most visible cases; (2) explore the contribution of 
the vision of citizenship contained in statebuilding discourses and practices to create 
a peaceful sociability; and (3) transcend the depoliticising arguments that, and 
though they are important, constitute only a partial view of the problem. Thus, we 
searched for a case-study with a formal peace but where international actors were 
still present, providing support to the creation of peace by supporting statebuilding 
actions. We searched primarily for a country which had, in some moment, the 
presence of the UN, considering its role in the promotion of peacebuilding practices 
worldwide. Considering our aim to grasp the inclusion of statebuilding in 
peacebuilding actions, we privileged cases which firmed their compromise with 
peace during the 1990s and where formal peace has prevailed. In a first moment we 
aligned some possible options such as El Salvador, Mozambique and Guatemala. 
There were however, two particular aspects that prompted us to choose Guatemala: 
first, the existence of an international commission against impunity in the country 
which constitutes, so far, a unique international statebuilding action and which is 
sponsored by the Peacebuilding Fund; and second, the indigenous communities in 
the country, far from being a minority, and their cosmovision were a clear challenge 
that could enrich any theoretical development regarding citizenship.  
The armed conflict in Guatemala came to an end in December 1996 after the 
signature of twelve peace agreements, and has been characterised as one of the 
bloodiest in Central America. The violent conflict which it is estimated to have 
claimed more than 200 000 lives is often framed in the set of conflicts that emerged 
as a consequence of the bipolar confrontation (CEH, 2006). Though this dimension 
cannot be ignored, it offers a limited insight to 36 years of armed conflict. The UN 
was called by conflict parties – the Guatemalan state and the guerrilla Unidad 
Revolucionária Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) – to mediate the negotiations and to 
later verify the implementation of Peace Agreements. This contribute allowed the 
parties to address in different agreements what were perceived as the structural 
causes of violent armed conflict in the country and establish an ambitious project of 
reforms able to sustain a project of peace. Despite the international support and due 
to a multiplicity of factors, the agenda of reform contained in the agreements was 
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only partially implemented, which has limited the materialisation of the peace project 
therein inscribed, though it assured the end of armed conflict. Moreover, the country 
assisted to a transfiguration of violence, which is now carried by multiple actors and 
has even gained expression in the private sphere, as the growing number of 
femicidios testifies. The perseverance of violence, together with the strong presence 
of organised crime and narco in the country, created additional challenges to the 
implementation of the peace project and demanded a shift in political actions to 
address state’s fragility, especially in the justice and security sector. This perception 
of fragility demanded an action, supported internationally, to rehabilitate state 
institutions, considered now as a precondition to the creation of a peaceful sociability 
guided by the rule of law and state capacity to democratically enforce it. Sixteen 
years after the signature of the peace agreements, the project of peace therein 
inscribed remains a reference (at least rhetorically) both to national actors and 
international actors’ intervention in the country and, accordingly, statebuilding 
actions became part of the effort to contribute to the creation of a peaceful 
sociability, inspired in the liberal peace project contained in the peace agreements.  
 
Conducting the research 
 
We developed two fieldwork periods in the capital city of Guatemala. 
Necessarily, and preceding these two periods and following the last one, was an 
effort to map and reflect on the concepts used in the analysis and an attempt to gather 
relevant information to improve our knowledge of the case-study. As a consequence 
we elaborated: (1) a literature review on the emergence and guiding assumptions of 
post-armed conflict statebuilding and the main critical contributions to revise it; (2) a 
reflection on the concept of citizenship departing from a review of citizenship 
debates; and (3) a historical contextualisation of the Guatemalan case. In order to do 
so, we gathered information through secondary sources, namely books, academic 
articles, and institutional reports and policy papers. Concerning these documents, we 
focused our attention on the institutions that directly engage in statebuilding actions, 
through direct presence or funding, and institutions which have a normative role in 
defining development aid principles, particularly in what concerns the issue of states’ 
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fragility. We also used secondary sources to establish a deeper understanding of 
Guatemala’s armed conflict, peace negotiations, and formal peace in order to create a 
solid ground for the fieldwork carried in 2009 and in 2011. These secondary sources 
included books and articles as well as reports from international institutions, research 
centres and non-governmental institutions. It is important to note that this effort 
continued during the fieldwork periods with the purpose of bringing to the discussion 
the reflections that existed in Guatemalan society and academia and confront them 
with the information we had gathered.  
In addition to the secondary sources, we decided to gather information 
through semi-structured interviews. Necessarily, the method to gather evidence must 
be consistent with our research proposal and overall methodological stance. Semi-
structured interviews were described by Leech (2002) and Liamputtong and Ezzy 
(2006) as a “middle-ground” between unstructured interviews and structured 
interviews with closed-end questions, that provides “detail, depth, and an insider’s 
perspective” (Leech, 2002: 665). Such instrument seemed particularly relevant 
considering our research proposal and our goal to map a depoliticising narrative 
through citizenship, departing from the interviewees’ social constructions on 
Guatemalan context. Semi-structured interviews were also adequate to our purpose 
of gathering specific information while providing enough space and flexibility to the 
interviewees to express their thoughts and articulate more complex answers, where 
important social constructions could be revealed. 
The choice for semi-structured interviews brings, nevertheless, important 
challenges to the researcher. Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006) have affirmed how 
crucial listening is in interviewing and have distinguished two different tasks related 
with listening: first, the interviewer needs to listen to the content expressed in the 
answers given; and second, the interviewer must listen without losing sight of the 
interview process, i.e., if what one listens covers the topics defined, if there is still 
time to discuss them, what the interviewee’s body language shows, among other 
things. This means that even though semi-structured interviews aim to provide 
liberty to the interviewees and the answers they give, one must bear in mind the 
research purpose when preparing and conducting the interview. Specifically, this 
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entails that the interviewer needs to be prepared to guide the conversation without 
limiting the interviewees’ answers.  
There is some discussion regarding how one should prepare the semi-
structured interviews both in terms of its content – the questions – and the 
respondents – how to choose or sample. Regarding the issue of questions, different 
authors emphasise different elements: Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006) for instance 
refer the usefulness of a theme list to guide the interviewer in the questions that need 
to be posed; Leech (2002) presents us with different types of questions that might be 
used during semi-structured interviews; Foddy (1996) expresses how the choice of 
questions must be rigorous, considering their purpose and how the information will 
be treated, and the overall research purpose.
1
 Overall, it is evident that despite the 
variation, there is a consensus regarding the balance that needs to be achieved 
between the open-end purpose of the questions posed and the definition of a script 
that allows the interviewer to conduct the interview. There are, nevertheless, three 
remarks which are particularly important when preparing such script. The first 
concerns the relevance of the questions for the research purpose and it means that 
while defining the script and conducting the interview the researcher poses the 
questions without losing sight of their research purpose (Foddy, 1996). The second 
note relates with the order questions are posed, and which tells us that easy questions 
must come first and more sensitive questions should only come up in the middle of 
the interview. This allows to “put respondents at ease” and “gain rapport” before 
posing more difficult questions, and thus sound less invasive and non-judgemental 
(Leech, 2002). Finally, the third remark is concerned with the form of the questions. 
The interviewer must be aware of the different vocabularies that are used by different 
subjects, and thus, the questions must pass through a process of reinterpretation 
which assures that their meaning and purpose are kept (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 
2006). In what concerns the form, it is also important to note that the questions must 
not be presuming, i.e. they must not imply that the researcher already knows the 
answer (Leech, 2002). 
                                                          
1
 The author identifies three fundamental categories of questions: (1) grand tour questions, that allows 
respondents to describe a process, a routine, or a theme, in their own terms; (2) example questions, 
that depart from an act or event identified by the respondent to establish an example; and (3) prompts, 
which are questions the interviewer pose in order to keep the respondent talking or to bring the 
conversation back to the purpose of interview (Leech, 2002). 
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Regarding the interviewees, the main discussion focuses on how to choose 
the individuals who are expected to provide the needed insight of the event or action 
being studied. This sampling question has different possible answers. According to 
Warren “respondents may be chosen based on a priori research design, theoretical 
sampling, or snowball or convenience design, or particular respondents may be 
sought out to act as key informants” (2001: 87). Golstein, however, establishes as 
fundamental that one departs from the research question and purpose to identify a 
target population (Goldstein, 2002). This does not mean that such a theoretical 
sampling excludes snowball sampling: a respondent identified through research 
criteria might provide access to other actors and organisations that are also part of the 
defined sample (Warren, 2001; Goldstein, 2002). There is an additional aspect in 
what concerns the respondents which, and though not directly related with sampling 
strategies, ultimately affects the interviewing process: access. Gaining access to 
individuals might prove particularly difficult for different reasons. Again, preparing 
the interviews is crucial, in order to anticipate some obstacles regarding access and 
prepare the fieldwork period accordingly.  
Bearing in mind the demands involved in interviewing we have developed 
two periods of fieldwork in Guatemala. Considering our research question and the 
conceptual categories involved, we targeted international actors, local actors 
involved in international statebuilding actions, and actors indirectly affected by such 
project. Specifically, we privileged civil society actors, both national and 
international, elements of international institutions, and local authorities and political 
actors, who we considered to be central to illustrate the international approach to 
statebuilding. Considering that these actors are present in the capital city, we 
confined our fieldwork to Ciudad de Guatemala.  
The first fieldwork period was conducted between May and June 2009 and 
the first purpose was to establish a first contact with the country and revisit the 
research question and the premise of analysis through interviews and observation 
notes. This first fieldwork period was also fundamental to consult secondary sources 
concerning multiple aspects of Guatemalan politics and society, as well as the history 
of conflict that were difficult to access from Portugal. This was a period to confront 
the initial assumptions of my research and to understand the need to depart from a 
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conceptual reference of citizenship able to grasp the complex political dynamics of 
the Guatemalan reality. The second fieldwork period was conducted in May 2011. 
With a consolidated purpose and conceptual reference of citizenship, the semi-
structured interviews conducted sought to complement and strengthen the 
information gathered in the previous period. This was a particularly challenging and 
yet enriching period in the country, marked by the tensions and disputes preceding 
presidential elections and a series of violent acts. 
In the months preceding these periods, I established formal contacts with 
targeted actors in order to arrange in advance possible dates to conduct the 
interviews. This allowed me to arrive to Guatemala in June 2009 and in May 2011 
and start my interviews almost immediately. In addition to the contacts established, it 
was also possible, through the snowball sampling strategy, to reach other actors and 
to have access to discussions, meetings and capacitation sessions that provided me 
with insightful observation notes that guided my reflection.  
In what concerns the interviews script, I adopted a mixed approach.  On one 
hand I created a theme list regarding the main issues that my interviews had to cover 
– briefly, the implementation of the peace project inscribed in the agreements, the 
role of the state in that process, the international statebuilding actions or the 
condition of citizenship in face with such actions. On the other hand, I defined a set 
of questions related with each theme but with a differentiated formulation according 
to the respondents’ profile. The interviews started with “grand-tour questions” 
regarding the general implementation of peace agreements and moved to more 
specific issues, regarding the role of CICIG, for instance (Leech, 2002). Both the list 
of themes and the questions related were defined according to the research purpose 
of discussing international statebuilding actions and the condition of citizenship 
promoted to (re)create a peaceful sociability. During the first fieldwork period, it also 
became clear that anonymity was the most effective tool available to protect the 
individuals who collaborated in the research while simultaneously assuring 
respondents’ disclosure, regarding specific topics (Warren, 2001).  
 
The structure of the dissertation 
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The writing process of the present work aimed, from the beginning, to 
mirror the evolution of our reflection as well as the effort to bring two conceptual 
fields – post-armed conflict statebuilding and citizenship – together. As a 
consequence, we have structured this dissertation in three moments. The first 
moment comprehends the two first chapters and engages separately with the state of 
the art of post-armed conflict statebuilding and citizenship. The first chapter deals 
with post-armed conflict statebuilding and is divided into two sections. In the first 
section we present first a broad overview of the evolving state’s role in the 
peacebuilding project and the inclusion of statebuilding approaches in international 
efforts to promote peace, and then, the specific elements that guide post-armed 
conflict statebuilding. In the second section, we engage with the critiques and 
revisions posed to post-armed conflict statebuilding practices, addressing the debate 
in the academia and international actors’ efforts to redefine their practices. In this 
chapter, our purpose is twofold: (1) we seek to expose how current statebuilding 
practices are part of an evolving international engagement with the state that started 
with a democratic emphasis but has evolved to a more technical statebuilding, which 
has radicalised the detachment of local realities and contexts, and (2) we explore the 
limits of the current critiques which either compel us to look to local actions as the 
expression of resistance and transformation of international actions or focus on the 
depoliticising consequences of international actors without providing us other 
possibility to engage with local politics rather than returning to liberal premises. In a 
second chapter, we explore citizenship as a conceptual tool to re-engage with the 
contexts where post-armed conflict statebuilding unfolds and to address (1) state-
society relations and (2) relations within society. We have divided this chapter in two 
sections: in the first section, we overview the main contributions of citizenship 
debates to identify four dimensions – the location, subject, rights and practices, and 
meaning – that mark the concept of citizenship, while in the second section we 
discuss these dimensions to establish our relational understanding of the concept and 
the analytical premises to explore citizenship in post-armed conflict statebuilding.  
The second moment is essentially a transition in our reflection and it 
engages with a discussion of citizenship in post-armed conflict statebuilding 
discourses and practices and how, by deploying alternative concepts to affect state-
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society relations, statebuilding moves away from the liberal premises on which it was 
initially based to materialise a depoliticising narrative. We sustain in this chapter that 
a comprehensive understanding of citizenship, departing from the elements 
identified, enables us to re-engage with the spaces of intervention in order to 
understand the power relations that affect the condition of citizenship beyond the 
depoliticising narratives and the international-local opposition.  
The third moment corresponds to our attempt to locate our reflection. 
Bearing in mind our purpose to overcome the depoliticising narrative of local actors 
and explore the power relations and political dynamics that have affected the 
condition of citizenship in Guatemala in formal peace times, we explore the histories 
of governance that have marked the political landscape and framed state-society 
relations in the country. Accordingly, and after revisiting the questions and 
circumstances that preceded the armed conflict in the country, we explore in the first 
section the armed conflict and the dispute between the counterinsurgent apparatus 
and the guerrilla, and then the peace negotiations and the signature of the peace 
agreements. The second section focuses on the content and implementation of peace 
agreements regarding the reinvention of state institutions in particular. In this section 
we seek to explore the trajectory of state’s fragility, particularly in what concerns its 
security and justice institutions, in order to expose the current configurations of 
international statebuilding actions. In a last chapter we specifically address the 
condition of citizenship in Guatemala. We depart from the histories of governance 
identified previously to (1) explore the transfigurations citizenship faced in the 
transition from armed conflict to formal peace times and (2) assess the role of 
international intervention in such process. Accordingly, we use the imagery device of 
inclusion/exclusion divides to explore the main questions which structure the 
condition of citizenship in the country and along which the power relations between 
different individuals and groups are established. We also assess how international 
actors have affected and interacted with these power relations and whether their 
actions have promoted a condition of citizenship able to sustain a peaceful 
sociability. 
This reflection closes with some conclusions regarding the condition of 
citizenship in Guatemala and the challenges ahead both for the individuals and 
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groups and for the international actors compromised with the country’s peace 
agenda. Additionally, we consider how this reflection can enrich citizenship debates 
which have so far neglected post-armed conflict statebuilding spaces. But foremost, 
we reflect on the implications of the present work for consequent reflections on post-
armed statebuilding. Our purpose is to establish the ground on which one analytically 
re-engages with power and politics in spaces of intervention and thus the conclusions 
of the work seek to lay the foundations for future reflections.  
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2. Building Peace in post-armed conflict scenarios 
Peacebuilding had been conceptually evoked and developed in the peace 
studies and the conflict resolution field before 1992 (Ramsbotham, 2005: 172). But 
afterwards, the term became a political statement of the international engagement 
with violent armed conflicts and the challenge they represented to the peaceful world 
order that was expected to emerge. The end of the Cold War is often pointed as one 
of the main factors that explain the adoption of the concept and also the leading role 
the UN assumed. The changing geopolitical interests opened a gap of assistance in 
areas once fundamental to the bipolar confrontation, while the mission in Namibia, at 
the end of the 1980s, called for actions beyond the traditional mandates of 
peacekeeping missions (Paris, 2004: 13). Accordingly, the UN envisioned a different 
role in international affairs considering the possibility to enlarge its action 
geographically, and deepen the nature of its intervention, supported by the 
application of its Charter.
2
 
Faced with the changing and challenging international context, the post-
conflict peacebuilding actions were, from the beginning, tied with the ambition of 
answering to “the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and 
political oppression” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The consequent (re)definitions of the 
term and what tasks peacebuilding efforts and missions should entail have been 
circumscribed by this propelling cause and the need to effectively define operative 
dimensions and actions in the field. Accordingly, the concept and the actions referred 
in the An Agenda for Peace (1992) were further developed in the Supplement to the 
Agenda (1995), where “Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional 
reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, 
electoral reform and social and economic development” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995) were 
identified as some of the fundamental peacebuilding measures. Kofi Annan later 
synthesised the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding as “the various concurrent and 
integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and 
prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation” (Annan, 1997: 40). In this reform 
                                                          
2
 In the Agenda, the Secretary-General refers to the renewed role of the Security Council in the 
application of the Charter, considering the end of bipolarity (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Kofi Annan also 
mentions the end of the Security Council’s years of stalemate and the possibilities opened by this new 
moment in the organisation’s life to answer to the challenges of security and peace (Annan, 1997: 36).  
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programme, the Secretary-General assumed the ambitious nature of peacebuilding, 
stating that it must include humanitarian and development actions, but embrace such 
tasks and develop them according to peacebuilding distinctive political nature that 
rests in the larger purpose of preventing the resumption of conflict and contributing 
to a lasting peace (Annan, 1997: 40). 
Ramsbotham (2005) draws on the evolution of the concept and 
encompassing actions to identify the two-fold ambitious nature of peacebuilding. 
Departing from the distinction Galtung establishes between a negative and a positive 
peace, where the negative facet refers to the cessation of direct violence and the 
positive one addresses the structural and cultural violences (Galtung, 1990), 
Ramsbotham conceives peacebuilding as the sum between 
(A) the ‘negative’ task of preventing a relapse into overt violence and (B) 
the positive tasks of aiding national recovery and expediting the eventual 
removal of the underlying causes of internal war (Ramsbotham, 2005: 
171).  
To the first aspect corresponds what the author identifies as “Clausewitz in 
Reverse”, meaning the reversion of the classical postulate of the “war as politics by 
other means” into arrangements to guarantee that post-war politics will deal with 
conflict in non-military terms.
3
 Necessarily, this first task needs to be supported by 
long-term sustainability achieved through “constitutional and institutional reform, 
social reconstruction and reconciliation, and the rebuilding of shattered polities, 
economies and communities” (Ramsbotham, 2005: 174). This positive facet and 
“colossal undertaking” aims to target three interlinked deficits present in war-torn 
societies: the political and constitutional fragility, the weak socio-economic 
conditions and the psycho-social trauma (Ramsbotham, 2005: 174).  
Regarding the difficult but necessary interconnection between the negative 
and positive features of peacebuilding, Ramsbotham identifies a common procedure 
of UN involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding activities that is structured on four 
areas of intervention: a military and security dimension, where the disarmament and 
                                                          
3
 It is worth mentioning that the author uses the term post-war politics deliberately since what 
peacebuilding seeks to do is to transfer the conflict from the violent field to the realm of non-violent 
politics. Hence, the term post-conflict, according to the author, is precisely what peacebuilding is not 
since the settlement of the violent dispute means “the projection of the politics of war forward [...] into 
the politics of conflict”, meaning the continuation of conflict by others means in order to make peace a 
feasible and desirable scenario where the parts can pursue their interests (Ramsbotham, 2005: 173). 
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demobilisation of the parties, the reform of the army and police and general 
demilitarisation of politics are framed; a political and constitutional area that 
prescribes power-sharing arrangements, a new constitution, and free and fair 
elections in order to edify a democratic government; an economic and social sphere 
that beyond the immediate relief of needs, seeks the rehabilitation of former 
combatants, the reconstruction of infra-structures which fosters economic policies 
with long-term macroeconomic impact; and a psycho-social dimension that seeks to 
promote long-term reconciliation through the management of the needs of peace and 
justice (Ramsbotham, 2005).  
The present chapter departs from the SOP identified by Ramsbotham to 
assess state role in it and how the international actors have changed their position 
towards the state in violent armed conflict and, consequentially, in peacebuilding. 
We expose first how this understanding and actions have evolved and what concepts 
and assumptions have been deployed to accomplish this change. We also discuss the 
current debates and critiques surrounding current post-armed conflict statebuilding 
practices, particularly in what concerns its relation with peacebuilding purposes.  
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2.1. Creating Peace through Statebuilding 
This section will approach the state role in the peacebuilding project in 
order to understand its place and relation with the emerging complex international 
context after the Cold War. By exploring how peacebuilding has adopted 
statebuilding, we expect to expose the evolving nature of the international 
compromise with the rehabilitation of states in post-armed conflict scenarios and 
how this translates to local spaces of intervention. Hence, we will focus, first, on the 
premises that currently guide the international engagement with statebuilding and 
how they have been shaped, and finally elaborate on the statebuilding put in motion 
by the different actors engaged with this task.  
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2.1.1. The post-armed conflict state: an evolving international engagement 
In the peacebuilding frame that emerged in 1992 the discussion and 
definition around states’ contribution to the creation of a lasting and sustainable 
peace progressively focused on states’ regimes.4 After the An Agenda for Peace, 
democracy became the way to assess how the state was supposed to contribute to the 
larger purpose of peacebuilding and this perspective was further elaborated by 
Boutros-Ghali in the An Agenda for Development (1994), Supplement to an Agenda 
for Peace (1995), and in the An Agenda for Democratization (1996).  
The political focus on democracy and its promotion as a fundamental 
element for peace occurred in a larger context. The specificities of the historical and 
political context of the end of the Cold War presented, in fact, a crucial moment in 
the worldwide diffusion of an international liberal peace project to which democracy 
was a fundamental requisite. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the uncertainties and 
challenges of the new world order, there was a wide agreement on the need to 
promote democracy in order to foster peace. The democratic peace thesis 
corroborated the establishment of a social contract with democratic institutions as the 
means to create a normative culture of peaceful setting of conflicts that sustains 
peace within democracies, while inhibiting violence between them (Russett, 1993; 
Rato, 1998; Levi, 2001; Doyle, [1986] 1997)
5
. Fukuyama (1992) had already 
announced liberal democracy as the final stage of human societies’ evolutionary 
process and had, by then, proclaimed the End of History. Therefore, the promotion of 
liberal democracy, at the national and international levels, seemed a viable path to 
                                                          
4
 This is not to say that the model of development put in motion through peacebuilding did not share 
the premises of structural adjustment and the fundamental role of the market. Pugh states that since 
the An Agenda for Peace the “framing of political economy issues in war-torn societies has closely 
followed developmentalist models for promoting structural adjustment and budgetary austerity” 
(2006). Nevertheless, the political emphasis of peacebuilding was placed in democracy and the 
essential articulations it had with development and peace. This is especially evident in the Agendas 
and subsequent documents of the Secretary-General that inscribed the term in the international 
political agenda. Moreover, the emphasis on democratisation was not incompatible with the idea of 
state promoted by the economic discipline of the Washington Consensus: a state with a power limited 
by a political regime was in fact a cornerstone for the establishment of a liberalised economy.  
5
 This dyadic image of democratic peace, where democracies do not go to war with each other, has 
been targeted with criticisms, especially regarding democracies inherent peacefulness when 
confronted with non-democratic states. But there are also recent efforts in the development of 
democratic peace theory that try to move beyond this separate peace assumption, arguing that liberal 
states’ “peace proneness is not limited to inter-liberal state relations” (MacMillan, 2003: 241). 
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build an international peace (Holm and Sorensen, 1995), considering not only the 
favourable international context, but also the favourable academic input at that time. 
Barnett presents this consensual emphasis on domestic politics when he assesses the 
liberal nature of the emerging international order through the analysis of four 
prominent reflections and reports of that time and the bridges that can be drawn 
between them (Barnett, 2010).
 6
 Barnett concludes that the four documents are “quite 
unabashed in promoting the spread of democracy” as a form to guarantee the 
inscription and respect of its norms in the international sphere and demand that the 
UN acts as an “agent of normative integration” (Barnett, 2010: 27).  
The UN developed its understanding of post-conflict peacebuilding amidst 
this favourable context for democracy promotion while facing growing demands to 
assume a different role in global affairs, regarding the challenges and the needs of the 
times, and the experience it had acquired. The Agendas of Boutros-Ghali reflected, to 
some extent, the post-bipolar optimism as a consequence of the possibilities opened 
to the international society and to the UN itself. Together, the documents assumed a 
compromise with a peace promotion intertwined with democracy support and sought 
to give the organisation a different and more active role in global affairs.
7
 The 
Secretary-General stated, in the definition of peacebuilding as an international 
instrument to achieve peace, “an obvious connection between democratic practices 
[...] and the achievement of true peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Furthermore, the 
Agenda referred to the conditions, procedures and rules that must be fostered and 
respected in order to promote democracy at the internal level of the state and 
amongst the family of nations. Summing it up, the Secretary-General affirmed that 
“democracy at all levels [was] essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity 
and justice” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In the An Agenda for Development he further 
elaborated on the priority that should be assigned to democracy promotion, 
                                                          
6
 The author departs from Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (1992), the Commission on Global 
Governance Report (1995), Evans’s Cooperating for Peace (1993) and the Report of the Independent 
Working Group on the Future of the United Nations (1995), to assess the features of the new world 
order they unveil.  
7
 At the beginning of the 1990s the UN launched several peace operations, which not only stressed the 
increasing demand for UN action in post-conflict scenarios but also created expectations regarding 
future action, considering the experience acquired in these missions. According to Bellamy and 
Williams (2010), this constituted the quantitative aspect in UN peace operations transformation and 
preceded the normative and qualitative turn, which will be considered further in this section.  
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considering its relation with development and, specifically, with development in 
post-conflict scenarios (Boutros-Ghali, 1994). He considered that democracy was the 
only reliable means by which good or improved governance, an essential condition 
for an effective development strategy, could be achieved (Boutros-Ghali, 1994). The 
elaboration of An Agenda for Democratization (1996) not only strengthened previous 
UN compromise with democratisation worldwide, as it came to crystallise the 
adoption of democracy as a strategy to promote peace. The Agenda referred an 
“emergent consensus” that perceived democracy as “a response to a wide array of 
human concerns”, “essential to promote human rights” and fundamental to foster 
“the evolution of a social contract upon which lasting peace can be built”: “a culture 
of democracy is fundamentally a culture of peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 1996: 6-7). 
Underpinning the elaboration of such Agenda, and its statements and 
recommendations, was the conviction that “peace, development and democracy are 
inextricably linked” (Boutros-Ghali, 1996) which expresses the conceptual and 
practical articulations developed in the previous documents. This emphasis and 
compromise with the promotion of liberal democracy are a fundamental feature of 
the normative and qualitative transformation of the peace operations undertaken by 
the UN, according to Bellamy and Williams (2010). 
Nevertheless, and despite the efforts undertaken to develop an international 
referential frame to answer to post-conflict challenges and promote peace, the 1990s 
constantly tested and challenged the actions undertaken by the UN and those who 
developed actions under the peacebuilding umbrella. When the Secretary-General 
wrote the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace (1995) or the An Agenda for 
Democratization (1996), it was already clear that the international society, and the 
UN more specifically, would have to face a more complex changing world than it 
was anticipated. If globalisation had managed to diffuse the “western model of 
governance characterised by market economy, democracy and human rights” it also 
created and intensified contradictory processes and demands (Jakobsen, 2002: 268). 
Jakobsen points to three globalisation related causes of the changes that UN 
operations faced throughout the 1990s: first, the relation between the introduction of 
economic and political conditionalities in aid development and the outbreak of armed 
conflicts and the collapse of states in the Third World; second, the normative change 
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that made democracy promotion and human rights support the fundaments for new 
peace operations; and third, a rising global awareness and coverage of massive 
human rights violations and atrocities that increased the pressure for peace operations 
on such grounds (Jakobsen, 2002). Such conditions, however, had dual impacts on 
the action of UN peace operations: while enabling stronger normative answers, they 
created a demand for intervention and expectations that the international society and 
the UN were not able to meet along the way. The discussion surrounding possible 
humanitarian interventions is, perhaps, one of the strongest images of the dual impact 
of these factors. The 1990s rapidly became a decade full of contradictions and 
contrasts: between an international optimism and the conflicts that (re)emerged, 
between the missions defined and the results accomplished, between guiding 
assumptions and inconsistent practices.  
The violent armed conflicts that emerged throughout the decade 
progressively questioned the frames that had been developed to understand and 
address violent conflicts. According to Kaldor (1999) such conflicts should be 
understood as “new wars”, a necessary frame if one wished to understand their 
distinctiveness and the challenges they posed in terms of peacebuilding. The 
indiscriminate use of violence against civilians and its progressive privatisation, the 
development of war economies and its global articulations were some of the central 
elements of these “new wars”. Fundamentally, what distinguished these violent 
conflicts were their purposes, the methods used and their financing (Kaldor, 1999). 
But more importantly, these new wars came to be identified in contexts of state 
disintegration (Kaldor, 1999).  
The connection established between state disintegration and violent 
conflicts and human rights abuses decisively marked the international debate of 
peacebuilding ever since. The phenomena and the debate were barely new but the 
9/11 events and the consequent actions deepened this connection, both in policy 
circles and in the academia. The perils of state failure were depicted beyond the 
devastation and violence that they were expected to create locally and, after the 9/11, 
the question of weak and failed states reached a different category in the international 
agenda: the attacks came to posit these places of failure as global concerns with 
systemic impacts.  
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In policy circles, the concerns over states’ fragility, failure or collapse 
rapidly came to the centre of the debate. In his Supplement to the Agenda for Peace 
(1995), Boutros-Ghali had already mentioned the collapse of state institutions as a 
fundamental feature of the “new breed of intra-state conflicts” and how these 
collapses presented UN actions for peace and security with specific challenges. The 
report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: our shared responsibility (2004), proclaimed weak and collapsed states as a 
systemic threat to international peace and security. The different emphasis of these 
documents on the issue of failed and collapsed states understates how this 
phenomenon evolved in international actors’ perspective, becoming a localised event 
in places of violent conflict with a systemic impact, considering the threat it posed to 
an interconnected security and to the international system (values and units). This 
discourse and perception, which have placed failed and collapsed states at the centre 
of the policy decisions of international actors engaged with the international 
promotion of security and peace, were made clear in different states’ approaches to 
(international) security challenges.
8
  
States’ role in peacebuilding evolved along this apparently international 
“schizophrenia”: even if the 1990s brought strong suspicions regarding states’ 
intervention in the social and economic spheres, with the eruption of violent conflicts 
and humanitarian catastrophes worldwide the absence and/or failure of states were 
progressively perceived as a source of instability, threats and violent conflict. Amidst 
this, the UN found its engagement with peace promotion questioned: the events of 
Rwanda or Srebrenica and the multiplication of violent armed conflicts (mostly intra-
state) raised several criticisms to the organisation’s action and created the need for 
internal reflection, balance and reforms. Progressively, the initial enthusiasm of its 
member states with peace operations (and their necessary contribution with money 
and personnel) also faded which only made the engagement defined in the An 
                                                          
8
 The United States of America (USA) National Security Strategy of 2002, forged in the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks, affirmed the threat failing states posed to the country’s security and the need to 
engage with other international actors (namely the European Union) to strengthen weak states abroad 
(US Government, 2002). The European Union (EU), in its own process of creating a common security 
and defence policy, also recognised state failure as one of the most preeminent global challenges: 
“state failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional 
instability” (EU, 2003: 4). 
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Agenda for Peace harder to keep (Bellamy and Williams, 2010). The organisation 
embarked on an internal process of reform and evaluation that was expected to point 
the errors and limits of the previous commitments and operations, and point towards 
future compromises and guidelines, able to properly address the security and peace 
threats. To some extent, this entailed a normative re-adjustment: the premises of 
post-armed conflict peacebuilding were re-assured but there as a progressive 
awareness that UN actions to implement it had to be revised. Naturally, the internal 
reform and evaluation process of UN peace operations reflected an emergent view of 
the state as a source of security concerns and where international intervention could 
be more consequent in its contribution to build peace.  
In 2000, the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000) reflected much of the UN’s internal 
process of reflection, recognising the mistakes that the organisation had previously 
made and pointing towards future directions in UN peace operations deployment. 
Although both the report and the implementation follow-up documents were too 
much focused on the UN institutional capacity leaving political issues marginalised, 
even when they were identified as responsible for important UN failures, the Report 
did, however, lay important ground for further reflections and changes in the 
perceptions of security threats and in the deployment of differentiated and adequate 
peace operations.
9
 This effort happened when the demands for international 
intervention rose again in what Bellamy and Williams have called “peacekeeping 
reborn” (2010: 121). The organisation’s actions in East Timor and Kosovo came to 
be fundamental in a re-statement of the need for UN contribution to peace related 
activities.
10
 Moreover, it demanded efforts tied to transitional authority frames from 
the UN, where building state institutions was considered a priority.  
As a consequence, and even though the UN did not abandon its normative 
reference of the liberal peace, it adapted its actions, considering the needs and 
demands of the international environment where it operated. Nevertheless, the 
organisation still had to manage the respect for international norms with the 
deployment of tangible actions. The Secretary-General launched in the General 
                                                          
9
 Rwanda and Srebrenica are mentioned by Bellamy and Williams as evident examples of this neglect 
(2010: 135-136).  
10
 Important lessons and critiques were drawn from this participation. We will elaborate on this issue 
later in our analysis. 
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Assembly, in 1999 and again in 2000, a serious challenge to all member states. The 
question was precisely over the definition of a principle that would enable the 
organisation to answer effectively to threats and humanitarian emergencies without 
disrespecting the fundamental premise of its Charter, the sovereign rights of states. 
The report “Responsibility to Protect” (ICISS, 2001), sponsored by the Canadian 
government, answered to this appeal and sought to bind the need to intervene at 
states’ level with specific criteria and motivations in order to preserve states’ 
sovereignty. It sought to nourish the deployment of humanitarian interventions able 
to effectively protect individuals where states were not able or willing to perform or 
engage with the responsibility of sovereignty. This principle of Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) is necessarily scaled: although the primary scale of responsibility rests 
within the state itself, the international community must accept this responsibility 
when the state, for any possible reason, fails to exercise it. Though the aim of R2P 
was the definition of a principle for humanitarian intervention, it came, nevertheless, 
to enunciate an understanding of states’ sovereignty, supervised and ultimately 
guaranteed by international actors (Chandler, 2010b).  
This international understanding of sovereignty reflected a changing 
approach towards the state’s role, in security and development, and, ultimately, in the 
creation of peace. Such change has been generally described as the post-Washington 
Consensus (Duffield, 2007; Fritz and Menocal, 2007) and entails a fundamental 
change over the expectations towards the state and the role it should perform in 
development. The 1997 World Development Report of the World Bank (WB) 
assumed the attempt to rethink state’s role in development and focused on the need 
to match state capabilities with expected roles (WB, 1997). The relation between 
effective institutions and states’ capability was expressed in this report, but was 
further elaborated in the 2000 Strategy Document of World Bank’s Public Sector 
Group (WB, 2000). These views expressed a changed focus towards the state: 
besides the regime guiding its actions, the state must have the capacity to perform its 
functions to guarantee the sustainability and legitimacy of the democratic regime. 
The question, then, was no longer whether to bring the state back in but how to do it 
(Ghani and Lockhart, 2008).  
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Combined, the new international approach to sovereignty, the threat posed 
by failed states to the international system and state’s renewed potential contribution 
for development, have produced a doctrine to (re)build states that focuses in giving 
the capacity to states to fulfil their sovereign responsibilities at the international and 
internal levels. The international actions and aid flows progressively became the 
decisive mechanisms to promote fragile states capacitation. The reflections promoted 
by the UN (in the case of the ICISS or the High-level Panel reports) or the 
documents adopted by the organisation brought to the peace operations field much of 
the issues identified as primary international concerns and needs. The understanding 
of failed and weak states, not only as a cause of violent armed conflicts but also as a 
systemic threat to international security and peace, as well as the adoption of the R2P 
approach to states’ sovereignty in Annan’s report In Larger Freedom (2005) 
materialised what Paris and Sisk have identified as “one of the most important 
macro-level shifts in peacebuilding strategy” (Paris and Sisk, 2009b: 1). According 
to the authors, such shift brought state institutions and its capabilities to the forefront 
of peacebuilding agencies’ priorities (Paris and Sisk, 2009b: 1). This shift is, in fact, 
integral to the perspective that had been emerging in the UN: empirical sovereignty, 
instead of de jure status, is consequential for international order (Barnett, 2010). This 
view of sovereignty is a central element of what Chandler has identified as the “UN 
people-centred approach” that ties the promotion of peace and democracy in places 
of conflict with an international intervention that renders the principles of 
sovereignty and self-determination to this need to promote an international 
consequent empirical sovereignty (Chandler, 2001).  
This shift towards capable states and supportive international actions was 
also sustained academically. Roland Paris’ seminal work At War’s End (2004) 
proposed a comprehensive analysis of the missions deployed during the 1990s by the 
UN with a clear emphasis on peacebuilding purposes, and where he ultimately 
developed an alternative approach to future international engagements. In the work 
published in 2004, the author departs from the acknowledgement of the liberal nature 
and purposes of peacebuilding to analyse UN peacebuilding actions. When 
introducing his argument, the author advert us that 
international efforts to transform war-shattered states have, in a number of 
cases, inadvertently exacerbated societal tensions or reproduced 
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conditions that historically fuelled violence in these countries. The very 
strategy that peacebuilders have employed to consolidate peace – political 
and economic liberalization – seems, paradoxically, to have increased the 
likelihood of renewed violence in several of these states” (Paris, 2004: 6). 
For Paris, the peace missions deployed proved that democratisation and 
‘marketisation’ were tumultuous processes with the capacity to undermine any 
existing fragile peace, despite the variations in the outcomes across the case-studies 
presented (Paris, 2004).
11
 Considering the mixed record of the missions, the author 
proposes the “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” (IBL) approach to 
peacebuilding that aims to build a minimum network of existing institutions before 
the challenging liberalisation processes (Paris, 2004: 7-8). More recently, Paris and 
Sisk (2009b) have stated that state institutions and their contribution to peace were 
strongly neglected in the 1990s, which severely compromised the outcomes of war to 
peace transitions at that time, an opinion that is shared by other authors (see Call and 
Cousens, 2008; Menocal, 2010). 
Such critique was further sustained on the democratisation limits that were 
being recognised even in the democratisation literature. Carothers’s article on 
democratisation stated that the proliferation of qualification terms to characterise the 
emerging democracies created a proliferation of qualified democracies that 
ultimately eroded the analytical usefulness of the transition paradigm (Carothers, 
2002). But more important, the author stated that it was equivocal to assume that 
statebuilding is a secondary challenge to democracy-building. In countries with weak 
states, with statebuilding needs and challenges, the democracy-building efforts had 
failed to bolster state capacity (Carothers, 2002).  
Both Paris and Carothers’s contributions testify a changed vision towards 
the state. Such vision assumes that dealing with states’ regimes is a limited approach 
to the institutional demands of a sustainable peace. Rather than prioritising regime 
change (democratisation) as a condition for peace, such vision suggests taking a step 
back, by focusing on the institutions and their capacity to support peace and receive 
international assistance (Duffield, 2007). The question is not on how the liberal 
democratic values affect the promotion of peace and neither on the tensions that 
                                                          
11
 The author analyses the major UN peace operations deployed between 1989 and 1999: Angola, 
Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, Croatia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone (Paris, 2004). 
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emerged in the promotion of democracy through intervention.
12
 At stake was how the 
focus and promotion of democracy had compromised peace operations capacity to 
effectively foster security and development in post-armed conflict places and define 
plausible and achievable goals for interventions. 
Thus, and despite the clarification attempts from institutions and academics 
between statebuilding and peacebuilding (either from a normative or a more critical 
perspective) they converged in peacebuilding actions.
13
 Statebuilding became a 
crucial concern for the agents involved in peacebuilding in terms that cannot be 
confined to the political realm of the Standard Operations Procedure (SOP) identified 
by Ramsbotham (2005). SOP assumed the promotion of democracy in post-armed 
conflict scenarios as the political dimension of an idea of peace coordinated with 
other dimensions. The prioritisation of institutions capacitation over democratisation 
extended the role of the state beyond the political realm: the emphasis on an effective 
state, able to meet its sovereign requirements became a prerequisite for the full 
transformation of post-armed conflict spaces and is expected to lay the foundations 
for a lasting peace.  
Recognising the shift this renewed international engagement with the state 
has produced in peacebuilding is important. It is nevertheless fundamental to 
emphasise that this approach, focused on states’ capacities and how they constrain or 
foster peacebuilding rather than on how states’ political regimes lead to peace, does 
not mean that the concern for recovering state institutions was not present when 
peacebuilding emerged or that democracy is no longer a fundamental element of 
peacebuilding actions. Rather, this approach represents an international privileging of 
a specific engagement with the state that departs from the diagnosis of missing 
capacities to define an intervention able to act, correct and prevent such 
imperfections. In the next section we will specifically deal with the various 
contributions to this process of diagnosis and how and why statebuilding is expected 
to (re)create peace.  
 
                                                          
12
 See Newman (2001) on these issues and dilemmas.  
13
 These efforts, as well as the emerging study on the tensions between the statebuilding and 
peacebuilding will be addressed in the following sections in more detail.   
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2.1.2. Statebuilding in motion: nurturing peace through institutions 
Over the last decade the efforts to define what constitutes state fragility, 
failure and/or collapse, and the attempts to map and understand the variables that 
affect such processes have grown exponentially, testifying multiple approaches to the 
phenomenon. Such analytical effort to understand this systemic threat to international 
security and peace has much to do with the international need to engage and to act on 
such spaces/places of failure and fragility in effective ways. Notwithstanding the 
debates over the state being built, what underpins statebuilding enterprise is the 
assumption that viable statehood is the requisite for political organisation and order 
(Milliken and Krause, 2002). Hence, an idea of state, or the need for an ideal state, 
has not only guided the diagnosis of failure and fragility but has also structured an 
intervention project on a referential unit and role model. Grasping the different 
categories of “deviance” to such ideal (collapsed, failed and weak or fragile) entails 
the assessment of the best international practices, according to the different 
specificities and demands.
14
  
The debate over states fragility, failure and collapse is contemporary to the 
development of peacebuilding. In 1990, Jackson’s book questioned statehood in the 
Third World (Jackson, 1990). He distinguished states with juridical sovereignty (with 
international recognition, rights and responsibilities) from states with empirical 
statehood (with domestic authorisation and empowerment and the existence of 
institutional features) (Jackson, 1990). Accordingly, the author posited that most of 
Third World states were internationally enfranchised with sovereignty rights but had 
limited empirical statehood and, thus, were in fact quasi-states. Even though quasi-
states could not be considered a new historical phenomenon, the novelty of quasi-
states relied in the international normative regulations which protected and inflated 
statehood by exempting such states of power competition, and how, internationally, 
these states were sustained by development assistance through the acceptance of a 
negative sovereignty (formal-legal condition) (Jackson, 1990).  
                                                          
14
 One must consider, however, that different perceptions of what the state is (or should be) at the 
national and international sphere necessarily emphasise different variables of failure and 
reconstruction and specific contributions to peacebuilding. This is also fundamental to establish 
differentiated categories such as failed, weak or collapsed states.  
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Krasner (2004; 2007) followed these questions in the definition of what 
constitutes failure and what should the international engagement resemble. Krasner 
affirms that conventional sovereignty assumes an homogenous international system 
when in fact, and considering the three constitutive dimensions of sovereignty – 
international legal sovereignty, Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty and domestic 
sovereignty – the international system presents a different reality. 15 Indeed  
One of the most striking aspects of the contemporary world is the extent 
to which domestic sovereignty has faltered so badly in states that still 
enjoy legal international sovereignty and sometimes, even 
Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty (Krasner, 2004: 88).  
The failure addressed here by Krasner is thus located at the states’ internal 
level: the failure of domestic sovereignty implies that the state’s authority structures 
were not able to manage their own affairs. The lack of domestic sovereignty implies 
a failure in governance systems that can generate the necessary conditions to peace 
and order. But even though the failure rests on the internal level of states’ 
sovereignty, such failures, in the author’s opinion, do matter for the contemporary 
world, considering the economic and security interests of powerful states (Krasner, 
2004). For Herbst what is new about state failure is the internal nature of this 
phenomenon: “political units in Africa, and in some other areas of the world, are 
collapsing because of internal strains” (Herbst, 2004: 304). This new feature of 
failure has, however, been wrongly addressed by the international understanding of 
states’ sovereign rights, which posits an immutability of status that in fact protects 
states that are failing internally.
16
  
Despite the differences in the policy recommendations, such visions depart 
from the concept of sovereignty, and what it entails in practice for states, to 
emphasise the crucial role of the internal realm in the process of state failure. For 
Rotberg (2004) the failure of states must be measured according to a performative 
criteria: what distinguishes states is their effective delivery of the most crucial 
                                                          
15
 The international legal sovereignty refers to the recognition of juridically independent territorial 
entities while the Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty entails the principle of non-intervention in the 
states’ internal affairs. The domestic sovereignty is not so much a norm but frames instead the 
domestic authority structures and their ability to control activities within their boundaries (Krasner, 
2007). 
16
 Herbst also explores how the international inability to deal with the internal dynamic of failure is 
present in international relations theory, giving as example the little that security dilemma has to say 
about inwards state failure (Herbst, 2004). 
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political goods. Ultimately, states fail because governance – understood by the author 
as the effective provision of political goods – breaksdown. For the author, collapse or 
failure represent outcomes of an internal state decay process (in terms of 
governance), where will and neglect play a crucial role (Rotberg, 2004). Thus, failure 
is depicted as the outcome of “purposeful actions of a leader or leaders” (Rotberg, 
2007: 88), which necessarily depicts human agency as the proximate cause of failure. 
Across this evaluative frame of states, the distinction of nation-states in different 
categories – strong, weak, failing, failed and collapsed states – is fundamental to 
answer to their different needs accordingly, prevent the descending movement 
towards failure and rebuild the ones that are drowned into failure (Rotberg, 2007).  
The existence of states for provisional purposes is associated by Milliken 
and Krause with three intertwined narratives of the modern state as provider of order 
and security, legitimacy and representation, and wealth and welfare (2002). Bearing 
these narratives in mind and how they became expectations and demands towards the 
post-colonial state detached from their historical contexts, the authors affirm that 
what collapses is essentially a vision of a state rather than a real existing reality. Such 
acknowledgement is fundamental if one is to rightly understand the two-fold 
meaning of failure: state failure is inasmuch an “empirically-observed decomposition 
or collapse of the institutions of governance” as it represents the “dashed 
expectations about the achievement of modern statehood or the functions that 
modern states should fulfil” (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 753). This distinction is, 
according to the authors, fundamental if one is to consider the cases where failure is 
chosen to classify a state even when its institutions are still in place and even more 
fundamental, it must structure a critical distinction between failure and collapse.  
Nevertheless, the performative approach, which focuses on the state 
functions sovereignty entails, has prevailed. Ghani and Lockhart (2008) developed a 
thorough frame to guide the engagement with fragile states and foster its 
rehabilitation. The authors depart from what they call “the creeping sovereignty gap” 
(the difference between de jure assumption of sovereignty and the de facto 
performative reality) to draw a multifunctional model of statebuilding and then 
elaborate on the current stage of international aid and how international efforts have, 
so far, only aggravated fragile states’ problems.  
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The concept of failure present throughout the book is then defined from a 
functionalist perspective.
17
 Hence, the analysis is based on a concept of functional 
sovereignty that seeks to encapsulate the international and internal demands posed to 
the state on a double compact that sovereignty (existing or recreated) must embrace 
(Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). The analysis of failure, understood as cause of troubles 
and conflicts, ultimately presents the international community with an opportunity to 
correct such “anomalies” in order to recreate the contribution of states to a stable and 
peaceful international system.  
Departing from the double sovereign compound – the internal and 
international functions that sovereign states are expected to perform – the authors 
created a list of ten crucial functions that states must perform nowadays. Briefly, the 
states must assure the rule of law, monopolise the legitimate means of violence, have 
administrative control, manage public finances, invest in human capital, create 
citizenship rights through social policies, provide infrastructure services, form a 
market, manage public assets and effectively public borrowing. These constitute, for 
the authors, the ten core functions that states are expected to perform, regarding their 
responsibility with their citizens and their international partners: 
focusing on all those issues simultaneously provides us with a much more 
holistic overview of the functions that the state must perform in our 
interdependent world if it is to have legitimacy as a sovereign state at 
home and play a responsible role as a constituent member of the 
international community (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008: 165). 
The sovereignty gap – or the failure of the state to live according to such 
standards – is then estimated according to these functions and guides the definition of 
what the authors call “sovereignty strategies”, which are ultimately an integrated 
model for statebuilding. The model defined entails an alignment of resources and 
processes towards a common objective, and assumes the need to create consensus 
between the different stakeholders regarding the creation of a sovereign state. 
Necessarily, the definition of the critical tasks in such sovereignty strategy (defined 
according to the assessment of the sovereignty gap) must be in accordance with 
international legal standards and must engage in mandating leaders and managers. 
For the authors, the strategic statebuilding put forward through the engagement in 
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 The use of the adjective implies that the authors depart from the definition of what should/must be 
state functions in order to evaluate states fragility and establish the recovery process.  
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national programs “repositions the international system as a catalyst and genuine 
partner in a process of enhancing state capabilities” (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008: 
193).  
The diagnosis of what variables affect state failure and a consequent effort 
to clarify and differentiate contexts and situations according to the different 
performances of states functions have led to the development of a larger purpose of 
engagement that is encapsulated in the generalised usage of fragility rather than the 
mere category of failure. It is important to note that using fragility to classify states’ 
performance implies, in fact, a broader field for international action in what concerns 
the task of statebuilding. It represents an international compromise not only to react 
in places of failure but foremost to identify situations of fragile statehood and act 
accordingly.  
Fragile statehood or fragile states are, according to Schneckener (2008), 
situations where the state structures or institutions present key deficits in performing 
key tasks and functions. According to the author, focusing the analysis on statehood 
terms and the state’s three basic functions– security, welfare and legitimacy/rule of 
law – allows to make a distinction between different configurations of statehood: 
between weak (states fulfil the security function but poorly perform the rest), failing 
(the security function is not met but there is still relative compliance with the other 
two functions), and failed statehood (where none of the three functions is performed 
effectively). It is also fundamental to understand the degree of stability that fragility 
entails and through what processes some aspects of statehood remain in place in the 
absence of others. This is, nevertheless, based on the performance of state functions 
to differentiate statehood configurations and degrees of fragility. Consequentially, 
statebuilding seeks to shape and strengthen states’ capacity to fulfil their basic 
functions and to govern guided by a clarified diagnosis of situations and demands 
(Schneckener, 2008).  
Using the fragility frame to understand the main challenges posed to 
statehood has become part of the policy concerns when defining and clarifying 
mechanisms and policies for international actors’ intervention, and especially for 
international agencies that guide states’ actions. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) constitutes one of the strongest examples 
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regarding this engagement with a better understanding of fragility. In 2007, the 
organisation publicised the good principles that were to guide its member states’ 
engagement in situations of state fragility and defined fragility as the absence of 
states will or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, 
development, human rights and security provision (OECD, 2007). In 2008, the 
OECD issued a report to clarify the concepts and dilemmas that should be considered 
by international actors when intervening in fragile situations (OECD, 2008a). In this 
document, three elements are considered to justify the attention given to fragile 
situations: a post-Washington consensus (reflecting the changed emphasis on state’s 
role in development), the connection between human security concerns and the 
states’ responsibility to protect, and the post-9/11 distress with the relation between 
fragile states and terrorism. Furthermore, the organisation elaborated on its previous 
understanding of fragility by defining a fragile state “simply as one unable to meet its 
population expectations and capacity through the political process” (OECD, 2008a: 
16).
 1819
  
Consequently it has become rather consensual to map situations of fragile 
statehood through a focus on the sovereign condition of states. Either by criticising 
the discrepancies between the sovereign status and practices or focusing on the 
expectations towards the functions states must fulfil, diagnosing fragility has 
progressively focused on the internal sphere of the states. Such internal performative 
fragility represents most of all a governance malfunction that, beyond its domestic 
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 This redefinition of what is meant with the use of the term fragility constitutes one of the efforts that 
the organisation has developed to assess international actions and to define a framework for action 
able to meet the challenges properly and efficiently, and to answer to the different critiques and efforts 
of revision. We will explore this “revisionism” and the specific issues it addresses later in our 
analysis.  
19
 Another example is United States Agency for International Development (USAID) definition of its 
engagement priorities and strategies, departing from the diagnosis of fragility. According to the need 
to improve the agency’s response in situations of fragility its strategy paper draws a distinction in 
fragility: a vulnerable state, unable or unwilling to assure the adequate provision of security and basic 
services to its population, whose legitimacy is questioned, termed as failing states or states recovering 
from crisis; and a state in crisis, where the central government does not have effective control over its 
territory, fails to provide vital services throughout its territory, whose legitimacy is weak or non-
existent and violent conflict is a reality or a great risk (USAID, 2005). This “fragility framework” 
defines a model of states’ behaviour, both in terms of effectiveness and in terms of legitimacy, in 
security, political, economic and social realms. The diagnosis and differentiation of fragility it allows 
is then fundamental to structure the priorities of USAID engagement in situations of fragility and to 
establish a strategic engagement (not all states provide opportunities for the agency), able to focus on 
the causes of fragility and propel short-come impacts as well as long-term structural reforms (USAID, 
2005). 
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expression, poses a challenge to governance at the regional and international sphere 
(Zartman, 1995; Krasner, 2004; Schneckener, 2008). Hence, 
Understood as a systemic prospect state failure is causally linked to 
increased and widespread humanitarian suffering, regional instability, and 
transnational threats of international organized crime and terrorism. It is 
thus not just treated as the local population’s Hobbesian nightmare, but 
also as a potential source of insecurities for the core states of international 
society and as a phenomenon that threatens to undermine the modern 
project of achieving political order (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 764) 
State fragility and the consequent definition of a statebuilding strategy faced 
the dual nature of its threat: not only fragile states prevented development internally 
but underdevelopment also came to be the source of security threats. Duffield (2001) 
affirms that, through a relation of mutual reinforcement, development and security 
have been inextricably connected and the impact of this relation has profound 
political and structural implications. This security-development nexus expresses the 
vision of failure located at the state level but with possible severe consequences for 
the international sphere, which ultimately involves the deployment of an 
international solution for states’ internal fragility. This perspective towards state 
fragility and the international intervention it entails is framed by the understanding of 
sovereignty as states responsibility to perform certain functions, a perspective that is 
present in R2P. The vision of sovereignty as responsibility that emerged refers both 
to the state internal behaviour and to the action that must be deployed, internally and 
externally, in order to effectively apply R2P. 
The purpose of the report was not, as argued before, to elaborate on the 
principles that should guide the international action in situations of state fragility. But 
its elaboration and its attempt to provide a referential frame for states to solve the 
dilemma between the strict interpretation of the international principle of sovereignty 
and the appeals for action in scenarios of humanitarian emergencies, human rights 
violations and human security threats, diffused a refined understanding of 
sovereignty which sought to solve the “intervention dillemma”. Peace operations, 
and mostly “peace-builders”, had been charged, from the beginning, with the dual 
task of preserving states’ sovereignty while simultaneously challenging 
governments’ legitimacy. The sovereignty dilemma, which crosscut the 1990s, posed 
serious challenges and concerns, not only in doctrinal terms but also to the credibility 
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and capability of those who carried out peacebuilding actions on the ground 
(Bertram, 1995).
20
 The growing emphasis on the need to prevent and act in fragile 
states also collided with this dilemma. The R2P report ultimately solved it through a 
vision of sovereignty that justified international actions at the internal level of the 
states and saw no incongruence in the promotion of effective sovereignty through 
international intervention.  
The statebuilding agenda has, then, become framed by two fundamental 
elements: a diagnosis of fragility defined in terms of the states’ capacity to fulfil their 
functions; and the justified intervention of international actors in fragile contexts in 
order to revert the situation, prevent total failure and (re)build states’ sovereignty. 
This agenda, with its diagnosis premises and assumptions, was progressively 
transferred to peacebuilding practices. This renewed attention towards state 
institutions was welcomed by Ramsbotham et al (2011), for whom the introduction 
of a statebuilding component does not preclude the wider focus that peacebuilding 
entails. According to the authors, building effective and legitimate institutions and 
practices of governance, was a requisite to answer to violence in the conflict 
resolution field (Ramsbotham et al., 2011).
21
 Indeed, the focus on rehabilitating state 
institutions was always a concern for peacebuilding and it was expressed in the An 
Agenda for Peace and in its Supplement (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Boutros-Ghali, 1995 
respectively). The results presented by Suhrke et al (2007) also show that the peace 
agreements of the selected case studies contained fundamental dispositions for 
statebuilding even if they were signed at the beginning of the 1990s.
22
 Despite this 
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 The author identifies three fundamental dilemmas that crosscut the peacebuilding operations: the 
sovereignty dilemma, as we have posed it above; the neutrality dilemma, that expresses the tension 
between the aimed status of neutrality, perceived as fundamental to the success of UN peace 
operations, and the reallocation of power that peacebuilding in fact entails; and the security versus 
democracy dilemma, which expresses the tension between the short term need to promote security and 
the long term purpose of promoting democracy (Bertram, 1995). It is interesting to note how these 
dilemmas can be found in post-armed conflict statebuilding actions, despite the revision efforts to 
address these issues.  
21
 Ramsbotham et al. mention as an example, how both Burton’s work on conflict and its relation with 
human needs or Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict “located their focal point on their effort 
to address deep-rooted conflict and protracted social conflict on the requirement to build effective and 
legitimate institutions and practices of governance that meet basic human needs” (Ramsbotham et al., 
2011: 200). 
22
 The case studies analysed in this study are Afghanistan, Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone (Suhrke et al., 2007). 
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presence, there was an emerging sense that statebuilding was not only neglected in 
the past peace operations, which constitutes one of the main reasons for their limited 
outcomes, but had also been “actively undermined by international efforts at peace 
and development” (Call, 2008b: 12). Indeed, behind this accusation of neglect lays 
the international practices of peacebuilding that hoped that democratisation would 
ultimately generate institutions capable of managing tensions and conflict. The 
capacitation and the very existence of state institutions were not questioned since the 
“nature” of its behaviour was considered the purpose of intervention. Necessarily, the 
evaluation process of the limited outcomes of peacebuilding actions throughout the 
1990s was translated into a re-centring of peacebuilding efforts around the 
(re)creation of state institutions. The diagnosis of fragility of the statebuilding agenda 
was not only assumed as the necessary readjustment of peacebuilding actions to its 
limited outcomes and the new demands of peace and security, but was also 
progressively adopted to understand and address violent armed conflict. This 
preference for statebuilding is articulated in the diagnosis-intervention axis and the 
way it unfolds statebuilding assumptions of fragility and intervention in diagnosing 
violent conflict and deploying a peacebuilding plan.  
Diagnosing in peacebuilding has been centred on the understanding and 
knowledge over the root causes of violent conflict. Throughout the 1990s the 
analysis over what caused wars was, according to Woodward (2007), divided in three 
approaches: a cultural argument that addressed cultural and ethnic discriminations as 
a fundamental dimension in the occurrence of civil wars, either as primordial factors 
or as the result of social constructs (for the grievance argument see Gurr, 1993; 
Kaufman, 2001); an economic approach, that analysed the existence of primary 
value-added commodities as a strong incentive for rebels to continue fighting (for the 
greed argument see Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 2001); and a third approach, centred 
on the political regime argument, which posited that the absence of democracy 
deprived the countries from fundamental mechanisms to manage tensions and 
conflict, much inspired by the democratic peace proposal (Woodward, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the criticisms of this three-fold analysis of conflict causes, the 
definition of policies and practices remained, for Woodward, too much centred upon 
the need to address the root causes of conflict (Woodward, 2007).  
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The inclusion of state’s fragility diagnosis in the understanding of violent 
armed conflict based these possible causes on the inability of the state to answer and 
manage these tensions peacefully. The statebuilding purpose became then, to correct 
behaviours and prevent damaging situations for peace and security both at the 
internal and international levels. Defining a strategy able to capacitate states for 
compliance with their sovereign responsibilities and assure the creation of a positive 
mutual reinforcing relation between security and development has become 
fundamental in the definition of statebuilding for peacebuilding purposes, primarily 
undertaken by international organisations, transnational non-government 
organisations (NGOs) or third states and with activities that range from stabilisation 
and/or reform and transformation of existing structures, to rebuilding institutions and 
structures that were not present before.  
Broadly, statebuilding actions can be categorised in three fundamental 
dimensions that answer to the three narratives that modern states are expected to 
perform (Milliken and Krause, 2002). The deployment of a statebuilding agenda 
structured on a security dimension, where the efforts to demobilise, disarm and 
reintegrate are connected to a large effort with the security sector reform (SSR) and 
the enforcement of justice; a political component envisaging the creation of a 
political process that assures participation (through democratic elections and civil 
society participation), institutes the rule of law and (re)instaures legitimacy; and an 
economic element, where the development of a public finance and economic policies 
concerned not only with immediate relief measures, but also with macroeconomic 
policies, engaged with the transformation of the state into a viable economic unit 
(Ottaway, 2002; Call, 2008b). Acting across these dimensions reinforces the 
contribution that statebuilding measures can have in the construction of a viable 
peace not only because they nurture the creation of mechanisms that prevent the 
recurrence to violence, but also, and foremost, because they provide the 
infrastructure necessary to sustainable development and to smooth the impacts of the 
withdrawal of international actors.  
This connection has also been defended by the former Special Adviser to 
the Secretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi, who believes that building a sustainable 
peace requires the establishment of viable and capable institutions (2007). Faced 
 40 
 
with the expectations brought by the end of war, the international community should 
“plan, prioritise, sequence and explain its assistance” in order to produce a holistic 
approach that directs the interventions towards the goal of statebuilding and 
promotes effective partnerships with stakeholders. For Brahimi it is important to note 
that statebuilding is about transforming states that were previously engaged in 
repressive activities or were part in massive violations of human rights (Brahimi, 
2007). 
The new engagement of peacebuilding with states is present in the 
“Capstone doctrine” of Peacekeeping Missions (UN, 2008). In the four critical areas 
of peacebuilding activities described, it is acknowledged the importance of restoring 
state’s authority which may entail “operational support to the immediate activities of 
state institutions” and, where relevant, “include small-scale capacity-building or 
support to larger processes of constitutional and institutional restructuring” (UN, 
2008: 28)
23
. More recently, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the current 
challenges and directions that must guide the organisation’s actions in peacebuilding 
and the Peacebuilding Commission future affairs (2009b). The Secretary-General 
identifies the fundamental areas for engagement in an early post-conflict period: the 
support to economic revitalisation adds to the support that must be given to restoring 
basic security and safety, providing basic services, restoring core government 
functions and promoting a political process that creates conflict-management 
capacities at the national and sub-national levels. The core issue that unites such 
priorities is indeed the attention given to the state as the engine of a process that 
assures a stable and peaceful political order. In fact, these priority areas and the need 
therein expressed to nurture core state capacities – provision of basic services and 
public safety, the rule of law and the protection of human rights – are fundamental to 
develop governments’ legitimacy and effectiveness (Ban Ki-moon, 2009b).  
 Progressively, (re)building viable institutions in post-armed conflict 
scenarios became a fundamental element of a credible international engagement with 
peacebuilding. Statebuilding for peace entails an understanding of the conditions that 
                                                          
23
 Bellamy and Williams argue that this final version of the principles and guidelines was in fact less 
authoritative and progressive, by comparing it with the assumptions (stated and implicit) in the 
Brahimi report or previous drafts (for example the need for explicit authorisation for use of force only 
evident in the final version) (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 142-143). 
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fuel and feed other causes. But the diagnosis-intervention axis, with its reference to a 
performative sovereignty, unveils a statebuilding agenda that departs from a 
weberian evaluation of its capacity, and unveils the idea of statebuilding as 
institutional capacity building (Call, 2008b).
24
 (Good) governance is both a guide to 
this international capacitation as it is its assurance that, in post-armed conflict 
statebuilding, state institutions not only work for a viable project of development, 
able to avoid the relapse into failure or/and violent conflict (World Bank, 2000: 1-19; 
Boutros-Ghali, 1994; Boutros-Ghali, 1996), but they also have the capacity to do it. 
Statebuilding is thus represented as a pre-condition to put in motion any consequent 
peacebuilding strategy.
25
  
This focus on capacitation moved international actions away from the term 
of intervention to the use of partnership (Chandler, 2006; 2008). Regarding the 
international performative approach to sovereignty and how the actions of 
international actors are framed in the international responsibility to protect (prevent, 
react and rebuild), the relation between places of fragility and international actors is 
considered a collaboration through active partnerships, where both levels and actors 
(internal and international) join efforts in the recreation of sovereign responsible 
states able to contribute to a sustainable peace (Chandler, 2006; 2008). This relation 
between capacitation and international responsibility to act, and how it has been re-
casted as partnership is present in the Secretary-General Report Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect (2009a) where he defines the international assistance of 
capacity-building at the states level through active partnerships as a fundamental 
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 Two fundamental aspects must be considered when approaching the statebuilding enterprise: the 
weberian view that poses statebuilding as institutional capacity building; and a view that addresses 
state design, i.e. its organisational arrangements. The organisational features of the state relate to the 
allocation of power and authority but also to the regime that guides that allocation in principle. For the 
author, both are intertwined and despite the focus on the weberian dimension, statebuilding is forced 
to make choices related to state design when they seek to affect institutions. 
25
 Schneckener (2008) analyses four broad strategies towards statebuilding that necessarily emphasise 
different priorities and focus. He presents Liberalisation First and Civil Society First as holistic 
perspectives that tend to expand the range of activities and issues that must be dealt in statebuilding. 
Also, the author presents a Security First approach and Institutionalisation First that appear to simplify 
the process by narrowing down the statebuilding agenda to state functions. According to the author, 
the different organisations and actors that are currently engaged in statebuilding draw on these various 
strategies simultaneously (Schneckener, 2008). Our analysis suggests that even though the elements 
and priorities of these different approaches are present in any statebuilding agenda, especially in 
peacebuilding, the international practices have assumed a focus on institutions and the need to 
strengthen their capacities in order to answer to pressuring priorities and needs, such as security.  
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pillar of R2P implementation and identifies post-trauma peacebuilding
26
 as a critical 
point of assistance. This connection reinstates the view that the international society 
has the responsibility to engage in places where states fail with their primary 
responsibility to protect through partnerships that seek to capacitate state institutions, 
but which ultimately conceal an answer to the sovereignty dilemma that was present 
in the engagement of international actors at states level.  
Post-armed conflict statebuilding seeks nothing less than the (re)creation of 
institutions capable to perform states’ functions and honour responsibilities, and able 
to contribute to a sustainable peace. The IBL approach develop by Paris (2004) 
affirms this and contributes to create an understanding of statebuilding as the 
creation of supportive conditions for a peace project (Paris and Sisk, 2009b). 
However, Richmond and Franks’ analysis of liberal peace transitions has concluded 
that there is a “compromise agenda between peacebuilding and statebuilding […] It 
tends to veer towards statebuilding approaches, but uses peacebuilding as a 
framework for its legitimation […]” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 182). Such 
remarks seem to reinforce a distinction between statebuilding and peacebuilding that, 
and though rhetorically blurred by the state pacification project, becomes evident on 
the ground. This view reverses the relation: it is peacebuilding that is currently 
enabling statebuilding measures. 
Recent efforts to distinguish peacebuilding and statebuilding and elaborate 
on the possible relations and tensions between the two have been at the centre of the 
academic debate and policy development. The discussion over the relation between 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, and the inclusion of statebuilding premises in 
peacebuilding actions, have provided clarifications and readjustments, and 
furthermore, important critiques to the current practices of statebuilding in post-
armed conflict scenarios and the peace they promote. These issues will be addressed 
in detail in the following section. 
  
                                                          
26
 The Secretary General seems to use the term post-trauma here to distinguish the peacebuilding 
mentioned in the report from the peacebuilding that is supposed to be carried out in the aftermath of 
violent conflict. Nevertheless, our emphasis is upon the role that is given to the capacitation of states 
and the role the international community is expected to perform in that process.  
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2.2. Statebuilding under scrutiny: tensions, revision, and critique 
Statebuilding brought a different perspective to the relation between state 
and peace. The revision of peacebuilding records presented the academia and the 
policy circles with the need to explain the limited achievements and revise them. The 
emphasis grew apart from the previously established relation between the political 
regime and a consequent peace, to understand what the necessary conditions to fulfil 
the peacebuilding project of peace were. Statebuilding emerged then from the 
acknowledgement that states with limited power should not be mistaken by fragile 
states, and that the liberal peace project needed a working and viable state to flourish 
(Manning, 2003; Paris, 2004; Call, 2008b; Paris and Sisk, 2009b). The emphasis on 
the institutional capacitation of international statebuilding and the need to (re)create 
viable and responsible states came to be perceived as an enabling factor for peace 
rather than a specific dimension of the liberal peace project as democratisation was. 
The shift statebuilding caused in peacebuilding, from the project itself to the creation 
of enabling conditions, has had a great impact in peacebuilding practices and 
strategies. But the assessment of this shift cannot be done in absolute terms, i.e., only 
by stating that something has changed and institution-building is now at the forefront 
of international engagement in post-conflict situations. Analysing the impact of 
statebuilding must necessarily consider to what extent the inclusion of statebuilding 
in peacebuilding has caused (or not) a profound rupture with previous practices.  
The connection established between state failure/fragility and conflict, and 
how it has led to a revision of peacebuilding practices is undeniable. Nonetheless, the 
liberal reference was not denied: the diagnosis of states’ fragility focused on the 
necessary conditions for liberal peace instead of a revision of its norms. Furthermore, 
the diagnosis-intervention axis departs from a problem-solving perspective towards 
the social world that is consistent with the understanding of conflict precluded by the 
liberal peace and transmitted in peacebuilding.
27
 Both rely on a referential exercise of 
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 Drawing on the division done by Cox between problem-solving and critical theories (1981), 
Bellamy has addressed the current problem-solving nature of peace operations and its consequent 
implications (Bellamy, 2004). The author addresses the current problem-solving nature of peace 
operations in opposition to critical theories, in order to put forward the hypothesis of achieving the 
next stage of peace operations through critical reflection. Even though Bellamy is concerned with 
peace operations and does not specifically focus on peacebuilding, his reflection points to important 
features of peacebuilding practices and consensus by focusing on purpose, the position towards the 
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comparison with expected behaviours, which is responsible for the definition of 
different categories and concepts to understand and map social reality. Also, the shift 
towards statebuilding did not mean that democracy, as a peaceful political project, 
was to be discarded. Instead, statebuilding and its focus on institution-building came 
to be pointed as the necessary pre-condition to a consequent and meaningful 
democracy assistance in post-armed conflict spaces (Zeeuw, 2005), able to manage 
the tensions that might rise with elections and also responsible for creating the 
conditions for a civil society, supportive of democratic states, to emerge (Götze, 
2004). And democratisation, with its emphasis on the establishment of an elected 
democratic government and on the creation of a dynamic civil society continued to 
be crucial to legitimise the institutions built. According to Jahn (2009), both views of 
states’ relation with peace depart from modernisation assumptions in the definition of 
a self-referential analysis: they depart from what is present in “peaceful” societies in 
order to name deviant behaviours and propose sequenced interventions that are 
expected to multiply mutual reinforcing positive dynamics (Jahn, 2009). 
Therefore, the focus on statebuilding allowed a self-referential evaluation of 
the liberal peace project: the revision focused on its application to complex realities 
without questioning the project. In fact, the statebuilding diagnosis-intervention axis 
promoted an understanding of fragility and its relation to conflict that is ultimately 
tied with states’ internal incapacity to perform their sovereign responsibilities. For 
Bickerton, this fragility internalisation trend created a descendent movement of 
anarchy from the international relations towards the internal states level in a process 
identified by Bickerton as “domestication of anarchy” that ultimately internalises the 
causes of violent conflict (2007) and features regularly in current state failure 
literature (Hill, 2009). This descent movement acquits the international realm, 
namely the international system, from any responsibility in the process of state 
failure.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
social world and the relation between theory and practice. Consequentially, Bellamy (2004) identified 
three expressions of this problem-solving approach: first, an instrumentalist purpose tied with the need 
to resolve previously identified problems and develop more effective strategies and tools to address a 
certain issue; second, an assumed objectivist status of the analysis towards the social world, and third, 
and consequent of the first two, a non-reflexive condition between the production of knowledge and 
those who produce it emerges. These elements are not only cornerstones of the effort to understand 
conflict causes and cycle and define peacebuilding practices accordingly, as they are also present in 
the development of the diagnosis intervention axe of the statebuilding agenda. 
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The opposition between a domestic anarchy and a promising international 
order enabled the internationalisation of statebuilding processes whereby the 
international actors offered a solution to war-torn societies through an international 
statebuilding strategy. For Richmond (2006a) the prevalence of the international 
promise of peace over an internal anarchy testifies the oppositional logic that holds 
the international peacebuilding consensus. Accordingly, the author identifies two 
poles: a larger pole, the international, which refers to zones of peace, where the 
hegemonic idea of peace is in the present, attracted to other pole, where the zones of 
conflict and the national domain merge and where peace is simultaneously a lost past 
and a possible future.
28
 The interaction between the two tends to emphasise the 
strength of the international realm to extend its project of peace to conflict zones 
through the promise of a future peace after intervention.
29
 More importantly, the 
promotion of a viable state through institution-building assigned to peacebuilding the 
image of peace-as-governance (Richmond, 2004), which not only reflects the 
international attempt to control and correct behaviours in conflicts spaces through 
state-led policies but also reveals how governance became central to identify and 
correct deviant behaviours in post-armed conflict situations. Under this peace-as-
governance assumption the emphasis of peace is on the institutions that can promote 
good governance (Chandler, 2010b).
30
  
Hence, statebuilding performed an adjustment of the liberal peace program 
of action without denying its validity and viability (Whyeth and Sisk, 2009 apud 
                                                          
28
 Richmond presents us patterns of reflection and representations of peace merged in the development 
of peacebuilding consensus and intervention methodology: the opposition between the international 
and the national, used not only to express the possible disagreements over the understandings of peace 
but also to assert the international space’s prominent position in the validation of a peace model; the 
temporal quality of peace, that, through the representation of peace as an objective concept that might 
have been lost, needs to be defended in the present or sustains the hope of a future, and provides a 
legitimation to apply specific methods to promote peace within a frame of conditionality; a 
geographical division of peace between zones of conflict and zones of peace, which is not only useful 
to implicitly define peace but also fundamental to justify the access to the zones of conflict in order to 
extend the zones of peace to such places; and the hegemonic nature of peace definition, sustained on a 
specific frame of conflict analysis that instils a concrete set of answers (Richmond, 2006a). 
29
 The other patterns that Richmond mentions, such as the definition of agents and levels of peace, the 
distinction between top-down or bottom-up approaches, or the specific logic assigned to peace belong 
to the realm of such interaction (Richmond, 2006a). 
30
 The author elaborates on this emphasis change regarding his analysis of the current post-liberal 
nature of statebuilding. We will return to this point later when discussing the critiques and 
adjustments of the statebuilding practices. 
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Menocal, 2010). The focus on statebuilding framed the diagnosis of peacebuilding 
pitfalls and gave an answer to the critics of the liberal peace: it sought to safeguard 
the purpose of creating peace by correcting and refining the approaches to achieve it. 
Acknowledging these shared premises does not mean, however, that we should 
disregard the important transformations that have occurred in peacebuilding practices 
or the tensions that have resulted from the inclusion of the statebuilding agenda. 
Since statebuilding and peacebuilding are different arenas of international 
engagement, with different though intertwined purposes and goals, tensions between 
the two have emerged, despite the stated importance of viable states to a sustainable 
peace (Call, 2008b). 
 
Statebuilding for Peace? 
In the concluding chapter of his edited volume, Call affirms that building 
states “does not lead, directly and unproblematically, to peace” (Call, 2008a: 366). 
Departing from the chapters’ contributions, the author refers that state’s input for 
peacebuilding is necessarily problematic and contingent, and draws a parallel 
between state and statebuilding, and democracy and democratisation to emphasise 
that despite the value of states and democracy to a sustainable peace, statebuilding 
might cause disruptive impacts just as democratisation did (Call, 2008a). Richmond 
and Franks (2009) go even further and affirm that current statebuilding practices do 
not go beyond the promotion of a negative peace which necessarily reinforces a need 
to distinguish between the two and understand their tense relation.  
Such tensions in purposes gain expression during the implementation stage. 
In post-armed conflict spaces, statebuilding intrinsic tensions and dilemmas deal with 
the challenge of accommodation within a peace project. These tensions, dilemmas 
and contradictions have been under growing international scrutiny, ranging from 
adjustment proposals of its application to criticisms to its ambitions and contours.
31
 
The implementation of post-armed conflict statebuilding has been a central concern 
for those engaged in peacebuilding. In this sense, the literature has focused on the 
application of the necessary reforms and capacitation of institutions across the 
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 These “intrinsic” tensions have been summarised by Paris and Sisk (2009b) and will be enunciated 
later on in this section.   
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security, economic and political realm, and has envisaged, foremost, an evaluation 
and redefinition in terms of practices and instruments and a policy adjustment based 
on lessons learned. But despite the specificities of the functions assigned to each 
dimension, their evaluation has pointed common problems, obstacles and limited 
achievements, considering not only the isolated task of building a viable state, but 
also and foremost the eventual contribution to peace. The implementation of 
statebuilding actions is, then, persistently haunted by its limited effectiveness.  
Regarding post-armed conflict statebuilding effectiveness, the planning of 
the enterprise, the sequencing of tasks and the allocation of resources are some of the 
central issues pointed. In what concerns planning and sequencing, the attention has 
been centred on the movement from a systemic view of the statebuilding tasks and 
dimensions to a deployment of specific measures and reforms and their prioritisation 
(Schneckener, 2008). Such strategic and operative definitions are constrained by the 
availability of resources to meet statebuilding demands and needs across the different 
dimensions and stages of reform. Defining a strategy of prioritisation and sequencing 
that is met with the necessary resources has proven to be an difficult assignment. 
Additionally, and considering the multitude of actors and agents engaged in 
statebuilding tasks and the specificity of their mandates (areas of intervention 
prioritised and the resources available), a rising demand for coordination emerged 
(Zurn and Herrhausen, 2008). Paris has identified four levels where coordination 
problems were evident: first, between the different international actors involved; 
second, across the funding donors and their agencies regarding their different (and 
sometimes competing) goals; third, within the UN agencies system; and fourth, 
between the international actors of statebuilding and those who support them (Paris, 
2009). For the author, those engaged in statebuilding constitute a “loosely structured 
network”, a system of related actors that, despite their common objective, have “little 
joint planning for missions, patchy information sharing, inconsistent and often non-
existing coordination and no hierarchical command structure for the system as a 
whole” (Paris, 2009: 61).  
To this coordination issue a coherence problem is added: multiple and 
uncoordinated strategies, actions and resources can have a damaging effect in the 
feasibility of the overall project since they undermine the coherence across actions in 
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pursuing the final purpose. However this is concerned to a first element of coherence. 
But the challenge of coherence is threefold: beyond the coherence needed across 
means and actions regarding a final goal, there is also (1) a need to guarantee a 
coherent sequencing of tasks in order to not harm the project, and (2) to assure that 
the actions and means do not question the final purpose of post-armed conflict 
statebuilding.  
Regarding a coherent sequencing of statebuilding measures the agreement 
over what are the institutional priorities has been difficult, creating a fragmented 
institution-building programmes that strongly depend on the different mandates and 
assumptions of international actors – either from international organisations or 
national governments (Cliffe and Manning, 2008). There is however a growing 
tendency to define security as a fundamental requisite to put in motion other aspects 
of the statebuilding enterprise (Debiel et al., 2005). Such security privileging has 
sustained an evaluation of statebuilding that uses security related criteria as a crucial 
element in the definition of success (see Call and Cousens, 2008). This perspective 
is, in fact, in tension with more holistic approaches and may undermine the 
implementation of reforms concerned with the political and economic dimensions, 
which necessarily affect the coherence of the project as an enabler of peace beyond a 
negative expression (Debiel et al., 2005; Richmond and Franks, 2009). This potential 
harmful relation between actions and means and the end purpose was further 
developed by Chesterman’s analysis (Chesterman, 2004; 2005) of UN involvement 
in statebuilding, particularly in cases involving the transfer of authority.
32
 The author 
departs from the relation between means and ends to elaborate on possible patterns of 
contradictions – inconsistency, inadequacy and inappropriateness.33 Paris and Sisk 
(2009a) have added an important element to be considered in post-armed conflict 
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 Even though the focus relies specifically on transitional administrations, where these contradictions 
are more evident and address UN behaviour, it ultimately expresses issues that crosscut post-armed 
conflict statebuilding more generally, regarding the different contexts and actors engaged. 
33
 The question of inadequacy refers mainly to situations where the financial and human resources are 
not suited for the demands and needs of transitional administrations and this necessarily affects the 
performance of UN compromise with transitional administrations (Chesterman, 2005). The 
inappropriateness of means with ends deals with the opposite situation: the resources are available but 
they are not able to make a clear and strong contribution to the promotion of effective and improved 
governance because they are not suited for the ends (Chesterman, 2005). The inconsistency between 
means and ends curtails the previous two, since it implies that means applied are not consistent with 
the purposed ends (Chesterman, 2005). 
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statebuilding besides the concern and effort that effective design and implementation 
demands. For Paris and Sisk (2009a) it should be given more attention to 
sustainability in future actions, beyond the efficiency related questions like 
coordination and resources allocation. According to the authors sustainability is two-
fold: it refers to a sustainable international engagement with the statebuilding 
compromises assumed, in terms of attention and allocated resources but it is also 
concerned with the deployment of strategies that are consequent in the long-term 
(Paris and Sisk, 2009a). This implies a management of dilemmas and a necessary 
compromise with different forms of engagement and support of statebuilding beyond 
the physical presence of international actors in the hosting countries. In this sense 
effectiveness is inextricably linked to sustainability: statebuilding can only become 
an effective strategy to create peace if the long-term sustainability of reforms is 
assured.  
Related with effectiveness and sustainability is legitimacy. Legitimacy can 
be broadly understood as an acceptance and approval of the exercise of power by the 
state’s political community, transforming power into legitimate and supported 
authority.
34
 In post-armed conflict scenarios, legitimacy may refer to whether 
international actions are perceived or not as legitimate or to the legitimacy conferred 
through acceptance and approval to the internationally supported state’s institutions 
and the rules they entail (Mulaj, 2011). Two dimensions of legitimacy are usually 
considered: (1) an input legitimacy, related with procedure and process, i.e. the 
legitimacy given to institutions through participative mechanisms able to create 
social support; and (2) the output legitimacy, related with effectiveness, which refers 
to the legitimacy institutions attain with the deployment of policies and measures 
able to meet society’s expectations and demands (Schneckener, 2008; Mulaj, 
2011).
35
 Common to these dimensions are the subjective and relational qualities of 
legitimacy: legitimacy is anchored on “citizens’ perceptions and beliefs”, i.e. on 
                                                          
34
 Critical theory and post-structuralism crucially contributed to question the exercise of power and 
added important elements to this discussion on how power is transformed into legitimate authority and 
how this process may conceal dominative practices. We do not aim do disregard those contributions 
and critiques but this broad definition seeks mainly to explore how international actors address and 
approach the concept. In what concerns the process of legitimacy creation at the states’ internal level 
we will develop this issue later on when we discuss the mutual constitutive relation between state and 
citizenship. 
35
 For a more detailed discussion over the different sources of states legitimacy see Papagianni (2008). 
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subjective considerations defined with reference to the governing institutions’ 
actions. Considering this relational quality and the international dimension of 
statebuilding in post-armed conflict statebuilding, legitimacy operates on two levels: 
first, the legitimacy international actors seek for their actions which may come from 
a UN mandate or from their actions on the ground; and the legitimacy conferred by 
local populations to the actions undertaken. The implementation on the ground of 
statebuilding actions has proved more problematic in what concerns the creation of 
local legitimacy, with troubles arising when international criteria of action do not 
necessarily fit local demands. Traditionally, the social contract established between 
state and society frames the input and output of legitimacy and provides states with a 
strong reference to transform their power into legitimate authority. However, the 
international character of statebuilding actors has displaced the centrality of social 
contract from this process of legitimacy creation and regulation. International actors 
have sought to act on the ground in order to assure the creation of local legitimacy 
towards internationally sponsored state reforms.  
International actions for legitimacy creation have privileged its output 
dimension through a focus on a good governance premise. Good governance implies 
the proper use of the international resources by the state to develop reforms and 
capacitate institutions and, consequentially answer to social demands and 
development expectations. In what concerns the input creation of legitimacy, local 
ownership promotion, understood as a minimal local endorsement of international 
practices, has progressively become the strategy by which international actors seek to 
attain local support.  Nonetheless, and even though both input and output dimensions 
are addressed since states’ legitimacy is crucial to assure the effectiveness and 
sustainability of statebuilding reforms, the good governance clause has been 
privileged by the international actors, who define good governance parameters by 
which states are evaluated and legitimacy is granted. This international role in 
defining what good governance is as well as the flow of resources directed to good 
governance criteria appears to transform it into a dimension that international actors 
believe they can effectively affect, manage and control. Thus, and along with the 
international attention given to good governance and the actions related with its 
promotion we assisted to a progressive internationalisation of states legitimacy, by 
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which international actors replaced the role of the social contract with internationally 
sponsored criteria of good governance. In fact, and even though good governance is 
expected to drive states’ actions towards local populations, it is at the international 
level that states are judged regarding their compliance with the parameters the 
concept entails.
36
  
These actions aim to foster effectiveness and sustainability through an 
internationally induced legitimacy: international practices are expected to directly 
impact and improve governance and, consequentially, the local acceptance of the 
reforms. The ideal relation between legitimacy, sustainability and effectiveness is 
necessarily seen as a relation of mutual impact and reinforcement: these three 
elements are needed and must be addressed in parallel if current statebuilding 
practices are to be improved. Therefore, post-armed conflict statebuilding has 
progressively tied the relation between effectiveness, sustainability and legitimacy 
with the international actors’ actions and policies at the local level, in what concerns 
good governance and local ownership promotion. 
But these efforts may prove inconsequent. Woodward has identified four 
important problems with current policies: first, the promotion of an “internationally 
responsible state” may not be a priority for peace consolidation, especially since it 
tends to ignore local sources of authority and capacities to fulfil and sustain such 
demanding obligations; second, the lack of domestic support to a weberian-like 
transformative agenda; third, it ignores the need to reduce power uncertainties and 
establish authority, which refers to a moral aspect of the state that is not considered 
through institution-building; and four, it ignores the need to build a local 
constituency for peace (Woodward, 2006).
 37
 Considering statebuilding policies and 
practices limited achievements, there is a crucial need to question if statebuilding is 
                                                          
36
 States’ legitimacy has in the weberian frame an international dimension since the existence of states 
as independent territorial units demands to a great extent the acceptance and recognition of other 
states. What we identify here is a tendency of the international actors to intervene in legitimacy 
dimension that was confined to the realm of state-society relations and transform it into international 
affairs. This internationalisation, as well as its impact on the perceptions towards local populations 
will be further considered in the following chapter.  
37
 By local constituency of peace the author seems to refer to the individuals and groups outside the 
realm of the state which may affect the peacebuilding purpose. Reich defines peace constituencies as 
“networks or even more diffuse manifestations, which serve as conceptual tools to identify potential 
and necessary partners within the region and outside to reach a constructive transformation of the 
conflict”(Reich, 2006: 11).  
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indeed a peacebuilding strategy and reflect on it. For Woodward, “if done correctly it 
[statebuilding] is an essential task of peacebuilding” (Woodward, 2006: 27).  
Such perspective is shared by Call, who affirms that the “state cannot be 
ignored” (Call, 2008a). Hence, and notwithstanding  
“the harm caused and potentially lurking in post-war operations, 
international actors should not shrink from these efforts. Instead, they 
need to act with more thought, more caution, more deference to national 
actors and more humility” (Call, 2008a: 373-374).  
For Call (2008a) six tensions must be recognised and managed: 
statebuilding can spark and/or facilitate armed conflict if too many powers are given 
to the state too soon; second, international peacebuilding practices for delivering 
goods and aid, directly or by mediators has proven harmful for statebuilding 
purposes; third, state desired effectiveness must be balanced with the necessary 
power-sharing for sustainable peace; fourth, state’s security reform must be related 
with a larger political process of transformation towards inclusion and accountability 
that legitimises the state, creates stability and avoids war recurrence; fifth, the 
appeasement of peace spoilers while neglecting statebuilding needs may jeopardise 
the sustainability of both peace and state; and sixth, the transitional mechanisms that 
focus on solving the short-term issues may create obstacles for peace and state in the 
long-term (Call, 2008a). These tensions can be managed if the international actors 
act according to the principles of cognisance, context and patience (Call, 2008a).  
This “contingent yes” of Call resembles in some sense the dilemma analysis 
put forward by Paris and Sisk as an answer to statebuilding implementation and 
management challenges (Paris and Sisk, 2009a). Paris and Sisk have identified five 
fundamental contradictions of statebuilding that crosscut the implementation of 
reforms across different dimensions on the ground: first, the creation of self-
government through outside intrusive power; second, the establishment of ownership 
through international control; third, local problems solved with universal values 
promotion; fourth, statebuilding demands a rupture with the past while 
simultaneously needs to address historical inheritances, and fifth, short-term 
imperatives often clash with longer-term objectives (Paris and Sisk, 2009a). For the 
authors, these contradictions lie at the core of the dilemmas that statebuilding 
implementation has faced. To the coherence dilemma that we have previously 
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enunciated, Paris and Sisk add other four dilemmas that result from the hard choices 
between conflicting imperatives done during implementation: first, the footprint 
dilemma that expresses the degree of international intrusiveness on local politics; 
second, the duration dilemma that reflects the long-term nature of statebuilding 
enterprise and the obstacles such long international presence face (regarding not only 
the resources needed but also in terms of such long-term international presence 
perceptions); participation dilemmas, that cover issues ranging from the definition of 
local interlocutors to the lack of accountability of international actors to the locals; 
and fourth, dependency dilemmas, related both with the footprint and duration 
dilemmas, that frames how international assistance, despite its goal of creating a 
viable state, might create a relation of dependency that ultimately undercuts its 
purpose (Paris and Sisk, 2009a). Through this dilemma analysis, Paris and Sisk 
(2009a), ultimately seek an improvement of statebuilding as an adequate answer to 
the creation of peace based on more realistic expectations of what can be achieved.  
Both Call (2008a) and Paris and Sisk (2009a) consider the current obstacles 
that statebuilding, and specifically, statebuilding for peace faces. But they reinforce 
nevertheless the need to build states if sustainable peace is to be achieved. This 
position has been further supported by others such as Menocal (2010), who affirms 
that peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas “share fundamental complementarities 
which may, in general, outweigh some of the tensions” (Menocal, 2010: 15). Hence, 
“the intuition to develop a more holistic approach towards ‘statebuilding for peace’ is 
well placed” (Menocal, 2010: 15) despite the need to explore the contingent relation 
between statebuilding and peacebuilding and to improve the relation between the two 
sets of practices (Menocal, 2010).  
However, Menocal clearly states that political understanding and effective 
support of statebuilding is needed in order to create more realistic expectations of 
what can be achieved from the outside (2010). Such affirmation is symptomatic to 
views expressed by other authors. Ottaway (2002), for instance, has also argued in 
favour of a more realistic understanding of what is needed locally and what can be 
achieved through international actors. According to Ottaway, instead of over-
demanding there is a need for an international compromise, able to support 
institution-building while not demanding too much too soon, through the 
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implementation of best-practices that questions stability in the short-term (Ottaway, 
2002). For the author only newly generated power, currently neglected in the 
establishment of a de facto state, will be able to break the hold of existing groups and 
create institutional authority which is, in the long run, the purpose of statebuilding. 
The transformation of raw power into authority is then the first challenge that 
international actors should address but this has instead been disregarded in favour of 
a technical approach (Ottaway, 2002). Chesterman et al. have reinforced the need for  
“a realistic assessment of power (...) to formulate effective policies rather than 
effective rhetoric” in order to recognise the limited role that international actors can 
play in these processes (Chesterman et al., 2005: 384).  
This appeal for containment in the international ambitions does not mean 
that international actors should retreat from statebuilding but instead re-equates 
international actions according to more realistic perspectives towards what they do 
and should do. Barnett has followed this premise when he outlined what he describes 
as a republican peacebuilding, where statebuilding is assumed as the purpose of 
peacebuilding and is based on the republican principles of deliberation, 
representation and constitutionalism (Barnett, 2006). In practice, the simultaneous 
exercise of these principles as defended by Barnett conceals the purpose of stability 
with the need of legitimacy in a way that a liberal peace and its statebuilding policies 
are not capable. Barnett’s republican peacebuilding seeks to assist international 
actors with a more realistic, attainable and less contradictory project, possible to 
nourish from the outside (Barnett, 2006). Underlying these contributions and 
reflections, there is a perspective that the international actors have envisaged an 
ambitious project of statebuilding for peace which has been translated into limited 
outcomes. Despite the different reasons or elements that have been explored so far, 
one can identify a general tendency that points to the overambitious technical nature 
of statebuilding enterprise that nevertheless manages to leave important issues 
unaddressed.  
Fukuyama’s assessment on statebuilding departs from the striking 
limitations of international actors’ actions (2004). According to the author, the 
institutional transfer of knowledge through capacity-building has been transformed 
by the international statebuilding actors on the ground in a “capacity sucking out” 
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(Fukuyama, 2004).
38
 Fukuyama sustains that international actors have tended to 
“crowd out rather that complement the extremely weak states capacity of the targeted 
countries” which implies that even though governance is performed “indigenous 
capacity does not increase and the countries in question are likely to revert to their 
former situations once the international community loses its interest or moves on to 
the next crisis area” (Fukuyama, 2004: 139).  
But it is in the analysis of the demand side of statebuilding that Fukuyama 
grounds a noteworthy conclusion on the limits of international statebuilding actions. 
Fukuyama not only emphasises the limited role international actors play on the 
demand side since, contrary to what is assumed, specific incentives do not always 
generate intended behaviours and different elements account “deviations”, but he 
affirms that “institutional domestic demand for institutions or institutional reform is 
the single most important obstacle to institutional development in poor countries” 
(Fukuyama, 2004: 47).
39
  
By placing the burden of success on the demand side of institutional change, 
the author adds a different insight to the limited accounts of current international 
statebuilding efforts. If the question of expectations management had been equated 
regarding elements missing, tensions between statebuilding and peace, or the 
contradictions and dilemma causing. Fukuyama analysis and emphasis on local 
demand places the question over the will and ability of the locals to embrace 
international expertise, even when international actors try to induce demand. 
Fukuyama strengthens an analytical perspective, centred on the locals, through the 
demarked status given to demand of institutions as the “single most important” 
obstacle to properly consider the limited outcomes of statebuilding. Such focus over 
the lack of demand for institutional change is neither new nor exclusive to an 
ongoing evaluation of statebuilding achievements. Instead, we can identify a 
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Fukuyama identifies four components organised along an axis of transferability: to an organisational 
design and management dimension with a high degree of transferability follows institutional design, 
with a medium ratio, the basis of legitimation, medium to low, and social and cultural factors, with 
low transferability (Fukuyama, 2004). The author uses Ignatieff’s (2003) expression “capacity sucking 
out” to depict the contradictory actions of international actors regarding their statebuilding purpose. 
39
 For Fukuyama statebuilding is a transfer of knowledge over institutional construction and entails a 
supply side, which assesses the need for institutions at a given context and prospects their design, and 
a demand side, which refers to local willingness and desire for statebuilding and makes the 
construction of institutions possible (Fukuyama, 2004).  
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reinforcement of an internalisation process, this time translated in the causes of 
international limited results.  
This view is rather clear in Krasner’s work and his open appeal to a shared 
sovereignty that mingles the local responsibility of fragility and failure, the limited 
achievements of international actions and the international need to address 
statebuilding more effectively (Krasner, 2004). The sovereign decertification sought 
by Herbst’s appeal to international actors to “let them [states] fail” also testifies this 
vision, particularly when he affirms that internationals have not been courageous 
enough to show that “something fundamental has gone wrong in a country” (Herbst, 
2004). 
Although there are differences in the perspectives enunciated so far, 
important hints for reflection can be drawn. First, and despite the effectiveness 
record and the tensions identified between statebuilding and peacebuilding, there 
seems to be acquiescence over the need for a functioning state. Second, there is an 
appeal to international actors to lower the expectations that have guided post-armed 
conflict statebuilding (both at the international actors’ level and at the local level). 
The arguments that justify this appeal are assembled and articulated differently but 
they ultimately pass the idea that what the international actors can achieve is limited 
and most of the times it does not match what has been projected internationally. 
Hence the need to engage more strategically and effectively through a focus on 
stabilisation and/or the promotion of ‘good enough governance’ (Call, 2008a) in 
post-armed conflict spaces. Third and related to the need to limit expectations and act 
more effectively, there is an image of local affairs and conditions as a determining 
variable of statebuilding success on the ground. This view has had a crucial impact 
on the revision of statebuilding practices and specifically in what concerns the 
international actors’ engagement with local actors and a specific vision over the 
potential political agency of local populations on the spaces of intervention.  
Nevertheless, these views contrast sharply with the diverse arguments 
presented by other authors that identify the emphasis on stability and “good enough 
governance” not as an adjustment needed to improve statebuilding contribution for 
peace, but precisely as an outstanding feature of current international statebuilding 
practices. For them the tense relation between peace and statebuilding rests precisely 
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on these issues. Their point is not if statebuilding can promote peace. They question 
foremost what peace international statebuilding is creating.  
 
Statebuilding for what Peace? 
In the analysis of peace and peacebuilding developed by Richmond, it has 
been sustained that current engagement in the construction of peace, centred in 
statebuilding expresses a rather conservative approach to peace (Richmond, 2005b; 
2006b).
40
 The author posits that contemporary peacebuilding illustrates how the 
international actors enter the conflict zone within a conservative frame even though 
they aspire to move towards an orthodox model, assumed as sustainable and 
facilitator of the internationals’ withdrawal (Richmond, 2005b). However, this 
movement is neither linear nor simple. It rests on the criteria used to define the 
successful implementation of a specific graduation and how this fulfilment can push 
the goals of intervention further. The conservative and orthodox graduations of 
peace, where the main bulk of peace operations is placed by Richmond, rest on a 
state reconstruction framework, which seeks individuals’ emancipation through an 
interventionist agenda that envisages the creation of a social basis for a liberal peace 
through conditionality and transnational governance (Richmond, 2005b). This 
conservative feature was further explored by Richmond and Franks (2009) through a 
comparison between five case studies. They conclude that a conservative model, 
sustained on a limitation of self-government and self-determination and presented as 
the first stage for orthodox or emancipatory graduations, has been the main 
framework for international engagement (Richmond and Franks, 2009).  
Departing from these graduations and the contribution of Banks (1987) and 
the conflict he pointed between liberty, justice and order (the meta-narratives of 
political thought) Heathershaw (2008) has identified a democratic peacebuilding, a 
civil society discourse, and a statebuilding discourse (Heathershaw, 2008). This 
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 Departing from the four most important contributions to liberal peace – the victors’ peace; the 
institutional peace; the constitutional peace; and the civil peace – the author draws four graduations of 
peace: a conservative model, associated with top-down approaches to peacebuilding and often tied to 
hegemony and domination, which has recently descended to an hyper-conservative version; an 
orthodox model, structured on the consensual negotiation that seeks to bring a balanced existence of 
top-down and bottom-up approaches even though its emphasis remains in a state-centric peace; and an 
emancipatory model, currently concerned with peacebuilding consent and ownership and, 
consequentially, closer to the notion of civil peace (Richmond, 2006b). 
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discursive analytical framework led the author to analyse how a discursive 
incorporation has occurred through the progressive merge of security and 
development concerns in peacebuilding spaces. Discursively, this incorporation is 
visible in the meta-discourse of ‘Pragmatic Peacebuilding’ that offers a possibility of 
constant readjustment, and where peacebuilding and peace fully become “political 
discourses which represent and serve to justify certain political interests and ideas” 
(Heathershaw, 2008: 606). Hence, this meta-discourse allows for a elision of 
differences through intertextual relations and incorporative practices which 
necessarily leads us to acknowledge it as a governmentality expression “where 
ethical, spatial and temporal markers and policy modalities shift inconsistently under 
a hybrid liberal-conservative-humanitarian mode of hegemonic governance” 
(Heathershaw, 2008: 620).  
In this sense, statebuilding for peace, with its international nature, presents 
systemic motivations and impacts, which have been tied to processes of global 
governance. This connection has been pointed in different occasions by other 
authors
41
. Nevertheless, the primacy given to statebuilding in post-armed conflict 
spaces has deepened this critique. For Duffield the security-development nexus 
reinforced a biopolitical division between the secure and insecure global spaces 
(Duffield, 2007). It is in this division that fragile states are referred to in Duffield’s 
analysis. In fact, fragile states are a representation of the ungoverned spaces and, as a 
consequence, strategies for “closing the sovereignty gap” have emerged to assert a 
state for governance, through which international actors deny their own sovereign 
presence. This contingent sovereignty, described as mutual self-interest between the 
interveners and the intervened, constitutes a channel through which the West deploys 
“methodologies, dispositions and administrative arrangements”. We witness 
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 For Duffield, liberal peace was essentially an expression of an already existing frame of liberal 
governance or, better saying, an emergent form of liberal governance. For Duffield this could be 
explained by the encounter of global governance with challenging emerging political complexes at its 
borders: instead of complex political emergencies (situations of exceptional political, economic and 
humanitarian conditions) global governance encountered alternative processes of social 
transformation (even if they assumed a violent and disruptive expression) (Duffield, 2001). Pugh 
(2002), for instance, also explored this connection between the liberal peace and the processes of 
global governance. The author argued that “the maintenance of peace and security [...] is an aspect of 
global governance” and that peace operations, generally speaking, “have become institutionalised and 
structurally embedded in the system”, thus becoming active agents of its maintenance (Pugh, 2002: 
207). 
 59 
 
therefore a governmentalisation of aid that brings together aid and politics in the 
promotion of peace and stability in these ungoverned places (Duffield, 2007).
42
 
Chandler has also explored statebuilding interventionist practices and the 
peace they unveil through the relation international actors establish with local actors 
even if differently.
43
 There seems to be an essentially technical and administrative 
process that departs from the idea that political processes (such as democracy and 
political participation) are consequent of functioning state institutions (Chandler, 
2005). Hence, the statebuilding agenda has put forward an understanding of peace 
that deploys universal technical solutions despite any differences. Moreover, it has 
presented an idea of peace that separates the (re)creation of states from politics. For 
Chandler, statebuilding deploys a peace without politics, a peace where the different 
and possible causes of conflict and their nature are reduced to technical mistakes, 
deviant and corrupt elite behaviours in need of correction (Chandler, 2005). Such 
recipe of intervention was made possible by the “new wars” frame developed by 
Kaldor (1999) that, according to Chandler, has removed politics from the 
understanding of violent conflict and consequentially developed a strategy for peace 
that also outcasts politics.
44
 The consequences of this framing are two-fold: first, it 
removes political legitimacy from the actors involved in the dispute and second, it 
distances the international intervention from any interest other than ethical or 
                                                          
42
 Zanotti also derives her reflection over the UN statebuilding engagement in Haiti from the 
conceptual contribution of Foucault (2008). Departing from the UN attempt to redesign the penal 
system in disciplinary terms, Zanotti explores the images of disorder and transformation presented in 
the construction and deployment of UN reform plan. The view of the penal system as a disorder is 
translated into the UN project purpose of transforming those institutions into functioning institutions, 
able to enforce correction and surveillance. The author was led to conclude that rather than building a 
state or providing instruments of government to Haitians, “the UN intervention ended up by producing 
blurred spaces of governance, intensifying opportunities for international intervention, and reinforcing 
dependence” (Zanotti, 2008). Roberts has also affirmed how the current “orthodox peacebuilding” is 
an instrument of global governance sustained in the idea of governmentality. For the author, global 
governance is the means by which the “illiberal world is assimilated and conditioned into liberal 
behaviours” which necessarily attached  a biopolitical dimension to its actions (Roberts, 2011). 
43
 Chandler has published on what he considers to be a misreading of Foucault’s concepts and a 
misuse of his analytical frame of power. Particularly, he has engaged on a debate regarding the use of 
foucauldian lenses to criticise the concept of human security (see for instance Chandler, 2009; 2010a). 
In what concerns statebuilding, Chandler has departed from Foulcault to account on how practices 
come together to become a paradigm in is recent work (Chandler, 2010b).  
44
 Even though Kaldor appeals to international cosmopolitanism as an answer to this new type of 
conflicts, thus demanding politics as part of the solution, Chandler believes that the typology used to 
categorise and map the causes of conflict leave the political element out. It is precisely this vision that 
allows for a technical solution.  
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universal purposes (Chandler, 2005). In practice it prioritises and sequences the 
needs of the local spaces intervened under the problem-solving paradigm of technical 
scientificity which ultimately privileges the systemic needs over the process that may 
impact peace. In this sense, the “peace without politics” enunciated by Chandler is 
tantamount with the label of conservative peace established by Richmond 
(Richmond, 2005b).  
However, for Chandler statebuilding brought a significant change to 
international relations and the idea of global governance. Even though power persists 
in international relations and in the Western’s engagement with the non-Western 
states there is a major shift in its deployment. The Empire is in denial because the 
new forms of international regulation have avoided responsibility and accountability 
in the exercise of power by wrapping its actions in “a non-political, therapeutic or 
purely technical, administrative and bureaucratic forms” (Chandler, 2006: 11). This 
framework of action, which emphasises partnership relations while instituting 
mechanisms of domination and control, contrasts sharply with previous 
demonstrations of empire, centred on an open denial of self-government right. 
Instead, the regulatory framework of ‘Empire in Denial’ reinforces the legal status of 
sovereignty and denies any form of political control, departing from these principles 
to unravel a project of intervention and regulation. Indeed, the main point is precisely 
how the new forms of external regulation are “driven less by the desire to extend and 
enforce Western power than they are by the desire to deny it” (Chandler, 2006: 118).  
This exercise of power has created a “power without responsibility” which 
is, for Cunliffe (2007), what defines post-Cold War international relations and 
bridges the interventionism model of the 1990s, based on human rights, humanitarian 
emergencies, and state sovereignty’s suppression, and the current statebuilding 
projects, when the states are called back to international relations (Cunliffe, 2007).
45
 
If human rights’ universal promotion matched a “universalisation of responsibility 
beyond the bounds of [national] accountability” that downplayed political 
responsibility to the moral imperative of defending human rights (Cunliffe, 2007: 
59), the current state of global affairs demanded the creation of viable states and 
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 The author departs from Chandler’s view of human rights (Chandler, 2002), defined by the author 
as the exercise of power without responsibility in order to trace the common grounds of these two 
interventionist moments in international relations.  
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transformed statebuilding into the new interventionism that, nevertheless, continued 
to express the international exercise of power without accountability in the targeted 
societies (Cunliffe, 2007: 59).  
These critiques of statebuilding practices and the peace international 
interventions promote broadly exposes the technocratic view of sovereignty that has 
been the reference for international actions and has reconciled sovereign partnerships 
with regulatory interventions that apparently depart from different premises. For 
Chandler the ethical turn in international theorising, which has progressively 
presented the domestic political sphere of the states not as a vital constitutive sphere 
but rather as a space of division and conflict, is responsible for the conciliation of an 
apparent impossible juggling. In this ethical turn, the political sphere has become the 
problem to address: it departs from ethics and norms and expects to create political 
frameworks of existence (Chandler, 2006). Furthermore, the new doctrine of the 
states sovereignty also abandoned its political content of self-government and 
autonomy. First, by presenting sovereignty as a variable capacity instead of a right, 
the concept has been tied to a “sliding scale of capacities” which fosters and 
legitimates a new hierarchy of “variable sovereignty” where intervention can be 
“framed as supporting sovereignty” instead of violating the self-government. Second, 
the (re)presentation of sovereignty as a (shared) responsibility rather than a freedom 
legitimises intervention since international regulatory mechanisms define the content 
of such responsibilities and also hold states accountable for the failures in the 
exercise of their sovereign responsibilities. And third, the emphasis on the 
international legal sovereignty (defined through criteria based on the previous 
representations) detaches its formal status from any consequent political expression. 
Combined, these changes have allowed a social reengineering while providing the 
escape of denial: international actors and states have refuted the accountability of 
their actions by emphasising local actors’ responsibility in the process through the 
establishment of partnerships they in fact guide and direct under the auspices of a 
technical plan of recovery and control. 
Moreover, the technocratic view of sovereignty seems to represent what 
Cunliffe calls a “presentism, where politics is dominated by the tyranny of the 
present and we stagger from one crisis to another” (Cunliffe, 2007: 65). 
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Responsibility is then sacrificed by the elevation of emergency to a political 
category: “emergency does not constitute the first stage of a project of meaning: it 
represents its active negation” (Cunliffe, 2007: 65). In a similar sense, Hameiri 
exposes how  statebuilding interventions “rarely manage to become more than an ad-
hoc exercise in crisis management” (Hameiri, 2009: 50). Considering this presentism 
or crisis management exercise that seem to affect the states built under the 
technocratic sovereignty frame, Bickerton (2007) affirms that the current model of 
statebuilding, entails an exportation of state failure rather than the creation of viable 
states. According to Bickerton, current statebuilding literature and practices have 
transformed an eminent political problem – interpreting sovereignty meaning – into a 
technical challenge with a technical solution. “In response to the practical demands 
of state-building, analysts have responded by conceptually dismembering 
sovereignty into smaller, more manageable chunks” (Bickerton, 2007: 99).46  
Bickerton’s critique of international statebuilding precisely questions the 
international ability to promote consequent political institutions through externally 
driven processes (2007). According to the author, the promotion of sovereign states 
through technical approaches isolates sovereignty from its social bases and meanings 
which imply, in practice, the recreation of politically dependent administrations and 
the reproduction of failure (Bickerton, 2007). For Hameiri the current technocratic 
approach, which targets capacity-building, assumes the state as an institutional 
provider of services while it “de-historicises and naturalises” statehood, especially in 
what concerns the production and reproduction of political power (Hameiri, 2009). 
Thus, it implements in fact a multi-level governance through an intervention at the 
state level based on security-development nexus that tends to securitise failure and 
fragility and induces a risk management logic, and a gradated view of sovereignty 
based on performative criteria that distinguishes those who can intervene from those 
who are intervened (Hameiri, 2009: 43). 
Combined, these assumptions have created an anti-politics statebuilding 
which not only prevents particular forms of substantive political engagement but also 
perceives any questioning to its technocracy as a potential threat. More importantly,  
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 One can easily identify this technical emphasis on the performative definition of sovereignty put 
forward by Ghani and Lockhart (2008) and their division of sovereignty in two compounds. 
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understanding current statebuilding practices demands a consideration of the specific 
sovereignty it promotes: it is just not a matter of opposing sovereignty and self-
determination to trusteeships like missions but furthermost the acknowledgement that 
current statebuilding limits political autonomy precisely with the promotion of an 
internationalised sovereignty that fosters states’ integration into networks of 
governance (Bickerton, 2007).
47
 Accordingly, statebuilding seems to direct peace 
outwards: international actors engaged in statebuilding seem to foster a peace that 
assures a minimum stability and guarantees systemic needs. 
 
Moving forward? 
These critical voices echoed not only in the academia but also in the policy 
circles engaged in international statebuilding. There were important questions 
demanding attention and instilling a need for adjustment. On one hand, effectiveness 
critiques demanded an improvement of practices in order to enhance the effectivess 
of invested resources regarding the final purpose. On the other hand, the perspective 
of current practices as conservative or the expression of global governance that 
operates under the flag of sovereignty promotion, and detached from the political 
meaning of self-determination raised several issues. They questioned the legitimacy 
of international actions and foremost they have shown how local contexts have been 
overshadowed by international needs.  
In the UN context this revision gained a renewed breath with the creation of 
the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2007. Fifteen years after the term emerged, 
the UN gave peacebuilding an institutional expression. This process was considered 
an important step to rethink what peacebuilding had been and what should become, 
not only in terms of its practices but also as the expression of a UN sponsored 
international compromise. The PBC and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) 
had a cautious start but recent activities have been more visible, and the PBC, mostly 
through its Support Office, has issued recommendations that seek to define what 
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 It is interesting to note how Fukuyama (2004) and Bickerton (2007) share a view regarding the 
international ability to foster sovereignty in fragile states and how current policies are profoundly 
counterproductive to statebuilding’s main purpose. The conclusions drawn are however different, 
since Bickerton reflects on the integration of states in international processes of governance while 
Fukuyama makes an appeal to more realistic guidance to statebuilding interventions.  
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peacebuilding is and what are its dimensions, and the best practices associated with 
it
48
. Three documents are of particular significance in the PBC existence.  
First, the Secretary-General’s report in 2009 became a cornerstone for the 
activity of the PBC since it reflected on the lessons learned as well as on the 
challenges the organisation had to face, internally and externally, to deploy a 
“coherent and effective response” (Ban Ki-moon, 2009b). In the concluding section, 
the Secretary-General recognised national ownership as an imperative and anchored 
any peacebuilding initiative at the national level, whereby only those on the ground 
can assure a correct answer to the “fluidity of post-conflict contexts”. Two important 
notes must be drawn from these ideas: first, the Secretary-General inscribes the 
question of ownership as a guiding principle of peacebuilding, which acknowledges 
much of the debates in the academia about the relation between peace ownership and 
sustainability; and second, choosing the term fluidity and placing the focus of 
peacebuilding at the national level, entails a focus of peacebuilding actions on the 
specificities of local contexts, which is in fact a recognition of the unfeasibility of 
abstract global models. In the follow-up Report the Secretary-General reinforced 
these premises by recognising the still existing gaps at the national level to assure 
stable transitions while stressing the effort UN must do to address these issues (Ban 
Ki-moon, 2010).  
Second, PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned, issued in a report in 
2010, stating the organisation’s compromise to develop a systematic approach to 
peacebuilding based on past experiences. Nineteen meetings were held with different 
thematic purposes in order to grasp a vast array of challenges and issues 
peacebuilding should address. In the foreword of the Report, the Ambassador 
Heraldo Muñoz, Chairperson of the PBC, stated that 
“These years of experience of the Commission have shown that self-
sustaining peace means more than the cessation of hostilities. 
Peacebuilding must inculcate security, the rule of law and socio-economic 
development. [...] Peacebuilding must be based on the principle of 
national ownership, which should be accompanied by high levels of 
coordination and coherence among national and international actors, 
including regional organisations. Capacity-building is essential for this 
key principle to become a reality and not remain just an abstract concept” 
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 Bellamy refers some diplomatic issues over membership and procedures that delayed substantial 
work of the Commission until 2006, when country specific meetings started (Bellamy, 2010).  
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(Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission, 
2010: 1). 
National ownership is (again) stated as a fundamental principle to a strategic 
approach to peacebuilding, together with the principle of mutual accountability –
“strong partnership based on mutual respect and accountability between the 
Government and citizens and their international partners” – and sustained 
engagement – long-term “sustained and predictable engagement from all 
stakeholders” (Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, 2010: 5).
49
 
Finally, and in the same year, PBSO published a crucial document to clarify 
and systematise the UN approach to peacebuilding (Peacebuilding Support Office, 
2010). The document addressed the scope, planning and the resources needed for 
peacebuilding. Again, national ownership and capacity are defined as keystones of 
the UN approach to peacebuilding. Moreover, the needs identified by PBSO – 
support to basic safety and security, support to political processes, inclusive dialogue 
and conflict management capacities, support to the provision of basic services and 
support to restore core government functions – are equated under the need to 
promote a prioritisation of tasks according to each country specific needs and 
challenges (Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010). Consequentially, the document 
engages with more than peacebuilding principles: it defines needs and appeals to a 
country-sensitive prioritisation; it demands better and improved planning for 
coordination and coherence while acknowledging the limitations of simple technical 
approaches.  
These clarifications, revisions and adjustments reflect, in general, a reaction 
to the emerging critiques: they are not an innovation but rather an attempt to 
incorporate the critiques and lessons learned and deal with them. This trend, of 
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 Local governments face the dual accountability dilemma: they are expected to be accountable to 
their citizens and to their international partners. International actors, when they are states, are also 
expected to be accountable for the support given to statebuilding actions to their citizenry and to be 
reliable partners of local governments. Despite the appeals for mutual accountability, which 
strengthens the need to make international actors more accountable, there is however an absence in 
what concerns the relation of accountability between international actors and local populations. This 
absence is self-explanatory if we understand international actions as a non-political exercise that 
partnerships frame seems to veil. This view however entails specific consequences, especially if one 
considers how international actors exercise power in practice and the asymmetries that are made 
visible on the ground. This issue will be mentioned in the next chapter.  
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revision and (re)adjustment and the reconciliation between operative questions with 
legitimacy promotion has been followed by other international organisations and has 
also guided the OECD reflections on statebuilding and peacebuilding.
50
 The 
definition of the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations” established ten fundamental principles that somehow reacted to an aid 
diagnosis, expressed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, and to 
which the Accra Agenda for Action sought to answer (OECD, 2008b).
51 52
 But 
beyond the definition of these principles, the OECD inscribed the term “state 
resilience” in the international statebuilding discourse as the main purpose of 
engagement in situations of fragility (OECD, 2008a). State’s resilience refers to 
states’ ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness or legitimacy, 
considering a combination of capacity and recourses, effective institutions and 
legitimacy, underpinned by political processes that mediate state-society relations 
and expectations (OECD, 2008a). In practice, this concept seeks to give states the 
tools to keep a level of legitimacy within its polity. This open promotion of states 
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 The EU, for instance, has followed much of UN positions and shares with it the emphasis on 
capacity-building and local ownership of peacebuilding processes while also emphasising the need to 
promote state legitimacy (European Commission, 2007) which, and even though it can be related to 
local ownership, is considered as attainable through “good and effective governance” (EU, 2010)50. 
DFID, for example, introduced the term “responsive statebuilding”(Whaites, 2008). In 2010, this 
concept was rescued and tied with peacebuilding in a single strategy to be deployed in fragile and 
conflict-affected countries in order to create a virtuous cycle (DFID, 2010). This integrated approach 
matched the vectors that affect state-society relations with three interrelated elements of a positive 
peace – inclusive peace processes and agreements, mechanisms for a peaceful solution of conflicts, 
and the answer to the causes and effects of conflict – in order to create a “virtuous circle”, able to 
create strong state-society relations (DFID, 2010).  
51
 The need to take context as the starting point and the need to do no harm are referred as “the basics” 
whereas the appeal to focus on statebuilding as the primary goal, prevention and prioritisation, the 
recognition of existing links between political, security and development objectives, and the 
promotion of non-discrimination as a vehicle to the creation of inclusive and stable societies are 
united under the epithet of “the role of statebuilding and peacebuilding” (OECD, 2007). Under the 
flag of “practicalities” emerge the need to align with local priorities in different manners and contexts, 
the need for agreed practical mechanisms for international coordination, the urge to act and the need 
to stay engaged continuously to not endanger the intervention purposes, and the undesired possible 
existence of pockets of exclusion (OECD, 2007). 
52
 The Accra Agenda identified three major challenges posed to aid effectiveness in 2008: first, 
promoting country ownership; second, establishing more effective and inclusive partnerships, and 
three, achieving development results (OECD, 2008b). In order to face such challenges, the Accra 
Agenda set forward a frame of action according to the challenges identified. The reinforcement of 
country level policy dialogue, strengthening countries’ leadership and management capabilities, 
working closely with civil society and paying more careful attention to fragile states situations, and 
introducing changes in conditionality able to foster countries ownership, are some noteworthy 
measures (OECD, 2008b). 
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resilience is further supported by OECD’s attempt to clarify the intervention 
conditions across five statebuilding dimensions that should be promoted in order not 
to harm state-society relations and state’s legitimacy (OECD, 2010).53 The report 
also refers to emerging contradictions despite the interconnectedness between 
statebuilding goals and dimensions (OECD, 2010).  Two large issues crosscut 
international actions in the different dimensions: states’ capacity and states’ 
legitimacy.
54
 The former refers to actions that can prevent states to fully fulfil their 
functions or create additional obstacles to their consolidation. The latter is concerned 
with the counterproductive actions carried by international actions that may affect 
states’ sources of legitimacy and the future state-society relations. Nevertheless, and 
despite these efforts for providing clearer guidance in fragile contexts, the OECD 
recognised recently that, despite the adoption of such principles, practice remains 
detached from policy (OECD, 2011).
 55
 The concept of resilience, together with the 
guidance for “no harm” actions in fragile contexts as well as the 
dilemma/contradictions analysis, assumes and deals with the criticisms and efforts of 
revision that resounded in the academia. The reference to Paris and Sisk’s (2009a) 
proposal of dilemma analysis is a clear example of this inclusion. Moreover, the 
refocus on state-society relations and legitimacy and the focus on local contexts are 
again strong elements, present in these documents.  
It could be argued that the OECD concept of resilience targets situations of 
fragility and building peace is not the central concern of this international 
organisation.
56 
However, what is noteworthy in the concept of resilience is how it 
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The dimensions are: (1) the endogenous political processes; (2) the legitimacy of the state in society; 
(3) state-society relations; (4) society’s expectations towards the state; and (5) states’ capacity to 
perform their basic functions (OECD, 2010).  
54
 This division is also used by Call (2008b). 
55
 The report departs from the ten principles defined in 2007 and categorises the status of their 
application in three sets. The non-discrimination and alignment of development partner interventions 
matched the broadly and partly on track set of principles, while the principle to take context as the 
starting point, focus on statebuilding as the central objective, prioritise prevention  and recognise the 
links between security, political and development objectives constitute the partly off-track group. 
Finally, the off-track group is constituted by the principles to do no harm, agree on practical 
coordination mechanisms between international actors, act fast but stay engaged long enough to give 
success a chance, and avoid pockets of exclusion (OECD, 2011).  
56
 Even if some of the engagement principles with contexts of fragility are thought as principles that 
affect statebuilding and peacebuilding, the focus is on fragility rather than on violent conflict or 
peacebuilding.  
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directs international attention towards state-society relations while simultaneously 
proposing a different approach to fragility: resilience is not only an answer to the 
accusations of statebuilding detachment from the societies intervened upon but also a 
promotion of a statehood far from perfection but yet able to avoid fragility. 
Moreover, and beyond the vision of resilient states, it promotes a perspective of 
resilient societies and individuals able to adapt and circumvent the hardships 
presented.  
This idea of resilience is taking off not only in statebuilding in general but 
in post-armed conflict statebuilding specifically. A clear example is the 2011 WB 
report, Conflict, Security and Development, which tied the revision of international 
engagement in statebuilding with a better understanding of violent conflict and the 
construction of a viable peace using the concept of resilience (WB, 2011a).
57
 
Throughout the report, the relation between statebuilding, conflict and peace is 
clearly assumed and the main purpose of the report is to demonstrate “that 
strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, 
justice and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence” (WB, 2011a). It is clearly 
assumed that cycles of violence endanger development and spaces of institutional 
fragility are especially exposed to these cycles. There are six main axis structuring 
the report findings: first, the need to focus country strategies in fragility; second, the 
strengthening of justice, security and development partnerships; third, increase the 
attentions to jobs and private sector development; fourth, revise on the results and 
risk management frameworks; fifth, making financing less volatile; and sixth, 
striving for work excellence in fragile and conflict-affected situations (WB, 2011a). 
In a follow-up report the WB asks, through changed practices structured along these 
six dimensions, for no less than a paradigmatic shift in the current international 
engagement with fragile and conflict-affected situations (WB, 2011b). The 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) can be perceived 
as an attempt to produce the changes the World Bank is claiming.
58
 It is an 
international attempt to create an answer to statebuilding challenges in post-armed 
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 Resilience is here explored with a similar sense of the OECD understanding of the concept.  
58
 The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is an international forum where 
fragile states, civil society and donors converge to improve the actions that seek to facilitate the 
transition from conflict and fragility towards peace. Its secretariat is currently hosted in OECD.  
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conflict contexts and has emphasised legitimacy and accountability, the need to 
transcend mere technical solutions and the urge to renew the attention given to state-
society relations (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2010).  
Notwithstanding this initiative, one of the most interesting contributions has 
come from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) current framework 
to engage in spaces of fragility and conflict. Its vision over governance and the role 
and interactions it has on conflict transcends the realm of the effective deployment of 
political goods such as security. Democratic governance promotion is connected with 
effective, legitimate and resilient states, through a context-sensitive approach that 
anticipates the potential harmful effects for building a viable peace and maximises 
eventual benefits of democratic governance to conflict recovery (UNDP, 2009a). At 
the beginning of 2012, the organisation published a reflection over this topic where 
peacebuilding and statebuilding appear together and are institutionally assumed as 
closely interlinked processes. Accordingly, UNDP defined a framework of action 
where states’ responsiveness, inclusive politics, resilient societies and reinforced 
partnerships interact in the recovery process from fragility and conflict (UNDP, 
2012). “The novelty of the framework resides in its comprehensive approach to 
renewing the social contract and articulation of an integrated package of responses in 
fragile and conflict affected settings” (UNDP, 2012: 40).  
Despite the variations across these different contributions, they all revise 
past practices in order to put forward answers to shared criticisms. Indeed, the focus 
on local specificities and the need for adequate planning and support can be found 
across all the documents mentioned. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding these 
revisions, can we glimpse in these changes the paradigmatic shift desired by World 
Bank? In some sense policy circles have reinstated logics, concepts and arguments 
that some academic circles had been discussing. On one hand, the link between 
conflict, security and development, either from a negative explanatory logic or from 
a positive aspiration of construction, present, for instance, in the WB Development 
Report is not a novelty. The appeal to focus on local realities and necessities or to re-
centre international actions in states citizenry (here, its security and development), on 
the other hand, largely echoes the criticisms on technically abstract models of one-
size-fits-all. Moreover, the mutually affecting relations or the main fields of possible 
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intervention reify much of what had been said about states fragility and their relation 
to violent conflict: there is an appeal to engage in basic functions and the need for 
improved coordination and reinforced partnerships is not disregarded. 
There are, nonetheless, noteworthy elements that have emerged from these 
processes of revision and (re)adjustment attempts. The UNDP recent report over the 
relation between governance and peace related statebuilding and peacebuilding with 
no false complexes and reinforced the place of governance, both to rehabilitation of 
states and for the construction of peace (UNDP, 2012). Additionally, the 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding has created a new 
dynamic to materialise partnerships in the promotion of peace, even if these 
partnerships are guided by much of the concepts developed within the OECD circles 
and even though it seeks to dialogue and to listen to conflict or fragility-affected 
countries with a contextual framework of action previously defined.   
The instatement of resilience as a guiding concept for statebuilding and 
statebuilding-for-peace actions is perhaps the most significant contribution to rethink 
and readjust current international actions. This concept, which basically refers to 
states’ own ability to manage fragility and avoid failure, has apparently become a 
largely accepted concept in the policy circles to replace the ambitions of deep social 
engineering processes. This concept reinforces nevertheless the international actions 
as power without responsibility, since it seeks foremost to drive fragile states 
rehabilitation to the systemic needs. 
So, are international actors moving forward in order to materialise the 
liberal promise of peace or are they simply deepening and refining their instruments 
in order to avoid the critiques posed so far? For Chandler this is no longer a suitable 
question to grasp the current pattern of international statebuilding. According to him, 
statebuilding has become “a paradigm through which the world is understood and 
engaged” and has assumed a post-liberal character which ultimately ties the changes 
in the concept of sovereignty to the practices of intervention, technical in their nature 
and depoliticising in their application. This paradigm is marked by the absence of an 
articulated relation between state and society, which is crucial to classify the current 
international practices of statebuilding (Chandler, 2010b). In this post-liberal 
governance moment, resilience becomes the expression of an already consumed shift 
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away from liberal internationalism and towards a facilitation of a self-securing 
agency nurtured by international actors on the ground, which allows for an evasion 
of the problems faced by liberal framings of intervention (Chandler, 2012). Hence, 
and according to Chandler we are not moving forward: we are already there, at a 
post-liberal governance time.
59
 This is the reason why Chandler has become so 
critical of the liberal peace-based critique of statebuilding. For the author such 
approaches, and especially the power-based approach, are not only unable to grasp 
this change but have, furthermore, provided discursive tools to sustain such shift 
(Chandler, 2010b).
60
 For Chandler, these approaches have repeatedly tried to 
overcome attempts of hegemonic power and knowledge and have consequentially 
assumed power rather than questioned it (Chandler, 2010b). Thus, the failure to 
transform the world in liberal terms is understood as the failure of liberal forms of 
knowledge and focuses on a search for the non-liberal other (Chandler, 2010b: 39) 
which may create an non-liberal, fundamentally irreconcilable with the most liberal 
empowerment demands.  
This critical stance towards “liberal peace induced critiques” has been 
adopted by others. For Campbell et al (2011), and if one starts to question the critical 
account of the Liberal Peace’ critics, one might be confronted with striking 
resemblances between critics and the meta-narrative of liberal peace being criticised: 
both share a binary vision between those who intervene and those intervened upon, 
the international liberals and the others, non-liberals; both perceive the problematic 
that emerges from an alleged liberal universalism and demand a local sensitivity; and 
both do not discard intervention, despite the discussion on the grounds it should 
occur and how it should be conducted (Campbell et al., 2011).
61
 To this shared 
binary vision, Hameiri adds the failure to develop a “positive assessment of 
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 Chandler’s argument resembles the post-interventionist moment Duffield has identified. However, 
it is this perspective towards liberal peace that distinguishes the two approaches, since Duffield uses 
post-interventionist to explore liberal peace governance mechanisms while Chandler explores the 
post-liberal governance precisely to explain how statebuilding operates beyond liberal assumptions.  
60
 To understand his point one might consider how Chandler (2010b) and Richmond (2010) talk of 
post-liberal moments and refer to such different aspects of international action and practice: if for 
Richmond a post-liberal peace is needed, for Chandler a post-liberal governance is already in practice.  
61
 It is interesting to remind how Heathershaw accuses some peacebuilding critics of a bifurcated 
logic, which is, according to the author, what sustains the division of “them and us, then and now, bad 
and good. It is a world divided between the ‘enemy-other’ and the ‘ideal-other’” that sustains the 
“meaning, credibility and even legitimacy of the interventions” (Heathershaw, 2008: 603).  
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peacebuilding/statebuilding” that is focused on the “nature, dimensions and 
development of actual forms of political rule under contemporary modes of 
international and transnational intervention” (Hameiri, 2011: 196). Hence, the liberal 
peace critique “poses the risk of constraining and limiting critical political 
engagement with the policies and practices of international intervention, allowing 
critical theorists to operate within dominant policy frameworks, rather than critiquing 
these frameworks” (Campbell et al., 2011: 5). Either by considering that the liberal 
peace discussion produces a misleading focus on what really happens on the ground, 
the existent power and agency of local actors and elites, or by accounting for the 
selective critique of NGO’s role in liberal peace, there are indeed arguments 
challenging the usefulness of the liberal peace-based critique of statebuilding and 
peacebuilding (Paffenholz, 2011; Sending, 2011; Zurcher, 2011). 
Nonetheless, and even though Chandler’s perspective over statebuilding is 
an interesting proposal to understand the current state of global affairs and the 
policies related to the management of current global crisis, and though statebuilding 
underlying premises are currently applied worldwide, the contributions of liberal 
peace-based critiques must not be discarded.
62
 Hameiri stresses the importance of the 
liberal peace critiques to opening debates regarding the nature of international 
interventionism as well as the peace deployed in terms that questioned “an 
ideological constituted and ahistorical argument” (Hameiri, 2011). Post-armed 
conflict spaces remain as one of the most challenging places where statebuilding has 
been deployed. Besides the challenging conditions on the ground, international actors 
engage in conciliating statebuilding with peace, even if they have a post-liberal 
governance agenda. Discussing and reflecting on the project and form of peace 
deployed can be insightful to explore specific configurations of statebuilding, even if 
our focus is peacebuilding. These are not irreconcilable purposes. Rather, they are 
inextricably linked, just as peacebuilding and statebuilding practices have become. 
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 The reflections over post-liberal governance and the statehood therein inscribed are useful frames to 
understand the current state of global affairs across the political and economic dimension. It is in fact, 
a solid contribution not only to the issue of statebuilding in particular but furthermost to understand 
current patterns and thinking in international politics about state and governance. Its reflection on how 
government and self-determination, cherished values of liberalism, have been sacrificed for 
governance are particularly interesting to frame, for example, current economic adjustment 
programmes of some European countries, such as Portugal, Ireland and Greece.  
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Moreover, and though Chandler and others’ contributions raise important 
issues and hints for reflection they are mostly engaged on the macro-level of 
statebuilding. Hence, and according to Hameiri term they fail, just as the liberal 
peace critics, to develop a “positive assessment of peacebuilding/statebuilding” 
(Hameiri, 2011: 196). This reinforces a passive image of local actors which has been 
unveiled by the de-politicisation and internationalisation argument (De Guevara, 
2008).  
Indeed, Chandler’s critique does not give us a deep insight of what happens 
locally. Although he focuses on the description and identification of the non-liberal 
Other as a crucial element of the perspectives criticised, Chandler does not fully 
explore this question on his own reflection. One tends to note an absence regarding 
the possible paths to transcend this dichotomy and the depoliticisation of the local, 
and ultimately this silence reveals a non-engagement with local actors which also 
constitutes a limited account on local politics (Chandler, 2010b). However, and when 
assuming the international character of post-armed conflict statebuilding and the 
dislocation of legitimacy of political relations to the international level (broad 
features of the post-liberal governance paradigm identified by Chandler), one 
wonders if there is nothing left locally. In order to address this question, the present 
work will bridge such critiques with the concept of citizenship, a central political 
concept and the traditional frame of state-society relations, but currently neglected in 
the discussion of statebuilding and of post-armed conflict statebuilding in particular, 
both in policy circles and in critical assessments and reflections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
3. The concept of Citizenship  
The local spaces of intervention, their actors and peoples, have 
progressively gained attention in international statebuilding practices. Throughout 
the years, critical voices and revision attempts have sought to correct practices which 
took little account of local specificities, needs and demands. State-society relations 
have come to the forefront of the discussion, both in policy circles and academia. 
This growing attention towards the local spaces has been translated into a series of 
concepts, defined and developed with the specific purpose to conciliate statebuilding 
with local specificities. However, and although local realities, and more recently 
state society relations, have occupied a central place in current reflections, 
citizenship, traditionally assumed as the framing concept of state-society relations, 
has been absent from the discussion on statebuilding interventions and consequences 
and also from the plethora of concepts used to deal with the “locals” and improve the 
record of statebuilding practices.   
Considering the complex scenarios where statebuilding occurs and the 
growing emphasis placed on the need to address state-society relations properly, it is 
significant that citizenship in such contexts has neither been directly addressed nor 
debated in the main discussions of statebuilding practices and outcomes. However, 
this silence over citizenship does not mean that state-society relations were not 
important in statebuilding scenarios: in fact, and even if this did not occupy, until 
recently, the core of international actors’ concerns engaged in post-armed conflict 
statebuilding, other concepts and practices have been deployed to deal with the 
challenges posed by the need to address state-society relations in order to improve 
the effectiveness, legitimacy and sustainability of the actions. Notwithstanding the 
reasons, such concepts silenced a citizenship debate in statebuilding but, more 
important, presented a veiled understanding of citizenship which is a crucial starting 
point to address citizenship in post-armed conflict spaces. By mapping this silence, 
both in the policy circles and in the academia engaged with international 
statebuilding for peace, we aim to explore what the concepts used in alternative 
entail for citizenship and, foremost, for politics on the ground, thus questioning how 
the political individual in the spaces of intervention has been approached and 
nurtured, understood and represented.  
 76 
 
In order to achieve such dual purpose, one must depart from a conceptual 
discussion that goes beyond more traditional views of citizenship, is able to grasp the 
complexity that marks citizenship nowadays, and more specifically, the challenges 
added to it in post-armed conflict spaces where state and peace are being (re)built. 
We wish to do so not just with the purpose of criticising international practices but 
also, and foremost, to grasp citizenship possible meanings, expressions and contents 
in spaces of statebuilding interventions beyond this critique. Hence, the present 
chapter engages with citizenship debates in order to define the conceptual and 
analytical references needed to approach the condition of citizenship in post-armed 
conflict statebuilding contexts. Accordingly, we have divided this chapter in two 
moments. First, we map the current discussions and contributions regarding the 
concept of citizenship to map the elements of the concept from which we will depart 
to consider the complex configurations of the concept. In the final section we discuss 
these elements to define a conceptual map to re-engage with the question of power 
and the condition of the political and, consequentially, question the existing 
depoliticising narrative.  
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3.1. Mapping histories, narratives, and disputes 
The question of citizenship is not new or even recent in political theory. 
Antiquity coined the term in order to define the political nature of (some) individuals 
and its relation with governance systems either if we refer to the Greek polis, where 
political life had primacy, or to the Roman Empire, where individuals possessions 
and its regulation are crucial (Pocock, 1998). The political landscape of modernity 
came to be fundamentally different from the Classical period. However, the tension 
between the political and legal aspects of being a citizen, and the meaning of 
citizenship ascribed accordingly, transcended the transformations occurred and can 
be found in the present discussions over the concept of citizenship. 
Modern citizenship, as the classical conceptions of citizenship, cannot be 
separated from the space of governance it refers. In fact, state and citizenship have 
been inextricably linked in modern political thought since the latter has been 
considered as “the signifier of the relationship between the state and its population” 
(Migdal, 2004b: 24). Mapping modern citizenship thus entails a reflection on the 
relation established between citizenship and the state, especially because it was 
through the process of territorial bordering that states and citizens establish their 
existence as such.
63
 Modern state posits an image delimited by two types of 
boundaries (Migdal, 2001).
64
 The first relates with the territorial boundaries 
established between states which are responsible for the geographical delimitation of 
state’s political community. It is through the definition of these boundaries that states 
define their legal authority, exercise their power and thus establish a frontier of 
geographical inclusion in the legal framework it establishes. This match between 
state’s territory and its political community enables states to embody its population, 
to assume the state as the representative of a population of a given territory (Migdal, 
2001). The second sort of boundary relates to the demarcation established between 
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 Here we do not wish to discuss in detail how different processes of state formation affect 
citizenship. Rather, we aim to refer to an understanding of modern state that has tied citizenship with 
state and more specifically with the nation-state.  
64
 According to Migdal, the state is “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and 
shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a representation 
of the people bounded by that territory and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (Migdal, 
2001: 16). The process of boundaries drawing mentioned refers to those who constitute the image of 
the state.  
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state, specifically its institutions and actors, from those who are expected to become 
subjected to its rules and power or other non-state, private, social forces (Migdal, 
2001)
65
. This social-political boundary does not only separate and distinguish the 
state from individuals and other actors: the state is elevated and it represents society, 
assuming itself as the only form of social and institutional order which proclaims a 
general will or common interest as opposed to particular interests (Jessop, 1990; 
Migdal, 2001). In this sense, the modern state affirms itself apart from society, as the 
“leviathan” above its subjects (Migdal, 2004a). However, and because it is driven by 
claims of general will, state is necessarily a part of society, particularly because its 
legitimacy depends on society’s recognition of its status as the prevailing order and 
thus its actions must be connected to it (Jessop, 1990).    
Citizenship is affected by these processes of boundaries drawing while it 
simultaneously affects the modern state. The definition of a citizenry that recognises 
state’s authority is crucial to maintain the delimitation between states but it also 
represents a boundary between state and society, which is related with the 
identification of the state not solely as the highest actor of governance but also as an 
agent of eventual coercive and oppressive behaviours towards its society. In this dual 
process, modern citizenship becomes the signifier of a relation which grants the 
states with the recognition needed while it provides individuals with legal assurances 
to protect them from the state. Hence, citizenship appears to be necessarily linked to 
the formation of modern states just as states are tied to citizenship: states become 
membership associations, demanding the identification of individuals as members of 
the political community, providing the state with its social foundations. The legal 
equality and the universality of rights bound citizens and provide a unity and 
cohesion to the social foundations of the state. Thus, state’s actions on citizenship 
will necessarily affect its legitimacy and, as consequence, citizenship becomes not 
only a constituting subject of the state but also a crucial object of its activity 
(Stewart, 2001; Kaygusuz, 2006).  
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 Jessop affirms that the state cannot exercise power precisely because rather than being a subject, the 
state is an “institutional ensemble”, an apparatus of institutions and organizations, which necessarily 
precludes different potential structural powers affect by the specificity of each institutional ensemble 
(Jessop, 1990).  
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The national citizen 
Though state became a site for creating a community of individuals, this did 
not imply the creation of a shared cultural matrix, i.e., an identity with a cultural 
dimension (Jessop, 1990). However, modern state formation is not only marked by 
the political landscape it brought to Europe but also by the division it established 
based on cultural differentiation. The French Revolution is commonly defined as the 
emergent moment of the nation-state, i.e. where a community of shared values, the 
nation, encounters its political and institutional expression of self-government 
through the state (Heater, 1999). The nation-state is, nevertheless, the “heir to 
centuries of state-building and to the gradual development of national consciousness 
within the spatial and the institutional frame of the developing territorial state” 
(Brubaker, 1998). The nation entailed a correspondence between a political 
community and a cultural community, with shared traditions, language, able to create 
an identity that transcended the civic bond (the mutual recognition of citizens as 
equals) without denying it, and forged ties that bounded individuals together in the 
defence of the nation-state as the political expression of the nation (Hobsbawm, 
1992; Brubaker, 1998). Our purpose, however, is to understand how the idea of the 
nation, assumed here as a social construct, was instrumental for the state in the 
definition and reproduction of its political community and how this process has 
profoundly affected citizenship.
66
 This instrumental relation between state and nation 
is clearly stated in Gellner’s conception of nationalism and the causal connection he 
establishes between state, nationalism and nation (Gellner, 1983). According to 
Gellner (1983), nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy: this means that 
nationalism promoted by the state is an attempt to legitimise its actions by assuming 
the representation of the nation. This does not mean that the idea of nation 
exclusively depends on the state; on the opposite, the nation is an imagined 
community by its constituents (Anderson, 1991) and yet real, because it guides 
actions and frames behaviours (Smith, 1999). However, and because the state can 
affect this process, matching state boundaries with the nation boundaries is 
                                                          
66Hobsbawn affirms that “For whatever a nation was, the element of citizenship and mass 
participation or choice was never absent from it” (Hobsbawm, 1992: 19). Recognising this connection 
is especially important once we discuss the challenges and discussions of the concept of citizenship 
that have emerged recently and whose content address specifically the national domain of citizenship.  
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instrumental in reinforcing the legitimacy, unity and cohesion of the state. 
Ultimately, the nation-state merged the membership of individuals to a political 
community with the cultural membership to the nation: citizenship in this sense came 
to be equated as membership to the nation-state community, creating a symbiotic 
relationship between citizenship and nationhood that has mutually reinforced both 
(Brubaker, 1998; Heater, 1999).  
The definition of citizenship carried with the bordering of the nation-state 
has a powerful message of demarcation directed outwards with an inherent 
oppositional logic: it demarks foremost states’ territories and political communities. 
Necessarily, this bordering establishes the inclusion/exclusion divide at the borders 
of the state: inside rests the political community and legal framework established by 
the state which contemplates only the citizens included in this community; beyond 
the borders are the others, non-citizens of the state (perhaps citizens of other states) 
who are excluded from membership and thus from citizenship. This demarcation of 
nation-state, directed outwards, has been central in defining the access to citizenship.  
The concept of citizenship, particularly its content and meaning, has, 
nonetheless, been disputed by two main perspectives that inherited the duel that 
marked the classical period and has evolved amidst these competing visions 
(Sommers, 2008). While the legal view came to be adopted and extensively 
developed by liberalism, the idea of citizenship as participation in the political life of 
the community has been embodied by a republican view. This central difference is 
built on different approaches to social and political realities but they also share 
assumptions. Republicanism preciously carries the heritage from Aristotle and its 
political ideals of civic virtue are present throughout the writings of Enlightenment 
philosophers and the writings of Rousseau on the topic of social contract. 
Republicans focus their attention on the citizen but do not conceive the citizen as an 
individual unit: instead the polity is a cornerstone for the existence of citizenship. 
Republican citizenship embraces two fundamental issues: first, the value of public 
space as the sphere of politics where individuals come together as a community or a 
polity; and second the premise of self-government (Dagger, 2002). Consequentially, 
citizenship conveys a necessary engagement in public affairs, crucial to create the 
civic bonds that tie citizens together and to put in practice the idea of self-
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government, and demands the existence of a system with power sharing mechanisms 
that prevents arbitrary and autocratic government, which is the fundamental 
guarantee of citizens self-government (Heater, 1999; Dagger, 2002). This frame of 
governance is structured on the rule of law which guides citizens’ actions towards the 
community and the state and which assures that citizens are free of autocratic 
exercises of power from the state and also from their fellow citizens (Dagger, 2002). 
Citizens’ freedom is, nevertheless dependent on the participation of citizens on the 
political life, precisely because laws are defined in the public sphere. Accordingly, 
the legal and the ethical dimension, are connected, building the image of active 
citizens (Dagger, 2002). In this sense, states and citizenship are mutually 
constitutive: citizens can only be free in a republican state and the state can only exist 
as the expression of popular will and be legitimised by popular sovereignty. This 
relation is built on social contract and the political community forged is, for 
republicans, a good in itself (Beiner, 2003). Even though the form of government is 
not liquid, the most important is to preserve the republican nature of the state through 
the active engagement of individuals in public affairs (Heater, 1999).  
Liberalism places individuals and their purposes above groups and identity, 
and the political community defined within the frontiers of the state is mainly 
instrumental to help them achieve their goals and purposes (Beiner, 2003). Thus, the 
status of citizenship does not prevent individuals from seeking their self-interest and 
instead, and since the public and private sphere of life are so clearly separated, 
individuals may pursue their goals without having an obligation towards the public 
sphere (Heater, 1999). In this understanding private property and individual freedom 
are central and guide individuals’ actions (Schuck, 2002). By establishing an 
instrumental relation of recognition and protection between individuals and the state, 
citizenship means, foremost, the pursuit of private goals and interests under the 
mediation of the state, i.e., with the protection of individual rights (Heater, 1999), but 
guided by the goal of maximising individual freedom (Schuck, 2002) through the 
establishment of individuals’ universal legal equality. The principles of political 
utility mark the understanding of state existence and relevance but they are based on 
rules and rights that mediate state-society relations. In the liberal conception of 
citizenship, democracy is crucial to assure that individuals’ interests are represented 
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and rights are respected while it maintains the autonomy of individuals in face with 
the limited but legitimate state. 
Notwithstanding the differences expressed in the summarised description of 
the main features of the liberal and republican account of citizenship, especially in 
what concerns the relation established with the political community and the meaning 
individuals give to it, there are, however, shared elements that constitute fundamental 
bridges between the two and are important to understand how the concept of 
citizenship has evolved. First, both approaches recognise the public sphere as the site 
of politics and both assume that individuals possess political agency protected in 
legal terms: how, why and if citizens engage with the public sphere and exercise their 
political agency is already a matter of disagreement. Second, both concede the legal 
dimension a significant weight in the definition of citizenship even if, and again, the 
meaning and purpose of the legal dimension is not consensual. Third, both 
approaches recognise citizens as possessors of property, though for liberalism 
citizenship guarantees individuals property and for republicanism property concedes 
the individuals with the social and economic independence needed to better exercise 
their role as citizens (Heater, 1999).
67
 Fourth, both liberal and republican view 
citizenship as universal – a shared condition to the members of the state’s political 
community – and as the expression of individuals’ equality.68 And finally, both 
liberalism and republicanism, despite their differences, did not question the modern 
phenomena of nation-state and the consequences it had on the delimitation of 
citizenship.  
Republicans found in the nation the creation of community ties that could 
resemble and recreate the civic bond it claimed for citizenship, considering 
particularly the dimension and bureaucratisation of modern states. Moreover, the 
assumption that nation-states were the image of their nations embedded the idea that 
state-nation was the result of the nation’s popular will. In what concerns liberalism, 
the acceptance of the nation-state, however, may sound as a profound contradiction 
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 Heater clarifies that not all property was associated with civic virtue by the republican tradition. 
This is however a noteworthy aspect, especially due to the interaction that political citizenship has 
developed with the economic sphere of the market and also because it depicts republican citizens as a 
restrictive club (Heater, 1999).  
68
 Necessarily, those who were considered eligible to become citizens of a political community were a 
rather exclusive group.  
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with the premises we have just described, especially considering the individual focus 
and the emphasis placed on freedom and autonomy. Nevertheless, and according to 
Kostakopoulou (2010), one can understand liberal acquiescence of nationhood either 
as expressing an acceptance of the natural order of things or as a starting point and a 
given reality, in a strategy that the author conceives as “making a virtue out of a 
necessity” (Kostakopoulou, 2010: 50). Still, and notwithstanding the reasons for this 
acceptance, the nation came to delimit the space where citizens had their rights and 
autonomy assured and provided a sense of stability to the institutions which granted 
them. Thus, and rather than discussing exhaustively why and how liberals acquiesce 
the existence of nation-states, we aim to emphasise foremost how the nation was 
accepted both by liberals and republicans, bringing these two perspectives together in 
a juggling exercise. Modern citizenship based on the nation-states “became a 
coherent package, containing rights, duties and a sense of tradition, community and 
identity” that placed the geographical inclusion/exclusion divide at the nation-states’ 
borders while it assumed the universal condition and equality within its territory 
(Heater, 1999: 99).  
The evolution of citizenship was marked by the processes of 
industrialisation and the creation of an economic system based on capital that 
reinforced a separation between the public and the private sphere, where economy 
was located, and a differentiation between state and society (Magnette, 2005). 
Private life was privileged over public life but citizenship rights had a central role in 
protecting it and, as a consequence, the principles of universality and equality of 
citizenship were protected. However, and even though modern citizenship placed the 
inclusion/exclusion divide at the limits of its political community, and thus continued 
to echo universal and equal citizenship for its members, the rapid development of 
industrialisation and the growth of an economy based on capital brought along 
additional challenges to citizenship premises of universality and equality. Even 
though the nation-state was providential to the development of a new economy, this 
system was not equal to all its members. More importantly, these differences affected 
individual’s experience of citizenship.  
Marx extensively explored the inherent limits and contradictions of modern 
citizenship, particularly in what concerned its detachment from the economic sphere. 
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First, and because Marx perceived the state as a reflection of the division and the 
struggles between social classes, he questioned the contractualism which depicted the 
state as the site of freedom. Second, the liberal vision of the state divided and 
separated the political and the socio-economic realm subordinating citizenship to the 
individual’s needs. And third, Marx points to the contradiction between a political 
universality and equality condition and the de facto inequality (Magnette, 2005). 
Marx questioned this separation and decisively connected the two by relating the 
political, economic and social dimension of life. Moreover, Marx inscribed a 
collective aspect in the struggles for rights and freedoms that questioned the 
exclusive individualistic views of liberalism. Thus, and even though Marx’s views 
did not result in a reinvention of citizenship, they clearly affected the liberal-
republican conception of citizenship. According to Magnette  
From the moment when the liberal state acknowledged the legitimacy of 
trade unions negotiations, it admitted the incompleteness of the model of 
citizenship it had promoted and to which it had had the pretence of 
reducing politics (Magnette, 2005: 162). 
Modern citizenship evolved, then, through the management of the tensions 
between the promise of equality in politics and the challenging consequences of the 
free market (Heater, 1999). As a consequence, citizenship was extended to the social 
sphere and to other groups of society previously excluded. This extension added 
complexity to the concept. Additionally, modern citizenship managed the 
coexistence of republican and liberal precepts through representative politics which 
provided the individuals with the channels to participate in the definition of 
governance.  
T.H. Marshall addressed this evolution in detail in 1950, with his reflection 
Citizenship and Social Class (Marshall, 1992). His analysis was developed in the 
aftermath of World War II, but he evoked an historical perspective to citizenship, 
focusing particularly in Britain’s modernisation, in order to analyse how the concept 
had managed the contradictions between capitalism and the social inequality it 
carries, and the promise of equality (Marshall, 1992; Turner, 1993; Isin and Wood, 
1999; Marston and Mitchell, 2004). Marshall sought to explain how two 
fundamentally contradictory conditions, equal and universal citizenship and class 
inequalities, had lived together and how, in a moment so delicate as the post-war 
 85 
 
environment, this tension could be once again mediated through citizenship 
(Marshall, 1992).  
Marshall analysed citizenship evolution through rights and depart from three 
types of rights to understand the consequential relation between them (Marshall, 
1992). According to Marshall, civil rights were the first to emerge and the legal 
protection of individual freedoms they established was fundamental to assure the 
emergence the second set of rights. The political rights that emerged after civil rights 
were mainly defective, i.e., they were more of a privilege to a certain economic class 
rather than a right attached to citizenship, even if they recognised individuals’ 
political capacities (Marshall, 1992).
69
 This was however changed when the basis of 
political rights was (formally) changed from “economic substance to personal status” 
(Marshall, 1992: 13). Social rights only gained expression at the beginning of the 
20
th
 century and their emergence is inextricably linked to both civil and political 
dimensions and the widening of the rights conferred to previously excluded groups 
(Marshall, 1992).  
More important, according to Marshall’s narrative, citizenship sequential 
and cumulative evolution testifies how the concept has been closely related to the 
capitalist system and has progressively addressed and managed the tensions that rose 
between the premise of equality sustained by citizenship and the reality of social 
inequality between classes promoted by capitalism (Marshall, 1992). For Marshall, 
the inclusion and recognition of social rights and their impact on social inequality 
meant “a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general 
reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalisation between the more and less fortunate 
at all levels” which made status equality “more important than equality of income” 
(Marshall, 1992: 33) and ultimately levelled the existing inequalities. In this frame, 
the development of social rights not only assured an accommodation of the tensions 
between market and equal citizenship (Heater, 1999; Marston and Mitchell, 2004) as 
it has decisively affected the narrative of citizenship as the condition of rights, 
sliding from “a definition of a citizen as what a person does to what that person gets” 
(Castles and Davidson, 2000), as bearers of rights.  
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 For the author a “law-abiding citizen [...] was free to earn, to save, to buy property or to rent a 
house, and to enjoy whatever political rights were attached to these economic achievements. His civil 
rights entitled him, and electoral reform increasingly enabled him to do this” (Marshall, 1992: 13).  
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What the linear evolution identified by Marshall did not express, or could 
not predict, were the limits and the possible setbacks in existing rights. Necessarily, 
Marshall’s account of the evolution of citizenship must be understood as a 
“sociologically and normatively contextualised” analysis that, departing from the 
British reality, focused on modernisation processes and entailed the pre-existence of 
the civil and political dimension of modern citizenship for a consequent social 
dimension to emerge (Roche, 2002). Marshall’s remarks on the social dimension of 
citizenship as the “latest phase” of a “continuous progress” (Marshall, 1992: 7) did 
not foresee the countries’ obstacles to implement a social rights agenda and could not 
anticipate the setbacks that the welfare system would face when confronted with 
economic policies that sought to diminish the role of the state and, necessarily, 
reduce its ability to provide social rights to its citizens (Castles and Davidson, 2000).  
Paradoxically, it was precisely the economic context from the 1970s 
onwards that brought Marshall’s of citizenship analysis to the forefront of the debate 
and sustained challenging attitudes towards the neoliberalism that dominated a more 
and more globalised market economy (Sommers, 2008; Kostakopoulou, 2010).
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 In 
fact, and even if Marshall’s social citizenship was based on a liberal premise of 
rights, the understanding of these rights, and the role of the state in them, were rather 
different from the neo-liberal perspective that perceived state interference in the 
social sphere as a threat to individuals’ freedom and autonomy (Heater, 1999). 
Progressively, and with the extension of citizenship rights beyond the traditional 
public/private divide of social life promoted by the post-war welfare state, a view of 
citizenship as rights was privileged which entrenched the understanding of the 
concept in the legal status it conferred. The neoliberal policies kept the view of 
citizenship as a status was kept but its meaning was however shrunken by a 
utilitarian interpretation of this status and a limited scope of rights.  
John Rawls, in his seminal contribution  A Theory of Justice (1971) tried to 
recreate the liberal theory of rights by denying the simple utilitarian logic of 
citizenship and placing justice at the centre of social and political order. Rawls 
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 Sommers states that “just when so many of the egalitarian ideals T. H. Marshall so brilliantly 
theorized in ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ had been all but completely betrayed, his historical 
sociology of citizenship suddenly achieved canonical status” (Sommers, 2008: 147).  
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departed from an idealised original position of individuals to recast the social 
contract in terms of justice. 
71
  
His aim was to propose a political conception of justice that assured social 
cooperation between free and equal individuals in a constitutional democracy. By 
aiming to do so, the author necessarily recasts the issue of social contract but builds 
on it departing from the promotion of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971). Rawls 
defines two fundamental principles to create a just society: an equal liberty principle, 
through which basic rights and liberties are guaranteed to all individuals, and a fair 
equality of opportunities principle combined with the difference assumption (Rawls, 
1971).
72
 Assuming the universal plausibility of these principles, a social contract 
based on justice states a minimal claim about a basic unity of social life, more 
concerned with what is right than with what is good (Buckler, 2002; Arneson, 2006).  
Rawls’s proposal was not received amidst consensus. Quite the contrary, it 
fuelled a discussion surrounding Rawls’s limited account in what concerned identity 
first, and then regarding its impact on citizenship. This is particularly true in the 
critiques which have made the case for a communitarian view of citizenship 
(Klusmeyer, 1996). Though we cannot discuss in detail the most relevant 
contributions to the communitarian critique, it is important to note that the reflections 
of Sandel (1982), Taylor (1989), Walzer (1983) and MacIntyre (2007) brought the 
issue of community and its relation with individuals’ identity to citizenship debates. 
Broadly, the communitarian critique accuses Rawls’s version of liberalism and his 
idea of justice of being “excessively individualistic, atomistic, and abstract” 
(Klusmeyer, 1996: 84), particularly because the original position detaches the 
individual from the social and cultural context and their impact on individuals’ 
actions. On the contrary, communitarians assume that individuals’ identities are 
shaped within community’s norms and conventions and are precisely these 
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 Assuming individuals’ rationality, Rawls invokes a hypothetical original position where individuals, 
under the “veil of ignorance”, i.e. without the contingencies of the social world or any advantages, are 
asked to choose principles of justice to govern society. For Rawls this original position, a device of 
representation, is crucial to assure that the principles that guide society result from a fair agreement, 
i.e. from an agreement that departs from equal positions (Rawls, 1971) 
72
 This difference principle aims to guarantee that social and economic advantages are arranged in the 
greatest benefit of the least advantage. For Rawls inequalities and differences can only be built upon 
the individuals’ different achievements and, accordingly, the fair equality of opportunities must be 
ensured for a fair distinction. Hence, the difference logic is a guarantee to the respect of fair equality 
of opportunities.  
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conventions that establish authoritative normative principles in the community 
(Selznick, 1998; Buckler, 2002). This focus on community explicitly assumed a 
cultural element in political communities, in a clear statement against Rawls 
contribution to liberal theory (Delanty, 2003). For community defenders, rights in 
liberalism are too formal and neglect the identity and participation dimensions as the 
real ties that bind communities, thus revealing a concept of the self as a social 
product of a pre-existing community (Delanty, 2002).  
This does not mean that those who demand a renewed focus on community 
do not share values with the liberal approach or its concern with rights. On the 
contrary, the principle of equality is likewise central for those who advocate for a 
community turn. According to Delanty, the issue at stake in the debate between 
liberals, such as Rawls, and communitarians does not entail a choice between two 
opposed positions but it rather expresses more of a “difference in metatheoretical 
justification and methodology” and, therefore “the communitarian position is perhaps 
best termed ‘liberal communitarianism’ since these are no longer exclusive 
positions” (Delanty, 2002: 163).73 For Delanty, these perspectives, whose focus lay 
on cultural communities and how they precede the political communities where 
citizenship exists, intend to force liberalism to acknowledge this, and to recognise the 
role played by the cultural dimension in the definition of individuals’ identity as 
citizens (Delanty, 2002).   
It is precisely in this relation between a cultural and political community, 
and the citizenship that emerges from it that the differences between liberals and 
communitarians are more evident. Beiner states that while for liberals “political 
community is instrumental to the striving of individuals to give their lives an 
authentic meaning”, for communitarian perspectives “political community is 
instrumental to the strivings of community to elaborate a collective identity that can 
be constitutive of the selfhood of its members” (Beiner, 2003: 31). Communitarian 
discourses of community are, in Delanty’s view, discourses of the dominant 
community recognised as such by the state (2002) which has led Beiner to conflate 
communitarian views with nationalism (2003). Nevertheless, the definition of these 
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 This holds particularly strong if we consider Beiner’s statement that posits that the work of Walzer 
and Taylor evolved in a multicultural direction in order to reconcile the existence of different 
communities within the same state (Beiner, 2003).  
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principles based on a cultural common good assumes the unity of such community 
and its pre-political nature, ignoring the diversity and negotiability of identities and 
neglecting the impacts that competing identities cause on individuals’ actions 
(Bickford, 1996; Isin and Wood, 1999; Buckler, 2002).  
According to Bickford, communitarians share this disregard with liberals 
since by not engaging in a discussion of community and its cultural dimension 
liberals also fail to grasp the complexity associated with it. This inability is further 
sustained on the rather instrumental view of citizenship and the political community 
that sustains both approaches, even if they seize different purposes. For Bickford, 
and though liberal accounts of citizenship are forged to prevent individuals from 
colliding in the pursuit of one’s own understanding of good whilst communitarians 
foster a “turning inward” to the preservation of the common good, both views 
represent “too limited an understanding of human togetherness” with their visions 
structured on either right or good while obscuring how both individuals’ situatedness 
and capacity of choice interact (Bickford, 1996: 11).   
The discussion over citizenship appeared, in the late decades of the 20
th
 
century, to be divided between liberals, where the disagreement between the social 
version of citizenship and the neo-liberal utilitarian view was evident, and a 
communitarian approach that sought to bring the significance of belonging back to 
political thinking, thus carrying important consequences for citizenship. This 
discussion, however, did not challenge the core of modern citizenship: to the 
contrary, the value of equality, and, most of all, the value of universal status granted 
with citizenship were not questioned. Liberals assumed this universal condition and 
the equal status of citizenship as an assurance of individuals’ freedom to pursue their 
vision of good, though guided by a frame of rights and justice, while communitarian 
views approached equality and universalism as guarantees of communities’ cohesion, 
and definition through a recognition as equals by its members.  
Parallel to this discussion over the meaning of citizenship the economic 
context that developed in the 1980s had a crucial impact on the role of the state in 
economy but also in politics. Accordingly, the relation established between the state 
and its citizenry was necessarily affected and the content of citizenship, specifically 
the social rights cherished by T. H. Marshall, faced a strong attack propelled not only 
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by economic efficiency criteria but also by a vision of social life that demanded a 
less intrusive state. 
The concept of modern citizenship departed from a western-based approach 
to political reality, framed by modernity assumptions towards the state the central 
role it played in defining citizenship. Nevertheless, the discussion over citizenship 
gained a new momentum with the unfolding of global events or local actions with 
global echoes that defied its foundations. First of all, the dynamics of globalisation 
and the complex economic, political and social phenomena brought along have 
questioned several assumptions of political life and put in motion an irreversible 
process that revived the discussion on the subject. The global reach of economic 
activities and political actions and decisions, international migrations or worldwide 
communication may appear as common elements of our ordinary lives but they have 
impacted in a decisive way on our understanding of citizenship. First, the 
international flow of people and the migration patterns from pressured a system of 
rights and obligations forged under the national premises of citizenship. Second, 
either as a consequence of globalisation or as an answer to it, we assisted to an 
identity fragmentation tendency, of which the conflicts related to ethnicity and 
nationality are the most radical expressions, and which have challenged the assumed 
unity of the nation-state. And third, we assisted to a progressive emergence or 
affirmation of regional and international spaces of governance, some of which 
reclaiming a relation of citizenship with individuals that naturally seemed to clash 
with the exclusive nature of modern citizenship (Habermas, 1995).
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Together these globalisation-related events affected the role of the state in 
politics in general, they but affected foremost the relation established between states 
and their citizenry. Faced with a delocalised economy, the growing movement of 
peoples across borders, the emergence of a global activism and human rights 
rhetoric, and the development of global or regional governance arrangements like the 
European Union, the state saw its traditional monopolies and its sovereignty 
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 Habermas refers to the specific context of Europe and particularly refers to the impact that 
Germany’s reunification as well as the East Central countries’ liberation or the nationalist conflicts 
emerging in Eastern countries have brought to the national identity (Habermas, 1995). Even though 
the synthesis placed by Habermas refers to the European context and to national identity, we believe 
his proposal is useful for generally describing the challenges to citizenship that emerged along with 
the globalisation-related phenomena and were not exclusive of Europe.  
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questioned and necessarily redrawn (Linklater, 1996; Klusmeyer, 2001; Held and 
MacGrew, 2003; Sorensen, 2006). For citizenship, this meant specifically a 
questioning of the exclusive belonging to the national political community and the 
acceptance of the exclusive national status of citizenship when so many constraints 
were preventing state’s protection in several aspects of rights, when belonging was 
becoming such a complex and dynamic process and when other spaces for protection 
and participation were emerging. Citizenship debates developed amidst this 
globalisation context, essentially dual in nature and apparently opposed: to a growing 
global scale of events and relations and their impacts, matched a fragmentation and 
interconnectedness tendency of spaces and communities thus clearly challenging the 
modern definition of citizenship (Delanty, 2003). 
Additionally, two (apparently) unrelated facts definitively claimed the 
political potential of citizenship. First, the eastern countries’ transition to democracy 
and the role civil society played in it instilled a notion that citizens could find in civil 
society a privileged space to make their voices heard. Second, the emergence of 
social movements, in Latin America for example, and including those which 
stretched beyond the limits of the state’s territory, brought light on how the dialectic 
of inclusion and exclusion that marks modern citizenship is present not only at the 
frontiers of the state in a geographic sense but also within the state’s territory in 
different forms, as a figurative description. Again these movements assumed the 
discourse of citizenship but their practices and demands challenged the modern 
conception. Together, these events renewed the importance of citizenship in politics 
thus bringing the concept again to the forefront of political reflection.  
The discussion on citizenship evolved then amidst two dynamics that 
deconstructed modern citizenship assumptions: first, the erosion and questioning of 
the traditional frames, and second, the (re)emergence of citizenship as a relevant 
political concept and practice. As Habermas notes “New problems are shifting old 
perspectives and, what is more important, opening up new perspectives for the 
future, points of view that restore our ability to perceive alternative courses of 
action” (Habermas, 1995: 255). Hence, and yet somehow paradoxically, the concept 
of citizenship became less clear although its prominence increased (Heisler, 2005). 
Naturally, different approaches, viewpoints, and proposals emerged out of this 
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context of questioning and change which has generated a debate surrounding 
citizenship that has marked the tone in the last three decades. Beiner has framed the 
different contributions to citizenship debates in three broad categories, according to 
the critique they deploy to modern citizenship (Beiner, 2003).
75
 Instead of 
establishing categories, we approach different contributions to the debate departing 
from two guiding assumptions: first, the question of diversity and difference and the 
related lines of exclusion and inclusion; and second the plurality of spaces that frame 
and influence citizenship. These issues are inextricably linked to what are the critics’ 
main targets in modern citizenship – the equality and universal assumptions and the 
national exclusive location of citizenship – but they also deploy interesting 
possibilities to transcend the modern understanding of the term.  
 
Citizenship and Difference 
Feminists have played a decisive role in questioning modern citizenship 
through a broad critique of liberal politics and assumptions that placed difference at 
the centre of their arguments (Buckler, 2002). For feminists, modern citizenship is 
based on gendered assumptions that have perpetuated the historic exclusionary 
character of citizenship towards women and can be easily grasped in liberal, but also 
in republican or communitarian views of the concept. These exclusionary practices 
are, according to feminists, derived from the body and sexuality of women, which, in 
a patriarchal society, have framed the access to citizenship rights and the inclusion in 
the political community. Feminists pose that modern citizenship is essentially a male 
concept that perceives males as able of disembodying themselves to act in reason – 
and thus politically – while it depicts female as sexual and bearers of children – and 
thus confined to the private realm (Lister, 2002). It is this process of differentiation 
that has structured the role of women in modern politics and has confined the 
alternative perspectives and needs of women to the private realm of individuals’ life 
(Pateman, 1992; Buckler, 2002).  
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 Beiner identifies three categories: first the civil society based contributions that, departing from the 
experience in Eastern countries, tended to depict the citizenship practices in civil society as superior; 
second, what he (sarcastically) describes as radical pluralism, a trendy left-wing pluralism; third, and 
in some measure a generalisation of the previous two, the post-modernist challenge (Beiner, 2003). 
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Hence, and while modern citizenship is based on a narrative of equality and 
universality of citizenship – entailing a universal and equal status of individuals’ 
rights – in practice its history has been built upon neglect or exclusion The 
assumption of unity and utility disregards difference and the universalism tends to 
mask domination both in the public and in the private sphere, and conditions access 
to citizenship rights (Dietz, 1992). However, and notwithstanding the importance of 
access and the importance to unmask women’s domination, this is a limited approach 
because it works within liberal contexts. Thus, and even if law and rights are an 
important arena for feminist struggles, their dual nature, both as devices of 
emancipation and oppression, must be acknowledged and they must become means 
to an end rather than the final purposes (Lister, 2002). 
The complexity of women in politics rests not solely on the exclusion but 
foremost on an inclusion that diminishes women difference. Women have been 
included in political life through the subordination but they had a specific role to 
perform as mothers and caregivers of future (male) citizens (Pateman, 1992). Dietz 
believes that only a democratic conception of citizenship with an active engagement 
in politics will enable women to “claim a truly liberatory politics of their own” 
(Dietz, 1992). This means that patriarchal domination cannot be replaced by other 
gender opposition and superiority. This does not mean that difference should be 
disguised. Pateman reinforces this, particularly because it is from difference that 
women may question how they have been included (Pateman, 1992). Only the 
recognition of women’s pattern of inclusion and its questioning may enable a 
democratic citizenship where equality can and does encompass difference. As 
Pateman states “The equal political standing of citizenship is necessary for 
democracy and for women’s autonomy” but “for citizenship to be of equal worth, the 
substance of equality must differ according to the diverse circumstances and 
capacities of citizens, men and women” (Pateman, 1992: 25). It is important to note 
that this categorisation of women and their differences does not force the creation of 
closed categories. Lister recognises that even though the gendered terms that still 
mark current practices of citizenship creates a solidarity amongst women based on 
structural constraints, these constraints will certainly be experienced differently 
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(Lister, 1998). Thus, groups cannot be perceived as closed categories or they will 
necessarily tend to overshadow other sources of power and submission.  
Iris Marion Young has also based her reflection on difference but her 
understanding seeks to reinforce groups’ differentiation as a mechanism to free them 
from domination. Young understands universality first as a generality and second as 
equal treatment in face with the rules and laws, despite individual and group 
differences (Young, [1989] 1998). This universal vision entails an assimilation of 
difference and therefore creates a process of oppression where dominant groups 
determine the terms of this universality while masking this domination with an 
allegedly neutral humanism that devaluates difference, outside and within the 
excluded groups.  
Accordingly, and in order to foster inclusion and participation, Young 
stands for a kind of politics that asserts the positivity of group difference, both 
empowering and liberating, but which can only be achieved by simultaneously 
recognising the relativity of the dominant culture while asserting groups differences 
(Young, 1990). To this process Young calls “the assertion of positive group 
specificity” which means that these groups’ relations may be understood simply as 
difference rather than exclusion or dominance, while creating a group solidarity that 
is able to transcend the individualism promoted by liberal humanism (Young, 1990: 
166). According to the author, this assertion is followed by the self-organisation of 
oppressed groups and a principle of group autonomy which have been hard to accept 
both by liberal humanists and leftist political organisations. To be truly emancipatory 
groups’ assertion depends on separate organisations that exclude others, particularly 
members from privileged groups (Young, 1990). Though Young’s affinity groups do 
not exclusively have a cultural dimension, Young does stress how oppressed groups 
have particular histories and traditions that fuel cultural differences amongst them. 
This affirmation, together with the oppressed groups’ self-organisation is however 
far from being consensual and other views on groups’ differences and how they can 
affirm their difference have emerged.  
Kymlicka has proposed a multicultural approach to citizenship that seeks to 
reconcile difference with the liberal heritage of human rights (Kymlicka, 1995). He 
states that the question of cultural membership is often treated as an issue located at 
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the private realm of individuals’ lives (Kymlicka, 1995).76 Recently however, 
important events such as immigration, ethnic and nationalist claims across Europe 
and in the post-Soviet space, or the global affirmation of indigenous people’s claims, 
brought, according to Kymlicka and Norman (2000) minority rights to the forefront 
of discussion. Minority rights refer, in this context, to public policies, legal rights 
and/or constitutional dispositions sought by (ethnic) groups to accommodate their 
difference when they are faced with a state-led process of nation-building that 
promotes a dominant culture (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Kymlicka, 2001). 
Progressively, it has been recognised that the existence and defence of minority 
rights in liberal democratic states is a matter of justice since “blind” rules and 
institutions may promote disadvantage for specific groups outside the dominant 
cultural frame. Kymlicka’s proposal operates in liberal contexts and regarding only 
groups that accept and share liberal principles. In this frame, these groups’ 
integration simultaneously depends on integration into a societal culture – i.e. a 
territorially concentrated culture with a shared language used in societal institutions – 
and an accommodation of ethno-cultural differences by institutions (Kymlicka, 
2001). The integration of these groups entails, then, a simultaneous integration into a 
liberal value-dominated societal culture, which means that liberal frames of freedom 
and equality are respected, while the ethnic differences and practices that do not 
question these values are safeguarded (Kymlicka, 2001). Accordingly, and departing 
from the challenges presented by the integration of immigrants and national 
minorities, Kymlicka distinguishes the good minority rights, those who supplement 
individual rights, from the bad minority rights where restrictions affect individual 
rights (Kymlicka, 2001).  
The differentiated citizenship promoted within this liberal multicultural 
view is thus placed at state level and strives for the recognition and accommodation 
of difference through a process that safeguards both the state and the liberal values. 
Joppke stresses that the concept of societal cultural demonstrates a state-based logic 
accused of misunderstanding current states’ role as nation-builders while it promotes 
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 At this point it is noteworthy to mention what we have previously stated regarding the view of 
liberals when faced with the emergence of nationalism. Our attention was not placed on the existence 
of minorities but rather on the liberal instrumental view of the idea of nation as a factor of cohesion 
for the political community of the state. This affirmation remains valid, notwithstanding the liberal 
accounts over minority rights here enounced by Kymlicka (1995).  
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language as the main common linkage. A careful look to these elements and the 
reality of current liberal states show however a weakening of nation-builder practices 
and a simultaneous plural view of culture which, ultimately, diminishes the 
significance of minority rights as they are proposed by Kymlicka (Joppke, 2002). 
Furthermore, the differentiated citizenship is only perceived in reference to 
polyethnic rights or special rights of representation, and continues to assume the 
national domain as the main stage for citizenship and, for some authors, to exclude 
groups through the societal culture criteria (Isin and Turner, 2002; Joppke, 2002). 
Indigenous communities illustrate particularly well these limits. Their mobilisation 
and politicisation is a clear challenge to this multicultural view since what it is 
recognised as their cultural rights address only a part of the claims related to their 
cosmovision. Such movements are according to Yashar a clear challenge to the 
liberal model of citizenship and a decisive step towards a post-national model of 
citizenship (Yashar, 2005). 
In fact, the quest for self-government rights, as Young’s differentiation 
model demands, is therefore excluded from Kymlicka’s multicultural inclusion, since 
the purpose of this narrative is foremost the accommodation within a given societal 
culture and a liberal society and not the creation of a different political community in 
opposition to the existing one (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). To these criticisms, 
Kymlicka answers with a reaffirmation of the groups chosen as representative of the 
main challenges of integration faced by liberal democratic states, and with the 
relevance of a liberal discussion on minority rights in a world where the unitary 
model of citizenship is obsolete but the “post-modern” alternatives are incomplete 
(Kymlicka, 2001). 
To those who fear the effect this recognition of difference may have on 
citizenship as a status of equality or as the individuals’ civic identity, on citizenship 
practices or on citizenship as a factor of social cohesion and political unity within the 
states’ territory, Kymlicka and Norman oppose a project of accommodation that 
safeguards the unity of the state while it provides a sense of public reasonableness 
accessible and inclusive to all, thus assuring a modern virtue of their proposal 
(Kymlicka and Norman, 2000).  The demand for specific rights within a frame of 
citizenship is foremost a quest for inclusion for most of the groups and only their 
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disregard can negatively affect citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka and Norman, 
2000).  
This last bundle of concerns is strikingly present in Beiner’s account of 
civic republicanism and the current challenges faced by citizenship. But these 
concerns are however more directed toward the pluralism as Young defends it rather 
than Kymlicka’s multicultural project of inclusion. For Beiner, both Young’s account 
of difference and the postmodern view on the subject represent a threat to the very 
idea of citizenship (Beiner, 2003). Young’s pluralist vision is qualified by Beiner as a 
“ghettoization” since he perceives that groups in this frame tend to withdraw behind 
groups’ boundaries and identities, transforming citizenship into “an aggregate of sub-
national ghettoes” where a larger common culture is absent (Beiner, 2003). The veto 
power ascribed by Young to minority groups is, for Beiner, a clear example of this 
image, particularly because it would undermine the integrity of the political 
community as the site of legitimate decision-making and create a general political 
paralysis (Beiner, 2006).  
Beiner further enumerates three common criticisms frequently pointed to 
Young’s proposal: first, the doubts caused with the materialisation of the category of 
oppressed and the political prerogatives associated to it; second, a fear that such 
model of differentiated citizenship would translate into politics of grievance between 
groups; and third, the focus on specificity undermines a concern for shared problems 
and the solidarity and coalition-building that is necessary for egalitarian politics 
(Beiner, 2006). To these three critiques, Beiner adds two additional observations and 
questions regarding the achievement of inclusion through differentiated citizenship, 
and how the rejection of universalism undermines the project of multiculturalism as 
such. In what concerns the former, Beiner states that inclusion is defined with 
reference to a large political community of equals and, in the absence of this shared 
political community, the concept of integration is misplaced. Regarding the latter, 
Beiner considers that the rejection of a universalism of any kind results in a moral 
and philosophical dead-end, since it renders impossible to appeal to shared values of 
equality or justice (Beiner, 2006). The civic idea expressed by Beiner is, according to 
himself, “a liberalized and diluted late-modern version of Aristotle’s idea of 
citizenship”, “a weaker late-modern version of Aristotle’s conception of the human 
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being as a political animal” (Beiner, 2003: 197; 199). This means that even though 
the civic idea is present, Beiner recognises the challenges and limits posed to a 
political involvement in the structures that define the processes of governance 
(Beiner, 2003). However, and notwithstanding these limitations, Beiner stresses that 
“as attenuated as it is, it offers a sufficient trace of genuine attachment to a 
community of citizens and sufficient possibility of viable political agency” which 
renders the civic bond as a “meaningful normative standard” (Beiner, 2003: 199). 
Thus, he reinforces his idea that “people can only come together as citizens if they 
feel bound together as a civic community”  since it is their mutual recognition as 
members of a shared political community that sustains the equality that is to guide 
citizens’ relations (Beiner, 2003: 201).  
Beiner’s defence of the civic ideal exemplifies what has been termed as the 
revival of republican citizenship (Dagger, 2002). It largely echoes Oldfield’s remarks 
concerning the importance of civic republicanism, the sense of community it entails 
and how it is forged by solidarity and demands a political practice from citizens 
(Oldfield, 1998). It also echoes Arendt’s appeal to an active citizen whose rights can 
only become a reality through an interaction between citizens and institutions 
(Delanty, 2003). The revival of the inherent civic value of citizenship opposes the 
idea of individuals as liberals depict them and the vision of citizenship and rights as a 
political expression equivalent to the market logic of consumers seizing goods 
(Dagger, 2002). Beiner’s proposal, however, is not only concerned with this liberal 
view. For Beiner we are assisting to a debate on citizenship marked by two 
competing and mutually exclusive visions: a liberal universalism and an anti-liberal 
particularism. Both of them miss, nevertheless, the crucial element that sustains a 
political community where citizenship becomes egalitarian and inclusive. For Beiner, 
the civic bond, inherited from the republican view, is an alternative option to these 
views, particularly because in this frame the political community becomes a site of 
identity formation, an identity that is neither ethnical nor cultural but rather civic, in 
the sense of the common political facet shared by citizens (Beiner, 2003). To be 
forged however, political community and the citizenship created through this civic 
bond are necessarily bounded to the state even if the exact placement of those 
boundaries depends on historical contingencies. 
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At the centre of this disagreement is the tension that exists between 
universal and particular trends, where identity and the impact it has on citizenship 
plays a crucial role. A differentiated citizenship revolves around an apparent tension 
between identity and citizenship, mainly with its universal aspirations (Isin and 
Wood, 1999), while those who ground egalitarianism on shared bonds or universal 
status struggle with this emphasis on strict differentiation. Mouffe has tried to 
reconcile the recognition of difference with shared standards and behaviours in the 
political realm (Mouffe, 1993). Departing from a radical democracy proposal, 
Mouffe equates the question of identity and groups formation in a non-essentialist 
way and demarks herself from Young and Kymlicka’s societal culture. Rather than 
opting for difference or universalism, Mouffe perceives this tension and conflict as 
the location of the political, where the different political principles compete and from 
which a radical democratic citizenship emerges (Rasmussen and Brown, 2002). 
According to Rasmussen and Brown (2002), the radical democratic theory 
has enunciated three principles that affect the perception of citizenship: first, political 
struggles are temporary and contextual, contingent of particular power relations; 
second, citizenship is a continual struggle within those shifting power relations; and 
third, the struggle of citizenship transcends the realm of competing interests to 
become the site of subject formation, i.e., the site where citizens define an 
understanding of their interaction with the political world. For Mouffe, social agents 
are constituted in a necessarily fluid “ensemble of subject positions” (Mouffe, 1993: 
77), which creates an identity and processes of identification that can neither be fixed 
nor given (Lister, 1998) and are the expression of power relations. But more 
important, in a radical democratic frame citizenship becomes the activity through 
which one defines his/her identity: “the agency of citizenship is the act of 
identification, of seeking identity in familiar forms of representation (...) that shape 
but do not determine the identity of the subject” (Rasmussen and Brown, 2002: 182).  
Hence, politics can only exist in this complex ensemble and through a 
mutual constitutive process that Mouffe has identified as agonistic pluralism. In this 
view it is possible to reconcile a respect for difference but also to create a shared set 
of values and assumptions, essentially political. What agonistic pluralism introduces 
is a constant tension between the different groups mediated by the respect of 
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divergent claims through democratic dialogue (Mouffe, 2000). In this sense 
citizenship allows the creation of a chain of equivalences between individuals and 
groups able to promote a democratic articulation of demands (Mouffe, 1993; 2000). 
The common political identity is based on accepting democratic practices, dialogue 
and individual liberty, despite the different subject’s positions and the plurality of 
possible allegiances, instead of other pre-given identities (Mouffe, 1993; 2000).
77
 
Thus, the core of a radical democratic view of citizenship aims to “retain the 
egalitarian impulse in the idea of citizenship as a means of belonging to a political 
community without depoliticising or excluding other elements of identity relevant to 
power relations” (Rasmussen and Brown, 2002). There are however, critiques 
pointed to this perspective: first, its inclusionary impulse seems to create a 
universalising movement that resembles the liberal feature it criticises; second, 
agonism must necessarily be distinguished from antagonism and while this demands 
a constant struggle to define subjects’ identity it seems to presuppose existing 
competing norms and subjects; third, the agonistic view does not make clear how to 
engage and interact with groups that exercise power as domination apart from the 
democratic ethos (Rasmussen and Brown, 2002).  
The reflections that depart from difference expose how power relations are 
important in defining the content of citizenship and mediating the access and 
enjoyment of rights. Furthermore, they expose how, and besides the 
inclusion/exclusion divide that the modern state placed on its frontiers, one needs to 
consider the inclusion/exclusion divides that affect and divide individuals and groups 
internally. Nonetheless, from the recognition of difference emerge important 
questions, particularly in what concerns the cohesion of the political community 
which has traditionally relied on its unity. The radical democracy proposes a 
democratic articulation of difference that does not erase the state but clearly 
challenges the exclusivity on which its monopolies used to rely. In fact, other 
political spaces have progressively become central in citizenship debates.  
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 It is important to note that this democratic interaction is fundamentally different from the proposal 
of Habermas, since it departs from a philosophy of language to sustain that instead of reaching 
universalism through communication, it is precisely the tension between particularism and 
universalism that is the ground for politics (Rasmussen and Brown, 2002).  
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Citizenship beyond the nation-state 
This growing attention to the site of politics and citizenship beyond the state 
has not been exclusive of radical democratic theory. In fact, closely related with the 
reflection that explores the differences within the boundaries of the state, a 
questioning of the spatial dimension of modern citizenship has clearly emerged. 
Radical democracy, by assuming the political potential in different sites and 
practices, has clearly made a case to rethink the spatial dimension of citizenship 
beyond the nation-state, even if the focus on civil society or the appeals to reconsider 
the role of identity groups in citizenship practices had already somehow introduced 
this discussion.  
However, and beyond the existence of differences within the state, the 
global dynamics that had emerged clearly questioned the national domain as the 
exclusive site of citizenship definition and practice in a different way. Soysal’s 
proposal of a post-national citizenship is an obligatory reference in what concerns 
this discussion (Soysal, 1994). Soysal departs from guestworkers’ incorporation 
experience in European countries to analyse the complex topography of membership 
in the late 20
th
 century. His work focuses particularly on incorporation through rights 
and it is precisely here that he identifies the dialectic tension between nation-states 
and globalised practices. For Soysal there is an “incongruity between the normative 
and organizational bases of rights” since their legitimacy is located on a international 
human rights codes and instruments while their application is still country-specific 
and dependent of nation-state’s actions (Soysal, 1994: 8). This tension affected 
membership formations creating “contiguities beyond the limits of national 
citizenry” that overcome the opposing dichotomy between the citizen and the alien 
and includes populations formerly placed outside the national polity (Soysal, 1994: 
137). In such a view, migrant’s rights – civil, social, cultural and even political – are 
commonly depicted as a matter of personhood rights rather than as a prerogative of 
nationals. Thus, and even though nation-states and their sovereignty remain at the 
core of the international system, the main reference for membership through rights 
has progressively been internationalised with states founding the legitimacy of rights 
extension to migrants on the transnational frame of human rights. Therefore, the 
modern citizenship reliance on nationality criteria to grant access to membership 
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rights is no longer unique and instead “we have a system of constitutionally 
interconnected states with a multiplicity of membership” that reveals the emphasis on 
the personhood (Soysal, 1994: 163-164). This post-national pattern of membership 
formation forces us, according to Soysal, to “refurbish our definitions and theoretical 
vistas of and about citizenship and the nation-state” and thus acknowledge the post-
national character of citizenship (Soysal, 1994: 167).
78
  
Habermas has also developed a reflection in what concerns the relation 
between rights and nation-states and how this relation has evolved to a post-national 
moment (Habermas, 1995; 1996). Though, as Soysal, Habermas depicts the EU as a 
privileged space for the emergence of a post-national citizenship, his focus is on how 
the relation between nation and citizens, as a mechanism for inclusion, has evolved. 
Thus, Habermas focuses on how inclusion through citizenship can be kept despite the 
dissociation of the nation-citizenship relation of exclusivity. Habermas, departs from 
the instrumental role of the nation in creating “a democratic mode of [state] 
legitimation on the basis of a new and more abstract form of social integration” 
which “stimulated this move from the status of private subjects to citizenship” 
(Habermas, 1996: 128-129). Within the nation-state, citizenship acquired an 
“additional political and cultural meaning of an achieved belonging to a community 
of empowered citizens who actively contributed to its maintenance” (Habermas, 
1996: 128-129). Given this instrumental nature, the relation between the nation and 
the state is a contingent historical relation and, as a consequence, the nation and the 
state can be separated (Habermas, 1995). To those who ground the strength of 
constitutional principles on the communities that frame social relations, Habermas 
states that, on the opposite, it is the political culture that must sustain individuals’ 
association and promote a constitutional patriotism that respects societies’ 
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 On the issue of access to rights by migrants Brubaker concluded that membership in national polity 
mattered little to access social and economic rights. On the contrary, political rights were not available 
for those who were not considered citizens. As a consequence he identifies a dual membership 
structure in Europe organised in two concentric circles: an inner circle which is formed by members of 
the national community, and an outer circle where, in addition to citizens, other groups can be found. 
The main difference between these circles is precisely the access and the different rights granted: 
citizens, i.e., those who belong to the national polity, have the political privileges and obligations that 
form the political dimension of citizenship, in addition to social and economic rights while other 
groups’ rights are confined to the social and economic realm (Brubaker, 1989). Soysal account 
however necessarily diverges from this view, since his emphasis on rights is placed on the 
international sources of rights’ legitimacy rather than on the membership to national community 
(Soysal, 1994).   
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multicultural realities. (Habermas, 1995).
79
 The question for Habermas relies, then, 
on the conditions that enable such a transformation and a replacement of the cultural 
community by a political community constituted by individuals who conform to 
constitutional principles, able to safeguard the principle of inclusion that is inherent 
to democratic citizenship. For Habermas, democratic citizenship can only develop its 
social integration potential if the political, social and cultural rights are delivered 
(Habermas, 1996). In this sense, a post-national citizenship reflects a focus on the 
implementation of rights beyond the limits imposed by the nation and, thus, 
constitutes itself as “the core of what holds people together” into an inclusive public 
sphere (Habermas, 1995; 1996: 135). This demands the creation of an inclusive 
public sphere which for Habermas, can only be reached through the principles of 
communicative pluralism, i.e., a process where different flows of discourses and 
communications interact. This notion of democratic citizenship is furthermore 
necessary in a global context where it is foreseeable the need for political action 
above and between nation-states in order to safeguard the inclusive nature of 
citizenship in this post-national moment, where societies have come together in a 
community of shared risks (Habermas, 1996).  
This vision of an ensemble of citizens that cannot be confined to the 
traditional borders of the state has also been at the centre of a cosmopolitan revival. 
The idea of a world citizen has been a part of citizenship utopian imaginary and Kant 
and its proposal of perpetual peace is perhaps one of the most important references 
for cosmopolitanism (Isin and Turner, 2002). But the term and its proposal have been 
revived with the realities attached to globalisation. In fact, current approaches are 
deeply engaged with the human rights international expansion, with global civil 
society movements and with a compromise with democratic global governance in 
face with the current challenges posed to traditional accounts of state sovereignty. 
Most of the defenders of cosmopolitan citizenship are also concerned and dissatisfied 
with the engagement of nation-states with global ethics and rights (Linklater, 2002).  
Held, for instance, structured the case for a cosmopolitan democracy within 
a liberal inspiration. He argues that globalisation captures the fundamental changes 
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 Beiner considers this constitutional patriotism as a strong proposal to create the civic bond that he 
believes to be necessary to sustain citizenship (Beiner, 2003).  
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that are currently shaping the nature of political relations and political communities 
and, accordingly, the meaning and place of the democratic political community needs 
to be re-evaluated (Held, 2002). Assuming the dispersion of effective power, the 
existence of cross-boundaries communities, the disjuncture in the formal authority of 
the states and the structures of authority in national and regional levels, the changes 
in sovereignty and the cross-cutting loyalties as well as the existence of boundary 
challenging issues, Held claims for a common and international structure of 
governance that simultaneously assures a cluster of rights and obligations (Held, 
1995). This globalised system of governance entails a citizenship with a plural 
significance in belonging in order to make possible the access to several forms of 
political participation (Held, 1995; 2002). This quest for democratic international 
governance is fundamentally in a reconstructed proposal of cosmopolitanism which 
departs from values to affect the definition of a community tied by and within its 
compromise with democracy (Thompson, 1998).  
This appeal for a cosmopolitan frame of governance (or transnational, as 
Benhabib (2007) qualifies it) departs from a shared acknowledgement that states’ 
sovereignty has been progressively eroded with globalisation and that this erosion 
demands a necessary reflection on the future of citizenship. Linklater, for instance, 
departed from Hedley Bull’s neo-medievalism thesis (Bull, 1979) in order to 
characterise the challenges posed to European states’ monopolies and sovereignty, 
and develop his approach to cosmopolitanism and citizenship (Linklater, 1996; 
1998). For Linklater, one must consider this system of overlapping authorities to 
understand how the state’s monopolies are being affected by global issues and 
processes, and how this will affect the definition of states’ political communities 
(Linklater, 1996; 1998). Hence, the nature of political bonding elements have been 
altered and the perspective of new forms of political community reflects the post-
Westphalia complex reality and the emergence of plural concepts of community and 
citizenship (Linklater, 1996; 1998). Linklater supports his approach on critical theory 
and the necessary relation between transnational democracy and the struggle against 
modes of exclusion (Linklater, 1998; 2007). He presents transnational democracy as 
the system able to promote dialogue and recognise difference, and go beyond the 
borders of national states through a habermasian communicative ethos and, in this 
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sense, cosmopolitan citizenship can become the expression of global engagement and 
political and social inclusion, and can push further the quest for rights in the 
international space (Linklater, 1998; 2007).  
Benhabib has also engaged in a discussion regarding the development of an 
approach to cosmopolitanism that seeks the mediation of difference through a 
kantian morality in law, i.e. “thinking of cosmopolitanism as the emergence of norms 
that ought to govern relations among individuals in a global civil society” (Benhabib, 
2006: 20).  Considering the current challenges to state sovereignty, Benhabib stresses 
an apparent contradictory state of affairs: while in some dimensions state sovereignty 
is largely eroded by transnational dynamics, it is still vigorously asserted 
internationally as a valid unit and place of politics. For Benhabib we are witnessing a 
disaggregation of sovereignty and a consequential and parallel disaggregation of 
citizenship: the domains of citizenship – rights, belonging and identity – are no 
longer necessarily entangled and dependent of state sovereignty (Benhabib, 2005; 
2006). But even though these concepts – citizenship and sovereignty – are “part and 
parcel” of the same landscape, they have different normative logics. It is important to 
stress here the distinction made by the author between state and popular sovereignty: 
the former is mainly related to state institutions and the monopolies attached to the 
existence of a state in a given territory while the latter mainly refers to the existence 
of institutions that assure the representation of citizens. For Benhabib, the main 
challenge is to understand how a disaggregation of state sovereignty affects popular 
sovereignty and what alternative can be found to maintain the values and practices 
attached to this last dimension. Thus, this is not just a matter of recognising how 
citizenship elements are no longer exclusively dependent of state sovereignty but 
foremost, how the democratic value of citizenship can prevail in the current 
globalised context (Benhabib, 2007). This is particularly relevant if we bear in mind 
the internationalisation trend exposed in post-armed conflict statebuilding. For 
Benhabib, citizenship can only maintain its expression of democratic agency in a 
cosmopolitan frame supported by a strong global civil society that connects the local-
national-global through democratic iterations, responsible for a constant redefinition 
of perceptions and understandings and also for a mediation of universal norms with 
the will of democratic majorities (Benhabib, 2006).  
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Nevertheless, and departing from the elements of modern citizenship, the 
critics consider the absence of an equivalent political and governance actor to the 
state in the international sphere, and the consequent absence of a political 
community, insurmountable obstacles to define a sense of belonging and inclusion 
and to create a space where citizens can be represented and present their demands. 
For some, the solidarity bonds that cosmopolitanism seeks to build at a worldwide 
scale do not consider how identity plays a decisive role in the definition of such 
bonds and, thus, they ignore the cultural dimension that in modern citizenship has 
been a source of social integration.
80
 Miller, for instance, has reasserted the value of 
a republican citizenship based on the national community in face of the challenges 
posed by globalisation, the emergence of sub-state nationalisms and the 
fragmentation of identities beyond state’s borders (Miller, 2002). Miller believes that 
nation-states have the ability to adapt to the new complex contexts of differences and 
globalisation while maintaining their community as the referential site of citizenship 
(Miller, 2002).  
In order to address these issues, Linklater mentions two crucial dynamics 
that are already visible and whose interaction will be decisive in the creation of 
democratic principles of legitimacy in the international sphere: first, it is currently 
quite evident that there are transnational spaces and instruments of governance, 
which means that the absence of a Leviathan at a global scale does not entail that 
governance at this level does not exist; second, and precisely because this 
governance beyond the state exists, it is also evident that in parallel to this 
transnational tendency in governance, a global space for civil society actors to 
interact and discuss the dimensions and impacts of global governance has also 
emerged and has gained visibility and importance (Linklater, 2002).  
For Beck these interactions and decision-making at the global level can only 
be achieved with a socialisation of risk since this impels the necessary decision-
making processes while carrying a hidden community building aspect. Accordingly, 
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 Axtmann (2002) considers these issues when addressing Held’s proposal of cosmopolitan 
democracy (Held, 2002). Beside these issues that clearly present a challenge to the creation of a global 
democratic space that promotes an inclusive citizenship, Axtmann also mentions important remarks 
concerning the international relations level and how the structures of power in the international system 
constitute a solid barrier to the creation of cosmopolitan democratic system that would entail a 
redistribution and an equilibrium of power in the international system (Axtmann, 2002).  
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and even though we are currently in a “muddle between an old order based on 
international law and the new order, based on human rights”, the process–concept of 
“cosmopolitanisation” is already in motion if one considers the regulation and impact 
of certain movements and measures (Beck, 2002: 65).
81
 This process-concept must 
be perceived as relational, where cosmopolitan changes and movements are 
connected to blockages and resistances triggered by them, in a reflexive movement. 
Therefore, cosmopolitanism, as presented by Beck, is foremost an interactive 
relationship of constant redefinition displayed at the national and transnational 
spaces where conflict and tensions are central to this reconfiguration of politics in 
cosmopolitan terms (Beck, 2002).
82
  
For Sassen, however, most of the views enunciated are still too strongly 
grounded on nation-state-based conceptions of citizenship and, even when the 
perspectives challenge the connection between national polity and identity, the 
location of the non-unitary citizenship is also within the national boundaries (the case 
of Kymlicka’s proposal of multicultural citizenship is, in this case, a quite illustrative 
example) (Sassen, 2002b).
83
 Sassen defends a different view concerning the 
repositioning of citizenship in face of emergent subjects and spaces for politics 
(Sassen, 2002a). For Sassen, globalisation and human rights have made possible a 
new discourse of rights that, together with the widening of the inclusion project, is 
transforming citizenship and its relation with nationality. In fact, one must consider 
that since globalisation affected the territorial and institutional features of the state, 
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 Beck identifies two periods of political modernity: the first age of modernity, founded upon states’ 
sovereignty and international law, and the second age, cosmopolitan and dominated by the human 
rights rhetoric. For Beck we are currently in the “muddle between an old order based on international 
law and the new order based on human rights” (Beck, 2002: 65). In this second age, plural narratives 
of modernity are accepted since the traditional narrative, based on territoriality, collective existence 
and borders, is being questioned. It is amidst this process of constant redefinition that individuals 
define their identity and difference: through a process of overlapping identities and conflicts (Beck, 
2002). 
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 Cosmopolitanism as a process-concept fits the vision of reflexive politics defined by Beck since it is 
mainly the expression of subpolitics, i.e. the expression of agents and individuals contributions to 
shape politics departing from the different and opposing positions usually excluded from politics, 
which are, in purpose, rule-altering. In this frame, the reflexivity comes from the tensions and 
conflicts that permeate politics and subpolitics and results into a cosmopolitanism permanently 
contested and revised (Beck, 1997; 2002).  
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 Here the author departs from Bosniak’s reflection on the current proposals of citizenship 
denationalization and the critique the author proposes to these accounts (Bosniak, 2000). We will 
considerer this critical account of Bosniak in the next section.   
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citizenship has also changed (Sassen, 2002a). Thus, and considering these dynamics, 
Sassen argues that one must map the question of rights, authority and obligations 
differently (Sassen, 2002a). Sassen identifies two current patterns that challenge the 
view of citizenship as a formal status attached to nationality: the unauthorised and 
yet recognised, where there is a partial recognition of individuals as social beings; 
and the authorised yet unrecognised, where despite the legal status individuals 
political experience is limited (Sassen, 2002a). In addition to these categories, the 
author presents a third possibility where the meaning of national space has changed. 
Hence, and though the national space remains a referent, it is a “referent of a specific 
sort: it is, after all, its change that becomes the key theoretical feature through which 
it enters my specification of changes in the institution of citizenship” (Sassen, 2002a: 
17).  
For Sassen, denationalisation entails the transformation of the national as 
Sassen sustains, and it is thus concerned with new forms of citizenship not yet 
considered but which may emerge in this new understanding (Sassen, 2002b). This 
denationalised possibility is explored by Sassen through the “global city”, considered 
a strategic site for citizenship transformation in globalisation ages, since they create 
new structures of power, and rhetoric and operational openings for those traditionally 
excluded, therefore creating new possibilities for citizenship practices and identities, 
particularly in what concerns the institutional frame where citizenship is embedded 
(Sassen, 2002a; 2006). Ong also departs from the global space to explore new sites 
of citizenship. The author presents the global assemblages as the site for political 
mobilisations and claims, where the citizenship is a condition reconfigured by 
processes of territorialisation (Ong, 2006). These assemblages are contingent upon 
the specificity of the re-articulations, creating a heterogeneous political landscape 
where citizenship claims take place through the universalising criteria of neoliberal 
values and human rights. It is in this sense that Ong affirms that “the sites of 
citizenship are not defined by conventional geography” and the multiple assemblages 
of disparate elements create new political spaces (Ong, 2005: 699). 
Overall, the contributions that engage in discussing citizenship beyond the 
nation-state force us to reflect on the plurality of spaces where individuals and 
groups move and how these spaces question exclusive membership. Furthermore, 
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such plurality has not only a profound effect on the identification and membership of 
individuals, altering the process of identification-recognition that defined the modern 
state’s political community, but also multiplies the spaces and possibilities of claim-
making, which are fundamental to affect the inclusion/exclusion divides that have 
marked modern citizenship.  
Considering what we have exposed, we must recognise that the concept of 
citizenship as the signifier of state-society relations is being challenged and affected 
by the affirmation of difference and the emergence of political spaces beyond the 
state. Therefore, and in order to proceed in our reflection, we will explore these 
challenges and possibilities along the four elements that constitute the concept of 
citizenship: the location, the subject; rights and practices and its meaning. Our 
purpose, which will be developed in detail in the next section, is to discuss the 
current state of the art in citizenship debates along the axes we have identified in 
order to capture the main issues and questions that mark our current understanding 
and practices of the concept. By doing so, we seek not to develop a full fledge theory 
of citizenship but rather to establish a conceptual reference that enables us to explore 
the complexity and possibilities opened by citizenship in post-armed conflict 
statebuilding scenarios.  
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3.2. Exploring possibilities 
Departing from the contributions we discussed previously, we have 
identified four elements in the concept of citizenship and which we can divide in two 
categories. The first one concerns the subject of citizenship, its location and its 
content and practices and we term it here as definitional elements. We classify these 
as definitional elements because they guide the delimitation and definition of 
citizenship. The fourth axe identified, the meaning of citizenship, corresponds to the 
second category. It draws on the definitional elements and through the relation 
projected between them, it projects a meaning.  
The definitional elements must be understood regarding the clarifications 
they force and the interrelation between them. For instance, when we explore the 
location of citizenship we address the spaces where citizenship is forged as well as 
where it is expressed and exercised. Locating citizenship entails creating a political 
referential both in the definition and practice of citizenship. Moreover, this process 
of location is crucial in the definition of who the subject of citizenship is, since it 
mediates a process of identification/recognition that draws a line of inclusion and 
exclusion where issues of access – who is the citizen and how one becomes a citizen 
– are also established. Together, locating citizenship and identifying who the citizen 
is project patterns of social and political interaction between citizens and between 
citizens and the political referential identified. And this interaction is mediated by 
rights and practices and, therefore, they can also affect our definition of the subject 
as well as challenge the location of citizenship.  
The meaning of citizenship departs from definitions and delimitations but it 
deals with different perceptions that can coexist within this delimitation. What this 
conveys is that even if one agrees on the delimitations of the concept, the elements 
privileged and emphasised will clearly affect the meaning attached to it. When 
evaluating the post-national reconfigurations proposed to citizenship Bosniak states 
that the task demands an approach that relates to the different understandings of the 
concept. The author identifies four broad understandings of citizenship: as a legal 
status; as a system of rights; as a form of political activity; and as a form of identity 
and solidarity (Bosniak, 2000). These categories suggest us that, depending on the 
issue we privilege as definitional elements – rights or practices, the relation between 
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citizens or legal recognition and identification –, our perception of the concept is 
necessarily different.
84
 However, and even if the division proposed by Bosniak 
(2000) is particularly useful to explore the possibility of meanings attached to 
citizenship, we must not conceive these understandings as distinctive and mutually 
excluding perceptions of the concept. For instance, an understanding that perceives 
citizenship mainly as a political activity does not deny the existence of rights or their 
importance for citizenship. Thus, the meaning of citizenship assembles the elements 
together but it combines and unfolds their relation differently. 
We have opted to structure our reflection on broad categories in order 
explore the elements of citizenship in a non-excluding way. Departing, at this 
moment, from a location rather than considering it as a dimension would necessarily 
condition our discussion. That is not the goal at this point. Instead, we have chosen to 
identify dimensions of the concept that allow us to explore the different views over 
them in order to assess how the concept has evolved and explore the different 
possibilities that now co-exist in citizenship.  
In order to proceed, however, we will departure from the definition of 
modern citizenship. In this sense it is useful to consider the definition of citizenship 
proposed by Janoski (1998) where citizenship is “passive and active membership of 
individuals in a nation-state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a 
specified level of equality” (Janoski, 1998). Janoski departs from rights and 
obligations because he considers them as the dependent variable – they are foremost 
dependent on states validating norms as legal frames and seeking their 
implementation – while he defines the interactions and relations that occur in civil 
society and between civil society and the state as independent variables that account 
for the frame of rights and obligations defined (Janoski, 1998). 
Within this definition, citizenship is located inside the borders of the nation-
state, and even if civil society is crucial in building citizenship, it is the nation-state 
the political reference in the definition of citizenship. The citizen is a member of the 
national community of citizens and through this membership principles of equality 
and universality in the rule of law are established. The citizen, identified through 
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 For Bosniak these differences are particularly important because they mean that even if we are all 
discussing citizenship we may be talking about different things, depending on the understanding we 
have of the concept (Bosniak, 2000).  
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membership is then granted with different rights – political, economic, social – but it 
is also expected to contribute to the community it belongs, either in a more passive or 
active way.
85
   
However, as we have seen previously, the definition of modern citizenship 
as proposed by Janoski has been a matter of discussion in a variety of ways. We have 
assisted to a constant debate in what concerns the content of citizenship rights even if 
their role as an expression of citizenship is not contested. Furthermore, we have 
progressively assisted to critics of modern citizenship demanding an alternative 
conception that goes beyond the dispute of meaning between a more legal or political 
account to fundamentally question the definitional premises of modern citizenship, 
mostly its location and subject and the type of rights attached to them. It is important 
then that we consider the possibilities conveyed in the concept of citizenship along 
these elements 
 
The locations of citizenship 
Modern citizenship has been exclusively located in the national territory, 
defining the state as the political agent responsible for the effective exercise of 
governance. The social contract emerged from states’ location and sought to 
formalise state’s legitimacy as the political agent of governance while granting 
universal rights based on the equality of those who had their citizenship located in 
the nation-state.
86
 This location has faced multiple challenges that have questioned, 
territorially and politically, the exclusive relation between citizenship and the state 
and demanded an attention to (1) spaces within the state as well as (2) spaces beyond 
its borders.  
Regarding the first, the demands focus on the need for considering the 
different spheres that, within the state, intersect and constitute the exact location of 
citizenship. Janoski’s account of citizenship, assures civil society with a particularly 
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 Janoski’s definition is particularly useful because, by bringing the passive and active membership to 
the concept, it is able to grasp how modern citizenship has assembled both liberal and republican 
views of citizenship. 
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 One may live in a state without having his citizenship located there. As we will explore later the 
question of location is closely connected to the question of access and how this access is granted, 
which, in modern citizenship, is conceived in terms of membership in the political community. We 
will explore this issue in more detail when we consider the subject of citizenship.  
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relevant role in the definition of citizenship, by questioning state’s political choices 
or demanding advances in the sphere of rights. However, and if one considers 
Janoski’s account of the influence civil society has on citizenship while accepting the 
state as the exclusive political reference where citizenship is granted, one can, 
according to Sommers (2008), be mislead into not acknowledging the economic and 
market dimension present both at the public sphere and the state, and how the 
interaction established between these spheres affect citizenship. Consequently 
Sommers considers citizenship as the result of a “triadic assemblage of shifting 
institutional and discursive relationships and struggles for power among state, market 
and civil society” (Sommers, 2008: 20). Sommers identifies two distinct poles in a 
continuum along which citizenship regimes move. In the dystopian model of 
citizenship the inclusionary and equal stance of the concept is replaced by a 
contractual logic that aims to reorganise state-society relations within the market 
postulates and where, in the triadic relation, we assist to a colonisation of other 
spheres by the market ethos (Sommers, 2008). To this pole, Sommers opposes a 
democratic socially inclusive citizenship where the balance in the relation between 
these spheres is restored. In this view the state mobilises political power to regulate 
and limit the activity of the market and transforms it into a supportive dimension of 
citizenship livelihood (Sommers, 2008). It is in this search for an inclusionary 
democratic citizenship that Sommers affirms civil society as the site of citizenship, 
considering particularly two main reasons: first, it is here where citizenship fulfils its 
ethos as the individuals’ rights to inclusion in a political community and recognition 
by others as equals; and second, it is here, in this in-between sphere, that the equality 
and solidarity that binds citizens is safeguarded from the excessive behaviours both 
of the state and the market (Sommers, 2008).
87
 Ku denunciates how civil society has 
been associated with the market (especially in a liberal account of the term and its 
relation with citizenship), undermining its role as an autonomous sphere while it is 
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 Sommers perceives citizenship as the right to have rights and distinguishes two fundamental rights 
related to citizenship: first the right to membership, which is related with the right of becoming a 
member of a polity where citizenship rights are granted, and second the right to inclusion in civil 
society, where individuals are recognized as equal. According to the author, this view “combines 
aspects of republicanism and communitarianism, while at the same time it regrounds the principle of 
individual liberty not in nature but in the solidarism and membership of civil society” (Sommers, 
2008: 28). We will come back to this issue once we address how the view of rights as the content and 
practices of citizenship has evolved.  
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detached from citizenship. Instead, civil society should be considered as a site of 
“practices and struggles over rights claims, both legal and non-legal” where citizens 
struggle for “political recognition of neglected rights, needs, and values” giving 
citizenship “a set of cultural, symbolic and political practices” (Ku, 2002: 542-543). 
Both Sommers and Ku’s accounts of civil society as the location where citizenship 
materialise and how civil society is foremost the space where citizenship and the 
relation established with states and other individuals is (re)defined. This view of civil 
society as a space of citizenship is thus different from liberal accounts of the term: 
civil society acquires here a political density, based on the relations it establishes 
with the other spheres, which is different from the liberal view of the term as the 
associative realm entrusted with states’ behaviour control. Hence, the location of 
citizenship refers not solely to the place where citizenship unfolds but also, and 
foremost, where citizenship is (re)negotiated. This is particularly significant, as Ku 
argues, to consider those individuals who are not yet recognised as citizens but 
develop in civil society a dynamic or struggle for inclusion (Ku, 2002).  
In addition, more attention has been given to the informal spaces where 
individuals establish their livelihoods, and particularly to the impact this causes on 
on individuals’ citizenship, especially in what concerns the effective enjoyment of 
those rights. Kruijt et al (2002) departed from the context of Latin America and the 
informalisation of economy to assess how this informality limits individuals’ 
substantive citizenship, i.e. to the degree on which citizenship rights – political, civil 
and social – are developed and fulfilled. Accordingly, and considering how the 
economic activity is crucial for individuals to access citizenship rights and in face 
with the growing informality that mark the economy in Latin American countries, 
Kruijt et al (2002) concluded that the informal economic situation creates an 
informal citizenship as the expression of a precarious substantive citizenship. This 
notion of informality is generally related to an unrecognised and thus unaccounted 
dimension of social life.  
Here it is particularly relevant to understand that even though citizenship is 
considered as belonging to the formal spaces of social life – specifically because it 
entails recognition by to become effective – informal spaces, and the economic and 
social relations established there affect how citizenship unfolds. Boege et al (2008) 
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have developed the hybrid political order category as an analytical frame in 
alternative to the failed states categorisation. According to the authors, the analysis 
of citizenship would benefit from this analytical framework since it recognises 
existing “customary, non-state institutions of governance” that shape “everyday 
social reality” (Boege et al., 2008: 7) and moves from the general dichotomy 
between formal and informal and the connotations usually attached it. The notion of 
informality Boege et al (2008) use is different from the analytical perspective of 
Kruijt et al (2002), but it is equally important, because it reminds us that in the 
informal spheres one is also likely to find actors of governance which necessary 
affect state-society relations and social relations.  
In what concerns the spaces beyond the state, the globalisation related 
phenomena has forced and strengthened demands for transnational frames of 
governance which entailed an identification of actors of governance and other spaces 
in the assurance, recognition and claim-making of citizenship rights. These emergent 
spaces where different actors and possibilities of governance emerged greatly 
affected the exclusivity of the relation of governance established between states and 
citizens through a social contract. As we have seen, two transnational realities are 
often related with this: first, the existence of regional political organisations, 
especially the EU which has adopted a clear frame of rights and a discourse of 
citizenship, as well as international organisations or international legal instruments of 
humans rights that affect states relation with citizenship rights; and second, the 
emergence of global networks of civil society actors where citizenship related 
struggles gained transnational dimension.  
The EU is perhaps, and so far, a unique institution in this sense, and has 
progressively affected the experience of citizenship in its member states, while 
raising important questions. Bauböck and Guirandon (2009) have stated that 
contemporary debates on citizenship have focused on boundary transgressing 
phenomena – migrations, for instance – as well as multilevel citizenship, which 
combines sub-state with supra-national modes for membership and rights. According 
to the authors, the EU has been, in this new scenario, a “laboratory”, where a 
plethora of issues, ranging from supranational integration to the territorial dimension 
of citizenship, and how EU provides a second sphere of rights protection, 
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enforcement and claim-making (Bauböck and Guiraudon, 2009). Preuβ has stated 
that European citizenship, still being forged, has assumed a non-national character, 
which means not the denial of the nationalities that constitute the EU or the role of 
the state in the lives of the citizens, but foremost “the abolition of the nation-state’s 
monopoly on individuals’ affiliation to a polity” (Preuβ, 1998: 148). Thus, and 
foremost, the EU constitutes a space of governance and offers a location of 
citizenship that transcends the boundaries of the states and its exclusive membership. 
Nonetheless, and because it departs from the states, European citizenship builds on 
state citizenship while broadening the political spaces where individuals can forge 
and renegotiate the content of citizenship and challenge the conduct of their states. 
This condition is also shared by international instruments of human rights: albeit they 
provide a reference of protection outside the state and additional spaces and 
possibilities of claim-making, states remain their privileged enforcing actors.  
The possibility to transcend the territorial state boundaries to engage in 
governance discussions and/or to question state’s actions is particularly expressive in 
the emergence of the global networks of civil society actors. Bartelson draws a 
parallel with the functions assumed by civil society at the state level to grasp whether 
global civil society can be or is a vehicle of change (Bartelson, 2006). Global civil 
society is mainly concerned with the constitution of the global as a political space 
and with its transformation into a governable realm (Bartelson, 2006). It provides 
therefore an international alternative to the absence of a transnational demos, able to 
bring legitimacy to governance processes. In this sense, the concept of global civil 
society is both descriptive and instrumental, since its articulation conveys an image 
of global tendencies in motion but also seeks to deepen the global realm of 
governance (Bartelson, 2006).  
These views represent, however, a rather optimistic view of the international 
realm in opposition to the national sphere. They seem to convey the idea that the 
international realm, the spaces of governance as well as the transnational or 
supranational actors that constitute it, represent a definitive possibility to overcome 
the problems recognised to national citizenship. As we have seen in the critiques 
appointed to cosmopolitan views on the future of citizenship, this view is not 
consensually accepted. The critics to these views have framed their claims around a 
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series of questions and limits. First, and in what concerns international and regional 
institutions potential, critics remind us that these institutions accept and depart from 
the state logic of governance, and its evolution and action is crucially limited to 
states’ will to comply and become part of these dispositions. This critique is related 
with human rights instruments and legal mechanisms at the international level in 
general but is particularly evident in the EU context, since the rights granted with 
European citizenship are dependent of its member states’ actions regarding the 
conditions needed for its compliance or the enforcement of these rights. Second, 
there is a warning in what concerns the highly hierarchical feature of the 
international realm. According to Castles (2005) a citizenship located on the global 
space would entail a legal principle of equal rights to all individuals but this principle 
tends to mask a real hierarchy dependent of the location of the individuals in the 
international relations hierarchic frame. Thus, “the legal principle of equality of 
nation-states and of citizens is in stark contradiction to a reality of hierarchy and 
exclusion” (Castles, 2005: 691). In such a hierarchical context, citizenship at a global 
scale is particularly problematic because it may become a privilege of some and, 
thus, reinforce the inequalities that are already so evident between the states that 
interact in the international system (Pallas, 2012). Moreover, a promotion of a 
citizenship located at the global or transnational level which fails to capture these 
differences may ultimately justify interventions in other states, or claim rights on the 
behalf of others, thus reducing or dismissing the other’s agency and capacity for self-
government (Chandler, 2003; Pupavac, 2005; Pallas, 2012).  
Considering what we have just exposed, one is forced to address the 
location of citizenship as a fundamentally questioned, challenged and disputed issue. 
There are however important conclusions that can be drawn from this debate and 
divisions. First, citizenship location concerns not only where and by which 
institution/agent its content is assured but also where its practices unfold and 
citizenship is renegotiated. Second, and related to this different perspective towards 
citizenship location, we have identified a multiplicity of spaces where citizenship can 
be contested, defended and (re)negotiated. These plural locations must be understood 
beyond a geographical delimitation, since, as we have mentioned, they have a 
political aspect attached, and we must necessarily depart from their co-existence in 
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the context where citizenship is (re)enacted. Thus, this vision of multiple locations 
and their simultaneous existence offers different possibilities to affect citizenship. It 
is important to understand that this view towards the location of citizenship does not 
deny the national domain as a location but it seeks instead to replace the exclusive 
notion it carried with a more dynamic and interrelated view of the different locations 
that currently affect citizenship.  
The best way to capture the new nature of the relations between space and 
citizenship is through the concept of scale. Scale is often approached from 
dimensional and hierarchical perspectives which entail a classification of scales 
based on sizes and levels (Howitt, 2003). The spatial scale in citizenship traditionally 
focused on the national level, departing from the modern definition of the concept 
which located citizenship in the nation-state’s territory. This is particularly evident 
when we consider the cumulative tone of scales stretching from the local to the 
international or transnational. In this stratification, the citizen projects citizenship 
upwards and downwards the national level, both in terms of citizenship enactment 
and (re)definition (Kofman, 2003).  
However, these scales are simultaneous and individuals tend to gain 
mobility across them in a continuum that departs from the local, up to the regional 
and transnational level. This is visible not only in what concerns the agents with 
whom individuals relate in the process of governance but also in the protection, 
enactment and redefinition of citizenship rights and/or practices or in the 
(re)constitution of the subject of citizenship. In this sense, the distinctive spatial 
feature of citizenship has become the overlapping nature of its scales: discourses and 
practices of citizenship can be forged at one specific scale and be effective at another 
(Kofman, 2003; Marston and Mitchell, 2004). The overlap of scales in citizenship is 
deeply connected with the ability to engage and make claims at different spaces, 
either echoing local struggles at the global level or bringing transnational issues to 
the local domain. This overlapping simultaneity of scales, and how it affects 
citizenship, entails perhaps that one approaches scales not solely from a view that 
stresses their size and level and how individuals move between them, and, foremost, 
that engages with the interactions established between different actors. Cox has 
defended a different approach to the concept of scale based on the image of networks 
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which provides us with the idea of unevenness in the penetration of these scales by 
different actors (Cox, 1998) but also enables us to reflect on the alternative 
interactions established through the constitution of networks in face of this 
“unevenness”. This vision of scale, both as different but yet connected by the 
interactions established, is particularly relevant if one wishes to relate these spatial 
notions with the understanding that spaces have also come to be distinguished 
according to the relation established between individuals, institutions, and political 
actors.  
Mapping these different types of spaces and crossing them with the 
possibilities and dynamics of scales, is then crucial to frame the current relation 
between space and citizenship. Let us illustrate: spaces of participation, either invited 
or created (Cornwall, 2002) can be located at the national scale but the actors which 
interact in these spaces are also connected to local and global or transnational scales 
through networks.
88
 The connection to the global scale might be providential in 
creating more inclusive dynamics on national projects of development – consider the 
emphasis on gender issues, for instance – but local dynamics and claims on the 
subject of citizenship are crucial to mobilise such support. This implies that even 
though the relation between space and citizenship has changed, exploring spatial 
dynamics is crucial to understand how political agency is conditioned and exercised 
through citizenship and how it unfolds in different locations, particularly in post-
armed conflict scenarios, considering the variety of actors and scales present.
89
  
 
The subject of citizenship 
We have seen in the previous section how rethinking citizenship beyond the 
state alters the identification-recognition established between state and society. 
Accordingly, and considering what we have exposed above, the possibilities of 
citizenship have affected the exclusive relation between state and society which has 
been central to determine the subject of citizenship. Identifying the subject of 
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 We will address Cornwall’s distinction between invited and created spaces of participation in detail 
when we discuss participation as the content of citizenship later in this section (Cornwall, 2002).  
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 Nelson for instance uses the concept of topographies to explore the different scales at which 
Purhépechan Mexican women structure and enact their citizenship and how this affects their political 
subjectivies (Nelson, 2004).  
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citizenship has been, in the modern view of the concept, inextricably linked to the 
location of citizenship. The bordering processes of the modern state settled a 
geographic demarcation where the inclusion/exclusion divide forged a community of 
individuals considered equals. This bordering entailed a process of 
identification/recognition of individuals as members of the state’s community and an 
identification/recognition of the state as the political reference in governance. In this 
frame, the subject of citizenship was identified through membership in a (nation-
state) community, which granted individuals a status based on the equality of their 
membership condition and the universal reach of its content.  
This membership has been defined through different legal frames of 
identification/recognition which focus mainly on jus sanguinis (blood) and/or jus 
solis (birthplace), but has also contemplated the acquisition of this membership 
through marital status or residence in a country. The specific articulation of these 
legal frames, broadly defined as nationality laws – legal recognition of membership 
in the political community of the nation-state – are specific to each country and 
represent in this sense an attribute of state’s sovereignty. Thus, and according to Weil 
(2001) the identification/recognition of individuals as subjects of national citizenship 
expresses a state prerogative: “determination of nationality is an inherent element of 
a sovereign state’s power to decide who is a citizen” (Weil, 2001: 18).  
Nevertheless, the relation between citizenship and exclusive membership 
and the condition of access it defines have been progressively questioned. The 
contributions which questioned the universal and equal condition of this membership 
through an emphasis on difference have shown that the social and sexual condition 
and the cultural background must be considered as useful (but not mutually 
exclusive) categories that necessarily affect the modern definition of citizenship and 
membership to the national community. This is particularly evident in the case of 
women, immigrant and indigenous communities. Obscuring the different categories 
that interact in one’s identity has meant that membership has been an oversimplified 
question. But foremost, it means that the non-recognition of these groups has not 
promoted an integration based on their specific needs. These groups’ specificities 
have been diluted in the political community of the nation-state and, as a 
consequence, their integration has been framed by a blind universalism.  
 121 
 
Accordingly, the modern articulation of citizenship has been clearly affected 
by these critiques which often translate in groups’ struggles for recognition of their 
differences and singularities in face of what is considered a dominant culture. 
Departing from a vision of citizenship located in the state, Joppke identified two 
changes related with the challenges to the modern subject of citizenship: first, the 
author identifies a liberalisation of access to citizenship status, which has become 
“de-sacralized and less nationalistic”; and, second, state membership and identity 
were structurally decoupled and “states can no longer impose a substantive identity 
as a precondition for acquiring citizenship, and primordial group identities even 
enjoy the status of rights” (Joppke, 2007: 39 and 44 respectively).  
The appeals for a differentiated citizenship are at the centre of several 
accounts of citizenship. Stretching from Young’s proposal to Kymlicka’s 
multicultural manifest, and despite the clear divergences between them, these 
contributions focus on the effective inequality that the modern universal and equal 
citizenship status conceal under the veil of membership. Against this pretense 
homogeneity, the promotion of a differentiated citizenship or a multicultural project 
seeks foremost to nurture equality through the recognition of difference, specifically 
in what concerns the plural identities that co-exist in the political community of the 
state. Fundamentally, these views assert that no equality is possible if the specific 
circumstances of these groups are not recognised and considered properly.  
It is important to note that the identification of the citizenship subject affects 
the relationship projected between citizens. When modern citizenship identified the 
citizen as member in the nation-state community it sought to forge a sense of 
belonging that bounded the subjects through solidarity, who shared identification and 
interacted within the states’ territory. Shifting the foundations for identifying the 
citizenship subject thus profoundly affects the relation established between citizens, 
particularly because it questions the exclusive membership to the nation-state 
community where this solidarity is grounded. If this exclusive membership is 
questioned by other possible and plural processes of identification that come together 
to build one’s identity, citizenship sees its main source of solidarity and of social 
cohesion potentially threatened. Also, and because citizenship location plays a 
crucial role in the identification of citizenship subjects, the emergence and 
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affirmation of multiple spaces further questions this exclusive membership and 
nurtures different visions of community. For cosmopolitans for instance, the 
emergence of global spaces of governance entails that citizenship as membership 
transcends the political community of the state to establish a wider community of 
equals. For Falk (2000) new forms of political identity and multiple loyalties are 
emerging and changing the emphasis away from a territorial frame towards an 
allegiance based on shared values. This seems to echo Sassen’s global city or Ong’s 
global assemblages, where citizenship is structured on complex and yet fragmented 
processes of identification.   
But for Purvis and Hunt (1999) the proliferation and fragmentation of 
identities that mark the late modernity bring along conflicting political loyalties and 
obligations, which challenge any universal pretension of citizenship and necessarily 
thickens any attempt to theorise the concept of citizenship. The authors ask “how  
does (indeed, can) a concept which has as its core the principles of universality and 
equality accommodate the politics of particularity and difference associated with the 
new wave of identity politics?” (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 458). The authors have 
captured the dilemma that currently crosscuts the attempts to preserve the political 
heritage of citizenship equality with the need to address the existing differences 
between subjects and groups as well as multiple forms and understanding of 
belonging, i.e., of establishing an identification.  
But for Nyamnjoh “such essentialist and rigid articulation of belonging” – 
based on exclusive membership to nation-state as an equaliser – is not suited for “a 
world pregnant with mobility” (Nyamnjoh, 2007: 79) and must be replaced by a 
“flexible citizenship”, an unbounded model that manages to critically grasp the 
hierarchies masked by the nation-state citizenship, to create space for excluded 
nationals and non-nationals, individuals and collectivities and to listen to “multitudes 
(...) clamour for inclusion” (Nyamnjoh, 2007: 80). For those who share this view, 
membership may provide access to the status of citizenship but it does not assure that 
(1) members have equal access and (2) that the legal status is not disarticulated from 
citizen’s needs and demands. Moreover, this membership might exclude from 
citizenship individuals and groups who, though they are not members, share in fact 
the political spaces of governance. 
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To this emphasis on the recognition of difference, others have opposed how 
fragmentation risks the creation of solidarity between individuals and a political 
existence beyond a utilitarian vision of politics. The main question is that citizenship 
project of inclusion departs from an identification of equals in a community. With 
the fragmentation of identities and its effects on the constitution of (political) 
communities, some fear that the search for difference will erase from citizenship the 
promise of equality between individuals that constitutes its political legacy. The 
question is then how can citizenship maintain its project of inclusion without 
resorting to an exclusive membership to the national political community.  
In order to answer to this question, or to avoid it altogether, there is a 
growing emphasis on decoupling the access to citizenship from identity and 
membership. Kostakopoulou (2010), for instance, proposes an ‘anational 
citizenship’, a concept of citizenship based on individuals’ domicile, where 
individuals place their livelihoods and establish connections. In this sense, 
citizenship becomes a network good, this is, a valuable condition which is recognised 
to all the participants in a given network but which does not conflict with the plural 
identities that co-exist in states’ territories.90.  
Others, however, have embraced the juggling between difference and 
equality. Lister, departing from the radical democracy proposal, pledges for a 
“differentiated universalism”, an approach that embraces the tension between the 
universal and particular and where the achievement of the universal is contingent 
upon the attention to difference (Lister, 1998). Lister considers this approach feasible 
both at the level of rights and participation, first because rights can be considered 
differently according to the specific position of groups so that the values of equality 
and justice are effectively promoted; and second, because participation can be 
guaranteed that difference is addressed through solidarity and a plural conception of 
community (Lister, 1998). For Purvis and Hunt (1999) this tension, and apparent 
paradox between particular and universal, and Lister’s suggestion to embrace it, 
represents the precondition of democracy and politics. Placing this tension at the core 
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 Kostakopoulou establishes three objectives to guide the variable geometry of citizenship, i.e., the 
balance between equality and differentiation, in an ‘anational citizenship model’: first, the realisation 
of equality and full citizenship would be promoted and no regressions on this would be possible; 
second, the equal dignity of all human beings and their rights would be respected; and third, the 
enhancement of democracy would be a privileged goal (Kostakopoulou, 2010) 
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heart of politics, the authors believe “citizenship rights provide a framework – a 
framework that is stable but never fixed” with “criteria for the granting of differential 
rights, namely that such differential rights are only legitimate insofar as they serve to 
fulfil citizenship rights available to all” (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 474-475). The 
understanding of reflexivity in relation to citizenship put forward by Ellison (1997) 
seems particularly relevant to frame the possibility of change Purvis and Hunt (1999) 
refer. Accordingly, reflexivity 
refers to the general process, driven by social, political and economic 
change, by which social actors, confronted with the erosion, or 
transformation, of established patterns of belonging, readjust existing 
notions of rights and membership to new conceptions of identity, 
solidarity and the institutional foci of redress (Ellison, 1997: 711). 
What these last contributions suggest is that even though the exclusive 
relation between membership in the nation and citizenship has faded, one must not 
discard individuals and groups identity and the role this element plays in the 
(re)definition of citizenship. However, recognising difference may in fact mean that 
we build a more inclusive condition of citizenship even if this entails one’s 
awareness and acceptance to the possibility of change. The management of these 
differences in non-excluding ways seems, then, to rest on the articulation of 
difference through a democratic ethos, which becomes crucial to promote a sense of 
inclusion and provides a non-violent context for the demonstration of power 
relations. This approach is even more relevant to contexts where difference and 
differentiation was a cause and instrument of violent armed conflict, since it poses 
specific challenges to the creation of a peaceful sociability.  
 
Citizenship rights and practices 
Considering the challenges and critiques posed to the modern conception of 
citizenship, specifically in what concerns the location and the subject of citizenship, 
the content of the concept, the rights and practices associated to citizenship, has also 
been targeted. The appeals for a multicultural or differentiated citizenship have 
pushed a reformative agenda of citizenship rights. Such developments might lead us 
to rescue the evolutionary vision of citizenship rights articulated by Marshall. It is in 
fact tempting to add to the civil, political and social rights, cultural, sexual and 
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reproductive, and even environmental rights. Such a cumulative view however, 
despite grasping the extension of rights to dimensions once excluded from the legal 
frame of citizenship, conceal the struggles and setbacks that have marked and 
continue to mark the rights conferred to citizens across the different categories put 
forward by Marshall and the ones added to them.  
In fact, rights are also object of dispute and disagreement, through which 
membership, issues of access as well as the specific content of the legal status of 
citizenship are affected and changed. They become, in this sense, a crucial site for 
the struggle of citizenship since the social norms codified in the legal frame may 
maintain a status or induce social and political changes with the extension and 
expansion of rights as well as with the introduction of new rights, thus affecting the 
inclusion/exclusion divides established. As Armony states “the bundle of rights 
available to citizens does not move from incomplete to complete stages in the 
direction of full evolution, but it relentlessly expands and contracts in arrhythmic 
ways” (Armony, 2007: 96). Furthermore, and because the inscription of rights in the 
recognised legal status of citizenship does not necessarily mean that all citizens have 
equal access or enjoy those rights equally, this dimension becomes a particularly 
important question in the discussion surrounding the inclusion/exclusion divides that 
mark citizenship. For Armony, the law, and citizenship rights particularly, can only 
become a form of empowerment if individuals are able to transform the law into 
effective rights, and for this to happen complementary conditions are needed 
(Armony, 2007).
91
  
Together, the struggles for rights as well as the claims for their effective 
application, play a crucial role in affecting citizenship. For this reason, Ariely (2011) 
analysed the power potential of citizenship rights and concluded that the rights of 
cultural representation, together with political rights, have more power potential 
because they have the capacity to affect governance.
92
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 Armony uses the term “fields of citizenship”, defined as the “extent to which rights are effective for 
a given social group in relation to other groups”, in order to establish a comparison of the distribution 
of rights across different groups and in different countries (Armony, 2007: 98). The purpose of such 
comparison is to establish a causal story which explains why some groups are systematically more 
disadvantage in the enjoyment of rights than others.  
92
 According to this vision, Ariely believes that the fact that non-citizens are entrusted with social 
rights and not political rights is not a coincidence, since in this way, and even though individuals have 
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The vision of rights and its power potential is also (re)affected and 
(re)defined and it has been further strengthen by the international instruments of 
human rights. These instruments work as additional spaces of rights granting and 
enforcement, pushing the content of citizenship rights further or filling the 
citizenship gap of non-citizens (Shafir, 2004).
93
 They also work as a mechanism to 
question states’ behaviours and actions which are considered as obstacles to human 
rights respect and, equally important, the existence of these international frames and 
instruments may serve as a crucial reference to mobilise support internationally – 
either in institutions, third states and civil society actors which interact at the global 
level – and demand reforms and changes at the state’s level. 
Even though citizenship rights and human rights are two distinctive legal 
frames, their interaction is marked by the possibilities opened by the existence of 
regional and international institutions and civil society actors who operate at the 
international level. But these possibilities are not necessarily equal to all individuals. 
We have mentioned previously that one of the critiques pointed to cosmopolitan 
views is that they tend to rely on rather optimistic views of international relations and 
dismiss the hierarchy the permeates the relations between states. These differences 
are once again made visible in this case, where these possibilities are not equally 
available to all. Civil society actors interacting in transnational networks and 
engaged in human rights protection play a decisive role here, acting as an alternative 
mechanism to mobilise international attention to particular issues.  
Moreover, human rights are, themselves, targeted with criticism, pointed as 
a perspective that is centred on the individuals and departing from liberal views over 
rights and social and political life that assume a rather imposing nature (Chandler, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
access to the social rights inscribed in citizenship, they lack the ability to influence their content and 
distribution (Ariely, 2011). In our opinion, and even though this is a challenging view, Ariely does not 
engage with the political nature that is intrinsic to rights-claiming. This is, even though non-citizens 
are conferred with social rights and not political rights this is the result of political action, either from 
the part of the state that recognises the contribution of non-citizens to the community or because it 
seeks to manage their claims in a given territory. What we mean is that even if social rights provide 
social goods to individuals, they are part of a project of governance and thus imbedded in politics. 
Moreover, the enjoyment of social rights by non-citizens have provoked a crucial reflection that have 
pushed the legal realm further but has also questioned the foundations of modern citizenship, 
particularly in what concerns the definition of its subject. 
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 Citizenship gap refers to the condition faced by refugees, for instance. Though they may possess the 
status of citizenship, outside their political community their rights lack an agent of governance to 
assure their protection. Accordingly, human rights serve, in these cases, to enforce and demand 
protection on a legal basis. 
 127 
 
2003; Sommers, 2008). It has been widely discussed how human rights came to 
occupy a central role in what concerns the approaches to conflict throughout the 
1990s and how human rights violations have impelled armed interventions in 
countries. For Chandler, as we have mentioned earlier, this challenges others’ right to 
self-government, which is perhaps one of the central rights carried by citizenship. 
Considering this, the relation between human rights and citizenship rights is not, and 
could not be a straightforward relation, even when the purpose of their interaction is 
to affect existing inclusion/exclusion divides.
94
  
Despite the new terms for (re)affecting citizenship rights, some remain as 
core principles of the concept. Citizenship has embodied the right to self-government 
and notwithstanding the changes which currently mark the processes of governance, 
no longer exclusively under the responsibility of the state, citizenship continues to 
embody this right, understood as one of the most important political affirmations of 
modern citizenship. Benhabib, for instance, refers to the need for new forms of 
popular sovereignty, i.e., the exercise of the right to self-government, in a post-
national, cosmopolitan frame of politics (Benhabib, 2007). This means that even 
when citizenship is thought beyond the state’s space of governance, the question of 
self-government persists, even if it is as an aspiration. Additionally, and departing 
from Arendt’s line on the “right to have rights”, Sommers defends the right to 
membership into a political community where frames of governance are defined and 
individuals’ right of recognition by others, specifically in civil society. Together 
these rights assure social inclusion of individuals as citizens. This membership must 
be understood in relation to individuals’ quest for recognition and inclusion. Because 
individuals interact in spaces of governance, its recognition as a part of that space is 
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 In fact, even for those whose focus relies on human rights development, this is a particularly 
problematic association. Franke for instance questions the current effect that citizenship, as a located 
concept framing the rights of “emplaced people” might cause on a development of human rights. For 
Franke the idea of citizenship thought it proclaims a universality of rights, departs from located 
processes where the human subject of rights is formed and disciplined. This view entails notions of 
civilising the other which are rather excluding. For Franke “the supposed humanity of citizenship is 
expressed through a dehumanisation of those excluded from it”, through a displacement of those who 
are not citizens (Franke, 2011: 44). Thus, a hierarchy is established between the emplaced citizen and 
the displaced human. For Franke then, the universal condition of human right can only be established 
once they become the right to not have rights; this is, in the possibility of claiming rights not on the 
basis of what is settled in citizenship but departing from a debate that claims are made as humans 
rather than as citizens, or non-citizens. 
 
 128 
 
fundamental if inclusion is to be effective. Membership here is more relevant if 
understood as the location of individuals in a space of governance rather than as a 
narrow reference to identity and belonging. The specific contours of membership and 
recognition will necessarily vary (and membership can assume identity traces), but 
they provide powerful driving principles which have influenced the content of 
citizenship rights and the social struggles over them.  
In addition to rights, citizenship is expressed in its practices which are not 
only the obligations usually attached to it but mainly refers to the exercise of the 
rights inscribed in citizenship, including the right to participation. Participation is an 
important dimension of citizenship for liberal views, but for republicans participation 
is a central aspect of citizenship and it is what materialises the rights to self-
government.  
Not surprisingly, the majority of the critical accounts of modern citizenship 
have sought to rescue the concept from a utilitarian view and promote an 
understanding of citizenship practices beyond the simple exercise of citizenship 
rights. The critiques that emerged to this modern understanding transcended its 
delimitations regarding the location, subject and rights of citizenship. These critical 
views retained and developed the idea of citizenship as a crucial political activity 
according to each one’s critical proposal. This political turn in the new proposals of 
citizenship is perhaps best captured if we bear in mind how the location and the 
subject of citizenship have been questioned and how citizenship rights represent a 
particular site of struggles and changes. If one considers that citizenship is a rather 
contested condition, which individuals and groups seek to affect, individuals and 
groups’ actions must be considered first, as political, and second, as the expression of 
citizenship itself. Thus, citizenship practices are not simply the exercise of rights and 
include the practices which seek to (re)affect, (re)define and (re)negotiate citizenship 
and the inclusion/exclusion that mark it. The practices to which we refer are the ones 
which not only express an existing condition of citizenship but also those which 
challenge its contours and, therefore, we must assume that they can be enacted by 
different actors.  
The appeals for citizens’ participation in the public sphere expressed the 
need to deepen and sustain the legitimacy of democratic systems and their decisions 
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and to involve individuals in actively affecting governance, beyond the election of 
their political representatives. The quest for improved citizenship participation has 
co-existed and evolved with the emergence of new spaces of participation and the 
attempt to improve the existing ones (Cornwall, 2002) As Cornwall states 
Levering open spaces once closed off to citizen voice or public scrutiny 
and creating new interfaces and institutions, these moves are about 
positioning citizens in newly emergent political and policy arenas, and 
repositioning them with regard to older structures, of ‘traditional’ 
governance as well as of the ‘modern’ state (Cornwall, 2002: 1).   
This (re)positioning is particularly relevant if one considers how citizenship 
unfolds and is affected in different locations and by different political actors. In this 
frame the definition of the citizen is also changing and that allows us to understand 
why the current discourses on participation are marked by “complex configurations 
of actors and political spaces within and beyond the nation-state” (Cornwall, 2002: 
1). While western democracies deal themselves with challenges of participation, or 
thereof the lack of it, participation was also was inscribed in the relation with other 
states, particularly non-western. The development sector, which is the specific 
context that Cornwall explores, is, in this respect, an illustrative example of this 
dynamic of (re)positioning and how the interaction of different actors in pressuring 
for participation affects the application of the concept. Here we do not wish to make 
a critical assessment of the impact this focus on citizens participation has caused on 
development. But this example is useful to consider the types of spaces where 
participation occurs. Cornwall distinguishes between invited and popular spaces 
departing from the process that created them: while in spaces of invited participation 
“external resource-bearing agents bring them into being and provide a frame for 
participation within them”, spaces that emerge of popular mobilisation “are 
constituted by citizens themselves rather than created for the participation of others” 
(Cornwall, 2002: 17).
95
 Though these are useful distinctions to explore the variety of 
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 This distinction is further crosscut with the question of durability which has led Cornwall to further 
identify four broad categories of spaces, depending whether the spaces are invited or popular, and 
whether they represent a durable engagement or not: first, spaces of regularised relations, where a set 
of institutions become a regular interface between individuals and authorities, especially the state; 
fleeting formations, whose actors remain mainly individuals and the state but which have a more 
performative and ephemeral nature; alternative interfaces, where citizens act outside or on the state 
and interact mainly with intermediary organisations, such as civil society actors; and fourth, 
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spaces where citizens’ participation occurs, it is nevertheless crucial to consider two 
fundamental aspects when engaging with these categories. First, and despite the 
demarcations, the boundaries between these spaces are mutable and not fixed: 
popular spaces may become sites where the status quo is kept while invited spaces 
may become sites for expressing dissent, rather than collaboration or compromise. 
Second, and precisely because this demarcation or the type of participation promoted 
is not static or evident, other factors should be considered when one explores a 
fundamental question: how and on what basis people participate (Cornwall, 2002). 
Cornwall states that beyond the specificities of the institutional frame of invited 
spaces for instance, one should consider the particularities of context such as 
“histories of governance and experiences of rule, whether those gained through 
popular struggle or through decades of being treated as passive recipients of a 
paternalistic state”, and also the “prevailing cultures of politics”, which include 
citizens’ everyday relation with the arena of the political, expectations towards 
politicians or the practices of decision-making and dissent (Cornwall, 2004: 3). 
These are in fact crucial issues to consider not only in what concerns invited spaces 
but also the spaces of participation which result from popular mobilisation.  
These approaches to participation have as a guiding frame the search and 
promotion of an active citizen, whose participation in the public sphere is expected to 
improve the democratic experience in a space of governance, and materialise the idea 
that citizenship expresses individuals’ right to self-government. However, and to the 
image of the active citizen, Isin opposes the activist citizen, a condition achieved 
after individuals perform citizenship acts. Acts of citizenship, distinguished from 
action or practice by the author, assume a performative and yet purposive character, 
and are acts through which subjects question an established order – politics – and 
become citizens – political (Isin, 2008; 2009). Isin affirms that “acts produce actors 
that do not exist before acts”, addressing foremost the question of how individuals 
become part of body politic. Activist citizens, in contrast to the active citizen “who 
act out already written scripts such as voting, taxpaying and enlisting”, “engage in 
creating scripts and creating the scene” (Isin, 2009: 381). Though this is a 
challenging category, the most important is the question behind it – what makes the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
movements and moments, marked by flexibility and its ephemeral character, and their ability for forge 
critical mass.  
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citizen? – because it forces us to reflect on the practices of citizenship and their 
constitutive power.  
Thus rights and practices are not only the content of citizenship: they are 
foremost a crucial site where the power relations that structure citizenship are visible, 
particularly because the dispute or claim-making of rights have become an important 
tool to legally sustain an inclusive project of citizenship. This image of rights and 
practices as the site and means of change is particularly relevant in post-armed 
conflict spaces where rights disrespect and violations constitute a benchmark of 
social relations.  
 
Meanings of citizenship 
If, as we have seen, the definitional elements of the concept of citizenship 
have been so disputed and the possibilities offered by different locations and other 
subjects of citizenship has rendered the term so complex, deeply affecting the content 
of citizenship, can we engage with the possible meanings of citizenship along the 
four images that Bosniak (2000) proposes and which we have mentioned previously? 
We believe that these images are still meaningful and useful to discuss the meanings 
carried in citizenship and thus we will depart from them to discuss how and for 
whom these are valid meanings.  
The first possibility of meaning Bosniak proposes us is a perspective where 
citizenship is first and foremost a legal status which provides individuals 
membership in a political community and assures them the protection of certain 
rights (Bosniak, 2000). The legal condition of citizenship is still a powerful 
dimension of what it means to be a citizen and is carried by the current practices of 
nationality laws. This centrality is further reinforced by more flexible nationality 
laws which allow for the reality of dual citizenship. This means that the legal 
recognition has gained a relative primacy above processes of cultural identification 
through which some have come to match citizenship and a cultural identity.  
But this emphasis as a legal status can be interpreted from a different 
perspective. It might mean reducing citizenship to a minimum definition in face with 
economic and political processes that have tended to adopt a minimalist approach of 
citizenship, reducing it to a legal condition. Kantola, exploring the current patterns of 
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political governance, posits how it currently occurs in a frame of consensual politics, 
this is, a tendency to blur the differences between the actors who come to effectively 
implement governance and whose policies are mainly directed to the economic 
needs. For Kantola, “in consensual politics the citizen’s power is reduced as the main 
channels through which private problems can be expressed as public political issues 
disappear” (Kantola, 2005: 206). Therefore, and in practice, the right to choose 
between democratic alternatives is not only reduced as the political scope for the 
enactment and (re)definition of the concept is limited. As a consequence, rights are 
questioned and dismantled; the political space for participation in governance is 
progressively replaced with allegedly technical criteria of governance, and identity 
and solidarity are diminished in face with the demands of a globalised economic 
system where the mobility of flows demands a legal dimension of rights recognition 
that enables the economic practice. 
This view is in tension with those who understand citizenship mainly as 
rights. Obviously, the recognition of a legal status entails the establishment of certain 
rights to citizens. But its concern is mainly with the inscription of rights in the legal 
frame and not necessarily with the conditions needed for their enactment. Marshall 
was perhaps one of the first to challenge this view by establishing his evolutionary 
understanding of rights and assuming that civil and political rights were not enough 
to achieve the equality promised and, therefore, social rights were needed to 
materialise this promise of equality, or at least attenuate the tensions emerging from 
the confront between a promised equality and an excluding experience of citizenship 
(Marshall, 1992). The focus on rights has progressively claimed an understanding 
beyond a legal existence and as the effective enactment of those rights and the 
conditions needed to do so. This view over rights allowed individuals to reflect on 
their condition as rights bearers, and while doing so, analyse the content of 
citizenship itself. Citizenship as the right to have rights, using the arendtian precept, 
entails more than a recognition of a legal status and demands the effective protection, 
enforcement and enactment of recognised legal rights. This notion of citizenship as 
(effective) rights has led to a growing consciousness over excluding realities 
primarily related to the detachment between a legal status and the effective exercise 
and enjoyment of citizenship rights. Consequentially, citizenship as rights has also 
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become particularly relevant to those who ground their struggles for recognition and 
inclusion in the definition of new rights – sexual, cultural, environmental –, or 
extending and expanding existing ones. Citizenship as rights is particularly relevant 
if we recall how rights are themselves a site of struggles for inclusion, not only for 
those who are already recognised as citizens but also for those excluded from this 
condition.  
For others, however, the enjoyment of citizenship rights and the definition 
of a more inclusive citizenship are not possible outside an understanding of 
citizenship as an intrinsically political activity. Only through political engagement 
can individuals affect rights and be a part in the definition of the frames of 
governance, thus materialising the right to self-government. This is the premise from 
which civic republicans depart, but as we have seen, they are not alone in 
emphasising the political nature of citizenship. As we have mentioned, citizenship as 
political activity faces nowadays a series of challenges which have led to a question 
of the possibility of citizenship expressing individuals’ political agency. However, as 
the debates on citizenship testify, it is precisely this political dimension that has 
enabled crucial transformations in citizenship in the past – as the extension of its 
condition to previously excluded groups, and the expansion of rights attached to 
citizenship – which is particularly crucial in a moment where the modern definition 
of the concept is no longer exclusive and its reality co-exists with other locations and 
subjects of citizenship.  
Precisely because of this, the political dimension of citizenship has gained a 
renewed breath along with a sense of urgency. For those who engage with different 
locations of citizenship and its actors, with different subjects, and the complex 
questions that citizenship rights encompass, the political nature of citizenship, mostly 
as the expression of individuals’ right to self-government, is considered as the 
element that can guide individuals’ relations in shared spaces of governance. Only a 
political understanding of the concept, necessarily democratic, and which transcends 
and replaces the promise of cohesion unfold in nation-states communities, can 
become a reference for a concept of citizenship that accepts and democratically 
articulates difference and promotes inclusion. This is one on the strongest messages 
which can be drawn of Habermas or Mouffe’s reflections and also from feminists’ 
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contribution. Accordingly, those who appeal to this political turn proclaim foremost a 
democratic solidarity, where the democratic process is able to bind the citizens in a 
project of governance, despite their differences and divergences.  
This view of citizenship promises a solidarity that departs not from a 
cultural matrix but rather from a democratic political process through which 
individuals can be included in the governance processes that affect them. Identity is 
still considered in these approaches but in a non-excluding way. Nevertheless 
identity and citizenship remain strongly connected and in some case citizenship is the 
political materialisation of an identity and the shared identity provides a strong sense 
of inclusion and membership. Bearing this in mind is crucial to engage with 
demonstrations of nationhood or other identities, but they are particularly challenging 
when engaging with indigenous communities, since their cosmovision does not 
separate identity rights from their economic an environmental rights.  
In addition to these four categories proposed by Bosniak (2000) we would 
like to add two interrelated meanings attached to citizenship: citizenship as inclusion 
and exclusion. As we have seen, modern citizenship has been built on different 
divides of inclusion/exclusion, whether they are place at the borders of the state or 
refer to non-material divides along lines of social inclusion/exclusion. Depending on 
the individuals’ particular position regarding these divides, citizenship is understood 
as an effective source of exclusion or inclusion. This is a crucial aspect of citizenship 
and the challenges that have emerged throughout the years along these divides have 
been responsible for crucial changes and reflections on citizenship. For those who 
develop their livelihoods in the margins of these divides, citizenship is a matter of 
rights (the right to have rights, the right to inclusion and recognition) but because 
they constitute a challenge to an instituted division, their position is also and 
foremost a challenge to established frames of governance becoming a political 
affirmation. If we consider citizenship either as inclusion or exclusion, and we bear 
in mind the possible interpretations discussed above, we are forced to acknowledge 
that not only citizenship meanings are multiple, in the sense that different 
perspectives co-exist and are combined, but also and foremost, that the meaning of 
citizenship varies greatly between individuals, depending of their condition in the 
spaces of governance. 
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Citizenship and post-armed conflict statebuilding  
So far we have sought to map the main contributions and issues that have 
marked the discussion of citizenship. We have enunciated different theoretical 
contributions which we believe to be of particular relevance to question modern 
citizenship in present days, and we have tried to understand the discussions over the 
concept of citizenship and the possibilities they pointed. In the next pages we will try 
to draw on the main implications that this reflection entails in order to choose and 
clarify the lenses through which we will explore citizenship in the complex and 
challenging context of post-armed conflict statebuilding.  
The first element which we need to consider is that the specific 
configurations of citizenship are neither fixed nor consensual. Citizenship has 
evolved along non-linear paths. This non-linearity is mostly related with its inherent 
political dimension, particularly because citizenship is contingent of located power 
relations and their (im)balances in the definition of the frames of governance in 
which citizenship content and practices are inscribed. We evoke again the definition 
of Purvis and Hunt, where citizenship is a stable and yet never fixed condition, to 
recall precisely how the concept has in it the premise of change. This feature is not 
exclusive of the late-modern fluid approach to the concept. On the contrary, and 
though citizenship has excluded individuals and groups to maintain a status, different 
movements have questioned citizenship subject, and rights and practices throughout 
the last two centuries, expanding and extending citizenship to dimensions and 
individuals once excluded. This forces us to acknowledge the dual nature of the 
concept as the expression of politics: it is simultaneously a source of inclusion and 
exclusion, an expression of empowerment and agency and domination. As such, it is 
simultaneously a tool for maintaining a status or a driving force of social and 
political struggles. This duality is materialised along the different inclusion/exclusion 
divides that characterise different spaces of governance and the elements that sustain 
them, and therefore it is precisely in the disputes over these divides – for the 
establishment of new divides, the maintenance of others, or for profoundly 
questioning and altering them – that citizenship is (re)affected and (re)defined. More 
 136 
 
important, it is precisely here that different narratives on the condition of citizenship 
are (re)built and (re)enacted.  
Second, and if we depart from the complexity citizenship currently entails in 
terms of locations, subjects, rights and practices and the possible meanings and 
understandings of the concept, its political meaning, as the expression of self-
government, and its impact on the legitimacy of governance actors also demands 
reflection. The political relation established through citizenship between the state and 
society was based on legitimacy and accountability: the state was the expression of 
society and because of this it had to answer for its actions to the citizens. State 
sovereignty was structured on and conditioned by popular sovereignty, i.e., the 
recognition of the state as the legitimate political authority which mediated social 
relation, enforcing the rule of law and effectively implementing governance. As we 
know this is a theoretical underpinning and the legitimacy of states and how they are 
accountable to their citizens varies. Nevertheless, this relation, framed under an 
exclusivity clause, served as a guiding principle, mostly in the efforts to promote 
democracy at a worldwide scale and it continues to structure the claims of state’s 
centrality in political life. The multiplicity of actors which interact in the definition 
of governance frames at different scales as well as in the implementation of 
governance and protection brought along two fundamental questions. First, state 
sovereignty, as we have discussed in the first chapter, has been progressively 
internationalised, particularly in what concerns the recognition of states’ legitimacy, 
which fostered a relation of accountability directed outwards (framed under the good 
governance criteria), thus profoundly affecting state-society relations in what 
concerns the legitimacy conferred by individuals and the accountability demanded by 
it. Heater affirms that “legitimacy is weakened as accountability is undermined” and, 
consequentially “legitimacy and citizenship are consequentially impaired” which 
affects the democratic principle that characterises citizenship (Heater, 1999: 162). 
However, we must bear in mind that to this impaired relation matches an 
internationalisation of legitimacy, which in practice means that state’s sources of 
legitimacy are redistributed instead of its legitimacy being questioned. Second, this 
situation is further aggravated by the lack of accountability in the relations that exist 
between the citizens and these actors, even if they do in fact affect governance in the 
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spaces where citizens’ livelihoods unfold. This means in practice that to a 
multiplication of the actors involved in governance there is a reduction of citizens’ 
ability to materialise the democratic principle of self-government and be included in 
the definition of the processes which define governance principles and goals. This is 
more relevant if we consider how citizenship project of inclusion, especially in the 
recent attempts to detach the inclusion from national belonging while respecting the 
different identities that co-exist in spaces of governance, is currently centred in a 
democratic purpose of including individuals in the democratic definition of frames of 
governance.   
The third and last idea we would like to emphasise, which partially explains 
the democratic and political challenge of the previous remark is that we are currently 
engaged with profound transformations that are still far from being concluded or 
even clearly defined for that matter. The political, socio-economic and cultural 
context at which citizenship is being (re)defined and (re)enacted is at best confusing, 
if not contradictory. We are currently discussing citizenship beyond the definition set 
by the modern account of the concept while the state remains a cornerstone of 
political life and of citizenship. More expressive, much of the discussions on 
citizenship built on the modern principles and rights protection to propose alternative 
views of the concept. Beck’s image of transition between modernities draws an 
illustrative caricature of this context: the muddle between the old and the new 
political forms and principles is the canvas where citizenship is being re-drawn 
(Beck, 1997). Instead of describing the present context as “muddle”, we prefer to 
understand it as marked by the convergence of different temporalities: modern 
frames – either existing or ambitioned – converge in space and time with post-
modern demands and alternatives conceptions of the world. This convergence forces 
us to address the current moment not necessarily as a moment of transition towards 
an expected outcome, but rather as the expression of the political, in which its 
outcome is currently being (re)shaped.   
Post-armed conflict statebuilding and the different processes that define it 
are particularly evocative of this image. The states being (re)built are expected to 
reproduce the modern state but have to deal and engage with the spatial dynamics 
already in place. They are expected to protect rights and deploy a democratic 
 138 
 
political project of governance both inclusive of its citizens as respectful of 
international norms and practices. And, on top of all of this, states are considered as 
pre-condition for establishing a durable peace project. This task is particularly 
complex, especially in what concerns the international facet of this project which 
necessarily affects the process and how the state relates with its citizens. Migdal 
states that “statebuilding will not simply mean mobilizing a pre-existing nation or 
creating a nation coterminus with the boundaries of the state” (Migdal, 2004b: 40). 
This means that in the interconnected world where states are being (re)built, the 
relation between the state and society cannot simply reproduce the patterns followed 
in the 19
th
 century by European states. Instead, the states (re)emerging in the current 
international system will necessarily surface from the intersection of different 
processes, where the nation is just but one element in the creation of social cohesion 
in state-society relations.  
In what concerns the specificity of post-armed conflict spaces, the question 
is how to address complex issues without risking oversimplifying or rendering them 
impossible to grasp. This is a fundamental issue when we are seeking to establish an 
analysis of citizenship in post-armed conflict that simultaneously attempts to grasp 
an alternative view to the depoliticising narrative built on international actors’ 
practices and discourses of statebuilding without having the liberal frame as the 
exclusive reference. 
Departing from the possibilities of reflection offered by citizenship debates, 
we approach citizenship as a relational concept, which frames and mediates the 
relations established between political actors of governance and individuals, and 
between individuals in a shared space where their livelihoods materialise and 
intersect. We adopt the term of political actors of governance to grasp the 
multiplicity of actors that currently engage in governance processes just as we adopt 
the term of shared space to grasp the possibility that currently marks citizenship of 
transcending the exclusive space of the state. Second, we consider that citizenship is 
affected by the power relations established between actors, groups and individuals 
and as such, and though citizenship may have a durable configuration, it is subjected 
to contestation and change. Power relations are related to the dual nature of 
citizenship as a driver of inclusion and an instrument of exclusion, and therefore 
 139 
 
refer to the interaction between different individuals or groups’ agency. Accordingly, 
we understand citizenship as an inherently dual political concept which is 
simultaneously the expression of a prevailing view and the possibility of change. 
This view has two main analytical implications. First, citizenship is a 
located concept since it necessarily depends on the configuration of power relations 
established on the spaces of governance. Second, what results from this configuration 
is a condition of citizenship. We use this term to convey precisely the idea that 
citizenship depends of power relations that unfold in a specific space but it is also 
possible to be affected and changed. Thus, engaging with post-armed conflict 
scenarios requires that we bring our analysis from the abstract level and locate it on 
the spaces where power relations unfold. This is an exercise that we will refer as 
placing citizenship in context and entails that we locate our object of analysis both in 
space and time and analyse, departing from there, the processes that have led to that 
specific condition of citizenship.  
Considering that we depart from international intervention at states’ level 
the location of our object of analysis is determined. We depart from citizenship as the 
signifier of the political relations established in a space where the state is the central 
agent of governance. It must be made clear that this location is related to analytical 
purposes and neither excludes the multiple locations of citizenship we have 
previously explored nor the variety of actors that intervene in governance. Instead it 
means that we depart from a location precisely to explore others and how they 
interact and affect citizenship.  
In order to map the processes that converge to create a specific condition of 
citizenship, we will depart from what Cornwall (2002) has referred as “histories of 
governance and experiences of rule” to grasp the power relations which have 
affected citizenship and how they have evolved and affected the inclusion/exclusion 
divides. This analysis of citizenship in retrospective enables us to consider the 
different political actors that have marked and disputed governance and their 
evolving role and interaction in different spaces where citizenship is (re)affected and 
(re)enacted. It also allows us to carry the analysis in continuum, before, during, and 
after violent armed conflict so that we can assess its impact on the specific condition 
of citizenship in formal peace times, including the role of international statebuilding 
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actions. Before we carry this reflection to the specific case of Guatemala, it is 
nevertheless fundamental that we assess the understanding of citizenship carried in 
international post-armed conflict statebuilding discourses and practices to understand 
not only how it relates with its normative reference, but also and foremost the 
discourses and practices which are carried to spaces of intervention and explore their 
interaction with local power relations.  
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4. Statebuilding and Citizenship: re-engaging with power and 
politics 
As we have previously stated, post-armed conflict statebuilding departs 
from a diagnosis of fragility to define a project of intervention and rehabilitation. 
This diagnosis has the image of the modern state, its monopolies and functions, as a 
reference, and departs from this vision to create the conditions for the transformation 
of violent armed conflict. Within this project relies the expectation of creating the 
institutional conditions for a peaceful sociability where states effectively deploy 
order and security, wealth and welfare, and legitimacy and representation (Milliken 
and Krause, 2002). (Re)building states in the aftermath of violent armed conflict 
meant then (re)founding the social contract, i.e., the terms and frames of governance, 
between a functioning state and its polity, based on the functions states were 
expected to perform, and on good governance criteria.  
Considering the reach of this project, assumed as a precondition for any 
prospects of a successful peacebuilding, it is natural to assume that such project of 
governance necessarily affects state-society relations and the condition of citizenship 
on intervention spaces. However, and despite what citizenship entails for the 
definition of states’ political communities or as the signifier of state-society relations 
in the modern frame, it is intriguing to note how citizenship has not been considered 
for analytical purposes, not only by those engaged with the deployment of 
statebuilding projects on intervention spaces but also by those who have criticised 
how international actors have engaged with local populations. This absence has 
implied a silence over citizenship in the particular contexts of post-armed conflict 
statebuilding which is, at least, awkward and yet revealing. Such silence has been 
duly noted throughout the last years, impelled mainly by the refocusing of 
statebuilding discussions on state-society relations as an attempt to correct 
statebuilding actions trajectory.  
In 2006, the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and 
Accountability issued a report as a result of the first five years of its research which 
sought to present important findings able to contribute to the ongoing discussion on 
effective states and country ownership. In this document, the authors recognised that 
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even though “effective states are based on an evolving relation between the states 
and the citizens” it was surprising that this debate had not “picked up, defined, 
debated and put to use, the concept of citizenship” (Eyben and Ladbury, 2006: 5). 
Some explanations are put forward to help us understand why the concept was such a 
novelty for international development actors. Three fundamental reasons are pointed 
to justify this silence:  
One reason is that it tends to be seen as a term that is connected with 
formal, documented membership of a nation state and thus excludes from 
consideration some of the most marginalised, such as migrants and 
refugees. Another reason is that until recently the ultimate recipients of 
aid have either been seen as ‘beneficiaries’ who got what others decided 
was good for them or as ‘users’ who make choices in relation to services 
provided. A third reason is that ‘citizenship’ is a word containing a bundle 
of over-lapping meanings. Citizenship can thus be variously understood 
as belonging (to a certain place, group or community), as status (as 
compared with a non-citizen) as national identity (Swedish rather than 
Swiss) and as relating to rights and duties. This can be confusing” (Eyben 
and Ladbury, 2006: 5). 
Notwithstanding the reasons pointed to this silence – the complexity 
attached to the concept of citizenship, either through the different meanings the 
concept may assume or the dialectic relation between inclusion and exclusion that 
nationality criteria usually confers to its status, and the challenges it poses to 
international actors involved in the task of statebuilding – this does not mean that 
state-society relations were simply left aside, especially if we consider how the state 
has always occupied a key role in peacebuilding, first through democratisation and 
second, through statebuilding.  
During the first years of peacebuilding actions, the engagement with the 
state was done through a promotion of regime change which meant, specifically, a 
transition to a liberal democracy. A regime change was expected to create in post-
armed conflict spaces a relation between state and society able to overcome, through 
representation, separation of powers, and the rule of law, the patterns of violent 
armed conflict and, accordingly, establish a social contract that could empower 
individuals, by reconciling power/security and individual liberty and autonomy 
(Held, 1995). Citizenship meant, then, an empowerment of individuals and the 
materialisation of the principle of self-government through the rights and 
representation assured in a liberal democratic frame.  
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But the reach of this promise came to be very limited and democratic 
achievements did not completely fulfil its goals. Democratisation processes applied 
what Pouligny identified as a “democratic grammar”, i.e, faced with an absence of a 
clear definition in UN lexicon of what democracy should mean and entail, 
democratisation became an “intangible ‘thing’ comprising a variety of formal 
procedures” and “external interventions tend, in practice to focus upon a ‘democratic 
grammar’ of which the organisation of elections is a central component” (Pouligny, 
2006: 239-240). Civil society promotion was also part of this grammar since it was 
perceived not only as a consequence of the legal framework of liberal democracy but 
also had a supportive role to it, as a space of democratic socialisation of populations 
and as states’ deviant behaviours “watch-dog” (Baker, 2004). It is important to note 
that this also reflects a growing trend to perceive civil society as the site of 
citizenship. However, such view is different from the one Sommers (2008) 
expresses, and it is mainly liberal-inspired, i.e, is understood as an alternative 
associative realm and mainly non-political in nature.  
Such an approach departed from a replicable model at a worldwide scale 
and necessarily entailing a set of practices which did live short to their promise of 
peace and empowerment. Indeed, the critiques to democratisation attempts are rather 
consensual on stressing how they missed local realities and conditions and the lack of 
context sensibility. In what concerns citizenship, it was believed that a democratic 
elected government, and the legitimacy conferred through elections, would 
materialise the promise of empowerment into citizenship rights. This focus on 
elections seemed to narrow citizenship to a circumscribed political dimension: 
political rights of representation and participation were privileged over social-
economic rights, often assumed as a consequence of local development, but this 
privileging was circumscribed to elections, narrowing the scope of individuals’ 
political agency to specific spaces of participation. Additionally, civil society 
assumed a decisive role in this democratic grammar as an alternative site of 
citizenship, where individuals reinforced their autonomy from the state, performing 
and even replacing the state in some sectors. In practice, and if we depart from 
Marshall’s account on citizenship rights and their relation to citizenship in liberal 
democracies, three main implications could be drawn: first, and if we consider the 
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evolutional logic of rights development, this privileging of political rights could be 
seen as a previous and necessary stage in the development of social rights able to 
manage the existing inequalities; second, and because these rights were relegated for 
a second moment – a moment of socio-economic development – the citizenship 
promoted lost part of its potential as an inclusionary and empowering condition; 
third, and because elections reduced the scope of political agency, the role of 
individuals in the development of citizenship content was also not considered 
properly, which necessarily affected the legitimacy of the democratic reforms and 
thus imperilled the peace promoted through democratisation. Thus, and instead of 
improving state-society relations by contributing to a new social contract, 
international efforts on democracy promotion limited the role of the citizenry thus 
creating counterproductive impacts to its ambition of empowerment.  
The change of focus from democratisation to statebuilding engaged with the 
limits of the former in effectively promoting local empowerment and legitimate 
frames of governance. As we have discussed, the limited achievements of 
democratisation strategies were understood as a direct result from negligence on state 
institutions effective capacity to deploy governance and perform their tasks. 
Accordingly, post-armed conflict statebuilding actions came to be perceived as the 
creation of enabling conditions for a sustainable and legitimate project of peace. 
However, and despite this change, statebuilding shared with democratisation actions 
the criticism of their detachment from local realities. Nevertheless, and though 
international actors enrolled in peacebuilding activities had for long been criticised 
for their actions on the ground, especially in what concerns the unexpected local 
consequences of their actions and their disregard for the specificities of the contexts 
where they intervened, statebuilding interventions seemed to have radicalised this 
detachment, especially if one considers the technical approach to states’ sovereignty 
pointed by several authors and critics (for example Richmond, 2004; Chandler, 2005; 
Bickerton, 2007; Richmond, 2008).  
The growing emphasis on a performative vision of state’s sovereignty 
retains the liberal democratic view of individuals’ empowerment and self-
government. It assumes the political project of liberal democracy and the vision of 
citizenship therein inscribed, but since statebuilding becomes a precondition for 
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achieving these purposes, empowerment becomes a promised end, one which can 
only be properly addressed after functioning and viable institutions are in place. 
Thus, and notwithstanding this continuity between democratic grammar and 
statebuilding frame in post-armed conflict scenarios, it is nevertheless clear that 
statebuilding deepened the dependence of individuals’ empowerment of international 
actions and statebuilding interventions. Moreover, and by attaching a technical 
character to the statebuilding project and grounding its evaluation on good 
governance criteria, international actors relocated the sources of state’s legitimacy, 
privileging the international domain. This focus on good governance was in fact 
central, not only to state’s recognition as legitimate sovereign but also to recreate 
state-society relations. International actors’ approach to state-society relations 
departed from the state and privileged good governance criteria, believing that it 
would create the local legitimacy necessary to the new institutions.  
Progressively, it became clear that neglecting the input dimension of 
legitimacy, which deals with the recognition, acceptance and support that must come 
from society, was rather harmful to post-armed conflict aspirations. Indeed, and with 
the radicalisation of local detachment sustained on the growing trend of 
internationally driven and projected reconstruction of states, demands for increasing 
attention to local actors and conditions vigorously emerged. As we have exposed, 
there is a renewed emphasis on the need to improve, or not to harm, state-society 
relations. This attention is mainly related with the need to strengthen states’ 
legitimacy, specifically in its input dimension, considering how the (lack of) social 
support and endorsement of the reforms affect the long-term sustainability of the 
actions developed. This means that even if international actors maintain the centrality 
of good governance in affecting state’s legitimacy, they have progressively 
acknowledged that the legitimacy which emerges from society’s recognition of state 
and its project of governance is crucial to ensure the effectiveness, sustainability and 
legitimacy of the statebuilding project under motion.  
It would seem logical to expect that this emphasis on state society-relations 
would bring the concept of citizenship to the discussion over statebuilding, especially 
because this concept is, in the modern state frame statebuilding hopes to reproduce, 
the framing concept to the relation of identification-recognition established between 
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states and the members of its polity. However, and as we have seen in the final 
section of chapter 2, international actors have instead deployed an alternative concept 
to generate the needed input legitimacy. The engagement with local actors and 
individuals and the attempt to re-affect state-society relations was then framed by the 
promotion of local ownership as an attempt to root statebuilding in local acceptance 
of an internationally driven technical process. Thus, and paradoxically, a strategy of 
local ownership promotion was unfolded under international actors’ guidance to 
address the limits and criticism of international statebuilding radicalised detachment 
of the spaces of intervention.  
Local ownership was firstly used in the development circles and was 
officially inscribed in the field with the OECD recognition that local ownership was 
a crucial condition for the success of development policies (OECD-DAC, 1995; 
1996). Overall, it implied that local populations should be given a central role in the 
definition and implementation of development projects and strategies. To address its 
critics, peace and statebuilding borrowed the concept of local ownership from 
development circles, transforming it into a referential map to those involved in post-
armed conflict statebuilding actions. However, post-armed conflict statebuilding also 
inherited some of the fuzziness and lack of rigorous definition and operational 
strategy that marked the concept in the development field (Chesterman, 2007). 
Generally, and in what concerns building peace, local ownership “conveys the 
common wisdom that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live 
with it is likely to fail” (Donais, 2009: 3). But moving beyond this quite simple 
image may prove problematic. For Zurn and Herrhaussen (2008) the lack of a clear 
definition, together with the multiple possible meanings it may have is a clear 
problem. Chesterman for instance recognizes six senses of ownership, ranging from 
responsiveness to sovereignty (Chesterman, 2007).
96
 Considering how these different 
perspectives may intersect in the same space and temporality of intervention, the 
question of what ownership international actors promote becomes even more 
necessary.  
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 Chesterman defines responsiveness, consultation, participation, accountability, control and 
sovereignty as senses of local ownership in order to capture the multiple meanings the concept may 
assume (Chesterman, 2007: 9-10). 
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For Pouligny ownership represents “relations among stakeholders” 
particularly in what concerns  
their respective capacity, power or influence to set and take responsibility 
for an agenda and to muster and sustain support for that. This means that 
part of the implementing bodies need to be firmly rooted in the recipient 
country and represent the interests of ordinary citizens (Pouligny, 2009: 
8). 
This view calls our attention for the relational nature of this concept, the 
plurality of actors involved and the needed connection to local spaces of intervention. 
Moreover, it forces us to address the concept departing from the relation established 
between outside/international actors and inside/local actors. In post-armed conflict 
statebuilding scenarios, ownership represents a relation established between different 
stakeholders of the process, and specifically between international actors and local or 
national stakeholders in what concerns the definition and execution of reforms and 
actions. These relations are marked by an undoubted power asymmetry between 
actors’ capability, power and influence (Pouligny, 2009), and the appeals for local 
ownership implicitly recognise these asymmetries and how they have affected the 
sustainability of the actions, since states’ legitimacy is undermined by the empty 
authority ascribed to national governments. Therefore, ownership promotion 
becomes a process through which international actors seek to bring their local 
counterparts closer to the actions undertaken in order to reverse the asymmetries 
identified and create a positive impact on legitimacy and, consequentially, 
sustainability. In this sense, ownership, local or national, is not defined by 
opposition: it’s not a matter of putting local opposite to international ownership but, 
instead, a process, internationally driven, to make stakeholders in a partnership more 
equal.
 
 
Ownership depends, then, of the role international actors assume. For Zurn 
and Herrhaussen (2008) local ownership meaning necessarily depends on whether 
we are referring to an ongoing mission or to a situation where the internationals’ exit 
from the country demands a strategy (Zurn and Herrhausen, 2008). In the first case, 
and with the presence of international actors, local ownership refers to “minimum 
endorsement of policies by the majority of formally empowered national elites”, 
while in the second case, in the imminence of internationals’ absence, local 
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ownership “must mean the actual agenda setting, executing and controlling of the 
local elite” (Zurn and Herrhausen, 2008: 274).  
Thus, it is possible to infer that ownership is contingent on internationals’ 
presence or absence, since the role they assume during and after the intervention is 
expected to affect the national and local actors’ behaviour. With the international 
presence and the establishment of a partnership, local or national ownership is 
necessarily partial since international actors have a prevailing role on the definition 
and implementation of reforms. Under these partnerships, we tend to assist to a 
process of ownership promotion, perceived as a crucial strategy to affect the 
asymmetries understood as counterproductive to internationals’ purposes.  
Therefore, ownership becomes the end purpose of this process, becoming 
closer to a self-determination meaning only in the wake of the internationals’ 
absence. This vision is summed by Narten (2009) when the author defines local 
ownership of statebuilding actions as  
the process and final outcome of the gradual transfer to legitimate 
representatives of the local society, of assessment, planning, and decision-
making functions, the practical management and implementation of these 
functions, and the evaluation and control of all phases of statebuilding 
programs (Narten, 2009: 254).  
Narten emphasises another crucial aspect of ownership promotion: the 
gradual transfer of power. Indeed, if one considers how ownership is deployed 
internationally to address power asymmetries on the ground and what the notion of 
partnership entails internationally, it is clear that we face a project of power transfer 
where local ownership expresses the final stage of the internationals’ actions. 
However, and according to Zurn and Herrhausen (2008), the transfer of power must 
be dependent and conditional of the perceived capacities and willingness of local 
actors to contribute to the overall purpose of the intervention. This view adds a 
second level of contingency to ownership: first, ownership depends on the 
internationals’ presence, and then it depends on finding the correct stakeholders to 
transfer the power.  
Hence, ownership promotion entails an identification and capacitation of 
local actors in order to guarantee that they will be able to sustain the reforms 
promoted. In what concerns the identification process, international actors may 
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identify their local partners on three levels, governments, civil society and 
community level, but the process tend to reflect the priorities, principles, and 
interests of the outside party  (Reich, 2006; Pouligny, 2009), and the chosen partners 
will necessarily be close and/or familiar to the international actions and reforms 
(Narten, 2009).
97
 Moreover, capacitation assumes, in what concerns ownership 
promotion, a similar meaning used when we refer to a vision of statebuilding as 
capacitation. Specifically, it addresses the needs – material, educational and training, 
financial resources – necessary for the actors to affirm themselves as valid 
interlocutors during the process and become able to assume the reforms in a future. 
National governments and local elites have been privileged in this process: on one 
hand, if the country has an elected government or representatives they become 
natural stakeholders in the process; on the other hand, local elites maintain some 
influence in different sectors and their involvement may prove crucial to capture 
public support towards the process. Nevertheless, civil society actors have also been 
involved in this process and have become key partners in this process, particularly 
because international actors believe that through civil society actors, local 
populations will be reached, thus extending the potential creation of ownership. 
Though these two levels have been the grounds on which national ownership is 
distinguished from local ownership both are, however, considered equally 
fundamental to ownership promotion  (UN-PSO, 2011).
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 Perhaps more important, 
they have been merged on the ground, being promoted simultaneously by different 
actors, actions and programmes, that see in civil society a key site of ownership 
promotion.
 99
 Nurturing a vibrant civil society where international actors can rely is a 
method of action inherited from the democratic focus and is very much appreciated 
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 This process is not exclusive of statebuilding actions. Indeed Narten (2009) uses some concepts 
applied previously by others in the description of a general identification process of local partners and 
brings it to statebuilding field. This adequacy to general international patterns in identification 
processes of local partners is noteworthy and will be explored later on. 
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 In a recent workshop promoted by the UN Peacebuilding Supporting Office, this semantic 
distinction was addressed as the existing tension between a perspective which privileges central 
governments or political elites (considered to be closer to top-down statebuilding strategies) or one 
which addresses the relation between state and society through civil society (a bottom-up approach to 
peacebuilding) (UN-PSO, 2011). See also Donais (2009) to explore this division and how the author 
approaches the concept from different peacebuilding approaches – liberal and communitarian. 
99
 Here we follow a close stand on Heathershaw’s view on the merge of different peacebuilding 
discourses (Heathershaw, 2008). 
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by international actors to promote local participation along the process of 
(re)building the state. In post-armed conflict settings, and to the eyes of international 
actors engaged in statebuilding in such scenarios, civil society is expected to develop 
its action in order to foster processes that are expected to sustain peace in the long 
term. To the “amalgam” of what civil society is and what is expected to do underlies 
its image as sign of change from a previous set of political practices and relations, 
due to different roles and functions civil society is expected to perform (White, 2004; 
Hagopian, 2007).  
Paffenholz and Spur (2010) have identified seven fundamental tasks that 
civil society can or is expected to perform in peacebuilding: protection, monitoring, 
advocacy and public communication, in-group socialisation, social cohesion, 
intermediation and facilitation, and service delivery (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010: 
66-77). It is in the intersection between the performance of these functions and the 
relations established with the state that civil society is expected to contribute to the 
creation of a viable peace and to the establishment of a ‘responsible democratic 
state’. Therefore, and notwithstanding the different functions performed, civil society 
is expected to become an intermediary between the state and individuals, fostering a 
relation of mutual recognition and respect between them and therefore contributing 
to local ownership promotion, national capacities development and an inclusive 
political system which ultimately nurtures resilience (Peacebuilding Support Office, 
2010; Ban Ki-moon, 2011; UN-PSO, 2011; UN, 2011; UNDP, 2012).
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Accordingly, and while the emphasis for local ownership grew, so did the 
attention towards civil society and the impact it might have on promoting local 
ownership and mediate state-society relations more broadly (World Bank, 2005; 
UNDP, 2009a; OECD, 2010; UNDP, 2012). Civil society actors are expected to 
fulfil particular roles in ownership promotion, according to the components of the 
concept fostered, the international actors prevailing role and the process of 
identification and capacitation initiated. Departing from the six senses proposed by 
Chesterman (2007) and the components of the concept identified by Pouligny (2009) 
                                                          
100
 Civil society will act apart, against, in support, in dialogue, in partnership or beyond the state 
(Chambers and Kopstein, 2006).  
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we explore the set of components/meanings deployed.
101
 According to Pouligny local 
ownership “encompasses the different components of local involvement, 
participation, capacity, accountability and empowerment” (Pouligny, 2009: 9). These 
components can be used to describe the international expectations towards local 
actors and we add to this the notion of control, sovereignty and self-determination 
(Chesterman, 2007)
102
. Beyond this there is also what international actors assume as 
their part which is responsiveness (Chesterman, 2007), capacity-building and power 
transfer. During the first stage of this promotion and while internationals’ role on 
statebuilding reforms is still evident, ownership entails local involvement, 
participation, accountability and sovereignty and demands responsiveness and 
capacity-building efforts from international actors.
103
 This first phase is mainly 
focused on the identification and capacitation of local stakeholders. The local 
involvement and participation of civil society actors promoted at this stage happens 
in invited spaces of participation (Cornwall, 2002), created with the main purpose of 
establishing the grounds for effective capacity-building of local civil society actors 
while fostering future demands of accountability towards states’ actions. 
Empowerment, just as self-government and control, appears here as a guiding 
principle which will only gain its true dimension after local actors acquire the 
capacity to lead and sustain the reforms in the internationals’ absence. Only at a 
second moment, when international prominence in statebuilding reforms diminishes 
substantially, will empowerment, self-government and control transcend the realm of 
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 Here we rescue Chesterman’s (2007) definition of the six senses ownership may assume and we 
crosscut them with the view presented by Pouligny (2009), that dismantles the concept into 
components. We establish a division between what components are directed to local actors and the 
components which refer to internationals’ actions. Our purpose is to explore how the components are 
assembled differently to create a vision which fits the idea of ownership as an end goal of 
international actions. Hence we privilege here a possible “international display” of meanings. The 
meanings of the concept from the local actors’ perspective will be explored later on we present the 
critiques currently pointed to this vision.  
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 Chesterman uses only control and sovereignty. This last concept can be considered similar to self-
determination but we chose to distinguish between the two. We believe that self-determination is 
closer to the notion of ownership as empowerment rather than sovereignty. Self-determination and 
empowerment may assume different configurations while sovereignty is usually associated to the 
state.  
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 It may appear rare to place sovereignty under this first stage while leaving control, self-
determination and power transfer out. However, we refer here to an international vision of 
sovereignty, which, as we have seem in the previous chapter, departs from a partnership approach that 
reconciles international presence with states’ sovereignty. Hence, it is this understanding of 
sovereignty that unfolds during ownership promotion. 
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guiding principles of ownership promotion, to become the expression of ownership. 
Accordingly, this entails that in the last phase, power transfer by international actors 
to local authorities will be effective and civil society actors are expected to continue 
to promote local involvement and participation and promote accountability in state-
society relations.  
Notwithstanding its more inclusive and comprehensive tone, this emphasis 
on civil society has been generally targeted for its limits, impacts and meaning. Two 
fundamental critiques have been pointed to international actors’ reliance on civil 
society actors: first, the image of civil society international actors carry to the spaces 
of intervention is misplaced; and second, the engagement of international actors with 
civil society has been exclusive and hierarchical in some degree. In what concerns 
the first, it has been pointed that international actors often depart from an uncritical 
celebration of the concept as a consequence of the political changes and democratic 
transitions during the 1980s and 1990s which have sanctified the concept around a 
perspective that perceives civil society as “merely supportive of liberal democracy” 
(Baker, 2004; Chandhoke, 2004). In such view civil society becomes an associational 
realm between state and society with a non-conflict and non-power character which 
accounts for the relevance international actors give to civil society (Chandhoke, 
2004; White, 2004). This consensual view, however, is misguided since it presents us 
a consensual ideal type vision of civil society that does not necessarily matches the 
complex realities on the ground (Parekh, 2004; White, 2004). In what concerns 
separation and autonomy there is a clear emphasis on the fact that civil society 
steams from the larger society and thus, necessarily reflects the struggles, divisions 
and interests that mark each society and depends of the specific context (political, 
social and economic) where the society is located (Belloni, 2008). If we recall the 
vision of civil society defined by Sommers (2008) in her dystopian and democratic 
model, civil society is permeable to other spheres influence. Civil society autonomy 
is necessarily limited and only this assumption allows us to perceive the dynamics of 
power that in fact permeate civil society and are a constant feature of democratic 
activity (Chandhoke, 2004). Such limits gain especial dimension in post-armed 
conflict spaces, where the power relations or power disputes have assumed a violent 
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armed expression and therefore, one may face the reality of a fragmented version of 
civil society (Belloni, 2008).  
The second set of critiques is closely related with the first. Because 
international actors depart from a conception of civil society they adopt a biased 
approach when seeking for partners in civil society (Parekh, 2004). In fact, 
international actors’ search for representative structures of civil society that 
corresponds to an existing vision tends to neglect the contribution and significant 
roles traditional structures may assume (Pouligny, 2005; Belloni, 2008). This biased 
approach often denunciates a consequential view of civil society that defines the 
eligible civil society partners for capacitation so that they can form a civil society 
that will ultimately match the liberal ideal. Here civil society depends on the 
international actors support to flourish (Baker, 2004; Götze, 2004). This view 
necessarily affects the process of identification and capacitation of local civil society 
by international actors: their attention will focus on urban groups, “English-speaking, 
receptive to western ideas and ready to overlook traditional sources of power and 
counsel” (Mac Ginty, 2006: 52). Such identification will tend to (re)create lines of 
exclusion since, by privileging certain actors, international actors will affect the 
distribution of resources and the ability to act of local groups or associations or the 
possibility for some excluded groups to organise (Parekh, 2004; Pouligny, 2005). But 
beyond this line of exclusion, a relation of dependence/influence is established, since 
civil society actors seem to be dependent of international support and actions to 
flourish and to act. Belloni (2008) identifies three dimensions where this 
dependence/imposition is materialised: first, the deployment of international 
resources neglects the existence of local resources and knowledge and creates a 
circular relation of dependence and reliance reinforcement between the international 
actors and the chosen local organisations; second, this relation of dependence 
between international actors and local organisations tend to set in motion an agenda 
that matches the international actors’ priorities and demands; and third, the technical 
mould of international strategies necessarily reinforce an international position of 
expertise, thus reinforcing an existing hierarchy (Belloni, 2008).  
NGOs are an illustrative example of these criticisms. Civil society has  
progressively reduced the chosen interlocutors of civil society to non-governmental 
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organisations, often conflating civil society with NGOs (Mertus and Sajjad, 2005). 
These organisations  
respond quickly, are not bureaucratically crippled, cannot coerce and 
therefore are widely respected. Most important, the combination of these 
assets means that they can fulfil roles and tasks which states and their 
liberal organisations simply cannot achieve (Richmond, 2005a: 24).  
Progressively, NGOs stood out as trustworthy and privileged partners to 
assure an aid channelling that circumvents states’ limited capacities to reach for 
communities, and guarantee an involvement of civil society’s actors in the reforms 
while anchoring them in local societies. Considering the availability of resources for 
civil society actors and the international expressed support for it, we have assisted to 
a multiplication of NGOs, which became progressively oriented towards the outside 
world (Pouligny, 2005; Fischer, 2008). Through this privileging as representatives of 
civil society, NGOs become the finished expression of the western biased vision 
towards civil society actors, materialising logics of exclusion that ultimately reduced 
the heard voices of civil society to a small group of organisations. Moreover, and 
departing from the distinction between international and local NGOs, Pouligny alerts 
us that “there is much more proximity between northern or international NGOs (...) 
and international organisations (IOs) than between the northern and southern NGOs”, 
and it is common that they compete for resources and the same “symbolic space” 
(Pouligny, 2005: 501). More important, international actors tend to privilege 
international NGOs, which basically means that “while pretending to work with the 
local civil society, outsiders actually collaborate with other outsiders - in other 
words, with themselves” (Pouligny, 2005: 501). Hence, international actors do not 
only exclude multiple civil society actors when they privilege NGOs but they also 
create a hierarchy amongst them. This support for NGOs also deepened a relation of 
dependence/influence, considered by some as a dilemma that results from 
international support to civil society (Belloni, 2008), which has three related 
consequences.
 104
 First, NGOs’ intervention agendas are more and more directed 
towards international demands rather than social needs and social change (Mertus 
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 Belloni (2008) defines this relation of dependence as the result of the systemic dilemma that 
crosscuts international support to civil society between too much or too little support. We aim to stress 
the recognised outcomes of international support that currently largely sustains the civil society 
promotion strategies in post-armed conflict statebuilding. See also Carey (2010) to explore other 
configurations of dilemmas faced by NGOs whose actions are directed towards peacebuilding.  
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and Sajjad, 2005; Pearce, 2010).
 105
 Second, this influence deepens the distance 
between local populations and those who were expected to serve them, since the 
focus of NGOs’ accountability is directed towards the international donor 
community and away from society (Mertus and Sajjad, 2005). And finally, we 
observe how, through NGOs, international actors tend to indirectly affect and direct 
the intermediary role of civil society in state-society relations, since the asymmetries 
of power evidenced and expressed in the relation between donors and NGOs 
necessarily affect how local societies perceived these actors and the reforms and 
projects they implement.
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Considering the critiques pointed, it is relevant to question how this 
international engagement with civil society, that the privileging of NGOs so neatly 
illustrates, affects the purpose of ownership promotion, especially in what concerns 
the meanings/dimensions the concept assumes. The functions ascribed to civil 
society in peacebuilding by Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) interact with the 
dimensions that ownership promotion entails. However, understanding how civil 
society actors perform these functions entails a context-driven reflection, which 
establishes a relation between these functions and seeks for causal relations between 
them. Therefore, assessing civil society actions and its contribution to peace or local 
ownership is necessarily complex. Our purpose though, is not to perform an 
exhaustive evaluation of these functions but foremost to add a crucial aspect to this 
analysis. Indeed, we believe that the functions performed by civil society actors are 
necessarily curtailed by the issues we abovementioned and the current relation 
established between civil society actors and international actors. Thus, and 
considering this, the answer to the question on how civil society involvement may 
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 In her article, Pearce discusses the meanings of social change, especially in its relation with 
transforming power as opposed to empowerment. Regarding NGOs and their possible impact on 
social change the author posits that this impact is highly dependent on the idea of social change that 
guides their actions. If NGOs answer to international donors linear view of change as the direct result 
of a project funding – which seems to be the most common approach that guides the contractual 
relationships between NGOs and international donors – then their role on social change and 
transforming power is necessarily limited, since, as the author says, “social change cannot be reduced 
to funding” (Pearce, 2010: 632).  
106
 Indeed, and even though NGOs have a strong compromise with transparency (towards international 
and local actors), this must not be confused with accountability, which entails transparency bout goes 
beyond it, since it demands the justification of actions. NGOs are generally transparent but they are 
firstly accountable to those who provide the resources for projects and interventions (Mertus and 
Sajjad, 2005). 
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affect local ownership is not linear. It will certainly vary from case to case, 
depending on the actors involved, the relation established between them and how 
these elements reflect on the functions performed.  
There is however general conclusions that may be drawn departing from the 
impacts the current approach to civil society creates on state-society relations. First, 
the current record of identification of actors for ownership promotion in civil society 
creates a sense of “exclusive ownership”, available only to specific members of 
(civil) society and which hardly reaches key stakeholders and actors who may in fact 
affect the process. Thus, this approach creates fragility in the process of ownership 
promotion since it limits its potential scope. Second, the relation of 
imposition/dependence created throughout the identification and capacitation 
processes limits the beneficial impact of local participation and involvement, since 
the chosen civil society actors tend to guide their actions towards international 
demands, which also necessarily affects the accountability promoted locally. This 
relation directly contradicts the purpose of social recognition, involvement and 
support of the reforms, thus, necessarily threatening their sustainability. Finally, and 
related with the previous two, the actions undertaken by international actors to 
support civil society contradicts the purpose of power transfer local ownership 
promotion entails and derails the achievement of local ownership as self-
determination and control. Thus, it’s plausible to state that current international 
actions of local ownership promotion centred on civil society partners seem, at least, 
counterproductive to the purpose of ownership promotion.  
But the effects of this counterproductive, and apparently contradictory 
process, stretch beyond local ownership promotion and reaches the state-society 
relations more broadly and, necessarily, states’ legitimacy and international 
statebuilding actions. This is necessarily so not only due to the reasons stated above, 
but also to the tendency recognised internationally to channel funds and reforms 
through NGOs which creates a parallel public sector that undercuts states’ ability to 
perform their governance tasks which are necessary to improve state-society 
relations. This is clearly stated by OECD, whose 2010 report “Do No Harm”, 
recognises that even though NGOs can be very effective in service delivery there is a 
real risk of affecting state’s legitimacy through the creation of a dual public sector, 
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led by NGOs, that minimises the role of the state in delivering basic services to its 
society (OECD, 2010). Moreover, and beyond this counterproductive effect, both 
dimensions result from apparent contradictory international actions which sustain a 
promotion of local ownership while in reality it places internationally sponsored 
processes at the core of state-society relations. The promotion of local ownership, 
with the engagement it supposes with civil society actors, contradicts its purpose of 
improving the legitimacy of statebuilding actions and reforms while postponing 
ownership as the expression of self-determination, empowerment and control. 
And it is precisely from here that steam the strongest critiques to the 
international promotion of ownership. Reich argues that, against the international 
vision of ownership, one must consider that the principle of ownership is “directed 
against domination by external partners in foreign-funded development cooperation 
and peacebuilding activities” in order to “shift the balance of power in favour of 
local actors” (Reich, 2006: 8). Hence, the concept has a dual interpretation that 
necessarily entails different meanings and temporalities. While for international 
actors we are discussing ownership promotion, for local actors such concept is 
assumed as inherent to local politics and is under threat by the existing power 
asymmetries. Precisely because of these differences, internationals’ use of ownership 
seem, to the author, as rather pretentious since, it attempts to cover the differences 
and asymmetries that mark reality (Reich, 2006). Accordingly, and  
taken seriously as a guiding principle for action, local ownership would 
mean far more than a consulting or participatory role given to the local on 
behalf of the donors of external parties. Rather it means that local actors 
have the final decisive power over a project’s process and outcome. Local 
ownership then means a power shift which goes far beyond existing 
practices. Local actors would not only be involved in the information 
gathering process or strategy development, but should have the means to 
decide about the agenda, strategy and budget management themselves, 
even decide who the beneficiaries of the project should be (Reich, 2006: 
15).
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In this sense, Richmond poses that local participation is a better framing 
concept to describe current attempts to bring local actors to the discussion of matters 
and reforms, since local actors “have little choice over what they come to own but 
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 The author develops her arguments explaining how the term local ownership is misplaced to define 
the relation between insiders and outsiders and how practice dismantles its intended meaning. The 
author builds on the need to depart from peace constituencies to define local partners able to cooperate 
with internationals to deploy and sustain some reforms (Reich, 2006).  
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are expected at least to participate” (Richmond, 2012: 359). In fact, and for the 
author, local ownership, as it is currently promoted by international actors, “is neither 
local nor ownership” and is instead “international, elite or national, and defined by 
participation in pre-existing programmes” (Richmond, 2012: 371). Thus, the concept 
is assumed by Mac Ginty as a rescue package of peace interventions orthodoxy 
(MacGinty, 2010) and it is defined by Chesterman as a conciliatory mechanism of 
international quasi-dictatorial practices with the principles that are suppose to guide 
them (2005). For Chesterman, and since ownership does not mean control nor does it 
imply direct control over the process and means instead that ownership is at the end 
of transitional administrations, “openness about the trustee-like relationship between 
international and local actors” would, at least, ensure “transparency about the powers 
that they [international actors] will exercise at various stages” (Chesterman, 2005).  
Others, however, have naturalised this apparent contradiction in a 
“dilemma/contradiction” package which crosscuts statebuilding interventions and 
conciliates the international control with local ownership. Paris and Sisk (2009a) 
state that “if full local ownership of the domestic affairs in the host state could be 
achieved without direction, there would be no need for robust, multifunctional 
statebuilding missions in the first instance” (Paris and Sisk, 2009a: 305). Thus, such 
perspective accepts the consequences and impact of such vision of ownership, 
internationally directed, where the main issues concern “who the ‘owners’ should 
be”, and where participation and local ownership can have perverse results “no 
matter how well-intentioned the international actors” due to the distorting effects 
international presence causes, “like a powerful magnet in an electric field” (Paris and 
Sisk, 2009a: 308). This view of local ownership does not seem to contribute to 
improve state-society relations or to the goal of inclusion recently formally inscribed 
as a priority by the UNDP (UNDP, 2012) and the Secretary-General’s report on 
peacebuilding (Ban Ki-moon, 2009b) which seem to testify an intention to move 
beyond this perspective.  
However, and even if this reflection on local ownership promotion as an 
international attempt to affect the legitimacy of statebuilding reforms is important, 
one must foremost explore (1) what this international engagement with local 
ownership in alternative to citizenship entails and (2) how this engagement and its 
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consequences directly affect the condition of citizenship on the spaces of 
intervention.  
International actors’ deployment of local ownership promotion strategies to 
affect statebuilding reforms legitimacy is consistent with the overall pattern of 
engagement that permeates statebuilding. It adopts logics of support while deploying 
discursive devices that reduce their role to a technical and non-political dimension. 
Citizenship is considered as a prerogative of states’ sovereignty and therefore, 
engaging with its condition, would necessarily entail assuming states’ role. Engaging 
with citizenship condition openly could have two possible meanings: first, 
international actors assumed their prevailing role in determining statebuilding; and 
second, this would establish a political relation between local populations and 
international actors, recognised as the political agents of governance. This is 
precisely what international actors have avoided by deploying what Cunliffe (2007) 
has termed as “politics without responsibility” which is visible on how international 
actors have engaged with states’ sovereignty and also with ownership promotion. 
Framing its actions as local ownership promotion allows international actors to affect 
chunks of the concept of citizenship – namely, involving individuals in governance 
to produce legitimate outcomes, even if this participation is induced – while avoiding 
assuming a political role in intervention spaces. Accordingly, in this non-political 
mediation of state-society relations, which is effectively exercised by international 
actors through ownership, internationally induced legitimacy is not 
counterproductive to state-society relations, but it is rather depicted as necessary.  
There are two main implications of this non-political engagement. First, the 
existing power asymmetries are naturalised and assumed as necessary to create a 
viable state and peace but this exercise of power is not accountable locally since its 
naturalisation dismisses it from any political questioning. Indeed, and within this 
frame, and even though accountability is established from the state and civil society 
towards international actors in a technical dimension, deprived of political meaning, 
international actions are not framed by these principles of accountability towards the 
local populations where their actions impact. In this view local actors are expected to 
participate and to become invited owners and participants of the policies defined 
internationally but their voices are only partially listened. And second and related 
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with the first, international actors transform statebuilding interventions into pre-
political moments, where individuals’ status as citizens is not questioned, but where 
their political agency is postponed until viable state institutions are in place. Two 
fundamental images merge to sustain this delay of individuals’ political agency. 
International actors often perceive individuals in the spaces of intervention as (1) 
victims (2) in need of empowerment. Hughes and Pupavac (2005) affirm that this 
social victimisation upholds an international pathologisation of post-armed conflict 
societies, which reduces the social and international dimensions of the conflicts and 
renders conflict as irrational or deviant behaviour, and cause of traumas and violence 
(Hughes and Pupavac, 2005).
108
 Accordingly, and through this process, not only 
local individuals are perceived as in need of treatment measures to eradicate the 
trauma as they are mainly perceived as victims of violence, deprived of power and 
agency amidst the violence that has disrupted their lives (Hughes and Pupavac, 
2005). These victims are then individuals whose empowerment becomes an 
international compromise. This promise of empowerment focuses on the individuals’ 
capabilities to assume themselves as agents of change and promises individuals a 
future autonomy while it simultaneously assumes the moment of intervention as a 
stage of non-autonomy existence, obscuring individuals’ agency prior to 
internationals’ intervention. Together, these two perspectives depict local 
populations mainly as victims whose empowerment is dependent of international 
actions to capacitate individuals and transform them into empowered individuals. 
Hence, and even if citizenship is not discussed directly in post-armed 
conflict statebuilding contexts, the international engagement with local ownership 
promotion, and the internationalisation of legitimacy unveil assumptions and 
practices that affect the concept directly and expose how they have become an 
expression of a depoliticisation narrative previously pointed. The sanitised exercise 
of power limits social contract as the result of state-society interactions and mutual 
recognition upon which citizenship has been (re)built and (re)negotiated until new 
state institutions can assume the responsibilities sovereignty entails towards their 
citizens, and until individuals are prepared to exercise their political agency in a 
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 This view is close to Chandler’s understanding that the new wars frame enabled international 
actors to remove politics from the understanding of violent conflict and thus from the construction of 
peace (Chandler, 2005).  
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functioning political society. Such vision shows us a condition of citizenship that 
departs from a hierarchical connection of scales, where the international space plays 
a central role in the definition of citizenship rights and practices and in affecting, 
according to international criteria, matters of inclusion. 
International actors do not in fact deny citizenship and it is not unlikely to 
see local populations referred to as the states’ citizenry or local citizens. It could not 
do it since the image of the citizen, as an autonomous empowered individual, is at the 
core of liberal democracy’s promise of peace for which statebuilding has been 
defined as a pre-condition. However, current international practices suspend the 
mutual constitutive relation that, in a liberal democratic frame, is established between 
citizens and the state, while addressing specific dimensions of the concept. A 
consequential vision is clear: citizenship political dimension, beyond a status of 
nationality, depends on the international intervention to create a political context for 
it to bloom and to capacitate and socialise individuals for democratic political life.   
Consequentially, it is not a surprise to read Richmond and Franks’ statement 
that “ultimately, the focus has been on building the state rather than a social contract” 
and “the universal contractual nature of liberal peace ideas – as a system derived 
from citizenship – has been lost” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 190). In fact, and 
bearing in mind the technical critique ascribed to international understanding of 
states’ sovereignty or the depoliticisation argument, together with the current 
internationalisation of states’ legitimacy sources materialised in the good governance 
and local ownership promotion, one could easily affirm that the basic postulates and 
conditions for citizenship, as liberalism proposes, seem to have been distorted. 
Nonetheless, for Chandler, this international view and treatment of local populations 
is not so much a sign of how liberal assumptions regarding political subjects have 
been lost in statebuilding sites, but foremost a sign of the shift in intervention 
assumptions materialised in statebuilding. Statebuilding represents a post-liberal 
governance paradigm where we assist to a transition from government to 
governance: what matters in intervention is the rationality of governance and not 
how governance is legitimised. This lack of articulation between state and society is 
pointed by Chandler as a crucial element to classify the current international 
practices of statebuilding as post-liberal and expresses the dominant trend of post-
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liberal practices that downgraded the liberal political premises of autonomy and self-
determination (Chandler, 2010b). This transition and downgrade of autonomy and 
self-determination testify how citizenship political dimension is circumvented and 
overshadowed even under liberal standards. Moreover, it embodies two simultaneous 
ideas: individuals are not just considered as incapable of political agency but their 
agency is no longer considered crucial in face of the growing trend of international 
outsourcing of power, where it is not clear who governs and who is accountable for 
governance practices.  
The question that must necessarily emerge at this moment is if this 
depoliticising narrative of which citizens’ political agency seems to have become 
hostage tells us the complete history regarding the political dynamics in spaces of 
intervention. As we have seen, international statebuilding actions, and the logic 
supporting it, have been targeted by a growing criticism of their detachment of the 
specificities of intervention contexts. As a consequence, recent contributions have 
sought to approach the spaces of intervention differently by exposing local elements 
and practices, and, consequentially, to enlarge our understanding and recognition of 
the different political dynamics and expressions of agency.  
This appeal to look beyond the international dimension to the local spaces 
of intervention has been a crucial point in Pouligny’s work. Her reflection is a 
noteworthy effort to criticise international actions from a perspective that seeks to 
understand these actions in the spaces they unfold. In her book Peace Operations 
Seen from Below. UN Missions and Local People (2006), Pouligny confronts UN 
actions and assumptions with the “various faces of local populations” and how they 
engage differently with the UN on the ground (Pouligny, 2006). For Pouligny the call 
of political anthropology to consider all social practices and daily power relations is 
fundamental to achieve a broader understanding of these dynamics and challenge the 
assumptions of international actors with the reality found on the ground.  
Discerning this requires distancing oneself from the many preconceptions 
made of local societies. The situations on which peace missions are called 
upon to intervene are generally characterised by a very high degree of 
fluidity, defying the traditional criteria used to define the status of 
political and social actors, this status being permanently altered following 
a large number of logics and issues (Pouligny, 2006: 44).  
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Hence, Pouligny explores a number of different local actors, stretching from 
military, political and economic entrepreneurs to “indigenous civil societies”, formal 
organisations and community actors (Pouligny, 2006). Regarding the first group, 
Pouligny identifies how oversimplifications are inadequate to understand the UN 
negotiation and peacebuilding partners on the ground: local political configurations 
are neither as straightforward as their apparent divisions appear, nor are the alliances 
amongst groups predictable and lasting. Thus, Pouligny says, the UN will find 
“directly or indirectly, a very wide range of actors linked by many variable ties, with 
multiple meanings” (Pouligny, 2006: 67). It is therefore necessary to understand how 
these actors move along and across these networks and how these changes obfuscate 
their status and their intentions towards the creation of peace and the presence of UN. 
In what concerns “indigenous political societies” Pouligny also contrasts the 
assumptions of international actors with the reality found on the ground, beyond a 
division based on the figure of the “victim – the civilian – passive” and the search for 
institutions that resemble those of western civil society. In what concerns community 
actors the author stresses how the contact between them and international actors vary 
so greatly in the urban and rural areas.  
In order to engage with local spaces of interventions, Richmond departs 
from the concept of hybridity to explore and map what he defines as the fourth 
generation of theories about peace and conflict which move beyond Westphalian 
answers to conflict (Richmond, 2008).
109
 Accordingly, what is needed is (1) a 
research agenda able to develop “multiple conceptions of peace, focused upon the 
everyday life of their constituents in the context of an institutional framework and 
social contract together with (2) a via media between them” (Richmond, 2008: 163). 
In this sense the author develops an eirenist approach to international relations and 
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 The author uses the contributions the critical and post-structuralist strand to deepen his reflection 
and suggests the need to develop an agenda for peace that departs from an inter-disciplinary 
perspective where the study of multiple concepts of peace is at the centre of IR. For the author, by 
believing in the mutability of the system social structures and human nature, Critical Theory has 
sustained a powerful critique of current liberal orthodoxy with its neo-liberal nuances and has 
promoted a conceptualisation of an emancipatory peace in IR. An everyday, post-Westphalian peace 
is its aim” (Richmond, 2008: 109) And Post-Structuralism, through its deconstructive approach, 
questioned current orthodoxies sustained in misleading oppositional binaries, therefore exposing 
power relations, even in spheres traditionally considered private that, in fact, cover foundational 
assumptions that reproduce and reinforce power relations. “An everyday, post-sovereign peace 
represents the more extensive aim of post-structuralism informed approaches to peace and conflict 
studies” (Richmond, 2008: 109).  
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peace, which entails an interdisciplinary approach, able to shed light into the 
practices of the everyday currently obscured by liberal peacebuilding and points to a 
need to return to the everyday and its relation with the practices of emancipation.
110
 
Departing from the work of De Certeau, Richmond states that the everyday refers to 
the ways individuals “navigate” and try to create spaces for their activities while 
dealing with existing institutions of power (Richmond, 2009: 571). Such concept 
assumes that “people adapt and take ownership over structures and institutions so 
that they begin to reflect their own everyday lives rather than structural attempts at 
assimilation” (Richmond, 2009: 571). Hence, the everyday becomes the site of 
politics and allows a re-appropriation and a transition from “subjects to active 
citizens, from de-politicisation to self-government and self-determination”. The 
everyday precludes an agency that is related to self-determination and self-
government through everyday practices that give meaning to life and community and 
thus form the basis for peace before institutions can (Richmond, 2010). The 
encounter between these everyday practices and international actors creates a 
hybridity – the overlay of multiple identities and ideas and how they interact without 
domination of one idea or identity. By using this hybridity and recognising the 
everyday as an alternative site of knowledge, Richmond presents peacebuilding as 
the place where the international encounter the local, and where a transmutation of 
both liberal and local arise, opening ways to insofar neglected and unrecognised 
agencies. This encounter has been identified in East Timor and in Solomon Islands 
(Richmond, 2011), thus showing the possibilities for peace offered by the 
intersection of the everyday and its hybridity that Richmond depicts as a post-liberal 
peace, “an everyday tactic of engagement between liberal states and non-liberal 
alternatives, or locally imagined polities” (Richmond, 2009: 572).111 This via media 
entails empathy and care (in a foucaultian sense) as well as a recognition of 
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 “Eirenism” refers to the analytical lens by which “one evaluates the claims, apparent or hidden of a 
particular epistemology, concept, theory, method or ideology” and is used by the author to define an 
approach to an ethical re-evaluation of liberal peace (Richmond, 2009: 563). 
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 For Richmond there are three currently overlooked dimensions that sustains such vision: (1) local 
attempts to develop assisted rather than guided processes of reconstruction and governance after 
conflict by international actors; (2) really existing forms of governance on the ground that exist and 
represent “peace” even if the internationals do not recognise it; and (3) the emergence of hybrid forms 
of governance associated with the local patterns of politics.  
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differences as enabling conditions for a kind of agonistic dialogue with “unscripted 
conversations” to build a post-liberal praxis.112  
The growing emphasis on the need to recast social relations in a way that 
recognises individuals’ agency and the local specificities offers an alternative 
approach to engage with spaces of intervention while trying to transcend the 
depoliticising narrative the international actions promote. However, others have 
drawn their attention to the controversial and counterproductive impacts of 
addressing local spaces of interventions and local actors as “non-liberal alternatives” 
since this may fuel a sense of irreconcilable differences between international liberals 
with non-liberals which may translate into a resign over liberalism demands 
(Chandler, 2010b). For Sending (2011), and despite the important contributions of 
“context sensitivity, of local ownership, of bottom-up and hybrid forms of 
peacebuilding” such insights are mainly used as “ammunition to criticise external 
actors’ strategies and behaviours” instead of a contribution for an explicit account of 
the interaction between international and local actors (Sending, 2011: 56) which 
must be the primary focus.
113
  
Indeed, and despite the glimpses of political agency the hybridity frames 
have shared, this political agency is mostly presented as a resistance of the locals 
towards international actors. By posing agency as resistance to international actions, 
as important as it may be, one only explores a part of political agency on the ground, 
as if individuals’ political agency only gained dimension with international presence. 
However, and while departing from state’s sovereignty is an important dimension to 
consider how the liberal principles of self-government and autonomy have been 
downgraded by this post-liberal governance, a renewed, and somehow nostalgic, 
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 Something Duffield (2007) had already demanded and Richmond uses here.  
113
 Sending assesses this interaction departing from peacebuilding political infrastructures, which he 
believes to frame the interactions between internal and external actors shaped by sovereignty 
(Sending, 2011). The author’s purpose is to show how local actors and institutions are in fact able to 
receive, select, use but also discard elements of donors’ programmes, which only attest how they are 
actors with interests, identities and projects. The presentation of sovereignty appears to be, in this 
account, underexplored, and thought of as a one-dimensional concept understood by local and 
international actors in the same way. We do not share this view and instead we believe that 
sovereignty, as a framing concept to mediate the relations between nationals and international actors is 
necessarily a disputed concept, depending on the perspective of actors and, therefore, it differently 
affects actors’ behaviours and reactions. For instance, the current view of sovereignty as responsibility 
can be opposed to a view of sovereignty that is closer to self-determination. Both internal and external 
actors recognise sovereignty but their views do not necessarily entail the same behaviours.  
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engagement with state’s sovereignty guides our attention to the relation between the 
state and international actors. As useful as this may be, it continues to explore 
political agency through state lenses, even if this agency is considered as the 
expression of popular sovereignty, this is, as the expression of national citizens’ 
agency. As we have discussed, this image of state’s sovereignty as embodying the 
polity is based on an exclusivity assumption that citizenship debates have exposed as 
over-simplistic, at best.  
Citizenship is, in this sense, particularly useful, especially if we consider it 
as a conceptual alternative to overcome the limits of an analysis structured on state’s 
sovereignty, since, as we have exposed in this section, it allows us to grasp the 
depoliticising narrative that permeates international approaches to post-armed 
conflict statebuilding but it opens a possibility to engage with agency beyond the 
state level. Exploring the condition of citizenship in these contexts forces us to centre 
our attention on state-society relations and recast them in order to recognise and map 
individuals’ agency, as well as the factors that affect it in formal peace scenarios.  
The growing emphasis on state-society relations has been crucial to the 
appearance of reflections centred in citizenship in the aftermath of violent armed 
conflict. In a publication of the Word Bank Communication for Governance and 
Accountability Program (CommGAP), Kaltenborn-Stachau identifies the national 
dialogue – understood as the exchange of ideas, perspectives, information and 
opinion that are responsible for the kind of relation that citizens establish with their 
state – as a pre-requisite for the success of statebuilding (von Kaltenborn-Stachau, 
2008). The purpose of strengthening these relations has been the missing link 
between recent interventions and their long-term success: even though national 
dialogue and citizens’ rights are mentioned in the existing literature and programs 
their dynamics and requirements have been, overall, neglected (von Kaltenborn-
Stachau, 2008). The UNDP report (2012) seems to address this negligence, by 
developing it’s reflection around the concept of governance and the (re)establishment 
of a social contract.  Overall we assist to a growing appeal to put citizens at the 
centre of intervention and replace the state-civil society divide that has marked 
donors’ funding and policy (Benquista, 2010).  
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Regardless of the reasons that have so far supported this absence, the 
advocates of this citizen’s centred approach state that only a focus on citizenship, 
that rescues the vision of the citizen as actor and agent of change rather than 
consumers, voters or beneficiaries, will create legitimate and responsive states 
(Eyben and Ladbury, 2006; Benquista, 2010). Both Eyben and Ladbury (2006) and 
Benquista’s (2010) contributions – inserted in the DRC-Citizenship, Participation 
and Accountability – depart from a relational account of citizenship, this is, a view 
that comprehends the relation between state and society as well as the relations in 
society. In this sense,  
effective statebuilding requires addressing not only vertical relations 
between the state and the people but the exclusions and discriminations 
that occur within society and that affect state capacity to be responsive, 
legitimate and accountable to all (Eyben and Ladbury, 2006: 5).  
Furthermore, Eyben and Ladbury add, a citizenship sense does not 
necessarily start with the state and is best described as a “societal sense” that 
emerges from belonging or exclusion in different types of collective association  and 
is built on concrete actions, through which individuals develop their reference of 
rights and responsibilities towards the society and the state (2006). Thus, not only is 
citizenship recognised as a relational and dual concept, marked by the interaction of 
inclusion and exclusion, as it is an inherent political concept, related with 
individuals’ agency, i.e. their ability of claiming and acting (Benquista, 2010).  
Though these reflections do engage with citizenship and are particularly 
important in their attempt to bring citizenship to the discussion of statebuilding, they 
are fundamentally concerned with the development and support of citizenship in 
spaces of intervention. Moreover, their accounts remain as rather state-centric, 
meaning that they do not engage with the impact that multiple spaces and actors have 
on citizenship, particularly in what concerns the exclusiveness of its relations with 
the state. Notwithstanding the importance of this reflection and effort, understanding 
the condition of citizenship in post-armed conflict demands a perspective that puts in 
context the evolving nature of state-society relations and the inclusion/exclusion 
divides that have marked them and the condition of citizenship. Accordingly, if one 
aims to explore the possibilities and expressions of political agency on intervention 
spaces to dismantle a depoliticising narrative, it’s imperative to depart from an 
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analysis that considers the multiplicity of actors which, in different locations, 
currently affect the processes of governance at the state’s scale, and what 
possibilities and constraints posed to individuals’ political agency. But engaging with 
this, demands that we place agency in context, this is, in order to begin to understand 
the possibilities, constraints and expressions of political agency in post-armed 
conflict spaces, one must consider how citizenship condition has evolved. 
In order to explore in (some) detail what we have exposed we will consider 
the case of Guatemala to illustrate the evolving compromise with the state in the 
creation of peace and to explore the processes that may affect the condition of 
citizenship. Our purpose is not to reach conclusions that are common to all post-
armed conflict settings, but rather to deploy an approach that allows exploring 
through the concept of citizenship the complex and specificities of the political 
condition in different scenarios where international support for building peace has 
assumed the statebuilding form.  
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5. Building Peace in Guatemala 
Understanding what has been and still is the task of building peace in a 
country where, after 36 years of armed conflict, violence still reclaims so many 
deaths in the country and permeates the social relations is necessarily a complex and 
difficult task. The following sections seek to map Guatemala’s histories of 
governance, stretching from what led to the violent armed conflict to the creation of a 
peace project contained in the peace agreements – its design and implementation. 
After having revisited the main divisions inherited from the colonial and liberal 
period and which constitute the structural causes of the armed conflict, we will 
discuss the Democratic Spring and the counterrevolutionary response as the 
immediate causes of the armed confrontation. We then discuss the conflict in its 
different moments, as well as its actors and main strategies to understand the impact 
violence has had on the country. We also discuss the transition to democracy and the 
negotiation of the peace agreements. In a second section we discuss in some detail 
the content of the agreements and its implementation, with a particular emphasis on 
the tasks targeting statebuilding. After discussing the main obstacles to that 
implementation, we address the country’s trajectory of fragility, departing from the 
justice sector, and how international compromise with statebuilding has evolved 
according to this trajectory and the frames of intervention that emerged 
internationally.  
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5.1. The violent armed conflict and the negotiation of peace 
The histories of governance in Guatemala up until the armed struggle cannot 
be understood without a clear reference to the colonial history on which the country 
structured its project of independence.
114
 The country inherited the social 
differentiation along ethnic and socio-economic lines from the colonial period. The 
society was then divided in indigenous, ladinos and the direct descendants of the 
settlers and in addition to this hierarchy based on origin, the possession of property 
further divided society. The independence in Guatemala and its liberal project were 
based on the existing social relations and, though the 1824 Constitution proclaimed 
legal equality, these social cleavages were transformed and deepened in the liberal 
period. The elite who ruled the country, united by the modernisation flag, forged an 
economic transformation based on coffee exportation, which deepened the division 
between indigenous and non-indigenous communities. Three parallel dynamics 
occurred during this time: first, and due to the agro-business, the authorities gave a 
new impetus to the expropriation of indigenous lands; second, they tried to attract 
foreign investors to the country to increase the inversion in the coffee production; 
and third, they created the mandamientos, through which indigenous people were 
requested to satisfy the labour demands of business men (Lima, 1992). This 
economic project and the agrarian reform sustaining it deprived indigenous 
communities not just from their direct source of survival but also from the central 
element of their worldview and reinforced the different forms of forced labour (CEH, 
2006; Rostica, 2006). 
In addition to these economic reforms, the modernisation process also 
sought to forge a project of nation-state. Projecting a common identity sustained on 
mestizaje, a homogenising project gained impetus with the establishment of a laic 
project of education guided by the state and with the creation of the Military 
Academy, which aimed to embody the idea of nation in arms and provide Guatemala 
with professional armed forces (CEH, 2006). This project of nation reframed social 
relations but it kept a hierarchical nature where indigenous groups remained at the 
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 Guatemala officially proclaimed its Independence from Spain in 1821 but only in 1824 it draw a 
constitution inspired by the European liberal revolutions where the legal equality of individuals and 
the protection of private property were inscribed as central aspects in the fundamental law of the 
country.  
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bottom of social relations (Lima, 1992). Though it sought to assimilate indigenous 
communities, in practice their significance in the historical process of the country 
was reduced, or made invisible, and they were kept at the margin as a social group 
(CEH, 2006). Moreover, the European nation-state project and its liberal principles 
of material and scientific development, individualism, the purpose of profit and the 
defence of private property which Guatemalan elites sought to reproduce were in 
profound contrast and disagreement with indigenous worldviews, who perceived the 
land as sacred and spiritual and for whom the individual and its possessions only 
made sense in relation to others (Lima, 1992; CEH, 2006). Concurrently, the ruling 
elite’s project enabled ladinos to improve their social and economic position by 
assuming privileged positions in the control of land, municipalities and commerce. 
Ladinos progressively distanced themselves from indigenous communities to become 
an active part of a national project which could provide them a new role in the future 
(CEH, 2006).  
This model of economic development and the consequent social hierarchy 
were guided by the ruling elite formed by the military and the agro-exporting 
oligarchy, which, at several moments in history, were particularly coercive and 
violent in the defence of their status. Until 1944, the state which rose from the liberal 
reforms was committed to the agro-exporting oligarchy and their needs, assuring the 
necessary forced labour to its profitable activity. General Ubico, which gained power 
in 1931 and, as his predecessors, conceded no space for dissent. In this phase, the 
efforts to train the military and create an apparatus of intelligence in the country 
became part of the government’s attempt to control the consequences of the 1929 
crisis and assure a repressive stability that could sustain an economic recovery. The 
oligarchy’s policing powers at the fincas, were also reinforced in order to maintain 
the control over the indigenous labour force. Together, these measures bounded the 
modernisation process with a growing militarisation of the country (Short, 2007).  
Therefore, Guatemala reached the 1940s deeply marked by the social 
hierarchy it had inherited from the colonial period even if it had adapted it to the 
needs and demands of a national project of political, social and economic 
modernisation. The opposition between those who owned the land and those 
deprived from it, between the indigenous and non-indigenous, remained as the main 
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pillars of social exclusion though they intersect. They also represented the structural 
causes of the 1944 political revolution in the country.  
 
The Democratic Spring  
In fact, and despite General Ubico’s repressive efforts, the 1940s were 
marked by a growing contestation. Some ladinos and the urban middle class who 
was not included in the benefits of latifundio, joined the workers’ contestation to 
General Ubico’s political repression. The participation in the World War II, 
demanded an economic effort the country could not bear, leaving some sectors of the 
economic elite also deeply unsatisfied. The general strike in June 1944 led to General 
Ubico’ fall, then replaced by a junta expected to hold power provisionally (Rostica, 
2006). Until the end of 1944, the triumvirate of generals collapsed in benefit of 
General Ponce Vadios, who assumed the compromise to organise elections. Amidst 
this changing context, and the promise of elections, new political parties were 
formed and the country assisted to a social mobilisation that would oppose the 
dispositions of the provisional president and start what came to be known as the 
October’s Revolution.  
Elections were held as a consequence, and José Arévalo was elected 
President. In 1945 a new constitution was drawn, introducing important changes that 
would imprint new frames of governance and change the ideological frames of the 
exercise and justification of power. The fundamental text recognised for the first time 
important political and social rights and introduced a different perspective to the 
indigenous question and to the issue of land possession. To the freedom of thought 
and association, the text added new labour regulation, which specifically reversed the 
dispositions regarding indigenous forced work and allowed the mobilisation and 
organisation of different movements across the country (Lima, 1992; Rostica, 2006; 
Short, 2007). Furthermore, the 1945 Constitution forbid the latifundio and recognised 
the social function of property, which in practice allowed the recognition of the 
meaning indigenous communities gave to land and their collective use (Rostica, 
2006). Additionally, Arévalo introduced reforms to assure the military an apolitical 
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and independent role in the country, as the defender of state’s sovereignty and as a 
guarantor against power abuses (Trefzger, 2001).
115
  
The reforms initiated by Arévalo were deepened after the election of his 
former Ministry of Defence, Coronel Jacobo Arbenz, a strong opponent to Ubico’s 
regime and an active part in the revolution. His project of modernisation is 
considered by Rostica (2006) more anti-imperialist than nationalist due to his 
attempts to reduce foreign monopolies in the economic sector by investing in 
infrastructures and industrialisation.
116
 Even if such measures had already been 
suggested by the WB in 1951, they significantly affected the status of foreign elites 
in the country thus creating an opposing front to the reforms. The difficult relations 
between the government and the foreign elite were definitively spoiled by the 
agrarian reform initiated which sought to rescue, through expropriation, the 
unproductive and idle lands. However, the criteria used by the government meant, in 
practice, that 85% of United Fruit Company property was eligible for expropriation, 
which led the company to demand a considerable compensation which the 
government refused to pay (Jonas, 2000; CEH, 2006).
117
 The agrarian reform also 
compromised the labour relations in the fincas, since by providing lands to peasants 
and abolishing all forms of forced labour, the labour force available to work at the 
plantations necessarily diminished, changing the traditional power relations in the 
countryside. These changes gained additional impetus through the creation of local 
cooperatives and workers committees which meant not only a challenge to traditional 
labour relations but also a new pattern of mobilisation and organisation of peasants 
(CEH, 2006). 
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 Despite the purpose of transforming the military into a supportive institution of the public cause, 
this is also pointed as a crucial moment in converting the military into a political force, an ultimate 
guarantee of stability in face with state’s frailty (Trefzger, 2001; CEH, 2006).   
116
 Both the port of Guatemala and the railway (of which the economic activity depended) belonged to 
the American United Fruit Company while the Electric Bond and Share, also American, controlled the 
Guatemalan electric company, thus controlling the electric supply to the country. Trying to reverse 
this dependence, Arbenz’s government projected an Atlantic road, a hydroelectric station and the port 
of Santo Tomás, considered key investments in Arbenz’s modernisation ambitions. 
117
 Though the percentage of property of United Fruit Company eligible for expropriation reached 
85% , only 64% were effectively expropriated. The government set the value paid in compensation 
according to the fiscal value declared by the owners. Necessarily, and because the declared value didn 
not match the true value of the properties, the owners, and in this particular case the United Fruit 
Company, considered the value of compensation unsuitable (Jonas, 2000; CEH, 2006). 
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Consequentially, and though Arbenz’s agrarian reform sought foremost to 
stimulate the national market and the abolition of properties which did not contribute 
to that purpose, it created a sense of panic in the oligarchy and economic elite and 
came to be perceived as the definitive measure that menaced the status quo (Short, 
2007). In fact, the agrarian reform had an impact that stretched beyond the economic 
sphere, inducing a mobilisation in the country which questioned labour conditions 
and relations and challenged the social hierarchy considered until then a dogma. 
Particularly, it created the space for indigenous communities to organise and resist to 
both social and economic forms of exploitation (Lima, 1992).  
Considering how the reforms and transformations occurred in this 
democratic period affected the national oligarchy and international companies’ 
interests in the country, the reaction necessarily came from both national and 
international actors harmonised under an anticommunist rhetoric. The union forged 
across different sectors to support Arévalo broke with Arbenz’s social basis and 
gained the opposition of bourgeois and other social sectors, who saw in these reforms 
a project progressively out of control (Rostica, 2006). The coincidence of the reforms 
with the social mobilisation and the creation of the Partido Guatemalteco del 
Trabajo (PGT), the national communist party, allowed the creation of a narrative of 
communist expansion in the country which deeply affected Arbenz’s social basis of 
support, both in the civil and military sectors. Moreover, the challenging position 
assumed by Arbenz in face of big international companies’ interests, especially the 
American, created an international concern with the advance of communism in the 
country. The Cold War logic played here a decisive role, since the USA were 
compromised with avoiding communist advances in their zone of influence. 
Accordingly, national and international actors collaborated in reversing the reformist 
project initiated in 1944. A counterrevolutionary army lead by General Castillo 
Armas invaded Guatemala from Honduras and a disinformation campaign over the 
imminent American invasion forced Arbenz to renounce and exile. 
118
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 The USA were directly involved in this coup, providing the means and training the militaries 
stationed in Honduras through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The operation PBSUCCESS 
however also entailed direct bombing of strategic infrastructure and targets in the country. Despite the 
initial victories of Arbenz’s supporters over the Castillo Armas’s army, the possibility of an American 
invasion and occupation of the country weakened the resistance intents and lead Arbenz to resign on 
27
th
 June. It is also important to note that the commitment of CIA and the US Government with the 
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Though Castillo Armas was not in power for long, the fundamental purpose 
of the intervention was reached: the democratic constitution of 1945 was replaced for 
a Fundamental Law of Government in 1955, reversing the agrarian reform and 
returning the expropriated lands to their former owners, while the economic and 
social order relapsed to the pre-1944 patterns.
119
 The Constitution adopted in 1956 
departed from an anticommunist ethos to eliminate a series of political and social 
rights of the previous text, and erased the social function once recognised to lands 
reinstating the latifundio. Additionally, the military hegemony in the political sphere 
was affirmed and when General Ydígoras Fuentes became president there were no 
doubts regarding the role the military would perform in maintaining the social and 
political status in the country. The political power was henceforth marked by a stable 
coalition of different forces: the military, purified of the democratic heirs, assumed 
the role of constitutional guarantors and defenders of the national interest and united, 
under the anticommunist rhetoric, with the economic elites, interested in maintaining 
the political and social conditions for the agro-business. This convergence was 
further sustained on the military high ranks’ penetration in the economic activities 
which decisively prompted the military to use state institutions in controlling 
eventual subversive behaviour (Vilas, 1995). In practice, this meant that the 
polarisation which had marked the hierarchical social relations before the democratic 
period was restored and deepened (Jonas, 2000). The ruling elites’ anticommunist 
rhetoric served then as an excuse to effectively reduce the authorised political space 
and eliminate the undesired organisations, such as labour movements, particularly 
those related with the agro-business.  
Notwithstanding this regression in democracy and the closure of 
mobilisation and dialogue spaces, the decade of Democratic Spring that 
comprehended the 1944-1954 period left deep marks in the country that the 
repressive apparatus of Castillo Armas first, and Ydígoras Fuentes after, could not 
erase. First of all, the democratic period expressed a possibility for an alternative 
                                                                                                                                                                    
overthrown of Arbenz was not just solely motivated with fears of communist expansion. It also 
became an opportunity to establish a precedent on how American interests should be considered in 
other countries. Last, it is also insightful to emphasise that the State Secretary and the CIA Director, 
James and Allen Dulles respectively, were members of the Dulles family which controlled part of the 
United Fruit Company.  
119
 General Castillo Armas was murdered in1958.  
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engagement with the indigenous communities in the country and their role as integral 
members of a Guatemalan nation, while it simultaneously fostered a formal process 
of mobilisation and organisation of indigenous communities. Second, different 
sectors in society, namely some sectors in the military, having experienced the 
democratic period and ambitioned a political and economic change, did not want the 
oligarchy’s return and its agro-exporting model. The structural causes that had led to 
the reforms initiated by Arévalo and Arbenz were reinstated but the democratic 
experience established the grounds for its contestation (Jonas, 2000). The renewal 
process that affected the military after Ydígoras Fuentes assumed the presidency 
precipitated a radicalisation of different sectors that ultimately translated the 
confrontation into violence. With the sanitisation of the elements that supported 
Arbenz and the rising corruption amidst the military hierarchy, up until the figure of 
the president, the military institution faced a period of instability which affected its 
role as promoter of the order established (CEH, 2006).  
On 13
th
 November 1960, as a direct consequence of the radicalisation of 
positions, a group of militaries rebelled, protesting against the state of affairs within 
the institution and against the presidential permission regarding the training of 
irregular Cuban forces in the territory, perceived by some as a clear offense to the 
country’s sovereignty (ODHAG, 1999; Trefzger, 2001). Though this was an 
upheaval with immediate causes and demands, it played a decisive role in the 
emergence of the first guerrillas in the country (CEH, 2006). Their manifest 
mentioned realities beyond the military condition and appealed for the establishment 
of a political regime able to promote social justice, thus assuming a subversive 
agenda that naturally transposed the rebellion immediacy (ODHAG, 1999). The 
oppressive and violent answer to the rebellion and the persecution of its participants 
by connoting them with communism, sought to rapidly eliminate any subversion 
attempt within the military institution. However, and in response, the insurrectional 
elements, compromised with the purpose of ousting Ydígoras Fuentes, organised and 
formed the Movimiento Revolucionário 13 Noviembre (MR13) and became the 
armed rebel forces which carried the manifest of the 13
th
 November rebellion. The 
constitution of these forces marked the beginning of the violent confrontation 
between opposing actors in the country.  
 177 
 
The armed conflict 
Considering what we have exposed so far, it would be erroneous to consider 
the violent armed conflict that emerged in Guatemala in the 1960s simply as a 
“delegation war style”. Though its regional and international dimensions cannot be 
denied, the Guatemalan armed conflict was foremost a result of the social hierarchy 
and its patterns of exclusion reinstatement after the democratic period. Accordingly, 
the emergence of the guerrillas after the 1960s and the counterinsurgent answer 
deployed by the Guatemalan state represent a radical expression of a confrontation 
between divergent governance projects for the country. For analytical purposes we 
divided the discussion of what were the 36 years of conflict in three phases: the first, 
concerns the emergence of the first guerrillas and the definition of the 
counterinsurgent apparatus in the 1960s; the second; departs from the reorganisation 
of the guerrilla movement and the emergence of new groups in the 1970s until the 
transition to democracy in 1986; and the third, comprehends the years that followed 
the democratic transition until the signature of the Peace Agreements in 1996. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, two other movements joined MR-13 in their 
armed struggle against the regime of Ydígoras Fuentes. The 20
th
 October Movement, 
the armed expression of PGT, and the 12
th
 April Movement, formed by students who 
had been involved in the March and April demonstrations against the 1961 elections 
alleged fraud.
120
 These three movements joined efforts and formed the Fuerzas 
Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) which defined as their main target the North American 
imperialism, considered the pillar of national military and economic elites, and 
defended the armed struggle as the only means of reversing the status quo (CEH, 
2006). During the 1960s, the guerrilla acted mainly in the east, in Izabal and Zacapa, 
where the population was mainly constituted of ladinos. This location is related with 
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 During March and April 1962, the country assisted to a national mobilisation which expressed not 
only the discontent over the oppressive and corrupt actions of the regime but directly contested the 
result of the 1961 elections. The official party claimed it had elected 50 deputies of congress out of 66 
places and such results were considered the expression of an electoral fraud. The Association of 
University Students called for a Day of National Dignity and called for a general strike for 15
th
 March. 
This mobilisation soon became the largest mobilisation and demonstration of civil disobedience in the 
country since 1954. These mobilisations were not able to force Ydígoras Fuentes to resign, 
particularly because the political parties who opposed the president did not join the protest once it 
became radicalised and the Catholic Church appealed to the respect of the order. Furthermore, the 
support of the military to the president enabled its maintenance in power (CEH, 2006).  
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the ideological grounds of the movement which departed from class divisions that 
absorbed the ethnic hierarchy that existed in the country (Rostica, 2006). In the peak 
of its activity, it was estimated that between combatants and supporters, the FAR had 
5000 members in the corridors between Izabal and Zacapa (Figueroa Ibarra, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the political events in the early 1960s boosted the profile of 
guerrillas for better and for worse. A growing fear rose in the oligarchy and between 
American diplomats that the upcoming presidential elections could result in the 
victory of the former president Arévalo. As a consequence, the military assumed that 
removing Ydígoras Fuentes from power was the only assurance against Arévalo’s re-
election. The coup came to daylight in March 1963 and placed Coronel Peralta 
Azurdia, former Ministry of Defence, in the Presidency until the 1966 elections. This 
period was of particular importance to crystallise the framework of the 
counterinsurgency actions deployed by the military and other state institutions. 
During Ydígoras Fuentes’ presidency, and besides the purification of the military, 
new theoretical assumptions were brought together to forge a military doctrine able 
to eliminate any potential threat or communist advances in the country. The National 
Security Doctrine (DSN) was adopted as the guiding frame of defence, focusing 
particularly on the “internal enemy”, individuals, movements and groups that could 
bring communism to the country.
121
 DNS in Guatemala projected national power 
based on four elements – the economic, the social, the political and the military – 
which defined military strategies and actions. Progressively, military actions across 
these different elements were seen as crucial to fight the internal enemy and 
consequentially a logic of total war, a constant fight against communism and the 
guerrilla in all fronts, was enforced leading to a juxtaposition between the different 
groups that came to embody the image of “subversive”, regardless of their actions as 
democratic opponents or as guerrilleros. As the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento 
Histórico (CEH) affirms in its report 
Una vez iniciadas las operaciones militares y en aplicación del enfoque de 
seguridad nacional, os restantes elementos del poder nacional, el 
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 The National Security Doctrine was forged in close cooperation between different Latin American 
countries and the USA and sought foremost to establish a common military approach to the fight 
against communism in the region. This doctrine was adopted in Guatemala and was further developed 
in the military institution to consider the specific circumstances in the country and the threat of 
guerrilla (CEH, 2006).  
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económico, el político y el social, debían actuar para fortalecer la 
hegemonía militar dentro de una concepción de guerra total […]. Esta 
concepción significó que todas las estructuras del Estado guatemalteco y 
todos los recursos del poder debían ponerse a disposición del Ejército 
para combatir y derrotar la guerrilla. En este contexto, el poder político 
era responsable de brindar las decisiones políticas apropriadas y los 
instrumentos legislativos y jurídicos para impulsar la guerra 
antisubversiva. Al poder económico le correspondía apoyar con los 
medios financieros necesarios, la modernización y tecnificación del 
Ejército. El poder social, debía respaldar al poder militar, a través de 
campañas de información, desinformación, adoctrinamiento y preparación 
ideológica para conseguir que la población aceptara el Ejército (CEH, 
2006: 90-91).
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This approach to national security provides a crucial unifying narrative that 
enables us to grasp the continuities between governments and presidents despite the 
changes occurred through elections or coups. Coronel Azurdia deepened the 
mechanisms of oppression established by Ydígoras Fuentes and during the years he 
ruled, corruption and impunity in face of the violation of the Constitution rose and 
new restrictive mechanisms were enforced. The military pursued a modernisation 
guided by the needs of counterinsurgent warfare and created Intelligence Units with 
the support of the USA (ODHAG, 1999; CEH, 2006). A law establishing the new 
rules for the constitution and activity of political parties brought the anticommunism 
to the normative realm and, in practice, reduced politics to a limited political game 
between parties considered as ideologically pure, i.e. non-communists (CEH, 2006). 
It was in this conditioned political scenario, that the 1966 elections took place with 
the authorised political parties each presenting their candidate. Surprisingly, the 
Partido Revolucionario (PR) civilian candidate, Mendez Montenegro, assured the 
majority of votes, and after signing a secret pact delegating the counterinsurgent 
functions in the military, he assumed the presidency. This fact serves foremost to 
illustrate how, in fact, the military assumed control of the country during the1960s 
and how this control translated into a total war guided by the military institution and 
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 Author’s translation: Once the military operations were initiated, and departing from the national 
security focus, the other elements of national power, the economic, the political and the social should 
strengthen the military hegemony within the total war logic. This conception meant that all the 
Guatemalan state structures and all the power resources should be made available to the Army to fight 
and defeat the guerrilla. In this context, the political power was responsible to provide suitable 
political decisions and the legal and juridical instruments to fight the anti-subversive war. The 
economic power needed to provide the financial resources and assure the modernisation of the army. 
The social power should support the military power through information and disinformation, 
indoctrination and ideological preparation to guarantee the army’s acceptance by the population.  
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their purpose of eliminating the guerrilla, regardless of the president being a civilian 
or not (CEH, 2006). 
It was precisely in this period that a crucial transformation in the 
counterinsurgent mechanism of repression and warfare occurred. If up until this 
moment, the arrest of “subversive” elements had meant torture and prison but being 
released after a certain period, after 1966 the arrest meant not only prison and torture 
as it carried a strong possibility of clandestine death and disappearance (Figueroa 
Ibarra, 1999). Before the elections, the counterinsurgent apparatus captured and 
disappeared 28 leaders and activists related with the guerrilla. Certainly they were 
tortured and killed but their bodies were never found. The forced disappearance of 
these 28 individuals was, for Figueroa Ibarra, a “parteaguas” case in the history of 
repression in Guatemala, establishing forced disappearance as a deliberate act of 
subversion repression supported by complicit judicial institutions, commonly used 
during the rest of the armed conflict (Figueroa Ibarra, 1999; ODHAG, 1999; CEH, 
2006). 
123
 The forced disappearance had a double function: it not only eliminated the 
subversive elements as it created a sense of uncertainty in the families and 
communities serving as a dissuasion for future actions. In fact, during the 1960s, the 
military understood the need to involve the population in its counterinsurgent effort 
and accordingly, and besides the intimidation assured through forced disappearance, 
it “delegated” in some groups, the comisionados, intelligence and surveillance tasks. 
These groups, constituted of former military or individuals loyal to the military 
purpose, exercised effective control in communities and were the basis of future 
death squads (CEH, 2006). These events had a profound impact on the future of 
FAR, which had been resisting to the counterinsurgency offensives while 
simultaneously facing internal divergences and leadership crisis. By the end of the 
decade, FAR were confined to the capital city where they carried their actions.  
This situation, however, profoundly changed after the 1970 elections and 
onwards. After an electoral campaign marked by political violence and repression, 
Coronel Arana Osorio became president and launched a terror campaign, supported 
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 The Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REMHI ) of the Oficina de Derechos Humanos del 
Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG) affirms that one out of five testimonies collected in the project 
refer to forced disappearance (ODHAG, 1999) and Figueroa Ibarra has identified 518 cases of forced 
disappearance in the 1960s (Figueroa Ibarra, 1999).  
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on a state of siege that allowed the lockdown of the capital city and door-to-door 
searches and arbitrary detentions. Despite the virtual defeat of the guerrilla, the 
counterinsurgent state did not alleviate the oppression and constant vigilance of the 
internal enemy and Arana Osorio invested in the development of the military and its 
ability to control the country (CEH, 2006). He also evoked the image of a 
developmental state, able to deploy a national development plan to refrain the 
discontent that emerged with the negative consequences of the international oil crisis 
in the country’s economy. This conciliation between the counterinsurgent apparatus 
and the developmental state was adopted and further developed by the General 
Laugerud Garcia, which gained power after fraudulent elections. By launching a 
second Development Plan, the president attempted to industrialise and protect the 
agro-exportation model and simultaneously tackle poverty (CEH, 2006).  
Faced with this apparatus, the rebel movement tried to reorganise at the 
beginning of the decade. Two new movements emerged out of the reflection and 
redefinition in the guerrilla movements. The Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres 
(EGP) regrouped around former guerrilla members in the exile. Trying to find 
equilibrium between a classist analysis and the needed inclusion of the indigenous 
population as an agent of change, the EGP sought to depart from an ethno-national 
problematic in order to deploy a different confrontation strategy (Rostica, 2006). 
Accordingly, the guerrilla established its actions in two departments with a majority 
of indigenous populations – El Quiché and Huehuetenango in the northwest, seeking 
not only to engage in the armed struggle but foremost to develop a social basis of 
support before it engaged in that confrontation (Short, 2007). 
124
 The 1970s also 
assisted to the emergence of the Organización del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA) which 
emphasised the racist nature of the social hierarchy in Guatemala and presented the 
indigenous as the necessary engine of revolution (Rostica, 2006). Just as the EGP, 
ORPA also established its area of intervention in indigenous populated departments, 
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 EGP refused the military approach deployed by FAR and defined and a new strategic focus which 
divided the country in three zones: the mountains, where a popular army would be constituted with the 
support of poor peasants, the city, where the proletariat would carry the fight, and in the south coast, 
where the agro-business proletariat would join the struggle. All the actions in these spaces would be 
structured according to EGP need of social support (CEH, 2006). The EGP tried in this way to 
organise movements across sectors so that they could become a part of the armed struggle, though in 
the end, this view pushed the movement to a classist vision which ultimately tied the class condition 
and the ethnic identity in one approach (Rostica, 2006). 
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specifically in Quetzaltenango, Sololá and Chimaltenango. While it sought to 
professionalise its members, ORPA actively supported the emergence of social 
movements (CEH, 2006; Rostica, 2006). Simultaneously, both FAR and PGT 
searched for strategic redefinition. The PGT concentrated its efforts on a legal 
dimension, supporting popular organisations and unions and considering the 
possibility of alliances with progressive parties. On the other side, FAR sought to 
strengthen its social basis by supporting the work of unions and peasant 
organisations (CEH, 2006). With this new impetus, the guerrilla had in the 1970s and 
early 1980s its most active and visible period, giving a national expression to the 
armed struggle and its political purposes (Costello, 1997). In this phase, violence 
rose with the extension of the armed struggle throughout the territory and the 
consequent dispersal of the guerrilla groups to inflict defeats on the military structure 
(CEH, 2006). By 1982, the guerrilla was thought of being present in half the country 
with well established infrastructure, particularly the EGP (Figueroa Ibarra, 2006).  
Parallel to this renewed impetus of the guerrilla, the counterinsurgent 
apparatus also reinvented its action by deploying more violent mechanisms. This was 
particularly evident after General Lucas Garcia became president in 1978 and gained 
a new dimension after the 1982 coup that brought General Efrain Rios Montt to 
power. During the first years of the decade, and with the Development Plans, new 
organisational spaces emerged and, as a consequence, Guatemala assisted to a bloom 
of new organisations and movements. Once Lucas Garcia gained power the political 
spaces that had enabled this new organisational dynamic narrowed greatly and the 
repression of grassroots protests against rising urban transport fares unveiled the 
renewed compromise with the violent repression of any form of contestation 
(ODHAG, 1999). The REMHI project identified two distinct dynamics in the 
counterinsurgent campaign launched by Lucas Garcia. First, the repressive efforts 
focused on destroying the recently emerged grassroots movements through 
executions, massive repression, abductions, forced disappearance and massacres 
(ODHAG, 1999).
125
 The second dynamic of this counterinsurgency was directed 
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 One of strongest illustrations of violent repression carried in these years was the killing of 37 
people in the Spanish Embassy after 30 activists had occupied the building to claim Spanish attention 
and action in face with the massacres happening in El Quiché. It was latter concluded that the victims 
burnt alive as a consequence of the grenades thrown by the National Police. 
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towards the guerrilla movements and involved actions which, beyond a direct 
confrontation with the different groups, sought to eliminate their social basis of 
support and comprehended the period between January 1981 and March 1982. In 
January 1981 the military launched an offensive in the departments of 
Chimaltenango and El Quiché which targeted the populations thought of having any 
affinity with the guerrillas. The military also set in motion a coherent military 
strategy that combined military objectives with information gathering and 
psychological operations (ODHAG, 1999). The military actions and massacres 
focused mostly on Chimaltenango, Sololá, El Quiché and Sacatepéquez departments, 
considering the assumed affiliation between the population and guerrillas (ODHAG, 
1999).  
However, at the beginning of the 1980s the situation in the country and the 
international context of Cold War, where the military commonly found support for 
their counterinsurgency strategy, had changed. According to REMHI project 
the criminal acts related [...] occurred in an extremely complex context in 
which evolving social phenomena – such as an increasingly active 
indigenous peasant movement and the expectations raised by the prospect 
of revolutionary change – came face to face the decline in “show-case 
democracy”, corruptions, and excessive ambitions of groups within the 
government bureaucracy and the business sector (ODHAG, 1999: 215).  
Lucas Garcia’s regime was in fact more isolated both internationally and 
nationally. The traditional support of USA was no longer certain. Internally, the 
economic elites perceived the obstacles of maintaining a developmental political 
regime with the human rights violations growing in the country, and the military also 
perceived that a strict military solution might be counterproductive (Schirmer, 1998; 
CEH, 2006). This did not mean however, that the military was losing control over the 
situation: a counterinsurgent strategy had been defined and the military had made 
important choices in order to accomplish certain purposes. 
126
Accordingly, and faced 
with the fraudulent election of General Aníbal Guevara and the opposition that 
followed the results, the military broke the “formal model of democracy” and placed 
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 With the evolution of the other regional conflicts, especially with international appeals to a 
negotiated settlement in El Salvador and the recognition of the guerrilla, the army understood that 
regional dynamics could interfere in the outcome of the conflict in Guatemala. Therefore, the army 
did not engage actively in the Reagan plans for the region in order to avoid intromissions in its 
strategy (ODHAG, 1999). 
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a triumvirate of generals in power, leaded by General Efraín Rios Montt, and 
endorsed by some political parties. The Constitution was suspended and a 
Fundamental Statute of Government became the fundamental legal reference in the 
country. After declaring himself as President, Rios Montt promulgated several 
decrees which sought not only to reshape the political landscape in the country but 
also to establish the legal frames on which the implementation of the 
counterinsurgent strategy could rely. In fact, and while the decree on Political 
Organisations considered all political parties as “committees of parties in formation”, 
formally eliminating the restriction on the formation of communist organisations, 
other decrees, such as the ones forbidding the dissemination of news concerning 
political violence, the amnesty for political crimes and the establishment of a state of 
siege, sustained the strategy to eliminate the guerrillas and achieve a military victory 
(ODHAG, 1999; CEH, 2006) 
The counterinsurgency campaign, whose motto “fusiles y frijoles” (bullets 
and beans) framed the actions carried by the military, departed from the National 
Plan of Security and Development which established a relation between subversive 
behaviour and the lack of development (CEH, 2006). Accordingly, the military 
implemented a five-part strategy consisting of (1) raising the number of soldiers 
deployed, including forced recruitment or civil patrols, (2) a pacification campaign in 
“killing zones”, (3) establishing civil affairs units able to coordinate civil patrols and 
relocate refugees in model villages, (4) the expansion of legal justification for 
counterinsurgency, and (5) a psychological warfare to win the population’s support 
(Schirmer, 1998). Until Rios Montt was ousted in 1983, the army put in practice the 
operation Victoria 82 and Firmeza 83. The operation Victoria 82 was a pacification 
operation and set in motion the scorched earth strategy to deprive the guerrillas from 
their social basis of support and isolate them (Schirmer, 1998). This campaign made 
no distinction between combatant and non-combatant, especially if the villages under 
siege were in the red zone, i.e. in the geographic areas where the guerrilla was 
present, where the orders would be to eliminate all elements.
127
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 In these red zones, often remote and assumed as close to the guerrilla, entire villages were 
massacred, with the army resorting to rape, torture, killing with machete, hacking or bashing to death 
or even burning people alive. In addition to the red zones, there were also pink and white zones, which 
the army perceived as a smaller threat and in which it carried selective killing and torture without 
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Those who survived the military offensives were placed in model villages 
controlled by the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PAC) where individuals were 
expected to behave according to new models of development. Though PAC were 
formally activated in 1981, the offensives of 1982 clearly enhanced the dimension of 
these patrols and role played in the counterinsurgent efforts. The military understood 
that PAC could be an effective tool to fight the guerrilla for several reasons: first, 
they forced the population to choose sides bringing them to the counterinsurgent 
apparatus; second, former indigenous soldiers could act in these patrols to mobilise 
human and intelligence resources, third, they allowed the army to present these 
paramilitary activities as popular support to the army; fourth, they contributed to 
develop a social opposition to the guerrilla. Accordingly, and after having been 
mobilised by the Army’s Civil Affairs and introduced in a development project, 
those who survived the massacres were recruited to special reserves or to form local 
PAC (Schirmer, 1998).  
It is crucial to note that the scorched earth strategy, as well as the creation of 
model villages and the (forced) recruitment of indigenous to integrate local PAC, 
must be understood at the light of the role given to indigenous communities, both by 
the army and by the guerrillas (Schirmer, 1998: 82). As indigenous communities 
were seen as potential source of subversive behaviour, the counterinsurgency defined 
a plan to re-socialise entire communities in order to eliminate any future threat. 
Resorting to the massacres and the scorched earth allowed the military so stimulate 
fear in the communities while depriving them of their social and cultural references 
by burning their villages, relocating them in different zones, and disrupting the social 
relations of indigenous communities with the inclusion of their members in the 
oppressive apparatus. The PAC revealed to be particularly useful in this purpose 
because they were not only a particularly effective control and surveillance 
mechanism, but they also socialised violence and assured a social division in 
communities. As Schirmer affirms  
The military has been remarkably adroit at not only penetrating daily 
village life but also spreading around responsibility for the killing. [...] 
                                                                                                                                                                    
necessarily resorting to the destruction of crops and infrastructure (Schirmer, 1998). According to 
Schirmer, it is important to note that the killings occurred during this campaign were not accidental 
abuses or excesses, representing instead, a “scientifically precise, sustained orchestration of a 
systematic, intentional massive campaign of extermination” (Schirmer, 1998: 45).  
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Every Indian soldier and patroller became implicated in or minimally 
acquiesce to the new order, with the subject of “loyalty” and “support” 
within the climate of concealment and intimidation useful in the army 
psychological war campaign (Schirmer, 1998: 82).  
Between 1983 and 1984, about 1.3 million of indigenous men between the 
ages of 15 and 60 were part of the PAC (Schirmer, 1998: 82). In addition to the 
army, these patrollers were part of the most violent period of the violent armed 
conflict. Through the testimonies gathered, REMHI has extensively mapped the 
massacres perpetrated during the conflict as well as the actors involved and reached 
the number of 410. Looking to the collected data it is possible to see that 38.5% of 
the massacres (158) occurred during 1982, and the period between 1981 and 1983 
comprises 296 of the 410 massacres documented. Additionally, the Army and PAC 
were identified as perpetrators in 91% of the cases. It is also possible to perceive that 
the massacres were carried in indigenous populated zones were the guerrilla, 
particularly the EGP, had established its fronts: El Quiché, Alta Verapaz and 
Huehuetenango were the stage of 364 massacres (ODHAG, 1998). It’s also important 
to note that the guerrilla groups also carried massacres as the REMHI project has 
documented even if in a much smaller scale (about 3.16% of the massacres 
documented) (ODHAG, 1998; Schirmer, 1998). Figueroa Ibarra also shows us that 
forced disappearances were particularly expressive in 1980s accounting for 2260 of 
the 4042 cases the author identified (Figueroa Ibarra, 1999).  
The coup that removed Rios Montt from the Presidency in 1983 halted, in 
some degree, the violent spiral that had swept the country in the previous two years. 
The military aimed foremost to reinstate the army’s hierarchy challenged by the the 
1982 coup. This did not mean that the counterinsurgent efforts were relegated. 
However, and because of the effects of the scorched earth tactics the military focused 
their action on restructuring the cultural and economic patterns in the zones where 
the massacres were carried as well as reinforcing their presence, particularly their 
intelligence capacities, through the creation of development poles (ODHAG, 1998; 
Schirmer, 1998). In parallel, selective eliminations of guerrilla members or members 
of social organisations and movements continued. 
On the other side of the barricade, the guerrilla movement, thinking of being 
closer to a military victory had united under the same flag. In 1982, the three armed 
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groups and PGT joined efforts and created a unified command of the armed struggle. 
The Unidad Revolucionária Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) became then a unified 
insurgent actor, even if marked by some divergences. However, and though the 
guerrilla had in fact a large projection in the territory, it was not able to protect the 
communities from the army’s offensives. As a consequence, the army effectively 
weakened its social basis, inflicting a decisive setback to its structures. Despite these 
setbacks, and in contrast to what had happened to the guerrilla movement in the 
1960s, URNG did not disappear and continued to develop its offensive actions. 
Nevertheless, and due to its limited military resources, it had to approach the conflict 
from a political perspectuive, in order to assure a relative leverage in the changes that 
were happening in the country in the mid-1980s and the political possibilities they 
opened (CEH, 2006; Figueroa Ibarra, 2006).  
Indeed, the government of Mejía Víctores set in motion a political 
transition, inscribed in the counterinsurgent strategy of the army, and which sought 
to transfer power from a de facto military government to a democratically elected 
civil government (ODHAG, 1999). Accordingly, Guatemala started in 1983 a 
recreation process of its political institutions and in 1984 it formally initiated a 
process of power transfer from military to democratic rule. The Constitution 
dispositions approved in 1985 resulted from the interactions between the interests of 
the elected political parties, the military and the business class but they allowed 
nevertheless the presidential elections to happen in 1986. More important, the 
Constitution rescued protection philosophy, departing from the value of human rights 
respect to create the figure of the Ombudsman, an additional guarantee of human 
rights respect, and established a set of dispositions preventing former elements of 
military juntas or coups to run for presidency. Moreover, it reasserted the 
individuals’ right of association and demonstration and created a Constitutional 
Court responsible for the defence of democratic institutions and rule of law in the 
country (CEH, 2006). In 1986, after the general elections, Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo 
assumed the presidency and the country formally started a process of democratic 
transition.  
The transition to democracy in Guatemala was necessarily related to the 
regional dynamics that affected Central American countries. First, regional 
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confrontations reached an unbearable level: the support given by different countries 
to different guerrillas or paramilitary groups at the regional level strengthened a 
sense of imminent confrontation between them (González, 2000). Since the bipolar 
logics offered no solution to the existing divisions other than fighting and continued 
countries and irregular forces’ arming, the neighbouring countries of these armed 
conflicts identified the need to establish a differentiated approach, in order to avoid 
an interstate armed conflict in the region (Leongómez, 1988). The Contadora Group, 
formed by Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panamá, successfully tied regional 
peace with the solution of the internal conflicts and was able to regulate the 
sponsoring of irregular forces. Nevertheless, and because the achievements were 
limited, Oscar Arias, President of Costa Rica, defined a Plan for Peace, which came 
to be ratified by the Central American countries in the Accord of Esquípulas II that 
contained ten dispositions and a timetable to address the internal conflicts. 
Democratisation became a condition for peace and a common set of rules to be 
applied internally by these countries was defined (Oliver, 1999).  
The democratic transition was carried by Cerezo Arévalo and important 
signs of effective political opening were given. The executive cooperated closely 
with the army, particularly in what concerned the attempts made by several society’s 
sectors to bring the violent acts perpetrators to justice (ODHAG, 1999; CEH, 2006). 
His presidency was, nevertheless, marked by a fragile management of the military 
influence, the needs of economic and fiscal reform to diminish the public debt and 
other reforms, and the demands and interests of the business class, represented by the 
Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas Industriales y Financieras (CACIF).  
The armed conflict however was still a reality and the offensives against the 
guerrilla continued during Cerezo’s presidency. After committing the country to 
Arias’s regional plan to achieve peace, the government and the army were 
progressively cornered by regional and international pressures to invest in a peace 
process to end the conflict. The end of the decade brought important changes to the 
international and regional context and President Cerezo and the military were forced 
to engage in a political negotiation with URNG to settle the end of the violent armed 
conflict. Of course, peace negotiations in Guatemala did not fully depend on the 
external dimension. In fact important internal changes and attitudes paved the way 
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for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. First, the transition for democracy opened 
a space for debate, discussion and negotiation in Guatemalan society. Second, 
URNG, though maintaining its operatives on the ground, pursued a parallel political 
agenda addressing its ambitions and demands in terms of socio-economic changes 
and promoted a negotiated end to the armed conflict (Figueroa Ibarra, 2006). And 
finally, the political and economic elite understood that a peace settlement was the 
only way to access the needed funds to modernise Guatemala and guarantee the 
needed stability for development (Holiday, 2000).  
The peace negotiations proved, nevertheless, to be long and cautious. Their 
regional framing forced in practice URNG recognition as a political stakeholder. The 
official conversations between the Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación (CNR) and 
URNG started in 1990 in Oslo, after Norway offered its good offices. The meetings 
between the guerrilla and several actors of Guatemalan society, including the 
government and the army representatives reached a very auspicious result, since it 
led to a framing agreement for the negotiation, defining some limited but 
fundamental points to formally launch negotiations, namely the issues contemplated 
in the peace negotiations and the future role of UN in the peace process. 
Consequently, five meetings were held outside Guatemala in the context of these pre-
negotiations agreements.  
Nevertheless, and despite progress towards common dispositions for formal 
and substantial negotiations, the process was constantly challenged and derailed 
internally until 1993. Some sectors remained strongly suspicious of a negotiated 
peace with the URNG. The army continued to engage in its offensives, by then 
directed towards affecting the terms of the dialogue and CACIF did not intend to 
discuss a new national project of Guatemala but aimed foremost to establish the 
terms of cease-fire that assured the guerrilla’s disarmament (Jonas, 2000; CEH, 
2006).  
The process was effectively stagnated surrounding the human rights 
discussion with the new President, Jorge Elías Serrano, sustaining that the effective 
protection of human rights depended of the internal conflict while his opposition 
considered that reinforcing the rule of law was the necessary condition of improve 
the human rights situation in the country. This impasse was only aggravated with the 
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Serranazo political crisis in 1993. Faced with what he considered to be an 
ungovernable situation, the president himself leaded a coup attempt, dissolving the 
Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice and suspending constitutional articles. 
However, the lack of support by the military and the rising social contestation 
prompted a decision of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Electoral Court that 
not only removed Serrano from power but also impeded his vice-president, a part of 
the attempted coup, to assume the presidency. The constitutional order was re-
established after the Congress nominated Léon de Carpio as President, the Human 
Rights Ombudsman until that moment.  
The negotiations became entrenched on matters of governance that echoed 
not only internal concerns, but also international perspectives (Padilla, 1997). 
Therefore, both parties welcomed UN actions as guarantees of future political 
compromises. In 1994, the warring parties demanded the mediation of the UN as a 
neutral outsider to conflict. As a consequence, the CNR was dismantled and a 
Government Peace Commission, assumed the negotiations with URNG 
representatives. The Framework Agreement signed in Mexico in 1994 defined the 
future procedures and themes that would structure the peace process. This accord 
defined three spaces for third parties’ intervention during the peace process: UN 
mediation, the Group of Friends and the creation of a civil space of participation in 
the peace process (Short, 2007). This agreement institutionalised the role of the 
international community in the peace process and intensified its scope of action and 
level of intervention in the peace negotiations (Short, 2007). The civil space of 
participation was formalised with the creation of the Asemblea de Sociedad Civil 
(ASC), which had the important role of informing the national discussion by 
promoting a space of debate of possible solutions and answers to the Guatemalan 
violent conflict causes. 
Between 1994 and 1995 four important agreements were reached: the 
human rights agreement, which established United Nations Verification Mission in 
Guatemala (MINUGUA), the agreement concerning the resettlement of populations, 
the accord on historical clarification, which established the CEH, and the Indigenous 
rights agreement. But the peace process stalled again: first, the definition of CEH 
limited mandate caused public demonstrations of discontent and affected URNG 
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capacity at the negotiations table (Short, 2007); second, the delays of MINUGUA 
deployment, expected to act as a dissuasive element of violence in the country, 
matched a worsening record of human rights abuses (Jonas, 2000); third, UN role 
was constantly defied by conservative forces and members of government in 
Guatemala and its international role was also questioned by its limits (political and 
financial) during the negotiations period (Jonas, 2000); and fourth, 1995 elections 
limited the engagement with further agreements given the uncertainty on the future 
government’s acceptance of the agreements.128 Although UN mediation guaranteed 
that all the previous agreements signed would became state agreements, only after 
the 1995 election and Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) victory did the peace 
negotiations gain a new rhythm. After holding secret meetings with URNG during 
the campaign, the newly elected president, Alvaro Arzú took several actions in order 
to make his commitment obvious to all involved in the peace negotiations (Stanley 
and Holiday, 2002). He correctly perceived that funding from the international 
institutions and other donors would only become available to Guatemala after a final 
peace agreement was reached (Jonas, 2000). Trusting the newly elected government, 
URNG decided to call an end to all armed offensive actions in March 1996. 
Consequently, the government halted the offensive counterinsurgency campaigns. 
The armed confrontations had, in practice, formally ended in Guatemala. 
After these movements towards peace, the signing of the other peace 
accords appeared to be a relatively easy and quick task, since it took less than a year 
to sign several substantial and operational agreements (Stanley and Holiday, 2002). 
The signature of the socio-economic accord, the agreement on military reform and 
strengthening of civilian power together with the four operational agreements – 
definitive cease-fire, constitutional reform and electoral regime, reintegration of 
URNG and the agreement of a timetable to implementation – paved the way for the 
Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. The Agreement was signed on 29
th
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 The mobilisation around the electoral results and the elite division between two major parties, 
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG, right-wing populist) and PAN (modernising agenda and 
pro-peace) denoted an uncertainty regarding the engagement of future government in peace 
negotiations. As a consequence, URNG had no intentions to negotiate any other agreement with a 
ceasing administration and with no assurances that the future government would in fact respect the 
previous ones (Stanley and Holiday, 2002). 
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December, 1996, putting an end to the armed conflict and establishing a 
comprehensive frame to build peace and promote important changes in the country. 
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5.2. The Peace Agreements content and implementation: a compromise with 
peace and an evolving engagement with statebuilding 
The twelve peace agreements signed to end the armed conflict were an 
ambitious governance project compromised with the challenge of a long-term peace. 
Pásara affirms that these agreements were in fact more comprehensive than any 
political party or government’s programme elaborated until then and that they 
represented, in this sense, an external exercise to the existing political dynamics and 
power relations in the country (Pásara, 2003). In fact, it has been acknowledged the 
UN fundamental role and its mediation to enlarge the scope of the agreements: 
without UN influence during the negotiation it was highly unlikely that the process 
and outcome would have been so comprehensive in what concerns the project therein 
defined (Torres-Rivas, 2006).  
Two dynamics converged in the ambitious content of the agreements. First, 
the 1980s assisted to a growing mobilisation of social forces that contested in 
different ways the patterns of exclusion as well as the human rights abuses still under 
way. The possibility opened with the creation of ASC and its contribution to discuss 
these and other issues considered relevant to truly promote change in the country 
allowed for a discussion of social and economic exclusion as the structural causes of 
the armed conflict. Bringing this to a discussion where the two warring parties settled 
a re-foundation of the country was fundamental to affect the issues and lines of 
action in the following years.  
These internal inputs on the close relation between social, economic and 
political reforms the country needed, which some social sectors had been demanding 
for long, were formally expressed during the negotiations by Quezada Toruño and 
they fundamentally converged with the international approach to violent conflict that 
was emerging at the beginning of 1990s (Pásara, 2003). UN involvement in the peace 
process was guided by the emerging notion of post-conflict peacebuilding (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992) and its purpose of solving armed conflict by addressing the structural 
and immediate causes of violent conflicts. Additionally, and due to the conflict low 
intensity nature, the factors that dominated the national agenda needed to be brought 
to peace discussions in order to give them dimension (Arnault, 1999). Accordingly, 
and departing from a diagnosis of the causes of conflict, the peace process and the 
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definition of the peace agreements became a moment to define a national agenda able 
to change the existing frames of the social contract, i.e., to (re)design institutions and 
establish a different pattern of relations and interactions between the military and the 
civilian, between indigenous communities and ladinos (Arnault, 1999).  
The constant human rights abuses, the non-democratic and military history 
of rule in the country and the fragile transition to democracy, the close relation 
between the state and the army, the inefficiency of the judiciary, the lack of 
development and the social exclusion of a large portion of society can be broadly 
identify as the fundamental causes and elements which fuelled the armed conflict in 
the country. These elements and causes were addressed along the different 
agreements. The question of rights crosscuts the agreements on human rights, the 
resettlement of populations, indigenous accords or even the operative agreements for 
constitutional reforms. Rights were a strong concern since there was widespread 
acknowledgment of human rights abuses and the absence of justice as central 
features of the armed conflict and, therefore, this was an issue present in different 
agreements. Hence, not only a set of rights came to be recognised as fundamental, 
but constitutional reforms were also planned to formalise and provide them with 
legal expression. The provisions necessarily included an articulated strategy towards 
the state, able to develop the necessary structures to enforce the rule of law and 
protect Guatemalans from the abuses of the past and define a new role for the armed 
forces (including the guerrilla) in a peaceful sociability based on liberal values. The 
Socio-Economic Agreement addressed the question of land and provided a broad 
conceptual framing development model, establishing a mechanism to access land and 
a public management and fiscal policy able to reverse the persistent patterns of 
underdevelopment that marked Guatemala. Indeed, and summing up the vast content 
and dispositions of the agreements, it is possible to identify a liberal facet to the 
project of peace set in motion with the final Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace 
(1996), particularly if we consider the agreements which address the social-economic 
issues and the deepening of democracy, even if the agreements do not necessarily 
express a particular ideological reference (Torres-Rivas, 2006). The harmony 
between institutions, democracy, rule of law and human rights and the market 
oriented development were defined in operative terms and became a project of 
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transformation. From the encounter between the demands of social sectors in the 
country and the international understanding of peacebuilding emerged a project of 
governance with a strong international echo and which became, according to 
Richmond, one of the first examples of the liberal peace consensus, fully articulated 
afterwards (Richmond, 2005b).  
Considering our focus on post-armed conflict statebuilding, we will address 
in detail the evolving engagement with the state through the different reforms 
projected and in order to access (1) the implementation and obstacles to reforms, and 
(2) the international support to these efforts. Our purpose is to explore how the 
understanding of state as a condition for peace has been present and to explore if and 
how the depoliticisation narrative which we explored in the previous chapter is 
visible in the international engagement with statebuilding actions in the country. 
The Guatemalan state’s role in the violent armed conflict is widely 
acknowledged. This prominence is particularly relevant if one confronts the state’s 
actions with the narratives of security and order, representation and welfare that often 
mark our vision of a functioning modern state. Looking at the Guatemalan state in 
such manner leads us to identify vulnerabilities that are not exclusive of the 
counterinsurgent apparatus but also result from the socio-economic relations on 
which the state was built and reveal how the state in Guatemala has been dominated 
by a particular understanding of modernisation, guided towards the maintenance of 
the economic and social elites position and interests (Pásara, 2003). Pásara identifies 
three historical moments where state modernisation was attempted: first, during the 
Democratic Spring reforms, with the reforms undertaken on education, health, social 
security and the investment on crucial infrastructure to the country’s development; 
second, the transition to democracy in 1985, with the establishment of institutions 
able to sustain and protect democracy; and third, the programme of reforms 
established when firming peace in 1996 (Pásara, 2003). These attempts however are 
far from representing a linear evolution in the modernisation process to the country. 
As we have seen, the reforms of the Democratic Spring which envisioned the 
creation of a modern democratic state were rapidly reversed and only in 1985 can we 
perceive changes towards a more responsive, non-oppressive state. It might seem 
contradictory to depict the Guatemalan state, in the counterinsurgent apparatus form 
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assumed during the violent armed conflict period, as being weak considering the 
presence of the army in the different departments and their active repression and 
oppression of guerrilla and social contestation. Nevertheless, and if one departs from 
different criteria this perception might be contradicted. This was particularly the case 
of those who departed from the expected functions of modern democratic states, for 
instance representation and legitimate governance, or provision of public services, to 
name but a few, and who perceived the actions of the Guatemalan state as 
illegitimate. The Guatemalan state was an effective counterinsurgent apparatus and 
providential in maintaining and defending the interests of the economic oligarchy, 
but it was not able to provide a governance frame on which peaceful and inclusive 
social relations could be built. Such inadequacy was furthermore evidenced by the 
fact that the state was simultaneously the agent and the materialisation of the 
exclusions and hierarchies identified as the structural causes of armed conflict. An 
interviewee affirmed that Guatemala had not have a state but had an army instead 
(Interviewee 12). 
Likewise, the changes which occurred in 1985 with the transition to 
democracy were partial and were described by Jonas as “a top-down liberalization of 
an authoritarian regime” which, in practice, meant a civilian version of the 
counterinsurgent state, where the military had the control over the opening process 
(2001: 101). This means that despite the changes brought with the 1985 Constitution, 
the state continued to fail in its function as a guarantor of citizens’ rights and in 
enforcing the rule of law. This is particularly evident if one recalls the selective 
killings of human rights activists in the country after 1985. Furthermore, the 
counterinsurgent state of the 1980s had left behind a scenario of destruction and 
internally displaced population, which only added pressure to the limited resources 
available to deploy public services in a democratic context.  
Having in mind the counterinsurgent role in the violent conflict and the 
fragile and still very conditioned democracy, the content of the peace agreements 
established the parameters for supporting the democratic process through effective 
changes, able to provide the democratic institutions with the resources and capacity 
to act as providers of security and order, representation and welfare. In the report of 
the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP), Torres-Rivas and Arévalo de León (1999) 
 197 
 
presented the result of the discussions and key aspects which were considered 
fundamental to a peacebuilding project. The need for a modern and strong state is 
cosnidered a specific key element but it is nevertheless directly related with the other 
four – economic and social development, rule of law and citizens’ security, the 
recognition of the plurinational configuration of society, and the coordinated 
international cooperation. The identification of this need for a modern and strong 
state transcends state reform and has more comprehensive purposes. It departs from 
the acknowledgement that as a consequence of the armed conflict, the state faces a 
weakened condition while the reconstruction needed for peacebuilding demands a 
strong political power, present in all of its territory (Torres-Rivas and Arévalo de 
León, 1999).  
According to the authors,  
Las estructuras del Estado que se ha heredado, agravadas por la crisis de 
los últimos 30 años, son disfuncionales para esta nueva etapa y acusan 
rasgos preocupantes: corrupción, ineficiencia, centralización, marginación 
arbitrariedad, etcétera. Es necesario entonces establecer claramente las 
funciones del estado; su interrelación con los sectores que componen la 
sociedad civil y el desarrollo de políticas adecuadas, con mención 
especial a las fiscales; es imprescindible buscar una adecuada articulación 
de los niveles locales con los centrales en el marco de una efectiva 
descentralización; establecer mecanismos de participación local y popular 
en los procesos de tomada de decisiones; fortalecer el rol de las 
organizaciones de la sociedad civil frente al Estado y mejorar 
sensiblemente el funcionamiento de los partidos políticos como 
intermediadores entre la población y el Estado (Torres-Rivas and Arévalo 
de León, 1999: 173). 
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This affirmation claims, then, needed reforms to deepen the democratic 
system and a reaffirmation and clarification of state functions in this new democratic 
moment. The content of the peace agreements echo these assumptions and have 
become a referential frame to redesign the institutions on which a peaceful 
sociability can be built. Though there are two fundamental agreements which address 
these issues – Acuerdo sobre el Fortalecimento del Poder Civil e Función del 
                                                          
129Author’s translation: The state structures inherited, affected by the crisis in the last 30 years, are 
dysfunctional in this new phase and they demonstrate concerning traits: corruption, inefficiency, 
centralisation, marginalisation, arbitrary, etc. It’s important to define clearly the state function, its 
interrelation with the sectors that compose civil society and the development of the needed policies, 
fiscal policies particularly; it is vital to search for an effective coordination between the local and the 
central level in a decentralisation frame; to establish local and popular participation mechanisms in the 
decision-making processes; strengthen the role of civil society organisations in reference to the state 
and improve the role of the political parties as mediators between the population and the state.  
 198 
 
Ejército en una Sociedad Democrática (1996) and Acuerdo sobre Reformas 
Constitucionales e Régimen Electoral (1996) – one cannot dismiss the implications 
that rest in the others, particularly the dispositions which affect states’ actions in 
specific matters, such as the fiscal reform for instance. In order to facilitate this 
exercise, we will address the different Agreements dispositions in three areas: first 
those related with the security sector reform (SSR), second, the measures which 
target a political reform, and third those related with the affection of socio-economic 
aspects.  
The SSR deserved particular especial attention in the peace agreements, 
particularly due to the counterinsurgent apparatus where the concept of security was 
clearly marked by the DSN, the figure of the internal enemy, and the role of the 
military. Accordingly, the concept of security promoted was related with citizens’ 
security, which necessarily re-equates the role of security forces in the enforcement 
of the rule of law and protection of citizens’ rights. In this frame, the peace 
agreements, namely the one concerned with civilian rule, established (1) the creation 
of a National Civilian Police (PNC), under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and responsible for all matters concerning internal security; (2) a redefinition 
of army’s role of the, circumscribing its action to preserving the state’s independence 
and sovereignty and specific cooperation in other affairs, as well as the substantial 
reduction in its operatives number and budget; (3) the elimination of the Army Chief 
of Staff and its replacement by a civilian controlled entity; and (4) PAC 
demobilisation. A different agreement – Acuerdo sobre Bases para la Incorporación 
de la URNG a la legalidad (1996) – established the demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) parameters for URNG and its inclusion in the political scene as 
a political party (SEPAZ, 2008). The need for a wide disarmament was also 
acknowledged and accordingly the compromise with new legal regulation on arms 
possession was established. Additionally, the judiciary sector was widely affected by 
the general content of the agreements, due to the impact and role impunity had had in 
the counterinsurgent strategy and the emphasis placed on the rule of law and respect 
of rights. Thus, the agreements referring to human rights, indigenous people’s rights 
of and consuetudinary practices, as well as the agreement on civil rule, all have 
important elements that should be considered when reflecting on the reforms in the 
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justice system. The purpose of these reforms was, foremost, to affirm state 
monopolies in what concerned the provision of order and security, while 
simultaneously defining a new institutional distribution of actions and missions 
according to the principle of the rule of law in democratic societies.
130
 These 
reforms, together with the emphasis on the rule of law and the changed army’s role 
in citizens’ security, depended of constitutional changes to provide legal substance to 
some dispositions.  
Regarding the political reforms, the fundamental purpose was to strengthen 
the still incipient democracy while promoting a more inclusive political system, open 
to its citizens’ participation and civil society’s demands. The SSR reform was a 
crucial aspect to guarantee such political reforms, particularly because it promoted an 
effective separation of powers between the army and the executive power. The 
political reforms contained in the agreements envisioned foremost an opening of the 
political system and a reform of state’s executive and legislative institutions in order 
to ensure broader social participation and legitimation of political affairs. It is again 
in the agreement on civilian power that these issues are displayed in some detail and 
we can identify (1) the dispositions regarding the modernisation of the Congress, to 
guarantee its representative nature as well as compliance with the Constitution and 
supervision of the executive policies, (2) the promotion of public services 
professionalism through the promotion of transparency and punishment of 
corruption, (3) a state decentralisation strategy able to strengthen the municipalities 
so that citizens could benefit from this process and social participation in the 
different governance aspects could be improved, (4) women’s role in strengthening 
civilian power and the importance of their social role and political participation 
(SEPAZ, 2008). A particular relevant aspect of the state’s political reforms was 
inscribed in the Acuerdo sobre Reformas Constitucionales y Régimen Electoral 
(1996), where the electoral system reform is considered in some detail in order to 
improve the representative nature of the Congress and broaden the participation in 
the electoral process to all citizens. Accordingly, and besides the mechanism needed 
to modernise the electoral system – documents and census, for instance – the reform 
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 For a discussion on the content and implementation of each peace agreement, please see Jonas 
(2000) and Pásara (2003).  
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engaged with the operational issues, particularly the question of facilitating access to 
voting centres (SEPAZ, 2008). 
In what concerns the last area –socio-economic aspects – the Acuerdo sobre 
Aspectos Socioeconómicos y Situación Agrária (1996) contained a vast set of 
dispositions that established the state’s future role as a promoter of socio-economic 
development and as a provider of public goods and services, such as education, 
health and welfare, for instance, as well as the need for a participative process to 
define development strategies. The agreement also defined the country’s 
fundamental economic matrix, fully expressed in the market-driven solution to the 
question of land. In what concerns the search for a participated model of 
development, the agreements departed from state decentralisation and the revision of 
the municipalities and departments competences, to bolster their contribution for 
development promotion while rescuing the figure of the Local Development 
Councils. Regarding state’s role in promoting social development, the agreement 
established that (1) an investment in terms of spending and coverage should mark 
state’s compromise with education, though the specific issues of content and 
capacitation purposes would also be duly noted; (2) the national health system should 
be strengthened, providing particular attention to low income groups and pressing 
health issues, such as malnutrition and maternal health; (3) the national welfare 
system mechanisms needed improvement; (4) the housing problem should be 
addressed with proper funding and policies; and (5) employment should be promoted 
in the country as an integral part of economic policies that depart from labour 
legislation and capacitation (SEPAZ, 2008).  
The Agreement also defined a frame of access to land, a crucial aspect if we 
consider not only the social value it has for indigenous communities and how it is 
central for the economic majority of the population and how it has for long structured 
the social inequalities and hierarchies in the country. As we have mentioned, the 
agreement echoes a market-driven solution based on modernisation of land 
possession regimes, establishing a land trust fund (FONTIERRAS) constituted by 
lands acquired by the government and made available to the population, particularly 
small peasants, at a small price. This redistributive pattern was to be complemented 
by a new property registration system after a national land survey. Additionally, and 
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even though the agreement did not include the social value of land and did crystallise 
the absolute right to private property, measures for protecting communal lands were 
nevertheless inscribed (SEPAZ, 2008). 
Nonetheless, and despite the importance of the dispositions mentioned so 
far, the last section of the agreement gathers the most disputed and yet fundamental 
issue to the rehabilitation of state institutions and their ability to act across different 
areas. The country’s fiscal policy had for long been an obstacle to the different 
governments in the country, which often faced limited budgets and lack of resources 
to deploy their programmes of governance. This was indeed a problem shared both 
by authoritarian/military governments and those elected after 1985. Opposing an 
extensive fiscal reform, CACIF had always managed to prevent tax rates that 
menaced their associates’ economic activities. The agreement dispositions 
necessarily reflect these different dynamics, but they define, nevertheless, a tax 
revenue goal, which focused on increasing to 12% the taxes collected. Also, and in 
addition to tax evasion measures, the agreement also affirms the need to transform 
the tax system into a fair, equitable and progressive system (SEPAZ, 2008). These 
principles sought foremost to provide the state with the needed resources to fulfil its 
constitutional obligations.  
It is also fundamental to note the dispositions established on the Acuerdo de 
Identidad y Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas (1995), particularly because they 
crosscut the different areas of state reform established in other agreements, defining 
important principles and measures to be considered in SSR, political reforms and in 
socio-economic measures. In what concerns the SSR, the agreement inscribed the 
cultural rights of indigenous communities as well as their consuetudinary practices in 
the country’s legal frame, which constituted an important change. Moreover, its 
proposal to inscribe in the Constitution the recognition the multiethnic, multicultural 
and multilingual nation, the agreement sought to rearticulate the boundaries of state’s 
political community and to promote an inclusion of the indigenous communities that 
respects their differences. This legal recognition strengthened the inclusive and 
participative tone given to the dispositions concerning the political reform and the 
socio-economic aspects. Basically, the agreement forced the recognition of 
indigenous communities’ right to participate and be heard in the political processes 
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and in the definition of public policies for development, particularly those which 
affected them directly. 
In what concerns the task of rebuilding the state, it is possible to affirm that 
the agreements posited a project of governance where the emerging institutions could 
sustain a democratic system, able to attain the legitimacy needed and change the 
state-society interaction patterns. Moreover, it counted with the support of 
international organisations and third countries, not only because of the emphasis 
placed on the connection between peace and a viable democratic state, but also due 
to the reforms in the socio-economic front – namely a modernising and market-
driven reform of land property and the fiscal reforms, which suited international 
financial institutions (IFI) criteria (Jonas, 2000).
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The implementation exposed, nevertheless, the fragility of the agreements, 
despite their comprehensive and ambitious dispositions, especially in what concerned 
state reforms. Two set of critiques are often pointed and perceived as a direct cause 
of the partial implementation of the agreements. The first departs from a question 
Pásara (2003) explores in his book and it is related with the realism of the 
agreements, i.e., their applicability, both in what concerns the content and the 
ambitious timings defined by the chronogram agreement. In the testimonies the 
author collected, the notion that the content of the agreements were not realistic 
prevailed. The demands for different constitutional reforms or the funding needed to 
promote the reforms inscribed in the agreements were particularly demanding, 
moreover if we consider the timing defined for their application, and did not 
anticipate the political dynamics which marked the peace negotiations and the 
implementation period. There was nevertheless an acknowledgement that the type of 
reforms contained in the Guatemalan peace agreements formed a long term project of 
governance which, and despite its limits, contained a premise of change regarding 
the political and social relations in the country (Pásara, 2003). The author further 
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 For an analysis of the neoliberal post-conflict state in Guatemala, please see Short (2007).Though 
we also recognise the liberal traits in this project of state, the author focus relies mainly on the 
economic dimension and the conclusion it draws, both in what concerns the economy promoted and 
state-society relations established as a consequence, departs mainly from the agreement on socio-
economic issues. The conclusions she draws regarding the citizenship project specifically lack an 
articulation with the political changes brought by other agreements which necessarily provides only a 
limited account of the changes introduced. 
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stresses that the comprehensiveness, or lack of realism thereof, was, nevertheless, 
precisely one of the factors that enabled the parties in negotiation to reach an 
agreement (2003). Torres-Rivas adds to these considerations the political will needed 
to push the implementation further absent from the political scenario after the peace 
signature – the second set of critiques (Torres-Rivas, 2006). Concerning the different 
actors, Torres-Rivas considers that URNG, now a political force, was distant from 
the organisations that emerged after the democratic transition which only diminished 
its real capacity to influence and push the implementation beyond the easiest 
measures therein inscribed (Torres-Rivas, 2006).
132
 Additionally, President Arzu 
imprinted a strong sectarian sense to the peace signature and when he lost the support 
of its party the broader engagement of other parties and the Congress, the peace 
agreements had already been affected. Moreover, and considering the conservative 
and ephemeral existence of political parties in Guatemala, their support and 
contribution to building a democratic and peaceful sociability was necessarily 
limited. Besides the parts who had signed the agreements, Torres-Rivas also 
mentions three other actors: first, the Catholic Church, which after the removal of 
Quezada Toruño from CRN became more compromised with the historical memory 
and reconciliation; second, the population’s general limited support and knowledge 
of the agreements content which severed the reforms from the needed social support 
of; and third, the existence of profoundly conservative sectors and groups in society, 
who boycotted the agreements and tried to misrepresent them (Torres-Rivas, 
2006).
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 In sum, and as Pásara wrote,  
la mira y la profundidad de los acuerdos no expresó a la fecha de su 
firma, el estado político del país, la relación entre las diversas fuerzas 
sociales, la ecuación entre quienes estaban a favor del cambio de 
Guatemala y quienes se oponían a él (Pásara, 2003: 145)
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The scope of the present work does not allow us to explore in detail the 
implementation of the peace agreements throughout the last 17 years. Nevertheless, 
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 On the subject of the political left that emerged after the signature of the peace agreements please 
see Figueroa Ibarra and Martí I Puig (2007). 
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 For an analysis directed to the specific role to the private sector and other sectors and social groups 
please consider Rettberg (2007) and Peacock and Beltran (2003).  
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 Author’s translation: The perspective and the depth of the agreements at the moment of their 
signature did not express the political context of the country, the relation between the different social 
forces, and a clear idea of who supported change in Guatemala and those who did not.  
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we will try to explore in the following pages what have been the main advances and 
obstacles as well as the current dynamics in the country towards the agenda 
contained in the agreements, specifically in what concerns the recreation of state 
institutions.  
The first major setback faced in the implementation phase was without a 
doubt the outcome of the 1999 referendum concerning the needed constitutional 
reforms to provide with legal value the changes inscribed in the agreements. After a 
difficult process at the Congress and after the intervention of the Constitutional 
Court, the content of the popular referendum was defined and in May 1999 the 
questions were submitted to popular vote. The victory of the “No” in all four 
sections, with a considerable difference towards “Yes”, created an impasse in the 
implementation of the agreements, providing the more conservative sectors of 
Guatemalan politics with additional arguments for blocking important reforms that 
directly affected their social and economic interests. The question which immediately 
followed was how such a result had been possible in a country with so expressive 
inequality and with an expressive indigenous population. Jonas has identified 
through an analysis of the campaigns for the “Yes” and “No”, how the different 
actors involved in the reforms acted. Accordingly, she has concluded that the 
traditional sectors which supported the “No” were able to mobilise the vote by 
waving old myths concerning the division between indigenous and non-indigenous 
and the guerrilla programme of action. On the other side the “Yes” campaign was 
built on PAN and FRG circumstantial compromise with the reforms and on a limited 
reach and mobilisation of the left political parties. Indigenous and popular 
organisations directed their efforts towards clarifying the reforms in the indigenous 
communities. In the end, the “Yes” campaign was not able to articulate a 
mobilisation for reforms able to challenge the “No” apparatus (Jonas, 2000). 
Additionally, the lack of information regarding the content of the agreements which 
necessarily influenced the knowledge over the reforms being discussed as well as the 
overall level of participation in the referendum even in indigenous populated 
departments (Interviewee 3, ; Carey Jr, 2004). For Jonas, the results show us that 
beyond the alarming levels of abstention, the country was somehow divided between 
those who had been directly affected by violent conflict and those who had not 
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(Jonas, 2000). Torres-Rivas affirms that the abstention and the victory of the “No” 
expressed the lack of popular support to peace agreements (Torres-Rivas, 2006). 
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Considering this difficult start and the political dynamics it made evident it 
is important to assess how the project of redefinition of democratic state institutions 
has evolved. In what concerns the socio-economic aspects, and despite the 
improvements in the public spending towards education and health, the goals 
inscribed in the peace agreements remain unattained while the redistribution of land 
through FONTIERRAS have had a limited impact in effectively granting access to 
land, with the demand highly transcending the offer, while it has simultaneously 
indebted its intended beneficiaries (Garoz and Gauster, 2002; Gauster and Isakson, 
2007). Furthermore, the country has not been able to define a rural development 
strategy and the current impasse on its draft prevents needed legal procedures and 
participative mechanisms established in the agreements to become effective (ASIES, 
2013). Additionally, the fiscal reforms which were so crucial to provide the state 
with the necessary resources to implement reforms and deploy public services have 
not achieved the settled goals. Though the fiscal pact firmed in 2000 established 
compromises in what concerns the state’s deficit and fiscal privileges, the 
achievement of the purpose defined in the agreement was postponed. As the 2010 
Report of Secretaria de la Paz (SEPAZ) recognises, the purpose had not been 
achieved, and the attempt to promote such a reform in 2012 under the Presidency of 
Peréz Molina have also been blocked in different occasions by CACIF, thus 
remaining an open question and an obstacle to state capacity (SEPAZ, 2010; ASIES, 
2013). At stake is not only raising taxes but foremost a progressive taxation that hurts 
the economic interests of economic elites.  
In what concerns SSR implementation, important progresses have been 
effectively made, particularly in what concerns PAC and former guerrilla’s DDR. 
There are nevertheless issues which continue to demand attention. First, PNC 
remains a partially incomplete project, considering its operative capacity to guarantee 
security and order throughout the country. Though this was a specific issue strongly 
supported and funded by international actors, there were some problematic issues 
since its creation. Specifically, the PNC integrated former army and PAC members 
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which was perceived as a negative input to the new institution, considering 
particularly the purpose of establishing a different approach towards security and 
rights (Glebbeek, 2001). Moreover, and due to the limited resources or to political 
preferences and demands, the PNC has remained closely connected to the army 
which contradicts the separation principle established in the peace agreements. More 
recently the need for more effectives and arms has also been noted as an important 
obstacle in PNC actions against criminal groups. The army, and though its personnel 
was formally reduced in accordance to the peace agreements, the budget conferred to 
the institution has varied, especially due to the direct transferences that occur 
between PNC and the army. But more important, the army still plays a decisive role 
in internal security tasks, being a resource that different presidents have used to face 
organised crime and to support the PNC (Keen, 2003). Additionally, and even though 
PAC members have been demobilised they remain an important social group in the 
country, answering to appeals of social sectors or waving their demands for a 
compensation for their patriotic services (Fonseca, 2004).
136 
The Intelligence 
structures created are still highly opaque and their collaboration with the army in 
internal security only adds complexity to the real separation of functions in the 
security sector.  
Nevertheless, the most important aspect of SSR remains the judiciary and 
the needed rehabilitation of the justice system in the country. The intended reforms 
to the justice system were perceived to be crucial in establishing the rule of law and 
the respect for human rights as the basis of democratic state-society relations. Pásara 
affirms that the demanded reforms inscribed in the peace agreements were generally 
conducted and it was precisely the execution of the dispositions which showed, 
through an institutional analysis, the dimension of the problems that affected the 
justice system in the country (Pásara, 2003). Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the 
progresses regarding the professionals that work in the sector, the limited human 
resources to restructure the justice system and provide it with effective mechanisms 
of justice are especially relevant: the system needs more judges and more interpreters 
to extend its activity throughout the country. It also needs to develop investigation 
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practices in order to provide proof and substance to prosecute criminal actions and 
human rights abuses. Additionally, the inclusion of consuetudinary practices and the 
juicio oral remain as highly unaddressed issues which necessarily demands attention 
(Instituto Interuniversitário de Iberoamérica, 2005; UNDP, 2009b; ASIES, 2011).  
Perhaps the best perspective to address the fragility of the justice system in 
Guatemala is by exploring the effective and perceived impunity in the country. 
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This notion of impunity marked the armed conflict since the justice system became 
an instrumental accomplice of the counterinsurgent state. However, and if the 
counterinsurgent state finds support in impunity, a democratic state depends on the 
effective enforcement of the rule of law and protection of citizens’ rights. In 
Guatemala this change has not happened. A MINUGUA report identifies “impunity 
as the main obstacle to the effective enjoyment of human rights” and acknowledges it 
as an “entrenched phenomenon” (MINUGUA, 2002) . This notion of impunity is 
explained by the inability of the system to answer properly to (1) the human rights 
violations that occurred during the armed conflict and (2) the violations of the rule of 
law that have happened since the peace agreements, carried amongst others, by 
abusive behaviour of security forces (both public and private), and by the illicit 
activities of organised crime and the maras.
138
 In what concerns the first, the limited 
mandate of CEH and the National Reconciliation Law approved in 1996, 
safeguarded the perpetrators, politicians or leaders responsible for the human rights 
abuses from being prosecuted and condemned for their acts. This allowed for a 
transition of impunity from the conflict to the formal peace period thus affecting 
people’s belief in the judicial institutions, and in the state more broadly. The second 
one is mainly related with the different challenges that have marked the country since 
1996 and are concerned with the justice system inability to provide an adequate 
answer to the organised crime and maras illicit activities, which may even occur 
during when they are in prison, after being convicted.
 
This second set of events have 
particularly exposed the fragility of the judiciary system, in terms of infrastructure 
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 For an interesting account on impunity in Guatemala – its dimensions, actors and illustrative cases 
as well as recent dynamics – please see Molina Mejía (1999). 
138
 The lynching phenomenon constitutes a violation of the rule of law. It has reached concerning 
levels after the Peace Agreements signature and constitutes a collective violent act. Nevertheless, it 
must be considered in relation with the issue of impunity, particularly because it is often framed as a 
social reaction to an ineffective justice system. We will discuss this dual aspect later in this chapter.  
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and human resources, the spread of corruption in the sector, the amount of legal 
appeals allowed and which overload and block the courts, as well as the threats to 
personal integrity to the judiciary workers. 
139
 In 2012 President Peréz Molina was 
able to grasp support for the Security, Justice and Peace Pact, which seeks to develop 
a cooperative approach to the security challenges and democratic governance needs 
while rescuing the institutional reforms defined in the peace agreements (Gobierno 
de Guatemala, 2012).  
Concerning the political reforms projected in the agreements to reinforce the 
democratic institutions, the 1999 referendum created an important obstacle to such 
transformations in motion particularly because they heavily relied on the 
constitutional reforms. Nevertheless the Law of Congress and the Law of Elections 
and Political Parties (LEPP) have been revised in different occasions, in order to 
improve the transparency of the different institutions and promote the inclusion of 
women and indigenous people. The 2004 reform of LEPP affected the system of 
electoral organisation and allowed the creation of electoral circles in rural areas, thus 
taking elections closer to the communities (Núñez Vargas, 2008). State 
decentralisation has also evolved, particularly in what concerns the institutional and 
financial capacities of municipalities, even if the question of local participation 
remains fragile (Huerta, 2000; Amaro, 2001; MINUGUA, 2002).  
There are, nonetheless, important issues to discuss. Beyond the accusations 
of corruption that crosscut the different presidencies, the legislative institutions of the 
state tend to affect the quality of democracy promoted. We have to consider the of in 
Guatemalan political parties’ specificities to explore how presidents may see their 
supportive majority dismantled. The volatility of the political parties is commonly 
pointed as a central feature of the political system (Núñez Vargas, 2008). Indeed and 
according to Brolo, since 1985, 66 parties have disputed at least one election at the 
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 During my second research period in Guatemala an assistant prosecuting attorney was abducted 
and murdered on 13
th
 May 2011, in Cobán, Alta Verapaz. He was decapitated and his body 
dismembered and separated into black plastic bags. The bags were placed at different locations: the 
head was placed at the local market and the rest of the body was placed in front of the Department 
government building. I remember I commented the symbolism associated this extreme demonstration 
of violence and it was often said to me that that was a symbolic act both demonstrative of power over 
individuals even after death as well as a dissuasive warning to the local community and authority. 
Several members of the Zetas in Guatemala have been arrested and condemned for this crime during 
the present year. 
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municipal, department or national level and we can observe in the data he presents 
that the majority of the sample disputed just one, which means that to a high number 
of parties created also matches a high number of parties cancelled (Brolo, 2012). 
140 
Additionally, Guatemalan political parties are often structured on formal and 
informal networks whose configuration necessarily affects their composition. This 
volatility reflects on the way the Congress works, particularly in the changes that 
occur between groups: the elected representatives may change their affiliation after 
being elected while keeping their seat, which means that the power configuration can 
be affected in the Congress after the elections. This is not uncommon and between 
2008 and 2010, according to ASIES, this was a dynamic that affected almost all the 
parties thus conditioning the debate as well as the negotiation of the legislative 
agenda (ASIES, 2010).
141 
In what concerns political parties URNG is an exception in 
this debate, particularly because it materialised the revolutionary left in the country. 
Nevertheless, and even though URNG is still present at the Congress, it does not 
have the representative dimension to create an alternative pole to right-wing or 
social-democratic parties. 
142 
 
The democratic evolution in Guatemala has been marked by the Presidential 
elections and the history of their campaigns and results which occurred after signing 
peace tells us a crucial history of democratic consolidation. Until today four 
presidential elections have occurred. The first presidential elections after 1996 were 
held in 1999 and were won by Alfonso Portillo, from FRG. Portillo was not the 
leader but since Rios Montt could not run for office due to constitutional 
impediments, he became the party’s candidate and assumed Presidency in 2000. 
These elections had a particular importance and relevance for the country’s 
democracy: for the first time all political forces were able to present themselves for 
voting, including URNG which participated in the elections in the leftist platform 
Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN). The results were particularly expressive: FRG won in 
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 Núñez Vargas estimates a “mortality rate” of 5 to 6 parties after elections (Núñez Vargas, 2008).  
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 Ortiz Loaiza et al (2008) provide an insightful and comprehensive discussion on Guatemalan 
political parties.  
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 Figueroa Ibarra states that URNG has effectively produced a turn to social-democracy which, 
nevertheless, did not mean that its elections results improved. Quite the opposite, and until the victory 
of Alvaro Colom in 2007, social democracy saw its results worsen (Figueroa Ibarra, 2006). 
 210 
 
all departments, even where Montt’s counterinsurgent strategy of scorched earth was 
most felt. For Jonas, and considering that these results were emerging shortly after 
the defeat of constitutional reforms in referendum, they could be perceived as a 
victory of the mano dura approach and a setback in the peace agreements agenda 
(Jonas, 2000). But the author states that this victory must be read in context, resulting 
from an “astute populist campaign” with an emphasis on state reform, and the 
“punishment vote” of the Arzu presidency.143 Besides the victory of FRG, the results 
obtained by ANN were also relevant since this platform became the third voted 
political force.  
The 2003 election occurred in a difficult context marked foremost by Rios 
Montt’s intent to be a candidate. As we have seen, the 1985 Constitution clearly 
prevented an active element in a coup to run for presidency and this was an obstacle 
that had prevented his participation in previous elections. The Portillo’s years 
however, lay the foundations on which Montt could build its case, namely by 
affecting the Constitutional Court composition and by giving him the Presidency of 
the Congress. In 2003, after seeing his intents denied in lower courts, Rios Montt 
appealed to the Constitutional Court were his appeal won, with the argument that the 
1985 constitutional dispositions could not be applied retroactively. The Supreme 
Court suspended this decision, but after a massive mobilisation of FRG supporters 
which invaded the capital city in July armed with guns and machetes, claiming 
Montt’s right to run for President, the Constitutional Court annulled the suspension 
and allowed Montt’s candidacy (Fonseca, 2004; ASIES, 2005). Thus, and contrary to 
the expectations, the 2003 election was not solely a moment of consolidated 
practices, but they were also a reminder of the challenges and limits of the 
Guatemalan democracy.  
Despite this victory, Rios Montt only reached a third place, after Álvaro 
Colom, from Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), and the future President 
Oscar Berger from the coalition Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA), close to the 
business sector. According to Fonseca, this defeat represented a clear democratic 
counterattack message stating that  
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 It is also important to mention the close relation that exists in the country between the existence of 
criminality and the support for mano dura. For Godoy this has been inherited from the conflict period 
and it is still present in the country (Godoy, 2006). 
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no hay espacio en la nueva república democrática para el manipuleo de la 
memoria histórica, para la impunidad, para el manoseo de los principios 
constitucionales de la transición democrática o para la burla de la 
institucionalidad electoral y política que surgió, con todo y sus 
imperfecciones en 1985 (Fonseca, 2004: 173).
144
  
Thus, and even if the process that led to elections made the limits of 
democracy evident, the outcome of the election was an important moment in the 
democratic consolidation. The results affirmed the political ascension of Álvaro 
Colom, a social-democrat, and showed an increase both in the number of those able 
to vote and those who did effectively vote (ASIES, 2005).  
In 2007, Álvaro de Colom was elected after disputing the election with 
Peréz Molina, a retired military, amidst a growing spiral of violence, which included 
the murder of members of political parties and political activists, and accusations of 
connection between political parties and organised crime. Colom was able to build a 
party with national projection and with a programme directed towards the social 
dissatisfaction that affected the country (Figueroa Ibarra, 2010). Despite the violence 
that marked the campaign and the challenges posed by a decentralisation in voting 
centres, these elections consolidated a tendency of growth both in terms of the people 
inscribed to vote and those who effectively exercised their right (ASIES, 2008). 
145 
 
Finally, the last elections occurred in 2011, with the results confirming 
Perez Molina as winner. The elections were necessarily marked by a growing 
opposition between Peréz Molina and Sandra Torres, who had recently divorced the 
President in exercise, Colom. Both exchanged accusations amidst the rising violence. 
In May 2011, a massacre of 27 fincas workers happened in El Peten, in the North. A 
week later an assistant attorney was killed and his body appeared in bags in Alta 
Verapaz. Reports of violent disputes between political parties’ members were also 
registered. Nevertheless, and against the expectations of the majority of people, the 
elections occurred with no major incident (ASIES, 2012b). After a long dispute, 
Sandra Torres was not allowed to be a presidential candidate, since her divorce was 
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 Author’s translation: There is no space in the new democratic republic for the manipulation of the 
historical memory, to impunity, to the manipulation of constitutional principles of democratic 
transition or to deceive electoral and political institutions that emerged with all their imperfections in 
1985.  
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 Figueroa Ibarra (2010) addresses in detail the election of Alvaro Colom, particularly his supporters 
and his programme. He also explores some of the obstacles and actors that will come across his path 
when he tries to implement a social democratic reform.  
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not considered as a valid argument to circumvent the constitutional imposition 
regarding the candidacy of President’s relatives. Manuel Baldizón from Libertad 
Democrática Renovada (LIDER) came in second place and LIDER is currently a 
strong political opposition force in the Congress. These elections were also the first 
in which Movimiento Político WINAQ (WINAQ) an indigenous group led by 
Rigoberta Menchu participated as a political party becoming the first indigenous 
movement gaining this status.  
Notwithstanding the reforms which effectively occurred and the ones which 
are still pending, at this point it is necessary to affirm that the task of assessing the 
implementation of the agreements content in what concerns the reinvention of 
democratic state institutions in Guatemala cannot be done without considering what 
has become perhaps the most pressuring challenge to its implementation. The 
violence that currently marks daily life in Guatemala has different expressions, 
origins and purposes. However, these expressions converge in the type of challenge 
they pose to democratic state institutions capacity to deploy an answer able to alter 
the current course of events while consolidating the rule of law.  
It must be noted that violence is not a new element in Guatemalan 
society.
146
 In fact several practices and violent methods used during the armed 
conflict, such as abductions and extortions or even summary executions, can be 
found today in Guatemala. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that this continuum 
is marked by a transformation in the actors who carry it which necessarily transforms 
the meanings and purposes of the violent practices that have transited to post-armed 
conflict times. As Vela et al note, the peace agreements put in evidence new 
demonstrations of violence, more frequent and visible, and in this new institutional 
frame the understanding of violence abandoned its political justification to become 
part of delinquency and criminality (Vela et al., 2001). These new demonstrations of 
violence, as the expression of delinquency and criminality, have four main traits: 
first, they mark a relocation of power, through which these groups seek to submit the 
economic and political realities to a cooperation needed for the maintenance of their 
activities; second, they are part of a business oriented logic that structure its activity 
                                                          
146
 For a comprehensive discussion on violence in Guatemala please see Zepeda López (2005) and 
López Garcia et al (2009).  
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on blurred divisions between legal and illegal activity; third, they become the 
expression of a transnationalised phenomena, where the criminal activities transcend 
state’s territories; and fourth, they symbolise in fact a de-monopolisation of violence 
within state’s territories which simultaneously challenges state institutions from the 
outside and fuels an institutional fragility within its institutions (Vela et al., 2001).  
In Guatemala, the narco business has embodied these characteristics and it 
is commonly pointed by the Government, media and international organisations as 
the main security challenge the country has to face. It was also mentioned in all the 
the interviews we carried as the main challenge the country has to face. In 2010, the 
BBC declared narco as the new enemy of Guatemala (BBC, 2010) and recently, the 
Guatemalan newspaper El Periódico (2013b) explored the cartels’ disputes over 
Guatemalan territory. Guatemala has become a privileged territory of transition 
between South and North America in drug trafficking circuits not only due to its 
geographic location. The 2010 SEPAZ report affirms that  
la pobreza y la falta de oportunidades para la mayoría de la población, 
aunado a la poca presencia institucional de un Estado que fue reducido al 
mínimo de sus capacidades, débil y sin recursos, han hecho el caldo de 
cultivo perfecto para los criminales que, huyendo de México, se han 
establecido en Guatemala, queriendo imponer su ley, a sangre y plomo. 
En palabras del Ministro de Gobernación, un alto porcentaje de la 
violencia y delitos contra la vida en el país, se debe precisamente a 
disputas entre grupos del crimen organizado por el control de los 
territorios de trasiego y distribución de estupefacientes (SEPAZ, 2010: 
157).
147 
In addition to the cartels, las Maras have also gained a significant 
prominence in the criminal activity landscape. It is important to distinguish between 
these two groups: even though Maras are frequently related to the narco business, 
their actions and behaviours must necessarily be considered in a social dimension, 
due to the project of inclusion they embody. They are indeed a specific group: they 
act locally, through clikas (local groups), but they are an expression of a 
transnational group. Their bonds are forged on a strong sense of belonging and 
                                                          
147Author’s translation: Poverty and the lack of opportunities for the majority of the population, 
together with the state’s weak institutional presence reduced to the minimum of its capacities, fragile 
and without resources, have created the perfect conditions for criminals that, running from Mexico, 
have established their actions in Guatemala, trying to impose their law. According to the Governance 
Minister a high percentage of the violence and crimes committed against one’s life in the country are 
related with the organised groups’ disputes for the control of the transition and distribution territories.  
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loyalty to the group, which means that their actions cannot simply be considered as 
an expression of organised crime or random delinquency (Moser and McIlwaine, 
2001).  
Besides these groups and the violent acts they engage in, one must also 
consider the violent attacks and homicides that occur in the country which can be 
related to common delinquents but are also a consequence or outcome of social 
conflicts or radical expression of disputes. Gender violence has reached concerning 
levels and femicidios express this radical expression of disputes also in terms of 
power. Lynching also deserves a particular reference not only due to the dimension it 
has assumed in the country but particularly because of the meaning it conveys. 
148
 
First, the phenomena has not just grown in numbers throughout the territory: as 
López Garcia notes, together with demonstration of regret after lynching, it has also 
become visible public statements defending and justifying the violent acts committed 
by the community against crime suspects (López García, 2009). And second, and 
related with the first, lynching as acquired a strong sense of “perverse political 
empowerment”, in the sense that this becomes a mechanism of individuals and 
communities to effectively act in face with the impunity that grasses (Interviewee 2, ; 
Godoy, 2006: 123).  
Therefore, and considering the state reforms limited implementation as well 
as the additional challenge of plural acts of violence and the multiple actors engaged 
in it, one may infer that the purpose of reinventing state institutions was only partly 
accomplished, pressured by democratic demands, conservative obstacles and violent 
sub-state actors in the country. The Guatemalan state institutions evolved from their 
counterinsurgent form, where though they had a strong coercive apparatus they 
lacked the legitimacy, to a period of formal peace where the counterinsurgent 
apparatus was demobilised and democratic legitimacy was instituted. This legitimacy 
was mainly expressed through elections, and was necessarily limited since the state 
had a limited capacity to deploy security and other public services, thus affecting the 
creation of legitimacy in its output dimension. Overall, the state lacked the resources 
and the political actors lacked the political interest/strength to carry the deep 
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 The edited volume by Torres-Rivas and Mendoza (2003), Linchamientos: ¿barbarie o “justicia 
popular”?, offers an enriching discussion over lynching possible causes, geography of acts and 
meanings.  
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transformations inscribed in the peace agreements (Interviewee 10). As a 
consequence, the violent acts and the groups we have previously mentioned only 
exacerbated the demands towards a state which continued to have, in formal peace 
times, a limited capacity to promote development, political representation and, most 
of all, to establish and democratically enforce order and security. The trajectory of 
the Guatemalan state shows us an evolving fragility, which has deepened and 
transited from a matter of legitimacy towards a matter of capacity, and whose evident 
expression is the security and justice sector. 
This evolving trajectory of fragility has been duly noted by international 
actors particularly those involved with peacebuilding in the country and the agenda 
inscribed in the Peace Agreements. The UN engagement with Guatemala is in this 
sense quite illustrative, evolving from a verification mission with a strong emphasis 
on the rule of law and respect for rights to a pioneering commission, which targets a 
specific fragility of state institutions, considered as key to reverse the situation. 
MINUGUA was established after the parties reached an agreement on Human Rights 
and was deployed in Guatemala with an initial mandate of verification regarding that 
specific agreement. In 1997, soon after the parties signed the final peace agreement, 
the Security Council approved a new mission, which kept the name MINUGUA but 
had a different mandate. In this second moment, the mission continued to have a 
strong verification component concerning the implementation of all the agreements 
but it also provided technical support and public information regarding the overall 
implementation and MINUGUA results and activities. The mission nevertheless 
transcended peacekeeping missions traditional boundaries and participated in the 
state’s restructuring process, mainly by providing technical support and assistance in 
rights-related areas, such as justice and public security (Louise, 1997; Palencia 
Prado, 1997). This particular emphasis on rights is directly related with the history of 
human rights abuses in the country and the accomplice role of a passive judiciary 
system. Nevertheless, the mission compromise with institution-building was 
foremost concerned with the implementation of the reforms inscribed in the 
agreements. MINUGUA stayed in the country until 2004 when it left with a limited 
record of achievements. For Pásara, the mission had four problematic dimensions: 
first, a limited capacity to assume its mandate; second, a dual relation with the 
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institutions on the ground, acting simultaneously as supporter and evaluator; third, its 
role in institutional rehabilitation; and fourth, the relation between the mission and 
society (Pásara, 2003). Pásara further states that the mission had a limited knowledge 
of the complex reality of the country and was in some degree detached from society 
which, together with the political context in the country, limited the mission’s 
capacity to influence the implementation process (Pásara, 2003). An interviewee 
noted that the mission had in fact a limited knowledge on the complexity of the 
political and social relations in the country (Interviewee 17).  
When the mission left the country in 2004, the reforms inscribed in the 
agreements were not fully implemented, and, as we have seen, there were severe 
limits to the state’s ability to perform its functions. By then, it was evident that not 
only was the agreements implementation suspended but the problems Guatemala 
faced demanded an answer focused on tackling impunity in the country. MINIGUA 
exit only made this more evident (Interviewee 3). In 2003, during Portillo’s years, a 
specific Commission was created to address impunity in face with the new security 
challenges and criminal actors – Comisión de Investigación de Cuerpos Ilegales y 
Aparatos Clandestinos (CICIACS). This Commission sought to intervene in the 
country, particularly in the justice system, through independent prosecutorial powers. 
The agreement was nevertheless denied at the Constitutional Court which left this 
issue pending to the Berger’s presidency. In 2006 an agreement was reached and in 
2007, after three Salvadorian members of the Central American Parliament 
(PARLACEN) were killed by PNC members, the Constitutional Court approved the 
mandate of a new commission, CICIG.  
The Agreement establishing CICIG ascertains a diagnosis of state’s fragility 
related with the problems of impunity affecting the country. The Agreement states 
that  
Considering that illegal security groups and clandestine security 
organizations seriously threaten human rights as a result of their criminal 
activities and capacity to act with impunity, defined as the de facto or the 
de jure absence of criminal, administrative, disciplinary or civil 
responsibility and the ability to avoid investigation or punishment, all of 
which weaken the rule of law, impeding the ability of the state to fulfil its 
obligation to guarantee the protection of the life and physical integrity of 
its citizens and provide full access to justice, with the resulting loss of 
confidence of citizens in the democratic institutions of the country (UN, 
2007) 
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Accordingly, it is established in Article 1 a) the purpose 
To support, strengthen and assist institutions of the State of Guatemala 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed 
in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and clandestine 
security organizations and any other criminal conduct related to these 
entities operating in the country (UN, 2007).  
Considering the Guatemalan state’s trajectory of fragility exposed 
previously, it is important to note that this international compromise reflects the 
international approach to statebuilding as a precondition to the creation of peace. The 
international engagement with the creation of peace in Guatemala has in fact started 
with a support of the democratic transformation of state institutions but the country’s 
trajectory of fragility realigned the international actors’ actions towards a 
statebuilding strategy able to capacitate the state to fulfil its functions and narratives. 
It is indeed an approach focused on technical capacitation of a specific sector of the 
state, considered to be crucial to rehabilitate institutions. More important, it is crucial 
to emphasise, that these efforts are nevertheless articulated with the peace 
agreements compromises – in the case of CICIG, Human Rights Agreement is 
mentioned particularly. This connection has been reinforced with the recent Pact on 
Security, Justice and Peace, which rescues (again) the rhetoric of the agreements and 
ties it with a capacitation of security and justice sectors and CICIG contribution 
(Gobierno de Guatemala, 2012). Furthermore, CICIG is funded through the 
Peacebuilding Fund providing a peacebuilding context to its statebuilding efforts. 
Likewise, it is important to note that this statebuilding approach is not exclusive of 
the UN compromise and other international actors have also aligned their actions 
with this diagnosis of fragility. The EU, for instance, has launched a programme to 
support security and justice in 2012, SEJUST, which has a budget of 18 million 
Euros and is mainly directed towards professionals’ capacitation and construction of 
infrastructures.  
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6. Before and after peace: citizenship in Guatemala  
In next chapter, we will discuss the condition of citizenship in Guatemala in 
the present context of post-armed conflict statebuilding. To achieve this purpose we 
will consider how power relations affected citizenship along the inclusion/exclusion 
divides that have marked the condition of citizenship in the country. We aim to 
explore in what terms citizenship has been (re)affected and (re)enacted and how 
these possibilities have interacted with international statebuilding efforts in formal 
peace time. Accordingly we will discuss in a first section the impact that the power 
relations that marked the armed conflict had on citizenship, particularly on the 
different elements that constitute it. The second section departs from the project of 
citizenship contained in the peace agreements to discuss the political puzzle that 
citizenship current condition exposes. Through this analysis we seek to re-engage 
with the power relations in the country to dismantle depoliticising narratives and 
rescue the political condition to the current reflections on post-armed conflict 
statebuilding.   
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6.1. The condition of citizenship in armed conflict times 
The vision of citizenship that the 1944 Revolution sought to promote 
encountered a project of national community profoundly affected by the social 
hierarchy. As we have seen, this hierarchy was mainly based on identity and socio-
economic condition and, as consequence, such vision nurtured a dominant culture in 
the country, even though that culture had no meaning to the majority of its 
population. This hierarchy created a social division, which reduced the rights 
recognised to indigenous communities and established a de facto inferiority 
expressed in the laws providing the agro-business with indigenous forced labour. 
Moreover, and because the country was conducted by the needs of the oligarchy, it 
tended to neglect other social groups’ protection and needs. It must be said that since 
the country had been governed by dictators for so long, citizenship rights and its 
political dimension were necessarily limited and controlled. The protection contained 
in the citizenship status was mainly directed to the rights to private property of land 
owners and the political contained in the status of citizenship referred mainly to the 
oligarchy effective power to decide who assumed the control of in the state. 
Accordingly, one may affirm that the state-society relations established within this 
limited condition of citizenship assumed a rather exclusive expression, structured 
along inclusion/exclusion divides of ethnicity and socio-economic status. 
The Democratic Spring and its modernisation project challenged this 
condition and affected these divides deliberately. Three aspects are particularly 
relevant. First, the October’s revolution resulted from a social mobilisation that 
Ubico’s repression could not stop, which meant in practice that the power relations 
which granted the domination of indigenous and peasants at the fincas or pacified the 
ladinos middle class were challenged, and different social sectors were able to force 
a change in the governance paradigms. Second, José Arévalo’s election meant in 
practice that the condition of citizenship acquired a different political meaning, 
coming closer to a vision of citizenship as the right to self-government, and extended 
to groups previously excluded from this political dimension of the concept. The third 
element comprehends the changes introduced with the 1945 Constitution and with 
the policies adopted during the democratic interregnum. As we have discussed in the 
previous section, this Constitution introduced a bundle of political and social rights, 
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including the right to association, which necessarily extended the scope of rights and 
practices inscribed in citizenship. Moreover, and considering the project of land 
reform and the recognition of its social value, the inclusion/exclusion divides 
established through ethnic and social lines were necessarily affected. Indeed, this 
recognition meant, in practice, that fundamental elements of indigenous 
communities’ identities were for the first time inscribed in the laws guiding the 
country. The vision over the subject of citizenship was thus enlarged and elements 
for recognising the multiple realities that constitute the state’s political community 
inscribed. Rights acquired a renewed impetus and citizenship participation gained 
new possibilities with the growth of associations and cooperatives. More than a legal 
status, citizenship became, in this democratic phase, the expression of rights and a 
political condition attached to the exercise of governance. It is important to note that 
we do not aim to “romanticise” the changes that occurred in this period. The divides 
sustaining citizenship remained: they might not be proclaimed by the state but the 
hierarchy and the social exclusion associated were imbedded in the country, affecting 
state-society relations, and the effective enjoyment of rights and participation in the 
political life were necessarily limited. However, this period set in motion important 
events in the country and the impact it created in the inclusion/exclusion divides is 
fundamental to understand the reactions to the authoritarian rule of power that 
followed the democratic interlude.  
In fact, the contestation and resistance to the authoritarian leaders that ruled 
the country after the 1954 coup must be understood in relation to the condition of 
citizenship during the democratic period and the setbacks imposed to it afterwards. 
The coup and the establishment of an authoritarian rule meant that, once again, 
state’s governance was based on clientlism between the interests of the economic 
oligarchy and the army, and on repression and exclusion of other groups. The 
condition of citizenship in the aftermath of the coup was profoundly affected by the 
abolishment of the 1945 Constitution, the rights therein inscribed and the spaces for 
political participation recognised. Likewise, social organisations were forced to 
return to political and social relations patterns previous to the 1944 period. The 
rebellion in some army sectors and the creation of PGT, showed, nonetheless, that 
this return to authoritarian rule was not consensual or uncontested. Indeed, and 
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though state-society relations were formally re-inscribed in strong divisions, the 
power relations established along the ethnic and socio-economic inclusion/exclusion 
divides gained a different expression, and the dominant position of the army and the 
oligarchy in maintaining a legal status of citizenship, emptied of a threatening 
political substance and which excluded the majority of the population, was 
progressively challenged by social forces on the ground.  
 
The condition of citizenship during the armed conflict  
 
The beginning of the armed conflict meant first, and foremost, a 
radicalisation in the power relations and disputes that sustained the 
inclusion/exclusion divides: on one side, the counterinsurgent apparatus, whose 
actions served the interests of the socio-economic oligarchy and whose violent 
actions served to repress and eliminate focus of social resistance and contestation to 
the reinstated order; on the other side, the guerrilla and other social organisations and 
groups who challenged the exclusionary and non-democratic nature of this order and 
departed from it to demand a different political project for the country, more 
inclusive and where state’s strength relied on the legitimacy conferred by its citizens 
and not on the economic oligarchy’s interests. One may ask if this polarisation 
between two sides corresponds to the complexity of the different social groups and 
organisations’ agendas.149 Our purpose is not to convey a sense of unity between the 
different movements but rather to explore precisely how the counterinsurgent 
apparatus departed from this polarisation to create totalising categories where it 
found the rhetorical and legal justification for the violent acts committed.  
The totalising nature of the counterinsurgent apparatus was conveyed in the 
DSN, particularly with the creation of the “internal enemy” figure. The category of 
subversive, inspired by an anticommunist neurosis widely diffused in society, 
allowed the army to direct the violent acts indiscriminately, stretching from the 
repression of popular demonstrations to the direct fight against the guerrilla. Within 
the governance frame of the counterinsurgent state, the category of subversive 
                                                          
149
 For an overview of the political movements that emerged in Guatemala from the 1960s onwards 
please see Brockett (2005). 
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framed all the subjects, groups and movements that could bring the communist threat 
to the country. This category had a two-fold purpose and utility for the 
counterinsurgent governance frame: first, by creating an internal enemy and waving 
the communist threat, the army sought to radicalise the terms of power disputes and 
remove them from the realm of politics to the realm of military action, thus enabling 
the army to claim legitimacy in deploying the violent mechanisms of repression and 
control; second, and with the totalising categorisation of subversive and the 
polarisation it sought, the army framed the social and political movements that 
emerged in the 1960s with different demands into the category of subversive, thus 
de-legitimising the movements’ claims and existence.  
As a consequence of the successful radicalisation of power relation, the 
counterinsurgent apparatus widened its repression instruments, both in terms of 
methods and reach of actions. As mentioned above, it was during the 1960s that 
forced disappearance became a privileged instrument of counterinsurgent actions, 
alongside with torture, or direct confrontations with guerrillas. Together, the violent 
actions carried contributed to effectively disband the social and political 
organisations and to confine FAR to a limited space. In the late 1960s, the 
counterinsurgent effort effectively turned the power relations in favour of those who 
gained with the maintenance of a profoundly exclusionary citizenship condition, 
therefore reinforcing its foundations. 
However, the 1970s brought a rearticulated guerrilla and assisted to a 
remobilisation of social and political forces which again challenged the 
counterinsurgent state and the governance frame deployed by the army and the socio-
economic oligarchy. Two elements are of particular relevance to understand the 
dynamics and consequences of the power relations established with this re-
emergence: first, the governments adopted two development plans in the 1970s 
which not only opened a limited political space for movements to emerged as it also 
revealed the emerging notion that (under)development was related with subversive 
behaviours; second, indigenous peoples gained a new visibility and centrality both to 
the guerrilla and, consequentially, to the counterinsurgent apparatus. This meant that 
if the inclusion/exclusion divides and power relations that affected citizenship in the 
1960s were mainly framed under a classist rhetoric, focused on the socio-economic 
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hierarchies established, the dispute would, from then on, bring the ethnic dimension 
to the forefront. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s assisted to a re-enactment of the polarisation 
that had affected the country in the previous decade but the levels of violence used 
were nevertheless different. To the remobilisation of social and political 
organisations and to the emergence of the two additional guerrilla movements whose 
actions focused on indigenous populated departments, the army replied with an 
upgraded version of its counterinsurgent strategy. As we have seen, to the forced 
disappearance, torture, selective killings and wide repression, the government added 
the scorched earth strategy which was responsible for the majority of the massacres 
carried in the country. In parallel, entirely displaced communities were resettled in 
model villages where surveillance and control were assured by PAC. The extreme 
violence which targeted communities and their relocation in model villages engaged 
with the reality of indigenous communities in a three-fold manner: first, through the 
massacres and killings, the army eliminated the social support of guerrillas while 
creating the necessary fear in communities to prevent and halter their support or 
forms of engagement in political affairs not considered proper; second, with the 
creation of PAC the army was able to enforce a necessary division in communities, 
planting a divisive line between victims and perpetrators and disrupting the existing 
social ties; and third, the poles of development sough to promote an inclusion of 
indigenous’ people in the national project, though this inclusion envisaged foremost 
to dilute their differences and specific cultural and spiritual traits. Through this 
process the counterinsurgent apparatus not only inflicted a military setback on the 
guerrilla and repressed the social and political organisations that emerged in the late 
1970s, as it promoted effective social control mechanisms that overall prevented 
subversive behaviours. The condition of citizenship maintained in this period the 
traits that had characterised it before: limited, highly exclusionary and sustained on 
power relations favourable to those who benefited from the counterinsurgent 
governance.  
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The democratic transition and the changing configurations of power 
This condition would only change with the democratic transition, where the 
state established new governance frames which affected state-society relations and 
social relations more broadly. Though this democratic transition was a controlled 
process the definition of a new Constitution provided a decisive opening in the 
political spaces available to citizenship practices and reframed the content of rights 
as well as its protection. Fonseca refers to the condition of citizenship that emerged 
with the democratic transition as the result of important transformations regarding 
self-perceptions on one’s political condition (Fonseca, 2004). Indeed, the evolution 
of the armed conflict had a decisive influence in the emergence of new mobilisations 
in the democratic transition period. As Fonseca summarises 
se trata de un cambio en la identidad misma de los actores políticos y 
sociales, incluyendo ciertos movimientos sociales que, pasando por 
procesos lentos de aprendizaje político y cultural, seguidos por procesos 
contradictorios de autoconstitución, resultaron irrumpiendo en la escena 
política guatemalteca en los años ochenta con los medios discursivos 
propios del lenguaje de los derechos humanos. Dado el descrédito de lo 
político, la trivialización de la ciudadanía por parte del autoritarismo 
patrimonial y del movimiento revolucionario, así como la prioridad y 
hasta la urgencia tanto existencial como material de lo social antes de los 
años ochenta, el cambio al que estamos aludiendo aquí es de importancia 
extraordinaria (Fonseca, 2004: 35). 
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If the extreme violence was able to eradicate the social and political 
organisations that emerged in the relative political opening of the 1970s, it also 
created the conditions for the emergence of a social mobilisation based on the human 
rights discourse and demands. Faced with the impunity that sustained the 
counterinsurgent actions and with the formal inscription of rights protection in the 
Constitution, albeit the limited application by a state still guided for counterinsurgent 
logic, human rights assumed an important role in establishing new patterns for 
mobilisation and gained relevance as claim-making arguments, able to pressure the 
state, gather international support and reach for international instruments of 
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 Author’s translation: It is a change in the social and political actors’ identity, including certain 
social movements, which, after going through slow processes of political and cultural learning, 
followed by contradictory processes of definition, appeared in the Guatemalan political scene during 
the 1980s with the discursive resources of human rights. Given the discredit of the political, the 
trivialisation of citizenship by a patrimonial authoritarianism and the revolutionary movement, and the 
priority or urgency, both existential and material, of the social before the 1980s, the change we are 
referring here is of extraordinary importance.  
 226 
 
protection. Moreover, the adoption of human rights rhetoric profoundly affected the 
patterns of mobilisation, transcending the traditional forms associated with labour 
and syndicalism and uniting different groups who had been affected by violence. 
Brett affirms that “lo que surgió fue un movimiento con la capacidad para movilizar 
una base masiva en torno a temas con los cuales la población se podía identificar y 
que podían resonar con la “cultura oficial” en la sociedad civil y en el estado” 
(Brett, 2006: 91).
151
  
In this new democratic context the indigenous movement also emerged as a 
prominent actor. It progressively affirmed itself apart from the guerrilla as an 
autonomous actor which was able to develop an agenda where an ethnic component 
was articulated, mainly through an emphasis on rights (Brett, 2006). An international 
favourable context to indigenous demands with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (Convention 169 -
1989) and the 1992 Nobel Prize to Rigoberta Menchú provided the indigenous 
movement with a growing visibility and legal support to establish a claim-making 
process based on indigenous rights. 
Nevertheless, the counterinsurgent apparatus as well as the violent conflict 
still marked the country and, as a consequence, the military strategy of selective 
repression of subversive elements limited and confined the authorised political space. 
Specific targeting of human rights activists demonstrated that the counterinsurgent 
logic that used to de-legitimise the opponents was still in place. In this limited 
democratic version, the spaces of participation and protest were limited and 
circumscribed according to the army’s counterinsurgent perceptions. However, the 
condition of citizenship, even if controlled by a civilian government still highly 
conditioned by the army and the counterinsurgent campaign, improved considerably 
in the country. Though the socio-economic condition and the ethnic identity 
continued to mark inclusion/exclusion divides, the power relations supporting them 
changed in the democratic period and the specific parameters of inclusion/exclusion 
were also affected with the formal inclusion of social and political rights in the 1985 
Constitution. An emergent civil society became in this sense a crucial actor in 
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 Author’s translation: what emerged was a movement with the capacity to mobilise a massive base 
departing from themes with which population could identify and which could resonate with the 
official culture of civil society and state. 
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affecting the condition of citizenship after the democratic transition and the state, 
with its progressive democratic normalisation was forced to recognise that role. In 
part, the political condition of citizenship was rescued in this process, particularly 
due to the recently emerged spaces of participation where the processes of 
governance were being discussed and affected. Additionally, it became clear that the 
articulation with the international realm, by grasping support to local human rights 
demands or by activating international legal instruments, would also become a 
fundamental aspect in affecting power relations in the country and introduce relevant 
changes in the condition of citizenship.  
The affirmation of power by the recently formed organisations and their 
ability to interact and connect to the international scales in order to set forward an 
agenda for change in the country was well conveyed with the creation of ASC and 
the role they had in the peace process even after the UN became mediator. The 
creation of ASC became a fundamental moment in affirming movements and 
organisations’ capacity of to present contributions and alternatives to the project of 
governance deployed by a counterinsurgent state. Formed in 1994, it became an 
alternative site for discussing the peace negotiation agenda and though its members 
did not have the power to establish the agreements content – the ASC was a 
consultative body and its proposals had to be approved by the negotiation parties – 
the organisations sought to draw effective contributions to peace agreements content. 
The ASC was composed by different types of organisations, including forces 
connoted with the guerrilla movement and even counted with the presence of FRG, 
Rios Montt’s party. This means that, within ASC, the power relations between 
organisations pushing for significant reforms and more conservative sectors were 
also present. CACIF abandoned the ASC precisely because it perceived that the 
inclusion of other social forces affected the balance of power within the forum. 
Nevertheless, the ASC was a privileged the space where indigenous and women 
organisations affirmed their role in the formal sphere of public affairs, adopting a 
narrative of rights-claiming sustained on cultural aspects. This posture was crucial to 
define the content of the Acuerdo sobre Indentidad y Derechos de los Pueblos 
Indígenas, an inedited agenda for the cultural identity and rights recognition in 
Guatemala and which contained crucial fundaments to (re)affect the condition of 
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citizenship in the country, putting forward a project of inclusion based on a 
multicultural reality.  
An important consequence of ASC participation in defining the agreement 
content was the support that the different Civil Society Organisations (CSO) received 
from international actors, mainly from funding institutions and NGOs working in the 
country. As Brett notes, 
En los niveles de la sociedad civil y del estado, por lo tanto, se hablaba el 
lenguaje de derechos, tanto de derechos humanos como de derechos 
indígenas. La gente tomaba conciencia de sus derechos, como resultado 
de la actividad acumulativa de los movimientos sociales y de los cambios 
que estaban ocurriendo derivados del retorno a la democracia […] y del 
proceso internacionalizado de paz […]. Así como los movimientos 
sociales estaban hablando el lenguaje de los derechos humanos y de los 
derechos indígenas y enseñando a sus miembros el ejercicio de dichos 
derechos, uno de cuyos focos principales de atención eran las estructuras 
y sistemas legales del estado, también los actores de las elites estatales, 
políticas y civiles se veían afectados por estos discursos (Brett, 2006: 
103). 
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These changes forced a definitive inclusion of the indigenous question in 
peace and national agenda and, moreover, affirmed the indigenous question as a field 
of social struggle in the country, diluted until then in the socio-economic demands. It 
must be stressed that despite the prominence of the indigenous questions and the 
consolidation of the indigenous movement, until the peace agreements signature the 
campesino movement also developed activities which sought to challenge the 
established status and push for an agrarian reform. The occupation of fincas was but 
one way of pursuing this purpose. Moreover it brought to the forefront the gender 
divide which had always been present but only became visible after the role women 
assumed during the conflict and in the democratic transition, as part of the guerrillas 
or as widows fighting against impunity. 
The condition of citizenship in the country was then profoundly affected by 
the democratic transition and the (re)emergence of social organisations movements 
able to articulate their demands through a rights-based narrative, departing from legal 
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 Author’s translation: At the civil society and state’s levels the language of rights, both human 
rights and indigenous rights, was used. People were becoming aware of their rights as a result of the 
cumulative activity of social movements and the changes that were occurring with the return to 
democracy […] and the internationalised peace process. […]. Just as the social movements were using 
human rights and indigenous rights language and teaching their members how to exercise such rights, 
and where the legal state’s structures and systems were their main focus, so were the actors of 
political, social and state elites affected by these discourses.  
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instruments and the political support of a human rights agenda. This shows that from 
the 1980s onwards citizenship was decisively affected in different locations, 
challenging and (re)affecting the traditional relations of forces that marked the 
conflict period, which opposed a powerful counterinsurgent state to dissident sectors 
in the country. Moreover, and though the issue of ethnicity and socio-economic 
condition continued to establish the inclusion/exclusion divides in terms of the 
formal content of citizenship and also in terms of enjoyment and enactment of its 
content, this period launched important discussions and projected a multicultural 
political community to the Guatemalan state, based not on identity but on the values 
of democratic sociability, and respect and inclusion of different groups. The 
condition of citizenship rescued in this period its political dimension and embodied 
the expectations of change brought with peace negotiations.  
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6.2. Peace, statebuilding and the puzzle of citizenship in Guatemala  
Considering the history of the armed conflict and the violence deployed by 
the counterinsurgent state, as well as the path that led to the signature of the 
agreements and the reconfiguration of power relations that marked the negotiation 
period, the depth and extent of the peace agreements were considered as a decisive 
step towards a changed governance frame and, consequentially, the prospects for 
(re)affecting the condition of citizenship seemed promising. This optimism and 
expectations towards the changes promised were shared, for different reasons, by 
different sectors of Guatemalan society and also by the international actors engaged 
in the process. However, and as we have seen, the implementation phase challenged 
this initial optimism and the 1999 referendum and elections results created a puzzle 
hard to solve and which has only grown in complexity throughout the years.  
The counterinsurgent state and its domination were perceived as the main 
explanation for the citizens’ limited rights and practices. As a consequence, it was 
expected that the changes promoted by the democratic transition and peace 
agreements would translate into significant differences, particularly in citizens’ 
participation in formal politics. The massive abstention and the victory of the No in 
the referendum showed, however, that such transformation had not materialised and, 
for the worst, the majority of those who decided to engage in formal politics was 
against a project of governance compromised with reconfiguring citizenship 
condition. The referendum was of particular importance to recreate the social 
contract between state and society and thus to define a new citizenship condition, 
based on multicultural values and a new role for the state. The victory of the No 
meant, in practice, a denial of citizenship in these terms regarding not only the vision 
of the citizenship subjects and the consequent relation established between them, but 
also in terms of the specific rights and practices therein inscribed. Furthermore, the 
results of the 1999 election, with the stunning victory of FRG, demonstrated a 
support for mano dura slogan, too close of the political reasoning of the armed 
conflict and which apparently remained attractive in formal peace times.  
This means that despite the end of the conflict and state’s reforms, the 
condition of citizenship maintained traits from the armed conflict period while it had 
to co-exist with the principles of democratic sociability. Torres Rivas and Rodas 
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affirm that citizenship in Guatemala is, in some degree, a schizophrenic condition, 
divided between democratic and authoritarian attitudes that have co-existed, and is 
often reduced to voting (Torres-Rivas and Rodas, 2007). This limitation of one’s 
political activity to voting is visible in the information available on citizens’ 
participation in social organisations which shows that the majority of citizens 
chooses non-political organisations and the levels of trust are also higher in these 
type of organisations, particularly the church (ASIES, 2012a). The electoral results 
furthermore, reveal patterns that are also illustrative of this remaining disconnection 
between citizens and politics in the country. Even though we can detect a positive 
trend in the level of abstention, if we consider solely the participation of citizens in 
elections, there are relevant conclusions that can be drawn from it, namely the 
limited number of indigenous elected member of congress or the number of women. 
In the 2011 elections, only 21 out of 158 elected members were indigenous and only 
20 were women (ASIES, 2012b). The data show us that despite the consolidation of 
democratic practices and the changes which have occurred in the country, these 
groups still have a limited representation at the state’s highest representative 
institution and which echoes in other institutions and also in the government team 
(Interviewee 8). 
Necessarily the inability to carry a reinvention of state’s institutions as it 
was inscribed in the peace agreements is crucial to understand the scope of the 
transformations in state-society relations and the condition of citizenship established. 
An interviewee close to an international institution in the country explained us that 
despite the need to create a strong state in the country, with the fiscal capacity to 
perform its functions and to seriously invest in education and health, the perception 
of the existing limits creates a circular argument that in fact prevents a serious 
discussion and engagement with the task: the state needs a different fiscal policy to 
strengthen its institutions and actions but the different social sectors often use the 
fragility argument to block the reforms. This circular argumentation blocks changes 
and, the interviewee affirmed, is built on the lack of political willingness by different 
social sectors to effectively produce changes (Interviewee 10). Other interviewee, 
who also develops work within an international institution, added to this lack of 
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capacity and political will, the political dynamics that in fact demonstrate volatility 
and affect governance 
It is correct to think of Guatemala as a fragile state, and this is not just 
related with the influence of the Narco, which has in fact infiltrated all 
state’s institutions, particularly the justice system. But...well...you know. 
The institutions are weak; the ministers change all the time. From the 
original government team [Presidency of Alvaro Colom] there are only 
two original ministers left. There is not a public service, there is no 
stability and functions may change all the time. [...] Besides, there is also 
the question of fiscal reform without which it is impossible to implement 
the reforms. There is not a national development plan or even one aiming 
to reduce poverty. Now, the UNE had a government plan. In fact I think 
they defined a plan until 2023...but well, you see...one thing is a plan 
another one is its implementation. Here they [the political class and 
parties] are very good in writing plans or putting on paper policies and 
strategies that will never be implemented. When such plans exist, they 
tend to be diluted into one-year operational programmes, because, in 
practice it’s impossible to project things for more than a year, precisely 
because there is no budgetary projection able to sustain them (Interviewee 
11). 
Though some interviewees recognised a change in state-society relations, 
they posited that this change is limited and citizens continue to see the state with 
strong suspicion (Interviewee 9, ; Interviewee 15). An interviewee referred how the 
loss of much of the reform agenda inscribed in the agreements created a 
disappointment in the country, first because the changes did not match people’s 
expectations, and second, because the democratic controlling mechanisms did not 
necessarily lead to political transformation. According to the interviewee the 
question which often emerged from the limited reforms was: “Gobernabilidad para 
quien?” (Interviewee 4). 153  
It seems then that state’s trajectory of fragility hindered the transformation 
of state-society relations in the Guatemala and citizens’ engagement with politics 
remains circumscribed to particular practices and social groups. Thus, and even 
though the premises sustaining power relations were affected – either solely in form 
or through limited reforms – this did not translate into the expected changes and the 
inclusion/exclusion divides in the country, based on ethnic, gender and socio-
economic condition remain valid. Nevertheless, and even though this perception of 
the limited state’s reform and its fragility may explain a sense of disenchantment 
with politics after peace agreements and, to some extent, the limited transformation 
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 Author’s translation: Governance for whom? 
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of state-society relations, the testimonies collected during the fieldwork periods force 
us to engage and discuss the continuities and changes with the armed conflict period 
that cannot be confined to state transformation.  
 
The heavy heritage of violence, impunity and division 
Throughout the interviews conducted, the permanence of violence as the 
social matrix of social and interpersonal relations was considered a clear challenge to 
citizenship, in what concerns rights and practices, and an heritage of the armed 
conflict. Necessarily, this was perceived as being closely related with state’s 
incapacity to enforce law and the activity of organised crime in the country. 
However, there are other aspects that demand our attention, specifically violence 
symbolic dimension and consequences. Though the levels of violence in the country 
are important, the phenomena cannot be reduced to the cruelty of numbers and must 
be considered in the social meaning and implications it carries. The permanence of 
violence and its growing visibility and brutality represent a pattern of power exercise 
inherited from the conflict phase though it has been transfigured: the actors are not 
necessarily the same, but the purpose or logic behind it remains. The use of violence, 
both as a mechanism of organised crime or as resource to settle social conflicts, is 
foremost a radical expression of power relations, this is, violent actions become the 
ultimate expression of affirming one’s power. More important, this continued 
radicalisation is the expression of a society whose relations remain highly polarised 
(Interviewee 4).  
This ultimately creates a sense of permanent insecurity and uncertainty that 
only reinforces the role of violent actions as the expression of one’s own 
empowerment, as the dual nature of lynching seems to suggest. The beginning of my 
second period of fieldwork coincided with the discovery of the bodies in El Péten, 
after a massacre apparently related to drug trafficking disputes. Coincidently, a 
worker of a finca near to the one where the massacre occurred was staying in my 
hotel only days after the event. Some other guests and I were discussing the 
particularly violent contours of the massacre when he intervened and affirmed that 
the situation was getting out of control and the workers from the area were taking 
measures to assure security at the fincas. He said this while reaching for the revolver 
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on his waist. This symbolic act stroke me at the moment but it reminded me precisely 
that people deal with violence and its ostensive visibility on a daily basis which only 
reinforces their uncertainty and perception of the impunity that grasses in the 
country.  
Impunity is, in fact, closely related with the permanence of violence and it is 
a second aspect that one needs to consider when discussing the continuities between 
peace and conflict. We have mentioned how impunity has been particularly relevant 
to discredit the state and deepen its trajectory of fragility. Nevertheless it is crucial to 
understand how the transfiguration of violence is related with the social impact of an 
impunity continuum. In an interview with a civil society actor whose work is related 
to the justice system reform and fight against impunity I was told that  
Cuando tienes una sociedad que no tiene memoria, que solo mira al 
presente, entonces siempre estamos entrando o cayendo en los mismos 
errores del pasado. Esto olvido ha sido aprendido y asimilado. Te dicen 
“van ustedes a abrir las heridas!”. Pero…es que no nos hemos curado de 
las heridas! Sea, tenemos que volver a estas heridas para curarlas y 
entonces hacer algo. Somos un país que se quedó con su tejido social 
destrozado. No tuvimos un proceso de salud mental para que la gente 
pueda asimilar lo que sucedió y después si ver para delante. Pero después 
de pasarnos por un proceso de sanación. Pero si no se pasa por eso como 
vas a pedir tú a alguien que haga algo hacia el futuro si tienen dentro 
cosas que ni siquiera han podido expresar. Hay gente que nunca dijo nada 
y se queda con eso ahí y le daña, y le daña, y le daña. Tenemos una 
cantidad de cosas adentro y por eso hoy somos una sociedad en realidad 
bastante enferma y tan enferma que tú lo ves en los niveles de violencia 
que tenemos. Estamos en un por medio de 16 o 17 personas muertas 
violentamente al día. Y no sólo es la cantidad sino la forma. Sea, llegar a 
la mutilación y esa saña con que aparecen los cuerpos…lo único que te 
dice a ti es que es una sociedad enferma y que ahí está sacando lo que 
bien nunca se trabajó, nunca se curó y eso es lo que tenemos ahora 
(Interviewee 9). 
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 Author’s translation: When you have a society with no memory, focused on the present, then we 
are always doing the same mistakes of the past. This process of forgetting has been learned and 
assimilated. They tell you “You are going to open wounds!”. But...the fact is that we have never 
healed. I mean, we need to go back to these wounds to heal them and only after that can we do 
something. We are a country with a torn society. We did not have a mental rehabilitation programme 
to enable people to talk about what happened and move on after. But only after we have healed. If you 
do not go through that how can you ask anyone to do something about the future if they have things 
inside which they could not express? There are people who never said anything and that just hurts, and 
hurts. We have plenty of things inside us and that is why we are, in reality a sick society, so sick that 
you see that in the levels of violence we have. We have 16 to 17 violent homicides a day. And the 
question is not just the numbers but also the method. I mean, using mutilation and the cruelty on how 
they dispose the bodies...the only thing this tells you is that this is a sick society and we are just 
harvesting what we never solved, never healed, and that is what we have now.  
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This testimony tackles the question of impunity, but it deals foremost with 
its relation with the memory of the armed conflict and the absence of a process of 
transitional justice and reconciliation, able to force society to deal and question the 
violent acts that occurred, in order to punish those responsible but foremost to rescue 
social relations from the normalising narrative of violent acts. This means that 
tackling impunity demands a revisit to the violent past of Guatemala which is a 
journey often unauthorised or publically reproved.   
The perception of the permanence of violence and its association with the 
impunity continuum has been particularly relevant in what concerns populations’ 
continued association between political action and violent consequences. An 
interviewee working with a NGO in rural areas mentioned that 
La gente no tiene buena valoración de los políticos ni de los partidos y 
incluso gente que estaba de alguna forma involucrada con organizaciones 
políticas se apartó de eso. Pero más, la gente sigue con miedo y así tienes 
que comprender algunas cosas que te parecen incongruentes. Hay una 
manipulación y desinformación que permite que gente del ejército 
consiga la victoria en elecciones, mismo en El Quiché, qué como sabes 
fue la parte del país más afectada por la violencia durante la guerra. 
(Interviewee 6). 
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I found this fear and association in other testimonies, particularly in what 
concerns the relation between the election period and the occurrence of violent 
episodes (Interviewee 16). Nevertheless, it is important to note that this association 
may cause two distinct dynamics: either individuals limit their political action and 
engagement, or they simply choose not to engage at all in the formal political sphere. 
This last possibility is particularly important and it must be distinguished from the 
image of the passive citizen, who enjoys rights but for whom the participation 
component is not important. The choice of not engaging in politics departs from the 
evaluation individuals do of this articulation between violence, impunity and politics. 
An interviewee expressed this duality that often marks the political reflection and 
condition of Guatemalan citizens when we discussed the wave of violence in the 
country.  
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 Author’s translation: The people do not have a good impression of the politicians or the political 
parties and even the people who were in some way involved with political organisations distanced 
themselves. But more, people are still afraid and that helps us to understand some things that appear 
inconsistent. There is a manipulation and disinformation that allows former military to win elections, 
even in El Quiché, which, as you know, was the most affected region by violence.  
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La violencia aquí es algo terrible. Vienes a trabajar y en verdad es que 
puedes morir en el camino. Y esto va a empeorar. Las elecciones están ya 
muy cerca y no sé si te das cuenta, pero en Guatemala las elecciones 
siempre traen más violencia. Por eso mucha gente tiene miedo de salir a 
votar. Uno no sabe el resultado de ese voto. Sea, no sabes si es algo que te 
va a traer problemas, y por eso muchas veces decides que es mejor que te 
quedes en tu casa (Interviewee 16). 
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This reasoning shows only one expression of depoliticisation in the country 
which was identified by a interviewee that worked in the country with MINUGUA 
(Interviewee 12). However this concept deserves some reflection. Overall, it refers to 
the effective removal of one’s political agency in the formal sphere of democratic 
context but in this case it is deeply rooted in the depoliticisation strategy deployed by 
the counterinsurgent state during the armed conflict with the specific purpose of 
discrediting dissent and defining non-political instruments to engage with opponents. 
This depoliticisation trend can be found in the country in relation to specific events 
and actors despite the counterinsurgent state dismantling. Usually oppositions are 
articulated differently, according to the purpose of discrediting opponent’s voices. 
This game of opposition and its transition from armed conflict to formal peace was 
identified by an interviewee who lived in Guatemala during the armed conflict and 
represented the state abroad.  
Durante el conflicto buscaban una división, qué aunque tenía un recorte 
ideológico entre comunistas y no comunistas, nos era presentado como 
una división entre los buenos y los malos. Encima de esta división 
tuvimos la capacidad de negociar el término del conflicto. Pero creo que 
la sociedad, mismo ahora en tiempos de paz, sigue permeando una 
división y esto sigue vigente (Interviewee 13).  
This division and opposition have been particularly evident in different 
moments: they were waved during the 1999 referendum campaign and have recently 
been waved again to discredit those who somehow took part in the process of 
bringing Rios Montt to justice for the crime of genocide in the Ixil areas. The 
depoliticisation which results from the perception of violence-impunity-politics is 
also a heritage from the armed conflict period where populations had the idea that 
being outside “political affairs” could mean “staying out of trouble”.  
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 Violence is something terrible here. You come to work and the truth is that you can die in your 
way. And this is about to get worse, Elections are getting closer and, I do not know if you are aware, 
but in Guatemalan elections always bring more violence. That is why many people do not vote. We do 
not know what will be the consequence of voting. I mean, you do not know if that is something that 
will bring you troubles and that is why you decided that is better to stay home.  
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Besides state’s absence or political parties’ paternalism and clientelism, two 
other aspects are equally important in fuelling these processes. The first one is 
related with the emergence of new actors and the informal relations and frames of 
governance they establish, often through violent affirmation, which necessarily affect 
the political relations in the country. Here we do not only refer to how organised 
crime has permeated the institutions of the state as suggested by some of our 
interviewees (Interviewee 6, ; Interviewee 11) but foremost to the alternative and 
informal development frame offered by narco, for instance (Interviewee 4). 
Moreover, organised crime or the maras act as alternative agents of governance in 
these spaces, affecting state-society relations either by assuming governance in their 
area of action or by challenging the state. The possible impacts of these actors in 
creating parallel and informal frames of governance have been discussed by Holston 
in the case of disjunctive democracies. However, these impacts are also similar to the 
dynamics present in post-armed conflict spaces (Holston, 2009). Overall, these actors 
reinforce the importance of considering the informal spaces as alternative sites of 
governance, which may indeed create a depoliticisation of the self in the formal 
sphere. 
The second aspect refers to the fragmentation tendency of civil society in 
Guatemala (Kurtenbach, 2010). This is mentioned by the majority of the 
interviewees when referring to citizenship participation in institutions and processes 
of governance in the country. It was often pointed that after the signature of the 
peace agreements, civil society actors multiplied in the country with an agenda very 
much guided by international funding priorities while they simultaneously dispersed 
around specific interests. This fragmentation weakened the role of civil society as the 
site where citizenship is (re)enacted and re(affected) (Interviewee 6).  
En los últimos años hube un cambio en la sociedad civil. La demanda de 
la sociedad civil antes de los acuerdos era contundente. Había mucha 
gallardía, mucha valentía de la parte de la sociedad civil. Cuando se 
firmaron los acuerdos y hubo mucho apoyo al Estado y a las 
organizaciones de la sociedad civil. […] Si hicieron capacitaciones, 
talleres de los acuerdos de paz y fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil. Pero 
desde entonces, se perdió algo. La gente ahora se va a las cabeceras 
departamentales hacer las capacitaciones pero no se va a las comunidades. 
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[…]. Claro que ahora hay otras demandas pero el perfil, la demanda, es 
baja (Interviewee 8). 
157
 
Finally, one must also consider how the ethnic question transited from the 
armed conflict. We have seen that the number of indigenous Congress members is 
still limited. This representation is considered by some interviewees as a 
demonstration of the ethnic division that affects the country. A worker of the UN 
system noted how racism is still a strong feature of Guatemalan society (Interviewee 
3) while others clearly emphasised how the indigenous communities remain 
excluded, with limited political participation (Interviewee 8, ; Interviewee 11). An 
interviewee expressed how this ethnic division is perceived as overcoming other 
distinctions when it comes to formal politics 
Los partidos en Guatemala son de derecha, ultra-derecha, izquierda o 
centro-izquierda. Para ellos, y también para el estado de Guatemala y el 
poder económico el indígena puede ser un empresario con muchos éxitos, 
puede tener fábricas de todo, pero nunca se va a reconocer como alguien 
de derecha. Siendo indígena siempre lo van a catalogar como siendo de 
izquierda (Interviewee 8). 
158
 
It is important to note, nevertheless that in the group of indigenous elected 
representatives in the Congress, different political parties are represented, including 
the presidential party. This means that political parties are alert to the need of 
bringing indigenous elements to their ranks to assure a broad support, particularly in 
indigenous populated departments. Nevertheless, it is still possible to find in the 
country more or less nuanced demonstrations of the prejudice against indigenous 
communities. An interviewee ended the reflection on the subject of violence stating 
“Yo siempre creí que cuando los indígenas bajasen de la montaña nos iban a matar. 
Y ahí está” (Interviewee 14).159 This statement illustrates how a depreciative 
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 Author’s translation: In the last years there was a change in civil society. Civil society’s demands 
before the agreements were strong. There was a lot of braveness and courage in civil society. When 
the agreements were signed, there was plenty of support to the state and civil society. Several 
capacitation sessions and workshops on peace agreements and civil society strengthening were 
organised. But since then something was lost. People now go to the departments’ districts but they 
will not go to the communities. Of course there are other demands now but demands profile is low.  
158
 Author’s translation: Political parties in Guatemala are right-wing, far right, left wing or centre-
left. To them, and to the state of Guatemala and the economic power also, an indigenous person may 
be a successful business men, have factories of all kinds, but he will never be recognised as right-
wing. Being indigenous will always be considered left-wing. 
159
 Author’s translation: I always said that when the indigenous came down the mountain they would 
kill us- Well, there you have it.  
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discourse on the indigenous communities and the violent behaviour is a dimension of 
the ethnic division in the country.  
 
The doors that peace opened 
Despite the continuities we have identified, it is crucial to note that there are 
important changes in the country which were recognised by our interviewees despite 
the state’s trajectory of fragility. Amidst the complexity and the challenges that affect 
the country, trying to assess this has not always been an easy task. But if one 
considers carefully the history of the armed conflict and how the power relations 
along the ethic and socio-economic divides have usually meant an oppressive and 
dominative relation between those able to enjoy the benefits of citizenship and those 
who feel neglected and excluded from its content, the democratic transition first, and 
the peace agreements after, brought important changes. An interviewee summarised 
the importance of these changes in the following statement 
Nosotros, los que vivimos en los años 80 de represión muy fuerte, que 
vimos morir a nuestros compañeros, a nuestros maestros, que 
escuchábamos en la capital de la muerte de los campesinos en el altiplano, 
qué vimos la quema de la embajada de España cuando la gente buscaba a 
sus derechos y que les escuchasen, tenemos que tener claro los cambios 
que se han logrado. […] Nosotros éramos universitarios, no teníamos 
derecho a pensar o a disentir, se instauró entre nosotros la cultura del 
silencio… uno tenía miedo de hablar porque se hablaba y decía lo que no 
era correcto entonces uno era de los malos, uno podía ser tomado por 
comunista y como a los comunistas había que desaparecerlos entonces 
uno tenía riesgo para su propia vida. Entonces…esta situación los jóvenes 
no la entienden porque ahora hablamos, discutimos y disentimos. Eso 
derecho a la palabra, tan importante, a nosotros nos costó muchos 
muertos. Una de las cosas más importantes que logramos con los 
Acuerdos fue precisamente eso, darle de nuevo la palabra a la población, 
darle voz a los indígenas qué hasta eso punto no se consideraban. Hemos 
rescatado las instituciones y eso es un legado importante donde debemos 
seguir construyendo la paz (Interviewee 13).
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160
 Author’s translation: We, who lived in the 1980s with a strong repression, who saw our friends and 
teachers die, who heard in the capital about the deaths of the peasants in the highlands, who saw the 
burning of the Spanish Embassy when all that people were demanding were their rights, we have the 
changes we have conquered very clear in our minds. We were university students and we had no right 
to think or to dissent, we created a culture of silence…we were afraid to talk because if we said 
something incorrect we were one of the bad guys, we could be considered communists and since the 
communists were supposed to disappear, there was a risk to our lives. So…this situation is not 
understood by young people because now we talk, we discuss and we dissent. This right to talk, so 
important, has cost us many deaths. One of the most important things in the Agreements was precisely 
this, give back the population their right to talk, give voice to the indigenous that were not considered 
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From these words, it is possible to understand that even though the reforms 
projected in the peace agreements did not fully materialised, there are however 
important gains that cannot be overlooked and the agreements remain an important 
reference in the country, even after 16 years. The first aspect which is noteworthy is 
how the agreements created important conditions for an effective enjoyment of civil 
and political rights. Until the 1985 Constitution the recognition of these rights, were 
highly restricted by the counterinsurgent state, particularly the political rights. After 
the Constitution, the narrative of rights protection was recovered and the political 
dimension of citizenship was formally rescued. However, and because the armed 
conflict persisted and the counterinsurgent state was still active even if more discrete, 
these rights, normally assured in a democratic society were still perceived as very 
fragile. The peace agreements and the dismantling process of the counterinsurgency 
established in their content was a crucial step to normalise these rights in Guatemalan 
society. The right to talk and dissent mentioned above constitutes, in fact, an 
important and relevant victory, even if today there are other elements that constrain 
this, as we have seen above. Moreover, the agreements introduced a rights agenda 
that echoed local demands and articulated them with international instruments of 
rights protection. Even if not all the rights inscribed in the agreement survived the 
1999 referendum results, they remain as a crucial reference in the political 
interactions in the country, in the initiatives that target legislative changes, and in the 
claim-making initiatives both at the national and international level. 
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The rights recognised to indigenous communities became an important basis 
for social demonstrations in the country and international legal actions against the 
state of Guatemala based on the disrespect of these rights (Davis and Warner, 2007). 
This is particularly evident in what concerns the indigenous rights to be heard and to 
be part in the development process in the country, a disposition contained in the 
peace agreements, but which the indigenous organisations find to be too often 
neglected. These dispositions and recognition of the indigenous people’s rights to 
affect the country’s development have sustained, on several occasions, indigenous 
                                                                                                                                                                    
until then. We have rescued the institutions and that is an important legacy on which we must 
continue building peace. 
161
 Sieder exposes this articulation when she explores the legal globalisation and how the different 
processes that mark it – globalisation from above and from below – have reshaped legal spaces in the 
country (Sieder, 2006).  
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demands against the mining sector in the country. The most recent example is 
unfolding while we finish this work. During 2013, thousands of indigenous peasants 
came out in the interior of the country protesting against the mining projects 
perceived as a threat to la Madre Tierra. As a response, and attempting to protect the 
mining projects, perceived as a strategic economic sector which has its activity now 
framed in the Mining Law approved in the Congress, President Pérez Molina has 
used the state of siege with the argument of re-establishing the rule of law. Despite 
the presence of the military in the departments of Jalapa and Santa Rosa in the 
southeast of the country, the local populations continued to protest, both against the 
mining project and the militarisation of the dispute, and for the respect of the local 
communities’ rights. In addition to these protests, in the early days of September, the 
organisation Consejo de Pueblos Indígenas de Guatemala, has presented a case 
against the state in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights following the Mining 
Law approval. The organisation sustains that the accusation is based on the violation 
of indigenous communities’ political rights to participate and consent, regarding 
projects that directly affect indigenous territories, and expresses, foremost, a political 
position (El Periódico, 2013a). 
This connection between the rights contained in the peace agreements and 
the mobilisation and claim-making, both at the state and international level have 
three main implications in what concerns citizenship. First, rights became not only 
the formal content of citizenship but also a site where citizenship is contested and 
(re)defined and where groups once excluded challenge the existing 
inclusion/exclusion divides, thus affirming the political condition of citizenship and 
confirming the power potential of rights. Second, the example we have just provided 
testifies how individuals tend to articulate their demands in different spaces and 
across scales, transcending the state realm to guarantee the respect of those rights. 
This has been the case with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights but has also 
been present in the transnational connection established with different indigenous 
organisations. And finally, the inscription of these rights in the peace agreements 
resulted from a mobilisation dynamic that started after the transition to democracy in 
1985 but has grown since the peace agreements, particularly in the case of 
indigenous involvement in the public space in order to affect governance. This 
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mobilisation movement was crucial to the appearance of, Movimiento Político 
WINAQ. An interviewee close to the party told us that the search for changes had to 
pass necessarily by an engagement in the formal political sphere through a political 
party able to promote a (re)politicisation from below, and to develop and implement 
an inclusive governance project where multicultural respect and acceptance produces 
a plural state, supportive of ethnic and gender equality (Interviewee 8).  
Women’s role in politics is also an important example of how peace 
agreements content addressed a gender inclusion/exclusion in the country, which was 
always present but only recently gained visibility, and set the terms for future 
mobilisation and demands. It is important to note that the category of women does 
not mean that the experience of exclusion is necessarily equal and, as Lister (1998) 
notes, one must account on how other inclusion/exclusion divides crosscut the 
gender aspect. In Guatemala, the gender issue has led to a reflection on the modes of 
exclusion and consequentially, the citizenship claimed is necessarily a model where 
the gender and ethnic dimension are inextricably linked and addressed (Guzmán 
Mendoza, 2004; López Mejía, 2004).  
The process of claim-making based on rights evidences then, that despite 
the defeat of the liberal multicultural project in the referendum, the redefinition of 
who is the subject of citizenship is a central aspect in the political interactions in the 
country. In fact, and though the results of the referendum were discouraging in some 
degree they opened an important political space to affirm a plural and multicultural 
view of the citizenship subject in the country. The definition of this subject entails a 
recognition of difference as a path to inclusive politics, based on individuals and 
groups’ equal dignity that form the political community of Guatemala, a territory 
shared by many but a state of only a few.  
Considering these elements together, it is possible to infer that the peace 
agreements created an opportunity to rescue the political condition of citizenship, 
bringing new political subjects to the public space. This change means in practice, 
that though inclusion/exclusion divides persist along ethnic, socio-economic and 
gender, the power relations which sustain them have been marked by the 
(re)emergence of actors politically compromised with their transfiguration and who 
have acted and mobilised support (political or legal) in different spaces and scales to 
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achieve their purpose. It is precisely here, in the disagreement and in the (re)affection 
of these divides that the question of citizenship has reencountered its political 
condition, despite the continuities with the armed conflict that still permeate society 
and limit the exercise and extent of this political condition.  
Bearing in mind what we have exposed, one might be inclined to acquiesce 
with the words of Torres-Rivas and Rodas on the apparent contradiction that marks 
the condition of citizenship in the country. Nevertheless, and considering that 
citizenship results from power relations, one might reinterpret these contradictions 
precisely as resulting of the present power balances that interact in the definition of 
citizenship, and thus subject to future change. If this will in fact happen or how it 
will be achieved is however an open question. During the last year two dynamics, 
closely related and yet contradictory, provided an insight on these power relations. 
On one hand, President Pérez Molina closed the department of Archivos para la Paz, 
a project established by Álvaro Colom with the purpose of rescuing and 
reconstructing the historical memory of the armed conflict and which departed from 
the military archives to produce and diffuse knowledge on the facts that occurred 
(Interviewee 17). This demonstrated a clear sign that looking at the past, and 
unfolding the truth behind the forced disappearances or massacres for instance, 
including those who perpetrated and who ordered, is not considered a priority for 
projecting a different future for the country. On the other hand, the trial of Rios 
Montt for genocide, and the convictions of former military and policemen for forced 
disappearances show the compromise of social sectors and organisations with 
memory and justice and how they are related with the fight against impunity. The 
outcome of the interaction between these contradictory dynamics is not certain. 
However, and what is relevant for our analysis is how they illustrate the power 
dynamics that affect the country and testify the political condition.  
 
The international actors’ role 
As we have seen, the international compromise in Guatemala has evolved 
according to the country’s perceived trajectory of fragility. As a consequence, the 
contours of this engagement reflected the evolving understanding of the causes and 
consequences of fragility and most of all the answer which needed to be deployed. 
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Notwithstanding the liberal reference on which post-armed conflict statebuilding is 
inscribed, the international engagement with the task reflects the general pattern of 
choosing eminently technical approaches to deal with fragility that often materialise 
in the creation of state’s capacity to perform its role. Within this approach state-
society relations are important but they are mainly dependent on state’s performance.  
In Guatemala this evolution has been expressed in justice system reform, 
with a particular emphasis on the impunity as an obstacle to recreate state-society 
relations. The creation of CICIG and the international support (both political and 
financial) it has gathered either through the Peacebuilding Fund or projects that seek 
to complement the activity the Commission is carrying, show us that state’s fragility 
is understood as a crucial obstacle to the fulfilment of its functions as well as the role 
it is expected to assume in creating peace. The international approach through CICIG 
is so far unique: it is focused on a specific dimension and it has a particularly 
technical mandate to investigate and capacitate local teams to perform such tasks. 
This specificity, as well as the coordination of efforts by the different donors and the 
involvement of civil society actors engaged with the defence of human rights 
promotes the idea that CICIG is somehow an “example of good practice in 
international state-building”, where coordination potentiates the effectiveness of the 
reforms promoted, “vested with an important degree of domestic ownership and 
legitimacy”, while its “institutional reform and capacity-building tasks aim at 
overcoming the problem of temporarily substituting local capacity instead of 
building it in sustainable ways contributing to enhanced accountability and 
legitimacy” (Schünemann, 2010: 17). To this optimistic account of what CICIG 
represents in terms of post-armed conflict statebuilding opposes a more pessimistic 
account of the changes it can effectively promote in Guatemala. One interviewee 
who worked close to MINUGUA told us that CICIG was unlikely to accomplish any 
significant change, because international actors cannot impose change on spaces of 
intervention when the local elites are not compromised with that purpose 
(Interviewee 12).  
Our purpose however is focused more on the impact CICIG may have on 
state-society relations and in social relations more broadly. Since CICIG will remain 
in Guatemala until 2015, at least, any type of evaluation is necessarily circumscribed 
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and incomplete. Nevertheless, there are important remarks that can be inferred from 
the testimonies collected and which can be divided in (1) what concerns the 
accomplishment of its mandate; (2) how it has affected state-society relations; and 
(3) how it affects the condition of citizenship in the country. 
Concerning the first, it is possible to identify an overall positive account of 
what have been CICIG actions regarding its fight against impunity and the 
capacitation of local authorities. An interviewee states that  
Well, CICIG has not had an easy life and has faced several obstacles 
within the justice sector. Nonetheless it was able to implement an 
investigation method in the institutions and force an acceptance of 
scientific proof which was something completely absent. But more 
important, it closed some high profile processes that without CICIG 
would have never reached a court room (Interviewee 11). 
Another interviewee mentioned that 
CICIG fue una gran vitoria. Yo creo que de forma general nosotros 
seguimos con un entendimiento positivo sobre lo que ha logrado hacer. Si 
no estuvieran ellos estaríamos todavía peor porque los casos que se han 
llevado a la justicia…bien, jamás hubiéramos pensad...por ejemplo, que 
¡un ex-presidente estuviera en juicio! ¡Jamás! O ministros. Es un gran 
paso haber llevado a la justicia gente que nunca se les había tocado. Este 
papel...bien, podría ser más, pero ellos tienen que moverse en un espacio 
nubloso de lo políticamente correcto (Interviewee 9).
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Thus, in what concerns CICIG mandate, and in the large majority of the 
testimonies gathered, what has been accomplished so far deserves recognition. 
Foremost the vision of CICIG as an equidistant actor, in the sense that it is not 
tainted with corruption and is the most adequate actor to lead the justice reform is 
also mentioned (Interviewee 15). This explains why we found no particular problem 
with the question of local ownership of the process, even if CICIG evidently 
represents an ownership promotion through capacitation. However, and due to state-
society relations and the negative perception of many citizens towards the state, this 
capacitation is welcomed and perceived as a state of exception in the history of the 
judicial system in the country.  
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 Author’s translation: CICIG was a huge victory. I think that generally we continue to have a 
positive perception about what was accomplished. If they were not here we would be worse because 
the cases which were judged...well we had never thought...for instance, that an ex-president would 
face a judge! Never! Or ministers! Taking people who had never been touched to justice was a big 
step...that role...well, they could do more but they move in a grey space of the politically correct.  
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Hence, the question of the impact CICIG may have on state-society 
relations is nevertheless a different discussion, particularly related with this 
equidistant role CICIG is expected to fulfil. The Commission embodies the 
international expectations towards the role statebuilding has in reinventing state-
society relations by promoting a moment of rupture with the conflict period. It 
departs from the view that these relations, as well as the condition of citizenship that 
frames them, rest on state capacity to perform its functions and therefore, 
strengthening the state is a necessary pre-condition for a full citizenship to emerge. 
We have also stated that by adopting such a consequent view on citizenship, 
statebuilding actions tend to subvert the mutual constitutive relation between state 
and citizens that liberal politics have framed in the social contract and ultimately 
present a suspended view of citizenship, somehow waiting for a viable state to be in 
place. Nevertheless, and as we have seen above, the Guatemalan case shows that the 
citizenship condition puzzle after the signature of peace is built not only of the 
statebuilding processes but also of challenging continuities with the armed conflict 
period as well as new possibilities for political action. Accordingly, it seems that the 
technical approach to states rehabilitation is but one of the elements that interact in 
the redefinition of state-society relations and therefore, international actors’ attempt 
to affect it is necessarily incomplete. Moreover, the puzzle of citizenship in 
Guatemala demonstrates how, against depoliticising narratives, the condition of 
citizenship expresses power relations that international actors have too often 
dismissed. Nevertheless, and despite the technical trait of its actions and their 
inability to deal with the continuities of the armed conflict, CICIG ultimately affects 
the condition of citizenship, particularly because by tackling impunity in the country 
it is affecting one of main pillars of the power relations. This process reinforces the 
possibility of democratic demands and legal claim-making which, as we have seen, 
have been crucial in (re)affecting citizenship elements in the country.  
That said, it is important to note, that not all the actions supported by 
international actors in the country affect power relations towards a more inclusive 
condition of citizenship. The State’s socio-economic role inscribed in the peace 
agreements with the blessing of the different international actors that supported the 
process is consonant with the needs and demands of a globalised economy, which is 
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highly unlikely to deploy an effective answer to the socio-economic demands of 
indigenous people, whose cosmovision is in utter contrast with the economic model 
based on extractive activities and unsustainable environmental practices. 
Accordingly, it must be recognised that the multiculturalism supported in the peace 
agreements was necessarily conditioned to a cultural sphere, where the recognition of 
cultural plurality and the rights sustaining it do not menace the economic model. This 
resembles in some degree Kymlicka’s multicultural proposal, where the cultural 
rights are recognised but in a non-challenging condition to the liberal dominant form 
of life. Hale has named it as “neo-liberal multiculturalism” where those who dare to 
challenge the economic system on basis of their cultural rights are targeted as 
radicals (Hale, 2002). Hale states that, in Guatemala this neo-liberal multiculturalism 
is “the mestizaje discourse of the new millennium, offering a parallel mix of 
opportunity and peril” (Hale, 2002: 491).  
This duality is used here as the expression of the purpose of inclusion that 
this multicultural project contains. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this 
duality is more important considering the impact it may cause on the condition of 
citizenship: it acts as a regulatory project, with a guided cultural plurality, but it 
simultaneously creates spaces of discussion, mobilisation and affirmation of political 
subjectivities, which may in fact be crucial in challenging limited notions of plural 
society and extend the realm of demands and claim-making. The Guatemalan case is 
particularly illustrative of these dynamics.  
Beyond the direct support international actors have given to the 
statebuilding tasks, it is important to consider their support to civil society and the 
consequences this has had on citizenship. This support to civil society, as we 
mentioned previously, must be understood as an effort to socialise individuals in the 
(re)new(ed) governance frame, i.e, promote reforms ownership, while 
simultaneously assuring the existence of an associative realm that is able not only to 
monitor state’s behaviour but also to deliver services where the state is absent. As we 
have discussed, this support of civil society departs from a specific ideal which, most 
of times, overrules the local dynamics of mobilisation and instils a disconnection 
between the civil society actors and the individuals they are expected to represent. 
We have discussed above how the testimonies collected describe the reality of a 
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fragmented civil society with numerous institutions working in the country on a daily 
basis and how this has contributed to weaken civil society actors’ political role. It is 
nevertheless important to understand the role the international actors have played in 
this process. An interviewee states that  
 Civil society in Guatemala has a real problem. It’s highly fragmented. 
And that perhaps is a bit of international cooperation actors fault. After 
the war the civil society development received a lot of funding and as a 
consequence new organisations emerged. The problem was they tended to 
multiply and today we are talking about thousands operating in the 
country (Interviewee 11). 
It is also important to note that the growth of these organisations assumed a 
particular shape. NGO’s emerged in the country executing projects, assuming state 
services and multiplying the activities of capacitation, a priority in the donors’ 
agenda, but not necessarily with a consequential approach to the activities developed. 
An interviewee affirmed the following when discussing the international cooperation 
in the country and the activities they supported.  
Cuando MINUGUA se fue, entramos en otra etapa. No se queda más que 
una cooperación direccionada para proyectos y capacitaciones. Ya ves 
que yo creo que las capacitaciones son algo bueno. Pero el problema es 
que en la mayoría de las veces, esas capacitaciones no tienen un 
seguimiento. ¿Hasta qué punto sabes tú si lo que has dado al grupo ha 
creado algún impacto? Se dio, se hizo y ya está (Interviewee 9).
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This is inextricably linked with the funding relations established between 
donor countries and institutions and organisations acting in the country. Adapting the 
agendas to donors’ demands and the intervention of project cycles place the 
organisations in a difficult position they have to manage. 
Bién…los financiadores tienen sus intereses. Tu, lo que deberías hacer era 
identificar las necesidades locales y después buscar un financiador para 
tus actividades. Lo que pasa es que en el momento en la cooperación, y 
después de la crisis principalmente, nos es así. Sea con los pocos 
financiadores que hay, con lo que están recortando y todo, tú tienes que 
agarrar a los financiadores. Entonces, precisamente se hace lo que no se 
debe hacer: tu a adaptarte a tus financiadores Somos muchas 
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 Author’s translation: After MINUGUA left we were in a different stage. The remaining 
cooperation is directed towards project and capacitation. As you can see, I believe that capacitation is 
a good thing. But the problem is that in the majority of the cases, these capacitation sessions do not 
have a follow-up. How do you know if the things you passed to the group had any impact? They were 
done and that was it!  
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organizaciones, extranjeras y locales y entonces es también un poco…es 
una competencia también no…(Interviewee 6). 164 
This dependence strengthens the accountability mechanisms towards the 
international sphere while it simultaneously weakens this principle towards those 
affected by such projects. Moreover, and though the donor states emphasise 
citizenship participation, such participation is necessarily guided by internationally 
defined terms which may not necessarily be relevant to affect the condition of 
citizenship on the ground. Another interviewee summarised this need to capture 
donors’ attention as a descriptive and yet charming exercise: “al final se trata de 
saber quién hace la vítima más atractiva para atraer los fondos” (Interviewee 7).165 
This statement deserves a further comment at this point because it frames two 
common ideas that we have also found in other testimonies. First, it is the 
dependence and the subjection of these organisations to the international funding 
agenda which we have mentioned above. The second corresponds to the 
attractiveness that the victimisation exercises on international actions and which 
presents local populations first, as non-political and, second in need to 
empowerment. However, both the history of conflict and the history of peace clearly 
show that this categorisation is not excluding of political action and may in fact 
propel a politicisation of the individuals. The struggle of the widows in Guatemala 
for justice in processes of forced disappearance is a good illustration of this dynamic.  
Nevertheless, and in simultaneous with this process of dependence and 
victimisation, new political spaces open and they may be fundamental on 
establishing the grounds for further reflection and action outside of the parameters 
initially defined. This political opening have been crucial in Guatemala to formerly 
excluded groups, such as indigenous communities, peasants and women, to rescue 
their political agency from previous oppressive frames and to develop a new political 
                                                          
164
 Author’s translation: Well, the donors have their interests. What you should do is to identify local 
needs and then search for a donor to fund your activities. What happens is that in current cooperation, 
and especially after the crisis, this does not happen. With the few remaining donors, with the cuts 
being done, you have to hold to them. So you do precisely what you should not: you are the one 
adapting. There are many organisations, foreigners and locals, so it is also...well, it is also a 
competition.  
165
 Author’s translation: In the end it all comes to who makes the victim more attractive to bring in the 
funding.   
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consciousness of their rights as citizens and the actions available to claim and extend 
those rights, and ultimately affect its meaning.  
Overall, international statebuilding actions in the country share this dual 
nature: they reproduce a non-political discourse of capacitation which, and even 
though it does not seek to engage with local expressions of the political condition of 
citizenship, it ultimately affects them by creating spaces of participation and 
channels through which individuals establish platforms for demands and claim-
making, and thus challenge the state of affairs. 
 
 251 
 
7. Conclusions 
Considering what we have exposed in our reflection, and the elements 
gathered in the analysis of the condition of citizenship in Guatemala and their 
interaction with post-armed conflict statebuilding, we have overall confirmed our 
initial assumption. International actors engaged in post-armed conflict statebuilding 
often connect with the spaces of intervention openly avoiding a political 
signification. Under a capacitation flag, they aim to affect state-society relations by 
focusing on the rehabilitation of state’s institutions and, in this view, citizenship is 
assumed as the legal status and exercise of rights that can only fully occur after a 
viable state is able to perform and assume its functions. As we have seen, this tends 
to reverse the liberal view of the social contract, which recognises that only through a 
simultaneous process of identification-recognition established between the state and 
the individuals does citizenship emerge. There are two major implications that can be 
drawn from this perspective. 
The first one is concerned with how international actors engage in these 
contexts and the relations they establish with society. It is possible to infer that 
internationally supported statebuilding actions are framed under a premise of a 
humanitarian social contract of exception, where international actions are necessary 
to reinvent the social contract and actors assume their responsibility in addressing 
fragility, and affecting governance and state’s legitimacy. However, and even though 
international actors assume this compromise towards local populations, they depict 
their presence as assistance, framed under the partnerships flag, denying not only the 
exercise of their power and how it is exercised through flows of financial support 
according to systemic needs and interests (the minimum being the fight against 
fragility and the security problems it creates) but also avoiding direct responsibilities 
and accountable relations towards local populations. Furthermore, statebuilding 
interventions are conferred with an exceptional character, since they are perceived as 
a temporary technical exercise of institutional expertise. Combined, the technical 
assistance rhetoric and the removal of power and politics from this assistance frame 
depict a fragility that demands an exceptional action of international actors in 
affecting internal state’s sovereignty. Their actions are a justified exception towards 
state’s rehabilitation, even if they directly assume some of states’ functions, or fund 
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those who can. Combined, the denial of the exercise of power and the exceptional 
character of internationals’ intervention confers statebuilding actions with a 
humanitarian facet that presents internationals’ statebuilding actions as a response to 
an emergence with no other guiding purpose than the ethos of assistance. 
The second implication relates with the fact that not only do the 
international discourses and practices of statebuilding deny their exercise of power, 
as their approach to citizenship, a condition dependent on states’ rehabilitation, 
reverses the liberal grounds of the social contract. This reversal expresses a radical 
disconnection with power and politics on the ground, an inability to consider how 
citizenship is foremost a condition subjected to change and (re)affection and shaped 
by the continuities between war and peace and the challenges of creating peace. As a 
consequence, the direct contribution of international actors to affect citizenship 
condition and therefore promote a peaceful sociability is necessarily limited to the 
impact that the state might have. Additionally, the compromise with civil society in 
order to sustain these reforms has proved to be problematic, not only for the purpose 
of statebuilding but also for the condition of citizenship, even when we refer to the 
aspired liberal version. The proliferation of internationally supported organisations 
that compete for resources and guide their actions by an international agenda is not a 
solid ground to promote a civil society able to sustain the principle of self-
government and individuals’ autonomy. Quite the opposite, and as the case of 
Guatemala shows, it tends to promote a fragmented civil society that might be able to 
deploy services in alternative to the state – which ultimately is counterproductive to 
overall statebuilding purposes – but has a highly conditioned role in the version of 
citizenship it promotes.  
If we departed solely from these two elements – how statebuilding 
discourses and practices convey a vision of peace that postpones the political 
dimension and consequentially fails to engage with the condition of citizenship on 
the ground and the power relations sustaining it – one might conclude that 
international actors’ contribution to create a peaceful sociability was limited, since 
international actions are ultimately projected towards an expected change and fail to 
engage with the continuities between the armed conflict and the formal peace period, 
which necessarily constitute the basis on which a peaceful sociability is projected.  
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It is noteworthy to mention that these continuities entail a reflection beyond 
assessing the structural causes of the armed conflict: as the case of Guatemala shows 
us, and thought it is important to understand if these causes persist, it is also 
fundamental to assess the violent behaviour that has permeated social and state-
society relations. In the case of Guatemala, the exclusion of indigenous groups, an 
identified structural cause of the armed confrontation, is commonly referred. On the 
opposite, the violence in the country is too often associated with delinquency and 
criminality instead of being discussed in relation with the heritage of armed conflict. 
This view nurtures a victimisation process that only reinforces a description of the 
local actors as non-political and exposes how international actors tend to work in 
closed categorisations. Both are however crucial to engage with the condition of 
citizenship and the power relations that characterise it.  
However, an approach to citizenship in Guatemala that considers the 
histories of governance in the country shows us that the answer to our research 
question is far more complex. In fact, and even though international actors affirm 
their actions in non-political terms and in denial of their own power, and despite the 
depoliticisation narrative this ultimately carries, the actions undertaken affect in 
different ways the inclusion/exclusion divides and the power relations that have 
marked and affected citizenship. The peace agreements content, for instance, 
provided an important frame of rights around which a mobilisation and claim-making 
was built. Moreover, the invited spaces of participation, though with a pre-defined 
agenda and a guided script, established important political spaces on which 
discussion and mobilisation over specific issues was built. CICIG actions, though 
highly technical and focused, have, nevertheless, played an important role in 
redefining perceptions of power relations.  
Two clarifications must be made. First, the fact that the invited spaces of 
participation or the support for reforms provided by international actors affect the 
power relations does not necessarily mean that international actors are aligned with 
the mobilisations and demands that might follow. What we wish to emphasise here is 
that in post-armed conflict scenarios, particularly in contexts such as the Guatemalan 
where the political condition of individuals was repressed and the state had an active 
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role in the violence during the armed conflict, these spaces provide an important 
opening for a (re)politicisation of individuals and groups.  
Second, exploring how international actors might affect the condition of 
citizenship forces the recognition of international actors’ power in spaces of 
intervention and the dual nature of its exercise: both as an enabler of changes in the 
social relations in the country, and an external force promoting a specific version of 
peace and social relations, consonant with systemic needs. Moreover, and as the case 
of Guatemala shows, we assist to a confluence of scales in post-armed conflict 
spaces that tend to transform international actors into additional actors in the power 
relations constellation, this is, their presence in the country merges the scales along 
which the actors of governance are perceived, thus transforming them into relevant 
actors in the local political landscape, with a privileged position in terms of power. 
The case of CICIG is rather important in conveying this image: considering the 
distrust of the justice system, the Commission is perceived as an actor that acts apart 
from the state, even though its action is connected with statebuilding and it is 
foremost centred on capacitation of local state institutions.  
This recognition of international actors’ power in spaces of intervention 
naturally echoes the majority of the critiques posed to post-armed conflict 
statebuilding which we have referred in chapter two. But the analysis of citizenship 
condition in Guatemala forces us to question the categories used. First, and in what 
concerns the search for local agency, one must consider the complex configurations 
of power relations instead of assuming the local/international opposition. Local 
political agency is neither solely expressed as an opposition between local and 
international nor is it confined to the local scale. As a consequence, a hybrid form of 
peace, understood as the encounter between different practices and conceptions 
(Richmond, 2010) must result not from the opposition between the local and 
international. Instead, if it is to emerge, it will necessarily be the outcome of the 
power relations established departing from the spaces of intervention. Second, and in 
what concerns the depoliticisation argument and the accusation pointed to the liberal 
peace critics, the analysis on citizenship condition in Guatemala opposes a mix trend 
of depoliticisation/re-politicisation based not on international processes and 
discourses but foremost as an expression of local politics, which exist beyond the 
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veil of international intervention. This means that even if international actions went 
back to the liberal respect to self-government, the political condition could not be 
completely rescued. Instead it would likely resemble the current appeals to empower 
the other.  
In a post-armed conflict context such as the Guatemalan, where 
international statebuilding is not as ostensive as elsewhere, the opposition between 
locals and internationals is not the unique determinant of political agency, but the 
spaces created, even if located in a non-political engagement with the local, allows 
the emergence of new political subjects as active parts in the formal political sphere. 
These actions need not to seek accommodation but instead they may seek a 
transformation of political subjectivities. The result of the encounter between liberal 
views, post-liberal governance actions, the position of country’s elites and the 
indigenous communities, in the case of Guatemala is neither closed nor pre-
determined: it will nevertheless evolve as the expression of the political condition of 
individuals and groups.  
The case-study of Guatemala and its condition of citizenship allows us to re-
engage with power and politics, exploring not only the exercise of power as 
domination, as it is often done, but also to rescue the possibility of political action 
and change. Only an approach that enables the engagement with the dual nature of 
power can rescue the political condition from the depoliticising discourses and 
practices often associated with statebuilding. The condition of citizenship, considered 
here as a political condition and relational concept, is able to convey this duality, 
precisely because it also carries a dual meaning: inclusion/exclusion.  
This reflection is necessarily only a first attempt to re-engage with this 
political condition in post-armed conflict spaces. But this reflection has urged others. 
First, it seems particularly important to deepen our understanding on the impact that 
violence, in its transfigured form, may have on the condition of citizenship. In the 
Guatemalan case, violence, as a radical expression and instrument of power relations, 
seems to be particularly important to grasp the different patterns of political 
engagement, whether we refer to the wide support that the mano dura rhetoric 
achieves or the deliberate non-engagement in politics. Second, it seems particularly 
important to explore the historical memory and how, both as a foundation of 
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citizenship in peace times and as a site of struggle for reconstructing the past, it 
might be providential in understanding the violence that currently permeates the 
social relations in the country as well as the process of individuals and groups’ de-
politicisation and re-politicisation. And third, and perhaps the most challenging, the 
indigenous political affirmation and the political transformations this may bring is a 
particularly challenging but fundamental reflection which demands attention. 
Considering the case of Guatemala, the question and the challenge presented is not 
so much focused on the existence of a state but foremost on the project and vision of 
political community conveyed and the social relations promoted. Indigenous 
cosmovision is particularly challenging both to the Guatemalan and liberal views of 
the material life. The question is then how indigenous communities may develop a 
project of citizenship that departs from the present condition to affirm an inclusive 
multicultural project able to gather support from different social and ethnic groups.  
Additionally, this reencounter between post-armed conflict statebuilding 
and citizenship has exposed important challenges to the current citizenship debates. 
Post-armed conflict scenarios, with the intervention of international actors in theses 
spaces in addition to the local political dynamics, are a particularly complex scenario 
where citizenship is (re)defined but which has been overall neglected. Let us address 
three questions which we consider to be crucial to the broad discussion of 
citizenship. The first aspect refers to the juxtaposition of scales in post-armed 
conflict spaces and which poses fundamental questions in the relation between and 
across scales as well as the relations established between different actors. In post-
armed conflict spaces the actions of different actors converge in one site and the 
simultaneity of their actions on the country’s governance tends to radicalise the 
limits of democratic accountability between citizens and the actors who affect 
governance, especially if we consider the international actors-civil society actors 
relation we have discussed. The second aspect relates with the convergence of 
temporalities in these spaces, market by modernisation attempts or the emergence of 
political subjects who, departing from their identity and their location, seek to 
(re)affect and transform the condition of citizenship. This means that different 
visions of citizenship interact in these spaces not in a consequential manner, but 
rather as the expression of the political condition. And third, the relation between 
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violence-impunity-politics, as the Guatemalan case demonstrates and its impact on 
deliberate depoliticisation of individuals cannot be grasped in the category of passive 
citizen, as we have seen.  
In the moment we close this reflection, and departing from the case of 
Guatemala, it is our belief that only a view of citizenship that promotes the inclusion 
of individuals and groups in the project of governance in the shared spaces where 
their lives are placed can promote a peaceful sociability, in post-armed conflict 
spaces or elsewhere. The post-national solidarity as Carvalhais (2004) proposes, 
where the state and cultural identity are present, but where the second does not 
determine the political community of the first, is a possible answer. This would mean 
that the political community would be forged by the identification-recognition of 
others as individuals or groups with rights and political agency whose actions and 
political subjectivity would rely on a reflexive view of social relations, allowing an 
interaction with difference in democratic and non-excluding ways. Whether and how 
this proposal can become effective largely depends on the evolving power relations 
that sustain citizenship. However, and because citizenship is “never-fixed” a more 
inclusive condition remains as a powerful driving force of political change.  
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